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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to pursue a grammatical, common sense, reading of 
some of the contemporary accounts of the workings of law. In so doing it relies 
extensively on the critical work by Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Stanley 
Fish. writers assumed to present a somewhat unified perspective on such matters as 
understanding. language, meaning and reading. 
The shorter of the two parts. 'Judgement. Criteria, Justice,' sets the stage. Looking 
at J e a n - F r a n ~ o i s s Lyotard's discourse, in Just Gaming, of a semantic and moral 
apocalypse, and his subsequent search for a concept of the just. the first part 
introduces the principal themes of the essay. These themes at once form some of the 
major concerns of the contemporary legal theory; the text of the law, the authorial 
intention, the politics of interpretation, the interpreter, and the limits of 
interpretation. Chapter 1.1 probes the concept of authorship as formulated by 
Lyotard. According to him, the modern situation produces a concept of the author 
that is detached. The modem situation lacks the transparency that characterizes the 
classical situation. where the author and the reader could relate to one another, and 
where, therefore, interpretation was a possibility. The Lyotardian concept radically 
distinguishes between the realms of the author and of the audience, a distinction that 
suppresses the ineluctably fraternal, attached quality of authorship. Chapter 1.2 is a 
critique of the concept of judgement Lyotard advances. It explores the two distinct 
orders within which, according to Lyotard, judgement is practicable: those of faith 
('the Jewish pole') and paganism. While both orders exclude the concept of an 
autonomous subject - a false order which defines the rhetoric of the mainstream 
Western thought - the homogenous formalism of one. faith. contrasts with the 
heterogenous localism of the other, the pagan attitude. Questioning the dichotomy, 
the discussion goes on to argue for a concept of the primordiality of the attached, 
situated. quality of both the issuing of the judgement and of its possible 
interpretatiOns. irrespective of the distinct orders of rhetoric - autonomous. 
D 
heterogenous, religious - in which they are presented. Chapter 1.3 explores the 
Lyotardian reworking of Kant's categorical imperative and seeks to point out the 
problematic nature of the enterprise. The discussion questions the idea that a 
thematic, non-moral, non-political, concept of the just may necessarily function 
better than one which is of common opinion, and indicates the illusory character of 
the Lyotardian venture radically to contrast what would be a thematic concept of the 
just with that which is mere common opinion. Chapter 1.4 continues on the subject of 
the politics of interpretation - can what would be the unruly, fantastic dictates of 
morals be avoided on the basis of a universalistic, politics-free, criterion? - to test 
the opposition Lyotard draws between the Sophistic and the Kantian positions. While 
from the Sophistic viewpoint a genuine opposition of competing moralities is not a 
possibility, the Kantian morality makes conceivable the concept of a rational, as 
opposed to mere opinion-based and rhetorical, choice. 
The longer part, The Law and Its Readings,' is a reading of some of the motifs of 
F r a n ~ o i s s Geny's Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law. Each 
of the four chapters that make the second part aims to dissolve one of the four binary 
oppositions that characterize the contemporary scene - polarities that are strictly 
mere variations on the theme of the dichotomy between the law and its readings, the 
law and that which is made of it: the text and the extratext, intention and extension, 
the tame and the freakish, the real and the formal. In the four chapters that form the 
second part, the logic behind the oppositions is explored, and a grammatical 
reassessment, which indicates the terms of each one of the polarities ultimately 
metamorphic and elusive, though, naturally, of possible grammatical use, is 
suggested. 
Chapter 2.1 examines some of the contemporary arguments relating to the text of 
the law. Extratextualist positions such as, famously, Geny's counter the mainstream 
textualist positions by arguing against the mechanistic conception of the law that is 
written, all inclusive, and once and for all. Curiously. however. the notion of the law 
therefore invoked presupposes a notion of the text which might best suit the 
m 
fonnalism of the mainstream JX>sitions - namely that the text, as opJX>sed to what 
might tentatively be called history, is the locus of meaning. What follows this 
markedly JX>sitivistic notion of the text, a notion invoked in particular in the 
extratextualist JX>sitions on the interpretation of the American Constitution, is a fear 
of judgement that would be made on the basis of what is often (as in the segregation 
cases) an obsolete concept embodied in the text. This fear, in fact, is not different 
from the formalistic, mainstream-textualistic, fear of what would become of the law 
in the absence of fonnally circumscribed, textual, constraints. In exploring the theme, 
the discussion focuses on certain individual cases, such as the segregation cases of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, arguments over which have been an integral part of the 
theory. 
Chapter 2.2 is devoted to the considerations of the legislative will. Counter-
intentionalist JX>sitions regarding the interpretation of the law, it argues, may in fact 
suggest an inherent intentionalism, as epistemologically understood, which may in 
tum JX>int in the direction of a reversal not dissimilar to that of the binary opposition 
of textualism and extratextualism. The traditional arguments against the mainstream 
intentionalism seem to gather on two points: first, that intention is a state of mind and 
therefore imJX>ssible to uncover for those who do not have a natural access inside 
others' heads; and secondly, that even if it were possible to uncover it, what one has 
with the legislative will is but a fiction, for it refers to, not one, but many minds who 
could not JX>ssibly intent one and the same thing. The discussion seeks to disclose the 
way counter-intentionalist arguments subscribe to traditional intentionalism by 
assuming intention as an occult presence, to use two concepts, one Wittgesteinean 
and one Derridean, together. And it argues how intention as a concept is a possibility 
precisely because it is in each case a collegiate, fraternal extension. 
Chapter 2.3 explores the problems of judicial discretion, politics, and the politics 
of interpretation. It discusses some of the traditional criticisms of judicial review, in 
particular the countermajoritarian objection, and points out the metamorphic 
character of some of the positions in the debate. In that countermajoritarianism 
refuted from a majoritarian viewpoint stands right behind the very idea of 
constitutionalism, a distinct refuge at once of the majoritarian positions. And the 
positions that resist the idea of a timid, majoritarian, judiciary appear to be equally 
paradoxical, for these positions are simply for being ill at ease with the constitutional 
principle that is countermajoritarianism par excellence. The discussion then focuses 
on the Dworkin-Fish debate on the politics of interpretation and at once attempts to 
pin down some of the veins in Dworkin's thinking on the subject of judicial licence. 
An overall evaluation of the conceptual scheme, potentialities, and assumptioos 
of legal realism is attempted in chapter 2.4. Realism appears to emphasize the part of 
the interpreter. as opposed to the text. in the event of adjudication. and question the 
traditional assumptions of formalism whose mechanistic concept of jurisprudence 
equates the law with its text. While some of the most crucial of the realist objections 
to the formalistic concept of adjudication have been genuine and insightful. the 
realist writers. however. have been for the most part unaware of some of the 
formalistic. and ultimately self-refuting. presuppositions of their own rhetoric. It is 
argued that realism betrays its very rationale and mimics the mainstream formalism 
as it effectively supplants the formalistic considerations of the law as a system of 
rules. a text-oriented enterpise, with its preoccupations of the law as the right 
methodology. What may be called a thematic correctionism has marked realism in its 
distinct patterns across diverse terrains of jurisprudence. 
Finally. concluding. the essay questions the validity of its own discourse and. 
offering a reappraisal of the dichotomy that marks the concept of a critical enterprise. 
namely that of the same and the similar, that which is and its representation. indicates 
its own limits. The idea is then tested against some of the recent attempts to evade the 
limitations and consequences of one's own discourse as a rhetorical exercise. The 
concluding chapter. therefore. is intended to balance. as it were. the discourse and 
hint at its own conditions of validity as an exercise in rhetoric. Some more explicit 
- traditional - conclusions are nevertheless drawn. 
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The good, therefore, is not something 
common answering to one Idea. 
But then in what way are things called 
good? They do not seem to be like the 
things that on!>' chance to have the same 
name. Are goods one, then, by being 
derived from one good or by all 
contributing to one good, or are they 
rather one by analogy? Certain!>' as sight 
is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and 
so on in other cases. 
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. l096b 
What could justify the certainty better than 
success? 
Wittgenstein. Philosophical In vestigations, 
324 
[Nlothing succeeds like success ... 
Fish, 'The Law Wishes to Have a Formal 
Existence,' 206 
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Introduction 
In a note in Lectures on Jurisprudence, Austin refers to the cliched statement that 
equates right with might as 'a great favourite with shallow scoffers and buffoons. '1 
Its formulation, according to him, 'is either a flat truism affectedly and darldy 
expressed or is thoroughly false and absurd. '2 The present essay agrees with Austin 
entirely, even though its own argument articulated in broadest terms is not 
dissimilar to the trite equation of right and might - law is anything you can get 
away with. The meaning of the statement then is so obviously true and the 
limitations it, as it were, induces are so general, saying it is hardly saying much. 
And it is preposterous, conversely, the moment it ceases to designate a 
primordiality, that is to say a condition for human association, and becomes instead 
a parochial concept, a statement which either grossly underrates the complexity of 
power formations, or, more naive still, anticipates a might-less, non-mediated, non-
political association. What is almost unarguably true becomes then ludicrous. As we 
have known since at least Aristotle, 'justice belongs to the polis .'3 Of those who 
consistently underrate the complexity of the nature of political association, of 
course, Austin himself is one, who identifies might with a typically parochial 
concept of power, the command of the sovereign. What appears to be a common 
sense, common place, notion expressed in the 'truism' of right and might, therefore, 
is in effect a disregard, on Austin's part, of the obvious truth of that truism. 
Ultimately he sees in the equation little more than mere cynicism and irreverence. 
Yet the reversal of the Austenean 'truism' is hardly a surprise considering the 
traditional pattern. Aristotle himself is compelled further to swerve and contrast 
government by men with government by laws,4 thus practically giving his blessing 
to the formalism of the Austenean concept. The constitutive force of the association 
is supplanted with the duality of the detached, autonomous, categories of man and 
the law. While the latter signifies the continuity that is the association, the former 
becomes a term capable of evading the primordiality of it. One of the best known 
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fonnulations of the dichotomy between right and might is that of Hamilton in The 
Federalist where government by 'reflection and choice' is opposed to government 
founded upon 'accident and force. '5 It is my contention in what follows that the 
suppression of the said equation, what I hold to be a common sense notion of the 
process, has been at the heart of much of what is problematic about the 
contemporary legal theory. The dichotomy between law and its readings, law and 
what is made of it. a concept I aim to show in this study to underlie virtually all of 
the contemporary accounts of the workings of law. has been a theme based on a 
suppression of the primordiality of might. of the attached quality of that which is 
right. of force. of the force of habits and appearances. 
The view taken in this essay then is a common sense view of the workings of 
law. Its basic arguments. I claim. are part of common perception. One exceptional 
class of verbal exercise where, in order to obtain immediate response, only the most 
widely shared assumptions are invoked, teased, displaCed, is jokes. In the Pedro 
Almodovar film Women on the Verge of Nervous Breakdown, a character with a 
past partly spent in a psychiatric hospital produces a gun, out of the blue. Calmly 
pointing it to another character who is absolutely bewildered, she explains herself: 
'I'm not really cured, I only faked it to fool them.' The common sense notion to 
which the joke owes its comical effect entirely is the immediately striking absurdity 
of the presumed dichotomy between sanity andfaking sanity. That is not to say that 
ordinary perception recognizes no difference between the two states. But the 
difference recognized is one merely of mimetic refinement rather than a difference 
between two states. one mimetic, grammatical, and one inherent, namely one that 
transcends the mimesis of habits. routines. models. appearances. We laugh at it, 
because we instinctively find the suggestion funny that the criterion of sanity should 
be something other than that of persuasion ('fooling'). Sanity is anything you can get 
away with. Sanity. in other words, is what passes for sanity. What possible sense 
would it make for someone to act sane but to be 'really' insane? The assumption to 
which the joke appeals forms the core of one of the arguments the present study 
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builds on - the argument by Wittgenstein against the idea of private language. 
What a language that is for private use only would be like is a question Wittgenstein 
raises to introduce a much discussed theme in Philosophical Investigations. 'The 
individual words of this language,' he explains, 'are to refer to what can only be 
known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another 
person cannot understand the language. '6 It may sound like a purely hypothetical 
inquiry. The argument questions, however, a certain attitude towards meaning 
effects in language that is very much established. Investigations opens with a 
paragraph from St. Augustine where the relationship between words and what they 
are about is designated as one of simple correspondence and labelling; 'the 
individual words in language name objects - sentences are combinations of such 
names.'7 Considered in these terms, our language is essentially a private language. It 
could have been devised by one person for private use only and in turn learned and 
employed by others, even though we may know historically and for certain that this 
is not so. One obvious effect of the difference between the two views of language, 
one private and one not so, or transparent, is that with one of them authorship, 
intention, ceases to be the privileged term that it is with the other. A fine example is 
the privacy the Almodovar character posits when she appears altogether to 
disconnect her insanity from the realm of the common. To her, madness signifies 
the immediacy of an inner experience as regards which those on the 'outside' can 
only entertain conjectures. Subsequently, she is the only person who may know 
whether she is 'really' mad. There is, therefore, a certain affinity between the idea, 
not infrequently professed, that intention is a state of mind and the assumption 
conceived by the Almodovar character that her madness is a private occurrence 
without necessarily a material, 'outside,' extension. The mode of thinking that 
epitomizes the idea of privacy is, of course, Cartesianism, an epistemology that 
radically distinguishes between the 'inside' and the 'outside,' the mental and the 
bodily. Man as res cogitans, 'a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply 
to think,'s contrasts radically with his physical extension, res extensa, that which is 
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mere accident about him.9 By 'thought,' Descartes understands all that 'which we are 
aware of happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it.'lO Thought, 
therefore, signifies sensory, as well as intellectual, awareness. But what exactly is 
awareness? How exactly are its individual modes known? Aristotle, for instance, 
designates a series of sensations in Rhetoric, anger, fear, shame, pity, indignation, 
envy, and emulation, by the single word pain.ll Wittgenstein expresses a similar 
concern when he declares in Zettel that joy, enjoyment, delight, love, fear, are not 
sensations. 12 He could have said that they all meant one thing - pain. Or that they 
were all basically fear - or joy. If the sensation felt is that of the unusual throbbing 
of the heart, pulsating blood, odd perspiring, and so on, it could be any of the 
above. It is not uncommon, as everyone knows. that sometimes the sensation lingers 
on even though one is unable to recall the reason for it. To remember what it is 
about at all one may need to be taken back to the moment when it was first felt. 
Furthermore. sometimes one is never able to 'name' the thing in the first place. one 
nevertheless has it, the so-called immediate object. the cogitatio, the awareness -
awareness of what? Fear, joy. love. envy. shame. idle insecurity. bad liver 
condition? It is not hard to see why as a private concept language would cease to be 
a possibility. Even if words standing for the so-called immediate states of 
awareness, and for those only. could be conceiVed, which one cannot see how; 
because each speaker of the language would have to 'know'13 the meaning of the 
words from his own private experience, and from that experience only. it would not 
be a language generalizable - an effect of what is traditionally known as the 
problem of 'other minds' - and would be therefore ultimately unacquireable and 
irreproducible. Yet fear, joy, pain, madness, and so on, are all states that can be 
mimed, illustrated. verbally related - states with what Wittgenstein calls 'criteria.' 
the telltale Signs.14 It is those telltale signs, models, habits and following 
transparency, that constitute the unique frame of reference for the performances of 
language. 'Now someone tells me,' writes Wittgenstein. initiating one of the most 
vivid paragraphs in Investigations, 'that he knows what pain is only from his own 
case! -' 
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Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 
'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone 
says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. 
- Here it would be quite possible for every one to have 
something different in his box. One might even imagine such 
a thing constantly changing. - But suppose the word 'beetle' 
had a use in these people's language? - If so it would not be 
used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place 
in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the 
box might even be empty. is 
The idea that the beetle should be more than just what passes for a beetle holds little 
common sense insofar as it presumes that what might not pass for a beetle could 
possible be a beetle. What would 'to be' mean in that case? What possible reason 
would one have to call that which does not pass for a beetle a beetle? 
More significant still, the argument for privacy entertains the concept that what 
does pass for a beetle could be excluded for not being 'really' a beetle on a basis 
other than that of criteria. In legal theory, the absurdity of private passion, the beetle 
in the box, in the face of criteria, the 'fooling' as the Almodovar character puts it, 
has been eloquently argued by Stanley Fish. In an old Marx Brothers joke (in the 
film Animal Crackers), Groucho asks Zeppo to take down a letter to the lawyers 
Hungadonga, Hungadonga. Hungadonga & McCormic. Realizing Zeppo has 
missed one of the partners in the title, 'you left out a Hungadonga,' bellows 
Groucho. 'You left out the main one too!' The common sense notion to which the 
joke appeals for its comical effect is the absurdity of distinguishing between 
different orders on a basis other than that of aiteria. To recognize the private 
passion behind what passes for a legal decision and thereby single it out, which is 
virtually what legal theories are all about, one seems to have only as much clue as 
Groucho Marx. That does not mean that common sense recognizes no real 
difference between individual decisions - a concept that would effectively preempt 
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criticism in the domain of the legal - but that differences are those merely of 
criteria. Commenting on Dworkin's distinction between personal preferences and 
principles in adjudication, 'the fear of personal preferences: writes Fish, 'is an 
empty one.'16 
A judge hearing [a specific case] might be inclined to decide 
against the plaintiff because she reminds him of a hated 
stepmother or because she belongs to an ethnic group he 
reviles. But think of what he would have to do in order to 
'work' such 'reasons' into his decision. He could not, of 
course, simply declare them, because they are not, at least in 
our culture, legal reasons and would be immediately 
stigmatized as inappropriate. Instead, he would be obliged to 
find recognizably legal reasons that could lead to an outcome 
in harmony with his prejudices; but if he did that he would 
not be ruled by those prejudices, but by the institutional 
requirement that only certain kinds of arguments -
arguments drawn from the history of concerns and decisions 
- be employed. 17 
Yet even as_ states that are totally irrelevant to the meaning of the individual 
decision I8 - for the difference they will make in the face of criteria will be exactly 
that of Hungadonga to Hungadonga in the Marx Brothers joke - 'I would go so far 
as to say that there are no such things as 'personal preferences," adds Fish, if the 
personal on the part of the judge is to be understood as the private, the fantastic, the 
extraordinary. the freakish.19 It is a mistake to assume that, even as undisclosed 
states (supposing that could be said), personal motives can justify a non-
grammatical. absolute, dichotomy of the common and the personal, the ordinary and 
the extraordinary. 'A preference.' writes Fish. 'is something one cannot have 
independently of some institution or enterprise within which the preference could 
emerge as an option. and an institution or enterprise is itself inconceivable 
independent of some general purpose or value - some principle - its activities 
express. It follows. then. that it is a mistake to oppose preference to principle. 'ZO 
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Dissolving the presumed dichotomy between preference and principle, Fish 
repudiates the concept of immediacy, presence, in whose terms preference is 
defined. It is paradoxical that theory should seek ways to repress preference, as 
opposed to principle, for traditionally preference is the privileged term precisely for 
its supposedly unbridled, freakish, unadulterated character. 'Mind is better known 
than the body,' pronounces the Cartesian dictum, indicating the unarguable primacy 
of the pure ego.21 The traditional pattern, as Derrida shows it,22 is the privileging of 
speech, of the immediacy that is thought to mark speech, of intention, of passion. 
over writing, that which is the apotheosis of mediation, mimesis, reproducibility, 
transparency, extension. At a parallel level, however, the absence which defmes 
writing translates into the absence of passion, and therefore into detachment and 
evasion, and becomes in tum a symbol of impartiality, not as a mimetic refinement, 
a grammatical possibility, but, perversely, as an absolute, pure, category - as 
presence. 
The argument by Wittgenstein against the idea of private language assumes a 
world described by Heidegger in the first half of Being and Time,23 an account of 
man and the world the present essay greatly relies on. Dissolving the opposition 
between awareness and extension, the mental and the bodily, and displacing the 
traditional hierarchy by redrawing the distinction in terms of a generalized concept 
of what is customarily the 'marginal' of the two, that is to say extension, or criteria, 
the argument against private language at once anticipates the manner of reading 
termed by Derrida 'deconstruction'24 - a word currently too trendy for its own 
good. A deconstructive reading is employed and the writings by Derrida are 
consulted throughout the extent of the present study. The refutation of the private is 
at once a repudiation of the fantastic, the extraordinary. Deconstructive reversals 
show that which is fantastic to be in each case, and already, the defining quality of 
the very tame. the ruly, thereby negating a non-mimetic, non-political, concept of 
the fantastic. The absurdity of the fantastic, the uncommon, the wayward, as the 
bogeyman of legal theory, is forcibly demonstrated by Fish in a series of essays 
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commenting on the work of some of the most eminent theorists of law. Fish's 
writings form the basis of the attempts throughout the present essay to test the 
vigour of some of the accounts of the extraordinary in contemporary theory. Fish is 
a common sense writer and writes in a fashion. not unlike that of the later 
Wittgenstein. which makes it not difficult to underestimate the freshness and 
novelty of some of his ideas. 
In what follows. the shorter of the two parts. 'Judgement. Criteria, Justice,' sets the 
stage. Looking at J e a n - F r a n ~ o i s s Lyotard's discourse, in Just Gaming ,25 of a 
semantic and moral apocalypse, and his subsequent search for a concept of the just 
without common criteria. I introduce the principal themes of the essay. These 
themes seem closely to relate to the motif that lies at the heart of much of what 
amounts to the Western perceptions of the legal, namely the binary opposition of 
principles and men. As it is put in Nicomachean Ethics. 'we do not allow a ftUln to 
rule, but law.'26 The typical testament to the continuity of the concept may appear to 
be the extent of interest some of the recent ventures to distinguish between public 
principles and private passions in the domain of the legal have achieved to 
stimulate.27 A more revealing indication of its resilience, however, seems to be the 
fact that the traditional opposition of government by laws and government by men. 
the law and its readings, is the very motif behind Lyotard's search for a concept of 
the just. Lyotard reproduces the dichotomy in his concept of the just as opposed to 
mere opinions of it. A probing of the binary opposition of the just and the mere 
opinions of it not only introduces the principal themes of the essay as Lyotard 
reflects on the just as a mode of authorship, and the opinions of it as mere 
interpretations, but it also helps to set the stage in its extraordinary combination of 
some of the Kantian and the Sophistic, pagan, motifs: while such themes as the text, 
the authorial intention, the politics of interpretation, the interpreter, and the limits of 
interpretation, therefore receive an introductory audience, against the tension which 
raises out of the Lyotardian eclecticism, the very approach of the thesis is further 
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explicated and put in the context of the Western thought. The critique of Lyotard 
initiates all the central arguments on whose basis the investigation of the second 
part is pursued: Wittgenstein's argument against the idea of privacy, the 
Heideggerian concept of transparency, and circumspection, a practical sight which 
engulfs, rather than oppose, the thematic sight of the theoria (1.1); the attached, 
situated quality of the utterance, the problematic nature of binary oppositions such 
as the literal and the metaphorical, the prescriptive and the descriptive, preference 
and principle (Fish), and the fallacy of logical positivist verificationism as a theory 
of interpretation (1.2); a negation of the positivistic concept of the moral as the 
unruly, the Heideggerian concepts of man, the world, and the primordial condition 
(1.3); the Derridean reassessment of the concept of supplementarity, of parerga, 
Derrida and Wittgenstein on intention and extension (stage-setting: a condition for 
meaning and interpretation), a re-evaluation of the idea of the fictitious, persuasion 
as a criterion of truth, and the concept of rhetoric (1.4). The arguments seek to 
identify the dichotomy between the just and the opinions of it, the law and its 
readings, as a specific continuation of the traditional distinction between principles 
and men. The word reading refers to the evaluations of the law as well as its 
procedural interpretations. Legal interpretation, in its technical sense, has 
consistently 1x>rdered on mere appraisal and opinion on the part of the judge, not 
necessarily from the viewpoint suggested in what follows, but from the viewpoint 
of those who have opposed the position of the judge on the particular issue. Writers 
who have attempted to draw a distinction that is observable between principles and 
men have not, naturally, felt the need at once to differentiate those who are in 
charge of the procedure of the delivery of justice from those who would be mere 
critics: where interpretation comes to an end and where personal politics enter the 
game have been notoriously difficult to identify. Therefore, Rawls, for instance, 
imagines a 'veil of ignorance' to de-personize man ad reach the rational man, the 
man that finally puts and end to the binary opposition by himself becoming pure 
principle.28 While its readings refer to its individual interpretations. discussions. 
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criticisms, and evaluations by what would be the 'men,' therefore, the law is 
distinguished as a concept that essentially transcends those individual appraisals, 
though some of the individual readings may overlap with the law as an objective 
concept. One of the observations of the present essay is that virtually all of the 
contemporary accounts of the workings of the law posit a concept of the law which 
simply reproduces this concept. Again, the typical instance my appear to be the 
Dworkinean idea of a right answer.29 The dimensions of the concept may be better 
estimated, however, in the case of a writer, such as Peter Goodrich,JO who would 
seem to oppose the idea of a right answer on all accounts, but who would 
nevertheless presuppose, in his criticisms of the state of the law, a concept of 
presence, an objective concept, against which the law as it is exercised or taught in 
a particular terrain can be tested. The affirmation on the part of this attitude of the 
traditional concept hardly comes with the fact that it raises objections to the state of 
the law. Rather, the traditional concept is posited in the silent assumption, by the 
writer, of a viewpoint which would be present, in the sense of non-moral, non-
political, non-religious, and from which, therefore, the state of the law could be 
condemned for being simply political, or simply fictitious - for being, in other 
words, a term of absence. Absence, the present essay argues, comes first. The law 
as a presumed presence, therefore, can be shown to be defined in terms of what is in 
fact absence, namely as a concept of contingency, a quality which marks its 
individual interpretations and evaluations. In this respect, the dichotomy between 
the law and its readings cannot be said simply to restate any of the traditional binary 
oppositions such as law and fact (as has been targeted by legal realist critical 
thought), and rules and their interpretations (targeted by critical legal studies). But it 
seeks to indicate a contemporary pattern of the greater, traditional distinction 
between principles and men, presence and absence, one which has dominated the 
mainstream Western perceptions of the legal (and one which has engulfed both legal 
realism and critical legal studies). 
As a fundamental distinction of the just and the mere opinions of it permeates 
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Lyotard's discourse on the meaning of justice. therefore. it becomes possible to 
explore the themes not only of transcendence and suprasensibility on whose bases 
the just is defined. but. more significant still. of meaning. language. and 
interpretation. against the background of an uneasy combination of the Kantian and 
the Sophistic motifs - those. in other words. of presence and absence. of essence 
and contingency. Chapter 1.1 of the thesis probes the concept of authorship as 
fonnulated by Lyotard. According to him. the modem situation produces a concept 
of the author that is detached. The modern situation lacks the transparency that 
characterizes the classical situation. where the author and the reader could relate to 
one another. and where. therefore. interpretation was a possibility. The Lyotardian 
concept radically distinguishes between the realms of the author and of the 
audience. a distinction that suppresses the ineluctably fraternal. attached quality of 
authorship. Chapter 1.2 is a critique of the concept of judgement Lyotard advances. 
It explores the two distinct orders within which. according to Lyotard. judgement is 
practicable: those of faith ('the Jewish pole') and paganism. While both orders 
exclude the concept of an autonomous subject - a false order which defines the 
rhetoric of the mainstream Western thought - the homogenous formalism of one. 
faith. contrasts with the heterogenous localism of the other. the pagan attitude. 
Questioning the dichotomy. the discussion goes on to argue for a concept of the 
primordiality of the attached. situated. quality of both the issuing of the judgement 
and of its possible interpretations. irrespective of the distinct orders of rhetoric -
autonomous. heterogenous. religious - in which they are presented. Chapter 1.3 
explores the Lyotardian reworking of Kant's categorical imperative and seeks to 
point out the problematic nature of the enterprise. The discussion questions the idea 
that a thematic. non-moral. non-political. concept of the just may necessarily 
function better than one which is of common opinion. and indicates the illusory 
character of the Lyotardian venture radically to contrast what would be a thematic 
concept of the just with that which is mere common opinion. The critique by no 
means suggests to refute the concept of universal applicability. namely that which 
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seems to surpass mere common opinion, altogether - since what would be the 
'universe' can be localized: the universal applicability will be, then, only a mode of 
the local, primordial, applicability. This is argued on the basis of the Aristotelian 
duality of the polis and the law of nature, and the parallels with the Heideggerian 
concept of human condition and Wittgenstein's concept of forms of life are 
indicated. Chapter 1.4 continues on the subject of the politics of interpretation -
can what would be the unruly, fantastic dictates of morals be avoided on the basis of 
a universalistic, politics-free, criterion? - to test the opposition Lyotard draws 
between the Sophistic and the Kantian positions. While from the Sophistic 
viewpoint a genuine opposition of competing moralities is not a possibility, the 
Kantian morality makes conceivable the concept of a rational, as opposed to mere 
opinion-based and rhetorical, choice. Just as the idea of universal applicability, the 
choices that are made on a moral basis (the only basis there is) are conceded in this 
chapter as part of human condition and indispensable. For a certain thing to be bad 
morally hardly signifies that that particular thing cannot, then, be claimed to be 
'really' bad. The present thesis, in fact, is a clear negation of this view of so-called 
'reality.' It seeks to illustrate the fallacy of an attitude well exemplified by Lyotard 
which takes pains to avoid (or put in inverted commas) concepts such as good, bad, 
just, and so on, on the grounds that these concepts have no morality-free basis. It 
criticizes Lyotard for trying hard to find an epistemological. as opposed to moral, 
basis in order to be able to condemn Nazism. Furthermore, it attempts to counter 
and reverse a myth that has persisted since the days of the Athenean philosophers, 
about the so-called Sophistic cynicism, and hold responsible for bad law such as 
that of the Nazi Germany the homogenous, totalizing suprasensibility suggested by 
Lyotard reworking the Kantian theme. The historical Sophist attitude and arguments 
on such issues as slavery, racism, xenophobia, sexism, zealotry, and so on, are a 
clear testament to this fact. That a heterogenous, Sophistic, approach may inspire 
better law, rather than diminish, as it were, the force of a grammatically reassessed 
dichotomy between good and bad law, the just and the unjust, is argued throughout 
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this thesis. 31 
That the law, as a concept of presence, is in each case to be defined in tenns of 
its readings, its interpretations and evaluations, that is to say, what is absent or 
contingent about it, therefore, ought not to be taken to mean that there can be no 
difference between individual readings, or that the attributes of the good and the 
bad, the just and the unjust, about the law may refer merely to individual positions 
in a particular case which one does not possess a measure to test against. That is not 
so, because one does have a measure against which to test competing moralities, 
albeit not always with finality. One lives in a world that is materially, as well as 
morally, highly structured. And the moral and the material layers seem frequently to 
be interwoven, such as in the attitudes regarding homicide and theft.32 This, 
however, is not to be confused with the concept of what is tentatively called the 
'silly' rule, intention, or judgement in this thesis. This concept pertains to the 
procedural interpretations of the law. The argument regarding it contends that the 
legal mechanism is an attached, situated institution, and as such it is simply 
incapable of producing that which would be 'silly.' The concept is formulated with 
specific reference to the fonnal warnings, such as in the 'golden rule' of the English 
statutory law, against the application of the particular law when it is downright silly. 
And it is argued that the situation anticipated by such formal warnings is not a 
possibility. To become an official interpreter of the law in a particular terrain 
involves a process (not necessarily formal) as constitutive and uncompromising as 
that which one would presumably have to go through to become a monk in Tibet. 
This fact does not only relate to the legal institution, but it is the very nature of the 
life man has, and has always had, on earth. It is a life of habits. customs. and 
institutions - a life, in other words. of faith. Strict, uncompromising training does 
not only define the status of the judge, or that of the academic who comments on 
the judge's work, but it is also what characterizes such basic human institutions as 
manhood. womanhood, and childhood. 33 These are institutions learned, institutions 
to which one is trained. To be sure. a particular interpretation of the law can be 
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regarded as silly. In that case, however, the 'silly' is merely a word of 
disparagement for what is in fact a thread within the body of threads that is the 
institution. In other words, when the particular rule, or intention, or judgement, 
applied or reached, is considered by some to be 'silly,' at once there will be some 
who will disagree: institutions only set and sustain an indirect, primordial 
consensus; they are not structures that do away with opposition and criticism 
altogether. 
The second part of the thesis, "The Law and Its Readings,' is a reading of some of 
the motifs of F r a n ~ o i s s Geny's seminal work Method of Interpretation and Sources 
of Private Positive Law.34 A set of polarities divides the second part into four 
chapters: the text and the extratext. intention and extension. the tame and the 
freakish. the real and the formal. As I explore the logic behind each one of the 
binary oppositions, I pursue a grammatical reassessment of the dichotomy between 
the law and its readings as the underlying assumption. The reassessment of a 
particular opposition does not signify a conceptual negation of the opposition, but it 
redraws the borders between the terms as grammatical. that is to say. habitual. 
institutional, or praxis-based, as opposed to thematic or transcendental. 
Consequently. the terms of each one of the distinctions are indicated. though. 
undoubtedly. of possible grammatical use, as ultimately metamorphic and elusive. 
Chapter 2.1 examines some of the contemporary arguments relating to the text of 
the law. Extratextualist positions such as, famously. Geny's counter the mainstream 
textualist positions by arguing against the mechanistic conception of the law that is 
written, all inclusive, and once and for all. Curiously, however. the notion of the 
law therefore invoked presupposes a notion of the text which might best suit the 
formalism of the mainstream positions - namely that the text, as opposed to what 
might tentatively be called history, is the locus of meaning. What follows this 
markedly positivistic notion of the text, a notion invoked in particular in the 
extratextualist positions on the interpretation of the American Constitution, is a fear 
of judgement that would be made on the basis of what is often (as in the segregation 
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cases) an obsolete concept embodied in the text. This fear, in fact, is not different 
from the fonnalistic, mainstream-textualistic, fear of what would become of the law 
in the absence of fonnally circumscribed, textual, constraints. The discussion not 
only indicates the ultimately textualistic character of the extratextualist rhetoric, but 
it at once attempts to define the text, as posited by textualist positions, in terms of 
what would be beyond its edges, namely the extratext. In exploring the themes, the 
discussion focuses on certain individual cases, such as the segregation cases of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, arguments over which have been an integral part of the theory. 
The view of the text as the locus of meaning is refuted on the basis of arguments by 
both Wittgenstein and Heidegger on meaning formation. And the concept of 
supplementarily as formulated by Derrida is invoked to work out the dialectic that 
seems to be at work between the text and that which 'supplements' it. 
Chapter 2.2 is devoted to the considerations of the legislative will. Counter-
intentionalist positions regarding the interpretation of the law, it argues, may in fact 
suggest an inherent intentionalism, as epistemologically understood, which may in 
turn point in the direction of a reversal not dissimilar to that of the binary 
opposition of textualism and extratextualism. The traditional arguments against the 
mainstream intentionalism seem to gather on two points: first, that intention is a 
state of mind and therefore impossible to uncover for those who do not have a 
natural access inside others' heads; and secondly, that even if it were possible to 
uncover it, what one has with the legislative will is but a fiction, for it refers to, not 
one, but many minds who could not possibly intent one and the same thing. The 
discussion seeks to disclose the way counter-intentionalist arguments subscribe to 
traditional intentionalism by assuming intention as an occult presence, to use two 
concepts, one Wittgesteinean and one Derridean, together. And it argues how 
intention as a concept is a possibility precisely because it is in each case a 
collegiate, fraternal extension. The discussion invokes the Derridean argument on 
the traditional privileging of speech over writing, and probes the paradoxical 
position of the parol evidence rule of contract doctrine where writing ostensibly 
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becomes the privileged tenn. Traditionally. writing is thought to lack the moment of 
presence which defines speech. The much discussed parol evidence rule appears to 
be wayward in view of the traditional hierarchy. In both the traditional privileging 
of speech and the parol evidence rule. however. writing is defined in tenns of 
absence - the absence of passion and privacy. Unlike speech. writing is 
depersonalized. detached. What is an exclusion of private passion and of therefore 
partiality in contract doctrine signifies in the traditional hierarchy the suppression of 
that which is the immediate, present, meaning - intention. The passion of the 
speaker is. likewise, the dreaded concept in the traditional distrust towards oratory, 
or rhetoric. a fear well reflected in the long-standing, and only recently relaxed, 
English doctrine that confines the search for the legislative will within the text of 
the statute. The concept of the lack of genuine intention (a concept whose fallacy 
Derrida brilliantly demonstrates in his critique of the Austenean intentionalism) in 
oratory has its most typical pattern in the classical dichotomy between dialectic and 
eristic. In eristic one is not supposed to be concerned about truth, all that one is 
concerned about is to persuade and win the argument. a difference that can hardly 
be sustained if intention is at once to remain an unrnonitored. occult. concern. 
Chapter 2.3 explores the problems of judicial discretion. politics. and the politics 
of interpretation. It discusses some of the traditional criticisms of judicial review, in 
particular the so-called countennajoritarian objection. and points out the 
metamorphic character of some of the positions in the debate. In that 
countennajoritarianism refuted from a majoritarian viewpoint stands right behind 
the very idea of constitutionalism, a distinct refuge at once of the majoritarian 
positions. And the positions that resist the idea of a timid, majoritarian, judiciary 
appear to be equally paradoxical, for tht"Se positions are simply for being ill at ease 
with the constitutional principle that is countennajoritarianism par excellence. The 
discussion then focuses on the Dworkin-Fish debate on the politics of interpretation 
and at once attempts to pin down some of the veins in Dworkin's thinking on the 
subject of judicial licence. A positivistic distinction between the moral and the legal 
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was argued in the post-war years to have been one of the elements responsible for 
the total submission on the part of the legal mechanism in Gennany to the Nazi rule. 
In a curious reversal, a violation of the dichotomy between the moral and the legal 
has been indicated by some of the writers with positivistic views on the 
interpretation of the American Constitution to have been behind the decision of 
Dred Scott v Sandford whose opinion declared the Black Americans 'a subordinate 
and inferior class of beings'35 - a significant precursor to the Nazi mentality. The 
positivistic principle is probably best reflected in the French delegation of powers 
where, until very recently, the notion of constitutional review, for instance, was 
totally abhorrent to the mainstream rhetoric. The impersonality the French system 
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seeks and sustains in the decisions of its judiciary - that is to say, a 'nullified,' in 
the true Montesquieuean spirit, notion of it - seems effectively to have yielded, 
however, to a judiciary much less timid in its interpretations of the law than in 
common law systems where, by contrast, judiciary is conferred upon much greater 
discretionary powers. A similar paradox arises from Dworkin's critique of the 
Hartian concept of discretion. The impersonality Dworkin seeks in supplementing 
rules with principles, as opposed to (strong) discretion, results in a 'Herculean' 
notion of jUdiciary. Both the French and Dworkin appear to invest much in a radical 
dichotomy between the freakish, the silly, and the tame in the procedural 
interpretations of the law. Questioning the dichotomy, Fish, on the other hand, 
suggests what seems to be a nullified concept of judiciary, not, however, necessarily 
on a Montesquieuean basis, but on the basis of a primordial hermeneutic condition 
in which the procedural interpreter, the judge, is an attached, situated, reader, rather 
than the free-wheeling, autonomous, subject anticipated by the mainstream legal 
theory. 
An overall evaluation of the conceptual scheme, potentialities, and assumptions 
of legal realism is attempted in chapter 2.4. Realism appears to emphasize the part 
of the interpreter, as opposed to the text, in the event of adjudication, and question 
the traditional assumptions of formalism whose mechanistic concept of 
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jurisprudence equates the law with its text. While some of the most crucial of the 
realist objections to the formalistic concept of adjudication have been genuine and 
insightful, the realist writers, however, have been for the most part unaware of some 
of the formalistic, and ultimately self-refuting, presuppositions of their own 
rhetoric. The discussion seeks to demonstrate how realism in fact betrays its very 
rationale in virtually all of its classical arguments against the formalism of the 
mainstream, mechanistic conception of jurisprudence, and how it in effect simply 
mimics all that which it otherwise attributes to formalism. And it does so, the 
discussion maintains, with a zeal arguably greater than that of the mainstream 
formalism. In probing some of its major patterns across diverse terrains of 
jurisprudence, the common motifs and presuppositions that seem to underlie much 
of what amounts to legal realist philosophizing are pointed out. (a) If realism, it is 
argued, is ineluctable in practical terms - which is held to be the realist principle, 
the rationale - then realism as a discourse is simply a formalistic permutation for 
being an essentially record-odented enterprise. Realism, in other words, pertains to 
that which it would consider to be mere theory, as opposed to practice - a 
dichotomy that is practically the backbone of formalism. If a radical opposition of 
theory and practice is therefore eventually to be affirmed, it is hard to see, 
subsequently, how realism as a way of doing can go on asserting its ineluctability, 
the principle that would in tum render the mainstream formalism a project that is 
impracticable: if theory can be detached from practice in a radical way, that is to 
say, if a vantage-point that is outside practice can be reached, it is difficult to justify 
why, capable in principle of reaching an autonomous viewpoint from which to 
manipulate practice. formalism as theory should necessarily be devoid of practical 
effects. And. conversely. if a point autonomous from practice is not a possibility-
the realist principle - it is not clear how realism itself as theory is to evade being 
simply superfluous and have effects. (b) If, on the other hand, the realist principle is 
to be abandoned altogether. as realist writers frequently do. and realism is therefore 
to be clearly more than a mere record-straightening enterprise and become instead 
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one that seeks to guide and manipulate that which it records; then, again, every 
single feature that has come to be the mark of formalism anywhere can be shown to 
lie at the heart of realism: a belief in formal guidelines in the form of theory, 
namely a concept of the n"ght method; the presupposition of a state of anything-
goes, that is to say, subjectivism and unpredictability, in the absence of formal 
guidelines either as rules or as theory; a positivistic distinction of the legal and the 
moral, is and ought, in the studies of law; and a formalistic (pictorial) notion of 
language underpinned by a formalistic (correspondence) theory of truth. The 
discussion ventures to indicate some of the realist associations which have 
consistently been neglected in the traditional assessments of the legal realist critical 
legacy. It attempts to pin down not only some of the significant connections 
between the earlier European and the later, better-known, American patterns of 
realism, an affinity on the part of the latter which accounts for some of its greatest 
intellectual obstacles, but it also draws attention to the extent of association, in both 
themes and, more important still, aporias, between realism and the more recent 
criticisms of the state of law in the American environment, such as those of critical 
legal studies, represented here in an argument (if somewhat more refined than the 
average within the movement proper, and therefore not strictly characteristic) by 
Paul de Man. What is also pursued is to try to contrast some of the so-called 
Scandinavian arguments of realism - central to which seems to be a 
verificationism not dissimilar to that reflected in Wittgenstein's early work - with 
the approach favoured by the later work by Wittgenstein to the phenomenon of rule-
government, one which drastically opposes the earlier, verificationist, or pictorial, 
approach in its assumption of an intrinsic, immanent. relationship between the word 
and that which it is about. 01' between the rule and that which accords with it. 
The concluding chapter seeks to differ from the conventional approach by 
proceeding to discuss the problems and limitations of a critical discourse as such, 
and reappraise the dichotomy that in each case marks the critical enterprise - that 
of the same and the similar. The significance of the awareness of some of the 
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problems inherent in one's own discourse is itself one major conclusion of this 
thesis. The essay inadvertently suggests a mastery, in its critique of a number of 
other projects, over the dynamics and the contradictions that are constitutive of its 
own rhetoric. The concluding chapter, therefore, is intended to balance, as it were, 
the discourse and hint at its own conditions of validity as an exercise in rhetoric. 
Some more explicit - traditional - conclusions are nevertheless drawn. 
The idea that a rhetoric may in no instance escape its own consequences, 
however, does not amount to a so-called nihilism, a state of anything-goes. On the 
contrary, the present essay takes issue with what it calls a Kirilov complex in recent 
theory. 'If there is no goo, then I am a goo. '36 In attempting to reverse the hierarchy 
traditionally assumed between principles and men, the Kirilovean condition 
operates on the basis of the concept of a possible oscillation between the presumed 
realms of the text and the interpreter, a mere reproduction of the traditional 
dichotomy between government by laws and government by men, the law and its 
readings. Its discussion in this chapter aims to trace and pin down the pattern that 
seems to mark the arguments regarding nihilism. Some of the references in the 
debate to the Nietzschean formulation of the concept are weighed, followed by a 
discussion of its critique by Heidegger, and the logic which forms the core of the 
pattern is pointed out - a logic of betrayal. The logic, it is argued, is responsible 
for the nihilistic conception as one essentially of presence and evasion. That which 
betrays violates. But it at once discloses, gives away. While the presuppositions of 
presence on the part of the nihilistic conception revive the notion of identity, of the 
same, evasion signifies a revival of the concept of autonomy and, as a presumed 
exception to the prirnordiality of the mimetic, the similar. becomes a condition for 
discursive validity. Two intertwined paradoxes to the pattern are therefore formed. 
As presencing, nihilism signifies re-presencing while de-presencing. And as 
evasion, nihilism signifies a mimetic uneasiness. even hostility, in the face of a 
discourse that is at once committed to the idea of the primordiality of the mimetic. 
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1 JUDGEMENT, CRITERIA, JUSTICE 
In marking the contrast between a conventionalist notion of justice, namely that of 
the Sophists, and a Kantian one, Lyotard discloses that 'an extraordinarily dangerous 
position' arises when justice is regarded as 'common opinion.' I The words he 
decides on are curious. The ordinary, the common, the conventional, as the begetter 
of that which is extraordinary, a rather quaint perversity of logic, is the key to work 
out the impasse in the Lyotardian discourse. 'A rule by convention would require 
that one accept. let's get to the bottom of things right away. even Nazism. After all, 
since there was near unanimity upon it. from where could one judge that it was not 
just?'2 Unless one subscribes to a conception of the general will which would 
exhaust all the traces of force within a given domain. what Lyotard seems to suggest 
may be hard to establish as an indisputable fact. Were all the traces of force clearly 
dissolved by the regime at the time in Gennany? For a well-known example on the 
contrary. the post-war Gennan case which fuelled in the late 1950s the debate 
between the proponents of naturalist legal theory and the positivists involved a Nazi 
soldier who had expressed his disapproval of the leadership and the regime to his 
wife and consequently been prosecuted.3 It is reported that in some of the cases in 
the same era prison sentences were passed only to make sure the individuals 
involved did not get in the hands of the civil or military intelligence.4 Furthermore, 
there seem to have existed German jurists. in the very heydays of the Nazi rule, who 
criticized openly, and published against, particular undue readings of the law by 
courts under political influence.s Obviously, in the face of such records, it is not 
easy to maintain what Lyotard seems to take for granted. The German Court of 
Appeal in the much discussed post-war case, mentioned above, ruled against the 
infonning wife with a particular reference to the notion of 'unlawful action' which, 
the court thought, had been held by the German public when the wife had chosen to 
take the particular course of action to hann the husband.6 In a similar case in 1952, 
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the same point was made and stressed by the Federal Supreme Court. The prevalent 
pattern of the just had been far from one commonly supported.7 The Federal 
Constitutional Court which invoked and defended this view zealously in many of its 
decisions went as far as to pursue a historical survey, of the sources in the Nazi era, 
one which the Court found to confinn its opinion.8 
To prove this, however, is not at all what is central to our concern here. Indeed, 
taking into account, on the opposite side of the argument, the anxiety which the 
post-war Germany naturally did have to restore the good name of the people, it will 
be equally hard to conclude, by the evaluations made in the aftermath of a war of 
losers and winners, that the support of the people for the regime was remarkably 
less than near unanimous. Lyotard, therefore, may well be right. Would that, 
nevertheless, give more credence to the point he makes on the possibly 
extraordinary hazards of an ordinary opinion of justice? Masses may go insane. 
Would their insanity, however, be necessarily different in kind from the sanity of 
the rest? 
I will argue that the direction Lyotard's text takes on that issue is not simply 
accidental. That which underlies it underlies much of his discourse on justice. Just 
Gaming, a dialogue in the Platonic fashion between Lyotard and Thebaud, is a 
significant work. That is so, neither because its project on justice is among the moo 
compelling nor because it forms one of the most persistent veins in the thinking of 
Lyotard himself.9 Its significance is for two reasons, both strictly of economy. First, 
it is easily one of the most typically articulated amongst the projects with a 
distinctive reading of what might be called a non-transcendentalistic, non-
foundationalist, order of themes that seems to have emerged in the present century 
in the writings primarily by Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein. Best exemplified 
in the English speaking world in literary and legal studies, of recent, the distinctive 
seal of that reading has been a consistent rhetoric of semantic and moral 
aJX>Calypse,lo Secondly, because the text in question is with an impressively wide 
horizon, or adventurous enough. to call at once upon such varying sources as the 
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Sophists, Aristotle, and Kant, reading it should enable us to call into consideration, 
if rudimentarily, the classical accounts of the subject as well as the challenges ~ ~
by the contemporary analyses. 
In what follows I will try to read into the text of Just Gaming four interwoven 
statements, each under a separate heading: (1) Authorship is mere proliferation of 
that for which the author has been authorized by the audience. A distinction, 
therefore, between the realms of the author and of the audience can only be 
grammatical. (2) Different genres of jUdgement, of justice, may be so 
distinguishable only on a grammatical basis. (3) That which is just can be told apart 
from that which is not only grammatically. Out of that grammaticality, however, an 
'anything goes' situation does not arise. (4) The extraordinary is merely a political 
category of the ordinary, and a distinction between the two is always a grammatical 
one. 
1.1 Judgement, Authorship, Audience 
The dichotomy Lyotacd introduces at the very outset is that of 'classicism' and 
'modernity.' These are not, however. words to designate periods. The latter is 
distinguished from the former on the basis of a series of negations which are 
notably atemporal. The classical situation, elucidates Lyotard. is 
a situation in which an author can write while putting himself 
at the same time in the position of a reader. being able to 
substitute himself for his own reader. and to judge and sort 
out what he has accomplished from the point of view of the 
reader that he also is.! 
The modern situation. on the other hand. differs radically in that it lacks an 
24 
audience; 'in modernity there is no longer a people. '2 Where there is no addressee, 
there cannot be 'a possible consensus.'3 And where there is no consensus, there can 
be no criteria. '[A]nytime that we lack criteria,' writes Lyotard. 'we are in 
modemity.'4 Where there are no criteria, in tum, there can be no law, no 
prescriptions, no judgement. and no taste. That which does get produced. no one 
knows what happens to; it is not 'received,' but simply trapped 'in networks of 
distribution. They are economic networks. sales networks. '5 Although we are clearly 
assured that '[t]he date does not matter.'6 one wonders in the face of such rhetoric 
whether some periodizing is not really in question. 'We are without interlocutors,'7 
declares Lyotard. 'for us moderns, prescriptions are not received.'8 All the same, we 
are reminded. again and again. that no temporal reference is intended, and 'that 
anytime we lack criteria, we are in modernity. wherever we may be, whether it be at 
the time of Augustine. Aristotle, or Pascal. '9 
The classical author is in a position of which defining quality is transparency. 
The consensus it signifies contrasts with the state of closure that is modernity. 
Criteria are what modernity lacks in its closure. They are models, routines. and 
habits. For a comparison. Wittgenstein has in mind precisely the habituality that 
marks Lyotard's classicism when the fonner challenges the assumptions of an 
essential closure traditionally posited with regard to fonnation of meaning in 
language. lo In the picture Wittgenstein draws signification is dependent entirely on 
what he calls 'criteria' - a curious coincidence with the Lyotardian notion. Criteria. 
naturally. are inconceivable without a participating audience. The transparency in 
whose specific terms Lyotard defines the classical situation. therefore. is a 
prerequisite of sign generally. The substitutability that defines classicism is the 
necessarily institutiona.1ized character of the deed. whether it be phonetic or graphic. 
That which the author composes takes place in a language which is not private. but 
which is substitutable. or which, as Derrida puts it. 'iterable.'ll Anything said. seen 
or thought is just so because it is reproducible; even in a 'private,' one-person 
language, signs that are employed will have to be iterable. The author will in no 
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instance be in a state of non-mimetic, absolute, closure. Every time he produces, he 
reproduces. The reproduction resists a radical dichotomy between the author and the 
reader. By this account, a state of closure is clearly out of the question. According 
to Lyotard, on the other hand, transparency is a feature which one could do without. 
As opposed to the classical author, the modern author, he notes, 
no longer knows for whom he writes, since there no longer is 
any taste; there no longer is any internalized system of rules 
that would permit a sorting out, the dropping of some things 
and the introduction of some others. all of this before the fact. 
in the act of writing. We are without interlocutors. 12 
The modern author has no audience whom to address, yet he somehow does write. 
What reason would one have to call him an 'author'? Authorship, after all, seems to 
be a word for the bond between the scribe and language. When language is 
involved, in tum, the bond that is authorship is one between the scribe and the 
others. Is it at all conceivable that one should become an 'author' before one is 
'author'ized to be one? Does authorization by the audience not always come first? Is 
one not always trained through criteria to the right thing, long before one is capable 
at all of writing? Is the author not, therefore, one who merely proliferates (aueto) 
what he has already been introduced to? Auction without an audience, indeed. is a 
contradiction in terms. Lyotard knows well that writers such as Augustine, 
Aristotle, Pascal, and indeed himself, all had and have interlocutors before them. 
What he does, however. is to tum such rhetorical refinements of everyday practical 
life as performer and audience, taste and distaste, into transcendental dichotomies. 
They in effect become distinctions between good and bad audience, and taste and 
bad taste. When Lyotard declares that 'there no longer is any taste: therefore, he is 
being apocalyptic simply about the kind of taste which Kant, for instance, refers to 
as 'taste proper' in contradistinction to 'sensory' taste.13 As with 'taste: in moral 
matters the Kantian project radically distinguishes the 'external' connections of 
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entities from what is 'intrinsic' to them. No formative relation is allowed between 
the twO. 14 The free-for-all which follows Lyotard's conception of modernity seems 
therefore to be an effect of the Kantian dichotomizing Lyotard adopts. The audience 
is regarded as dispensable rather than constitutive of the process. Hence a free-
wheeling concept of authorship - and the apocalypse. The words Lyotard employs 
to present his case - author. writing. the artefact. reception. rules, judgement, taste, 
the interlocutor - they all seem to refer to entities in a distinctively linear, 
unadorned. manner. They clearly presume a 'substratum.' an ontological haven, 
where things would 'be' pure and free of any accidental relations; a mode of 
presence based on a distinction between inside and outside. Substitution. a state of 
affairs Lyotard makes an attribute of classicism exclusively, can hardly be ruled out, 
unless one at once invokes a radical dichotomy of inside and outside, mind and 
matter; unless, that is to say, as Kant puts it. 'rational nature exists as an end in 
itself.'ls Taking pains to clarify the atemporal character of the distinction between 
classicism and modernity Lyotard does indeed hint at a similar concern: one can do 
without the transparency of habits and patterns 'wherever [one] may be. whether it 
be at the time of Augustine. Aristotle. or Pascal.' The dichotomy between classicism 
and modernity, therefore, is ultimately the expression of a moral hierarchy after the 
Kantian fashion, one between substitution through criteria and judgement without 
substitution. 'I judge,' holds Lyotard, 
[b]ut if I am asked by what criteria do I judge, I will have no 
answer to give. Because if I did have criteria ... it would mean 
that there is actually a possible consensus on these criteria 
between the readers and me; we would not be then in a 
situation of modernity. but in classicism.16 
If one thing the concept of judgement without established standards signifies is the 
lack of audience consensus, another is a questioning of that which is set up and 
instituted - the establishment. Is it not a clear defiance in the face of the 
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establishment when Lyotard declares that 'for us moderns, prescriptions are not 
received'?17 Criteria are transcended and the substitutability of classicism is dropped 
by means of a fine, and yet radical, distinction between inside and outside, one 
which ensures Kant the autonomy of the will uninfected by sensory experience. 
Lyotard's rhetoric on justice swings, by his admission, between two distinct 
positions, one non-transcendentalist (the 'pagan'), the other Kantian. The interesting 
thing is that we have been, and will have been for quite some time yet. through only 
the non-transcendentalist part where there has been so far not one single reference 
to Kant. The philosopher whom Lyotard does refer to is Aristotle. 'Yet we do make 
judgements,' intervenes Thebaud, 'there must be a sensus communis.' Lyotard 
replies: 'No, we judge without criteria. We are in the position of Aristotle's prudent 
individual, who makes judgements about the just and the unjust without the least 
criterion.'18 In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle describes phronesis (prudence) as 
neither knowledge nor art. It is not a 'making,' therefore not an art. It is not 
knowledge, because it can be reversed. Rather, as Aristotle sees it, phronesis is the 
capacity to issue well reasoned opinions regarding such matters as the good and the 
bad. I9 Lyotard goes on further to explicate that, for Aristotle, 
a judge worthy of the name has no true model to guide his 
judgements, and that the true nature of the judge is to 
pronounce judgements, and therefore prescriptions, just so, 
without criteria. This is, after all, what Aristotle calls 
prudence. It consists in dispensing justice without models. It is 
not possible to produce a learned discourse upon what justice 
'20 IS. 
One enigmatic point is the last sentence. one which is stated almost as a logical 
derivation of the sentence it follows, namely 'dispensing justice without models.' 
Issuing discourses on the whatness of justice and following criteria when judging 
are two different things. The latter has something to do, as Thebaud suggests, with a 
sensus communis, readily rejected by Lyotard: 'No, we judge without criteria.' 
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While the former is the kind of thing Socrates, for instance, does against the 
argument by Thrasymachus in the famous passage of The Repub/ic.21 Whatever 
phronesis is, it seems that it can defy only one of the two. What is defied, as far as 
Lyotard, if not Aristotle, is concerned becomes once more clear, when Thebaud 
comments that judgement without criteria is the case with Aristotle's judge, but only 
'because he has been educated, because there is a habit, because there is a pedagogy 
of the soul. '22 In fact, if Thebaud is right in his stress on the point of the 'pedagogy 
of the soul,' he cannot at once be right in recognizing this as judgement without 
criteria, for it can be what else but criteria to confer on the judge his habits and 
pedagogy. Nevertheless, the part of the pedagogy in the judgement of the 
Aristotelian judge, too. of one piece with the rejection of the sensus communis. is 
dismissed: 'I am not even sure that one can say that.'23 As I have noted it, Aristotle 
distinguishesphronesis from both art and knowledge. Considering criteria as habits. 
models. and categories based on the consensus of an audience, does phronesis really 
mean the capacity to judge without criteria? In Rhetoric, Aristotle explains 'a 
general principle' of judgement in conjunction with phronesis as follows: 
that which would be judged, or which has been judged, a 
greater good, by all or most people of understanding 
(phronesis]. or by the majority of men. or by the ablest, must 
be so; either without qualification. or in so far as they use 
their understanding (phronesis] to form their judgement. This 
is indeed a general principle applicable to all other 
judgements also; not only the goodness of things, but their 
essence. magnitude. and general nature are in fact just what 
knowledge and understanding will declare them to be. 24 
As invoked by Aristotle. phronesis seems rather a long way from a state of closure 
uninfected, as it were, by models. First of all, he makes it a general principle that 
that which is believed to be just is just. Believed so by whom? The circle is kept as 
large as it can be: 'by all or most people of understanding, or by the majority o/men. 
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or by the ablest.'25 Equally open-ended is the manner in which judgement is 
pursued: 'either without qualification, or in so far as [the people] use their 
understanding to form their judgement. '26 What Aristotle understands by phronesis. 
Heidegger calls circumspection (Umsicht). or prudence, a sight (Sieht) which 
contrasts with the traditionally privileged sight of the theoria.27 Theory. the 
'thematic' knowledge. according to Heidegger. is a category made possible by 
circumspection rather than an order that evades the primordiality of the practical. 
habitual knowledge that is circumspection.28 While the essence. the Being. of man 
is care (Sorge),29 explains Heidegger. he is primordially. and in each case. guided 
by his sight. 30 Care marks the nature of man's relation to the world and emphasizes 
his existence as fundamentally 'practica1.' And sight stands for all that which is 
conventionally thought to differentiate between man and the beings with which man 
co-habits the world. 'Equipment' signifies the class of entities which are of the 
specific mode of care that is concern (Besorgen).31 And the 'others,' the fellow 
humans. are of the mode of care that is solicitude (Fiirsorge).32 While men are 
subject to the instances of sight Heidegger terms considerateness (Riicksieht) , 
forbearance (Nachsicht) , and inconsiderateness (Riicksichtslosigkeit); equipment, 
whose sole Being is their use, the pragmata. the objects of man's concemful 
dealings, the praxis, is subject to the mode of sight that is circumspection 
(Umsicht).33 The sight which therefore in its various modes defines man's existence 
and houses what Heidegger calls man's 'capability-for-Being' is transparency 
(Durchsichtigkeit). a knowledge of the self as 'disclosedness,' as opposed to being 
'closed Off.'34 Circumspection, the sight on whose basis man's dealings with 
equipment are pursued and which is at once the frame of reference for the theoria, 
the thematic sight. is in tum a possibility of the transparent quality of existence. 
Hence, Aristotle's definition of phronesis. prudence. as 'a general principle 
applicable to all other judgements also.'35 Judgement, as a human capacity, free of 
models on the basis of consensus is a notion that seems to be alien to Aristotle. And 
in what I above quote from Rhetoric the reason for this is clearly put: 'not only the 
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goodness of things, but their essence, magnitude, and general nature are in fact 
what knowledge and understanding will declare them to be. '36 That is an insight, I 
will argue, which is rather in the fashion of the pre-Socratic thinking and which 
stands squarely against the fonn of the metaphysics of presence, as Derrida tenns 
it.37 posited by both Kant and Lyotard. It is most remarkably preempted in 
Aristotle's statement by the tenns in which he understands 'Being.' To capture that 
position more clearly and work out how a certain form of the metaphysics of 
presence underlies the ongoing discourse, however, there is still some length to go. 
One point left unclarified is what I indicated above as a peculiarity of logic that 
seemed to be reflected in two successive sentences by Lyotard. Aristotle's prudence, 
he notes, 'consists in dispensing justice without models. It is not possible to produce 
a learned discourse upon what justice is. '38 I recorded that it is mystifying for the 
second sentence to appear as a simple derivative of the first sentence as the two 
implied two mutually uneasy positions. The question arises when both of the 
positions that can possibly be held on the issue are negated. While it seems unlikely 
that Lyotard had in mind a third position into which his particular reading of 
Aristotle would fit. It looks beyond doubt, for one thing, that he regards the 
Aristotelian prudence as distinct from judgement on the basis of models, or criteria 
- the first position. Does. then. prudence. as he reads it, oppose also judgement 
based on a single. all-comprehensive discourse. the second position, and becomes, 
therefore. a third one? That, however, is not easy to infer as they both invoke 
justice. whatever the discrepancies. independently of criteria. and transcending 
criteria is simply what the distinction between the positions is about. Or is it 
possible that what is considered so far to be Lyotard's notion of 'judgement without 
criteria' is not quite an accurate depiction of what he actually means, and that what 
is rejected above is not two opposing positions after all? If this is the case. then only 
one of the two positions is rejected: judgement with. or without, criteria. Which 
one? The answer depends on what a criterion. for Lyotard. is. If we take a quick 
look back. we will see that in 'modernitY rules. prescriptions. taste. and so on, are 
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not extant.39 That is because the 'classical' substitutability, as one's capability to see 
through (Durchsichtigkeit) others«> has disappeared, and that is, in turn, because one 
has no criteria in the modem situation. One lacks criteria because one lacks those 
who produce and sustain criteria - the audience.41 Criteria are none other than 
'models' and 'habits'42 established on the basis of community 'consensus. '43 To state. 
accordingly. that Aristotle's judge judges without criteria."" and that is what 
modernity is all about. is to mean modernity to transcend one's models. beliefs. 
habits. common sense. in short, much of what is effectively one's native world. One 
question is whether that seems to be Aristotle's stance, for whom. famously. justice 
is inconceivable outside the polis. the world of praxiS.45 Even if that were so. 
however, the problem would be only reiterated rather than clarified. for Lyotard 
proceeds to classify his particular reading of the Aristotelian justice within the same 
order as the Sophists - the 'order of opinion.'46 Given his reading of prudence as 
judgement without criteria and the Sophist emphasis on the criteria of worldly 
habits and standards, one is once again puzzled whether one understands by 
'criterion' the same thing as Lyotard. 
The puzzle is prompted. in fact. by an almost elusive trace of force in his 
rhetoric. of which Lyotard is neither convinced nor not convinced. He is not 
convinced. yet he feels the force of that trace. He is convinced. because it is out of 
the question for one to feel its force unless one is already convinced of it. In a 
passage where he strives to defy and reverse the institutional character of 
judgement. things happen out of the sheer political force of a certain institution. 
namely that of the non-transcendentalist rhetoric in contemporary theory. How? 
According to Lyotard. the Aristotelian prudence 'consists in dispensing justice 
without models. It is not possible to produce a learned discourse upon what justice 
is. '47 Here it is not a simple confusion. on his part. that he dismisses the two 
opposing positions at once. Judgement based on criteria is equated with judgement 
based on an omnipotent theory only to oppose both by a third position. He does 
presume a third position after all. even if it is expressed only by confusions and 
32 
aporias. In addition to the passage above he reveals another mark for that position 
when Thebaud raises the ineluctable question whether Lyotard has not been 
developing, all along, a 'new critique of judgement' himself.48 He states in reply that 
the kind of judgement he suggests is no more than a 'feeling.' Unlike the ready-
made prescriptions of a theory of judgement. what happens in transcending criteria 
through prudence is that 'in each instance. I have a feeling. that is all. '49 What seems 
to be at stake. Lyotard is quick to explicate. 'It is a matter of feelings. in the sense 
that one can judge without concepts'. 50 In other words. judgement without criteria is 
judgement based merely on a 'hunch' and, therefore. without institutional ties. Being 
'without concepts: it is thematically uncircumscribeable. 
Judgement as mere feeling opposes both (a) judgement with criteria. and (b) 
judgement without criteria but with concepts. It is that delicate border-line between 
judgement without criteria but with concepts and judgement without criteria, with 
no concepts, but with mere feeling in which Lyotard invests all the plausibility of 
his reading of prudence. The unworldly 'feeling' of Aristotle's prudent judge is 
named 'opinion,' too moral a word (opinor) for an amoral elevation. It is, in tum, 
situated 'within the order of opinion, and not in the order of truth. I think this is 
quite close to some of the themes that one finds among the Sophists. '51 It is 
important to notice that it is solely his eleventh hour rhetorical twist for the word 
'opinion,' and against the word 'truth,' which places his particular reading of 
Aristotle in safe proximity to Sophism. The terms in which he defines 'opinion' are 
simply hidden away. The order of opinion disregards criteria exactly the way the 
order of truth does, only with the difference. by a last moment choice of words. that 
the former is no more than 'a matter of feelings' in contradistinction to what would 
be the bold prescriptions of the latter. Is he not endeavouring to get away with his 
daring, as it were. notion of transcending criteria by simply dropping the truth 
claims from that transcending? In the face of what is that endeavour? A certain trace 
of force, a political bully? 
'Truth.' just as a host of similar words in language. has become a cursed word. It 
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is a word never to be used outside the safety of quotation marks. Lyotard's timid 
and sometimes downright hostile uses of the word derive from a non-
transcendentalism which is at odds with the basic commitments of that rhetoric.52 
A voiding words on the ground that they do not deliver what they promise is 
precisely the same breach of grammar as philosophy has so often done from Plato 
onwards. Words do not make abstract promises. They are what they actually 
deliver. 'We are always within opinion.' declares Lyotard. 'and there is no possible 
discourse of truth on the situation. And there is no such discourse because one is 
caught up in a story. and one cannot get out of this story to take up a metalinguistic 
position from which the whole could be dominated.'s3 Is distinguishing language 
from metalanguage not a metalinguistic venture itself? Will there not always and 
unavoidably be an irreducible element of truth constitutive of a discourse? Rather 
than to try and avoid this or that particular word in language. the point seems to be 
being alert. in the face of metaphysical abuse, not to let the grammar of the 
particular word somehow elude its use. Once the models and habits which make up 
the entire being of the word are dropped. the violation of grammar is but a matter of 
course. Lyotard's discourse attests to that only too well. In a parade of words with 
an abused grammar. the very word 'justice' takes the lead. 
1.2 Judgement and Blind Faith 
The prevailing conceptions of justice. Lyotard classifies within three 'orderings.' 
The first one is the ordering of 'autonomy.' a category which. as the name implies. 
derives from the principle of the autonomy of the subject and which belongs to the 
mainstream of Western thinking. l According to the autonomous conception of 
justice. that which is just is so determined by man the subject whose definition of it 
is through the law. a mere reflection of his free will. And once the just has been 
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detennined, the obedience it requires means less a restriction on man's autonomy 
than a sole consummation of it. The subject 'remains autonomous even when he 
obeys it since he is its author. '2 The second ordering is what Lyotard calls 'the 
Jewish pole.' It signifies justice in the mode of 'obligation' - of obligation without 
ever the requirement of either understanding that obligation or being able to 
rationalize it. 3 The third ordering is that of 'heteronomy,' or the 'pagan' ordering. a 
category Lyotard does not consider distinct from the prudence of the Aristotelian 
judge; that is, as he reads it, judgement without criteria. Regarding the autonomy of 
the will. Kant also distinguishes between what he calls 'autonomy' and 'heteronomy.' 
The latter he takes to refer to man as part of the sensible world and, thus, under the 
reign of nature. while the former designates man's independence, within the world 
of intellect, from the impositions of the world of senses.4 The subject assumed as 
essentially autonomous, Kant simply reproduces what. for Lyotard. is the Leitmotif 
of the Western philosophy. The heteronomous justice of paganism, on the other 
hand. appears not to rely on a prior distinction between the sensible and the 
intelligible. On the contrary. in what Kant would consider to be the world of 
intellect, paganism recognizes no autonomous region; at least no more than that of a 
feeling, of, namely, the 'third' position.s Because the subject cannot be autonomous, 
he can. in no instance, be the author of that which prevails as just; '[t]he will is 
never free, and freedom does not corne first. '6 To illustrate the pagan case, Lyotard 
cites the narrative tradition of a particular group of Amazon Indians. Within that 
tradition, he notes, 
whenever a story is told ... the teller always begins by saying: 
'I am going to tell you the story of X (here he inserts the name 
of the hero) as I have a/ways heard it.' ... In other words, he 
presents himself without giving his own name; he only relays 
the story. He presents himself as having first been the 
addressee of a story of which he is now the teller.7 
Hence. the 'heteronomy,' or effective disappearance. of the subject. What the 
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narrator does is no more than to 're-lay' that which is already in place and which he 
'ha[s] always heard.'8 But then, is that not exactly the point which we tried. above. 
to lay against his argument of modernity? That one could not be conceivable as an 
author before one had been authorized to be one? The Lyotardian modernity is 
distinguished by its lack of criteria for judgement. And the lack of criteria arises 
from the lack of audience. It was. again. emphasized above, against the presumed 
vanishing of the audience and the lack of criteria. that authorship. whether in the 
delivery of justice or in literary exercise. could achieve to be no more than mere 
proliferation (aueto) of that which one. the author. has already been introduced to. 
and that auction without an audience would be inconceivable. 
Does that signify. then. a sharp turn in the ongoing discourse from the 
presuppositions of its modernity? For Lyotard. however. that which distinguishes 
modernity defines also heteronomy. These [pagan] stories,' notes Lyotard. 'have no 
origin. They treat origins in terms of stories that presuppose other stories that in turn 
presuppose the first ones.'9 In this texture of interwoven narratives. no one can 
stabilize what proper name refers to what body. That which would otherwise be 
known as the subject becomes a non-identifiable relation in a whirl of shifting 
bodies. In that perpetual shifting. the relationship between humans and gods. the 
just and the unjust. turns into a transfigurational one. In the event of a confrontation 
between any two figures. writes Lyotard. 'there is no reference by which to judge 
the opponent's strength; one does not know if s/he is a god or a human. It is a 
beggar, but it may be a god. since the other is metamorphic. and one will have to 
judge therefore by opinion alone, that is, without criteria.'lO Ending up. once more, 
with the lack of criteria and making it the definitive mark of heteronomy, Lyotard 
does only little more than repeat what he had to say concerning modernity. How the 
lack of 'reference by which to judge the opponent's strength' occurs in a tradition in 
which the narrator, the judge, owns no 'room of her own' but keeps referring to 
others is something which needs working out. Clearly. she tells the story just as she 
'ha[s] always heard.'ll In each case she 'ha[s] first been the addressee'12 of what she 
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tells. Is not what would naturally be expected of her to judge between gods and 
humans, or between the just and the unjust, the way she has always seen, heard, and 
been told? Yet, surprisingly, she ends up with no criteria, that is to say with no 
models, no habits, no stories. How does that come about? Characteristically, the 
enigma is prompted by a curious reading of the tradition that is cited. As Lyotard 
describes it, when a story is told, it is impossible to trace it back to any kind of 
origin. They treat origins in terms of stories that presuppose other stories that in 
turn presuppose the first ones.'13 The same can be said to be equally true for the 
judgement made at any given moment; for obvious reasons, it cannot be traced back 
to sources which would exhaust its origins. What characteristically intercepts 
Lyotard's account, however, is the presumption of a presence which comes in, once 
more. to activate what is already there. It is true that the criteria which originate the 
story. or the judgement. are not circumscribeable. That they are not fixed and 
present. however, does not necessarily mean that the specific judgement, or story, is 
made without criteria. Indeed, the criteria involved will be as untraceable as that 
curious 'trace' in Lyotard's own rhetoric, a theme that compels him so often to offer 
costly sacrifices to the gods of non-transcendentalistic politics. Likewise, although 
on no basis other than that of untraceable criteria, no pagan should ever be at loss to 
tell her gods apart from the ungodly. She will be at no loss, because, to lead 
Lyotard's own insight into its consequences, she does not exist. What exists is the 
vague and slippery totality of references into which she is born and which she keeps 
re-counting. 
The confusion between the untraceability of criteria and the lack of them is the 
same in kind as one greater confusion which is almost destined to evade attention. It 
is reflected in Lyotard's formulation of the three distinct orders of justice. Is that by 
which heteronomy is exemplified an account of the sole prevailing process, the Nazi 
idea of it included, or is it simply a possible, and yet more favourable, pattern of it 
among others? As with the distinction between classicism and modernity, the three 
orders - autonomy, the Judaic order, heteronomy - are conceived more as 
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radically distinct processes of judgement than as mimetically discrepant 
representations of one and the same process. A hierarchy, in turn, is established 
amongst the three, and 'heteronomy' is singled out. Autonomy, for one thing, 
derives from a distorted picture of man as the subject. It is his autonomous will 
which is reflected in the law and which determines that which is just. By Lyotard's 
own line of thinking, since autonomy is based on a false notion of the subject, it can 
be no more than a figurative, tactical, account of what is decided, again. 
heteronomously. that is. 'without criteria.' Autonomy, therefore. cannot be a 
statement of what might tentatively be called the actual process, but simply a 
political discourse on it. The distinction then between autonomy and heteronomy is 
political. That which is autonomous is, in each case. already heteronomous. The 
Judaic order, on the other hand, stands out as a distinct pole. namely that of faith, 
and issues justice neither with criteria nor without them. Heteronomy and the blind 
faith represented in the Jewish pole, therefore. must form the only genuine 
opposition. But how exactly does Judaism evade the primordiality of heteronomy? 
Or how exactly is heteronomy understood to be faith-free? 
Thebaud asks the question: 'If I hear a rabbi tell me 'throw this flower pot out of 
the window!' a debate begins to take place then. Am I just if I obey? Or, on the 
contrary, am I perhaps unjust if I hurl the flower pot out of the windOW?'14 We all 
know who a rabbi is. But who is it that receives the command from the rabbi? Is it 
Thebaud himself? Is it necessary that we have this piece of information? What is 
Thebaud's aim? Does he intend to get an answer from Lyotard as to how one 
decides the just in an everyday situation? What is an everyday situation? Perhaps he 
intends to force Lyotard into a comer: 'Now, would you not consider that outright 
silly?' The 'that' in my question is stressed because that is how it is echoed in the 
answer. In response, Lyotard states: 'One can suppose that because the rabbi is 
honest, because he is just, because he is as just as one can hope to be, one can 
suppose that if he tells you that .. .'15 What exactly does the rabbi tell? 'Throw this 
flower pot out of the window!' The that which comes in Lyotard's answer after the 
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buffer of a chain of adjectives indicates how rather tricky he thinks the question is. 
It is something one needs to be very careful about. He is so alert in fact that, before 
he proceeds to make any comments at all, he suggests that we consider the positive 
qualities of the rabbi; 'because the rabbi is honest, because he is just ... ' In the face of 
what are these positive qualities? The negativeness of what the rabbi commands? 
But Lyotard does not say that yet. In fact, he does not say at all that he finds what 
the rabbi commands negative or silly. What he does find, instead, is that the 
command by the rabbi is an utterance simply hanging in the air. He is, therefore, 
compelled to call in the down-to-earth - and not necessarily positive or negative 
- qualities of the utterer to help to make some sense of the statement. '[Olne can 
suppose that if he tells you that: he then concludes. 'it is not in order to deceive 
yoU.'16 And yet he adds: 'But one cannot be sure.'17 In saying so Lyotard not only 
thinks that the command is hanging in the air, but that the whole thing. the audience 
included. takes place in a vacuum-like environment. It is not situated, hence not 
even a situation. 
Of course we do not need to know who exactly receives the command from the 
rabbi. Who would a rabbi give a command to but only someone who would take it? 
The rabbi will hardly ever mistake his audience. By the same token. the receiver of 
the command will in each case have an equally operational view of what is taking 
place. 'But you cannot be sure,' warns Lyotard. 'Even if he [the rabbi] is not seeking 
to deceive you, he himself may be deceived.'ls That is how the whole thing is 
hanging in the air. In the face of some such command, 'you cannot be sure' whether 
either of you, or both, are not deceived. How very much like the Cartesian 
meditation it all is, which, in the absence of criteria, develops, not surprisingly, an 
all-inclusive doubt. Imagine, a person makes a holiday booking in a travel shop, 
pays the fee, gets her documents, and leaves. Then she pauses and thinks to herself, 
'I wonder, if I have been deceived?' Or she goes into a shop with the intention of 
purchasing a shirt and has a look at the price tags, decides on one, then 
contemplates, 'Suppose I bought that shirt, would it be my money's worth?' Of 
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course there is nothing Cartesian with the contemplation of that sort. It happens all 
the time, and it happens quite justifiably. When it happens, however, there always is 
in place some way of satisfying one's curiosity. In other words, the situation enables 
one, in each case, to be able to ascertain whether one has been deceived. If one is 
not already capable of doing so, it cannot be a situation, much less what is known 
as the game of 'deception'.19 Deception is a word in one's language. It is governed 
by the criteria which reflect the patterns, habits and conventions spinning around 
that word. If she thinks she may have been deceived by her travel agent or by the 
local shop, her ways of checking on that which bothers her, as well as the ways in 
which she is bothered, are common, established, and in each case already in place. 
And there is no reason why the same should not be the case with the rabbi. No 
matter how different the nature of the rabbi's relation is to the world at large or to 
his audience - different especially from that of the purchaser in the local shop to 
everyday taste and economics - to be in a situation requires that the rabbi's 
audience should be in each case and already in a position to notice, play, or reverse, 
the rabbi's game of deception, or, for that matter, any other game suggested by him. 
This is more so perhaps - because it obviously narrows its field of criteria by 
clearly rejecting the criteria of a more familiar, more widely known, terrain, and 
thereby employing for its frame of reference a special mode of transparency - in 
the face of a command such as the one in the example, 'throw this flower pot out of 
the window!' Conversely, if the certainty sought with respect to the rightness of the 
rabbi's command demands for its satisfaction a rigorous discourse, a colour chart, 
against which the statement can be tested - then the game is altered. In purchasing 
a shirt. if the purchaser believes that he has not paid for it more than other shops 
demand and the shirt is not of poorer quality, etc., and yet if he still thinks that he 
may have been deceived because of the way things get value. for instance, or of the 
imbalance between his income and the costs of living, again, the game has changed. 
If that person remarked to a friend of his whom he encountered immediately after 
purchasing the shirt that he may have been ripped off, though he did not think that it 
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was of poor quality or cost more than in other shops, his friend would think either 
that the purchaser did not know the meaning in English of 'being ripped off,' or that 
he was simply playing an altogether different game, one which is definitely not that 
of deception. 
The command of the rabbi is hanging in the air, because, as an effect of the 
distinction between heteronomy and faith, the rabbi himself is hanging in the air. 
Unlike the Amazonian Indians, the rabbi is more than a mere proliferator of that 
which is already in place. "Throw this flower pot out of the window!' Lyotard 
remarks that the example is an excellent one. It is excellent because it shows the 
hazards of taking utterances always at their letter. 
It is an excellent example because the refinement that Judaism 
brings to the notion of obligation is precisely that one has to 
watch out for prescriptions that appear to be just or 
authorized; they are not always to be taken literally, and they 
may result in the most extreme injustice.20 
The immediate alarm in commenting on the rabbi's utterance is now accounted for 
by a distinction between literal and otherwise reading. 'One can suppose that 
because the rabbi is honest, because he is just, because he is as just as one can hope 
to be .. .'21 In other words, if it were a command such as 'Water the flowers over 
there!' then Lyotard would not have to remind himself of the character traits of the 
rabbi. Why not? Because there would be no hazard and no injustice in taking it 
literally. But, is really the dichotomy between the literal and otherwise so alarming 
an element in the actual game? What is it that is signified when the metaphorical is 
posited in contradistinction to the literal? Undoubtedly, we all make plenty of uses 
of that dichotomy in many operational ways. It is important to notice, however, that 
one seems to refer to it as a practical device in certain situations, often in order to 
justify an action which has already been taken, and a/ways to justify the action on 
the basis of that which is already out in the open, and never as an element getting in 
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the way of the very practicality. '[a]ne has to watch out .. .'22 '[One] cannot be 
sure.'23 The watching out is a well-given piece of advice only when the utterance, 
the rabbi, and the audience, all are thought to be hanging in the air. It entertains the 
notion that the command could possibly be one that evades the system of narratives 
which is already in place and which frames the understanding (phronesis) of those 
who are with him. Could one really invoke a moment of hesitation, of assessment, 
an instant which would freeze the whole event in the air, rather like Zeno's arrow, 
and in turn mediate between what the rabbi says and what is made of it by the 
audience, whether what is said is literal or otherwise? If, on the other hand, that 
which is inside is simply for the sake of its having already been outside,24 in that 
case both the rabbi and his audience are all along down-to-earth and ineluctably tied 
with the traces of a system of narratives, of force, rather than hanging in the air. 
On the part of the rabbi. there seems to be hardly much of a choice. but to 
pronounce, or proliferate (aueto), that which is already out in the open as just. 'No 
one can say,' notes Lyotard, 'what the being of justice is. That. at least, seems 
certain. The rabbi cannot tell either. '25 A call to silence, as most characteristically 
pursued in the Kantian project regarding things-in-themselves, is not an avenue to 
preempt the claims of metaphysics. but, on the contrary, a curious reaffirmation of 
its most basic trait, namely the idea of a deeper layer, a substratum, which eludes 
the language and the sight of man. The assumption of a fixed 'being' for justice 
makes out of justice, a word in language, an abstract promise whose eternal content 
mayor may not overlap with what is its letter. The actual performances of the word 
are brazenly ignored. If justice is a word in language, surely there must be relatively 
clear indicators as to where the word is supposed to be cited at all, and when cited, 
what it can be, that is to say, what can be suggested, by the criteria already in place, 
as just. A speaker of the language, the rabbi, therefore, should be perfectly capable, 
in each instance, of telling what is just. He may be the representative of a 
distinctive, even peripheral, narrative tradition, a quality that may consequently 
narrow, or rarefy, the realm of criteria in the specific case. Yet even so, it is a 
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mistake to assume that the exceptional just of the rabbi could possibly evade the 
realm of the common and the categorized. One's status as a rabbi is hardly less 
established or institutionalized than the everyday performances of the word justice. 
It is difficult, therefore, to imagine the rabbi capable of suggesting what would be 
clearly, by common criteria, unjust. Consider the following passage in a story by 
Martin Buber: 
Once Rabbi Elimelekh was eating the sabbath meal with his 
disciples. The servant set the soup bowl down before him. 
Rabbi Elimelekh raised it and upset it, so that the soup poured 
over the table.26 
Now, is that just? It would be missing the point to think that some sort of self-
control on Rabbi Elimelekh's part would have to ensure that what is attempted is 
just - he could not possibly take the risk of doing or stating that which could not 
be read, by the prevailing criteria, as just. But, being part of the situation, what 
would contradict the criteria, the models, habits and patterns, of justice that are in 
place would simply not be available to him to begin with. As Fish puts it, 'all 
preferences are principled,' even though principles do not fonn a category that can 
be hierarchically opposed to preferences.27 As that which is common and 
established does not refer to a narrative, a genealogy, that would transcend that 
which is individual, the individual is in each case what is already common. How the 
rabbi's action is received in the end, therefore, is anything but a surprise. 
All at once young Mendel, later the rabbi of Rymanov, cried 
out: 'Rabbi, what are you doing? They will put us all in jail!' 
The other disciples smiled at these foolish words. They would 
have laughed out loud, had not the presence of their teacher 
restrained them. 28 
Choice is hardly the word that defines either the rabbi's action or the reaction from 
the audience. Supposing for a moment what the rabbi did did not turn out to be in 
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harmony with the prevailing criteria. the dramatism that would then be the case 
would have already altered the game; no one would describe then what the rabbi 
would have done as the effect of a choice. Nor does seem to be much choice, in the 
face of the rabbi's action. on the part of his audience. In the story. the young Mendel 
who ventures to make an - anti-institutional- choice (supposing that can be said) 
is not already a drop-out. He is not excluded from the game; there is not much that 
is dramatic other than he being called a fool. The adjective 'young.' however. which 
Buber is quick to put before Mendel's name. accounts for it all. Training. a time-
related enterprise. stands behind the whole event We do not drop out children for 
the strictly anti-institutional 'choice' of communicating with their shoes, yet we 
would be likely to do it with grown-ups. 
In the end, what takes place appears to be truly situated (hence. a situation). and 
the rabbi as tamed and trained 'as one can hope to be'29 (as opposed to being a free-
wheeling. evasive. distant subject). Unlike what Lyotard implies. not a single 
element in the rabbinical situation turns out to be hanging in the air. The hanging in 
the air. however. is not only implied. but is clearly fonnulated by means of yet 
another dichotomy by Lyotard - that of prescriptives and descriptives. The 
Lyotardian line unfolds as follows: 
One can suppose that because the rabbi is honest, because he 
is just, because he is as just as one can hope to be, one can 
suppose that if he tells you that, it is not in order to deceive 
you. But one cannot be sure. Even if he is not seeking to 
deceive you. he himself may be deceived. Here we are in a 
relation that is proper to prescriptives. because there is no test 
for the just whereas there is for the true. One cannot compare 
what the rabbi says with a state of affairs (a Sachverhalt).30 
There is evident continuity between the apocalyptic account of morals in modernity, 
the initial argument in the Lyotardian text,31 and the contention here. Statements of 
justice, rabbinical or otherwise. are defined here as prescriptives, and contrasted 
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with the class of propositions which simply mirror things rather than assign 
directions to them. The latter can be tested in the face of things which they describe, 
while the former lack the content to be factually verified. Consequently, moral 
judgements appear, once more, on the loose. The sense of a proposition,' declares 
Tractatus, the early work by Wittgenstein, 'is its agreement and disagreement with 
possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs [der Sachverhalte].'32 
The utterances which do not stand for facts, as states of affairs, are transcendent of 
the factual world. And that which transcends the world transcends language. We are 
not capable of talking about the unworldly and, at once, of making sense. That is 
because our language is no more than a totality of pictures which reflect the most 
basic worldly facts, a medium therefore not suitable to convey sensibly that which 
corresponds to no such factual being. That which is transcendental is the mystical. 
inexpressible and incommensurable (Unaussprechliches).33 Crudely, such is the call 
to silence in the discourse of Tractatus, a work which bears little in common with 
the later work of its author. Very much reminiscent of that rhetoric, Lyotard notes: 
One cannot compare what the rabbi says with a state of affairs 
(a Sachverhalt). There is no state of affairs that corresponds 
to what the rabbi says, and it is proper to prescriptives not to 
make commensurate their discourse with a reality, since the 
'reality' they speak of is still to be.:W 
To elucidate the latter day adherence here to what has come to be known as the 
logical positivist reading of Tractatus, 35 we could imagine the rabbi stating, before 
he goes on to pronounce his command, that 'there is a pot of flowers by the 
window.' The components of a statement such as this, accordingly, are analyzeable, 
through a logical reduction, into their most elementary parts. In turn, the elementary 
utterances can be checked against the elementary facts (states of affairs), of 
independent phenomena, in order to judge the accuracy, the truth, of the 
correspondence between the two. Roughly, that is how the true utterances are 
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distinguished from the false utterances, and, in the event, indeed, of an utterance 
with no factual content, meaningful utterances from the ones which are not so. We 
can readily multiply the kind of utterances which, however possibly false, as well as 
true, would nevertheless radically oppose the incommensurability of the justice, the 
truth, of the command by the rabbi to 'throw the flower pot out of the window.' 'We 
are four people here in this room.' 'The Rabbi wears a black gown.' 'He is older than 
I.' In each of these utterances, the truth the proposition bears can be tested in the 
face of facts it depicts in a pictorial fashion. The picture theory of Tractatus aims at 
hard truth, and is resolved to avoid many of the classical subject matters of 
philosophy by rendering them in advance as senseless. At best, for that which 
transcends the world, such as religion and aesthetics, silence is invoked. I have 
argued that invitations to silence following the claims of incompetence. of man's 
either language or sight, anticipate a sphere which exists beyond language and sight 
- one of the most persistent themes of modem metaphysics. The idea of banishing 
pieces of speech from speech in general does presuppose, however, a pattern to 
those pieces, one which has to be recognizable before banishing is possible. Does 
the inevitability of a pattern not indicate a basic and uninterrupted circulation of 
signs and subsequent meaning effects on the part of the banished pieces? How 
exactly do the concepts, of incommensurable nature, are distinguished from what 
are mere graphic or phonetic marks? Does one get to know the words just and 
beautiful in a way radically different from the words room and gown? 
Just as the dichotomy between the literal and the metaphorical,36 a distinction 
between prescriptives and descriptives is, no doubt, a legitimate tool with 
considerable efficacy. The legitimacy, of which one can speak, however, is one 
ensured by the grammar of the dichotomy, that is to say the models and habits, by 
which the tool is in each case employed. Are the words description and prescription, 
on the basis of criteria, labels attached to radically distinct states? On the contrary, 
in each and every instance, much of that which is considered to be descriptive 
seems to be already taken for granted. 'The Rabbi wears a black gown.' That colour 
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distinctions are cultural formations is a commonplace piece of anthropology. A 
gown is perhaps even more obviously prescriptive in its referential content. Again. 
probed, wearing will prove to be a concept with an equally controversial subject 
matter; let alone cultural diversities, it will be hard to pinpoint just what exactly is 
common in the uses of the word in various examples such as wearing perfume, a 
gown, a particular expression, a situation. 
Similarly, the declaration that 'there is no test for the just'37 turns a practical tool 
of everyday discourse into an element getting in the way of that very practicality. 
The 'just,' a much used word in language, must be testable by definition. That 
convention does not seem to point to one fixed way of employing it is hardly a 
deficiency on the part of the word. Why on earth should there be only one? What 
really counts. of course, is the fact that all the ways of employing the word is 
determined by some consensus which is in each case prior to what might be called 
secondary disagreements of it - discords that are as/air as agreements. If. on the 
other hand. the game pursued is one of attempting to see through that which is 
conventionally just (supposing this is a feasible concept); in that case. not only the 
words descriptive and prescriptive. but also the very notion of testability will cease 
to make any sense. Testability will become a notion with no conceivable use. It will 
have no use. because where there is no test for the prescriptive, nor will there be one 
for the descriptive. Alluding to the age-old tradition of all-inclusive scepticism in 
philosophy, '[d]oubt,' notes Wittgenstein, 'comes after belief.'38 'Throw this flower 
pot out of the window.' 'The Rabbi wears a black gown.' Does one employ, in 
judging the truth, the justice, of either of the statements, a frame of reference that is 
different in kind from what one would employ with the other? Perhaps not 
surprisingly, scepticism (the kind whose paradigmatic instance is the Cartesian 
sceptic in Meditations) goes hand in hand with the hard realism of logical 
positivism where in effect the incommensurable is regarded as taking place outside 
history. outside the realm of the commensurable. The incommensurable, as Lyotard 
posits it, is more than just that which one habitually takes seriously without at once 
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demanding the sort of justification that is categorized to be inappropriate for it. The 
incommensurable refers, instead, to a failure that is characteristic in the face of 
some no-nonsense test of reality. Hence an opposition of paganism and Judaic faith, 
a dichotomy that is more than mere mimetic distillation - a genuine dichotomy. 
Considering, however, the generalized faith that is the primordiality of criteria, 
judgement seems to be a project that takes place onlY in faith. Paganism, therefore, 
appears to be none other than a sub-category of what one might call Judaism - or, 
alternatively, if the former is chiefly marked by its locality, vice versa: Judaism has 
to be a grammatical category of what is paganism: that which is local is also the 
primordial. 39 'Let's be pagans,' calls out Lyotard. The answer then is: we are pagans. 
Defined as the local, paganism is the sole conceivable way to be. 
1.3 The Just, the Unjust, and the Ugly 
I have noted that the 'just,' a word commonly performed, must be testable by 
definition. That is not to say, however, that those who are the sole authority to judge 
the uses of it in particular cases, namely the speakers of the language, must 
necessarily come up with a definition of the just, or, for that matter, of the unjust, 
which would apply to all cases. Even in one specific case, the part played by the 
audience appears to have already consented, in one way or another, what may be 
brought up in the specific case as just, rather than to reach a unanimous agreement 
on it. The idea that, if not a universally valid definition, there should be one right 
answer at least in the individual case is, for various reasons, not a practical one; nor 
does it bear any sufficient reason that it should necessarily be so. The idea 
presupposes an evasive force in man, one that is to form a common intellectual 
sphere for the participation of all and from which the contingencies of history are to 
be left out. l History, or, as Kant puts it, the 'sensible,'2 is to be suppressed. for it is 
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none other than the world of senses that prompts the undesirable diversity of beliefs, 
prejudices and habits. That is, of course, if what is evasive, detached, about man is 
not, in each case, what is already out in the open, in which case the particular idea 
of the just which claims more validity, whether universally or for a local, specific, 
instance, will be merely attesting to a policy which tends to hold some beliefs dearer 
than others.3 As for the practicalities of the concept, decisions of the just are 
amongst those which one has to pursue in one's daily life in greatest multitude. Yet 
often one does not appear to have an overwhelming difficulty in assessing exactly 
how to go about it. At least, in each case, one seems to be in a position to be able 
reasonably to weigh the available suggestions of the just and the unjust. 'Let us take 
a look at it differently,' Thebaud invites Lyotard, immediately after the propositions 
of the just are certified untestable by the latter. 'What do we do with a thesis like 'it 
is unjust; I rebel'? How is one to say this if one does not know what is just and what 
is unjust?'4 If they do not correspond to circumscribeable states of affairs, have no 
factual content, and are therefore neither true nor false, what will one make of such 
everyday declarations of the good and the bad, of the just and the unjust, 
distinctions that are obviously indispensable for the continuity of life? In a blind 
struggle of competing moralities, is it not strictly the case that anything goes? 
The conclusion that anything goes does not stem merely from the Lyotardian 
project. It is deeply rooted in a tradition, from Plato to Descartes and Kant, in its 
principal stepping stones, one which appears to conceive of man within the 
framework of an inflexible dichotomy of the sensible and the intelligible.5 The 
human condition, in turn, becomes doubly apocalyptic; for not only the world of 
senses is cut loose, but, deprived of the criteria of senses to bridge the presumed gap 
between the private and the common, the world of reason is rendered devoid of 
unifying standards, a common language. Lyotard therefore ventures, for the sake of 
everyday continuity, to draw a definitive, unifying, line, if not for the just, for at 
least the unjust. He suggests: 
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Absolute injustice would occur if the pragmatics of 
obligation, that is, the possibility of continuing to play the 
game of the just, were excluded. That is what is unjust. Not 
the opposite of the just, but that which prohibits that the 
question of the just and the unjust be, and remain. raised.6 
In the passage the game perspective comes to the foreground not quite accidentally. 
Just Gaming introduces itself as an enterprise to 'use Wittgenstein's theory of 
language games to examine the problem of justice. '7 As he posits the notion of 
games, however, Lyotard does so only to induce further confusion. Because he has 
already excluded from the game the criteria of habits, models and patterns, the 
concept of a grammar which is absolutely central to the Wittgensteinean 
formulation. the notion has been already neutralized. Subsequently, that which is 
game-like becomes simply another way of referring to that which is shallow and 
unruly, that which has nofirm ground to stand on. 'It is unjust; I rebel.' This game is 
played throughout one's everyday life, when shopping, when encountering things in 
the street, when watching television. In each instance, however, one's is a 
judgement with no 'solid' foundation. It is in each case a statement that goes, by its 
nature. untested and unverified. But since these judgements are indispensable. one 
must try and learn to live with them. And that is exactly where the criterion of 
injustice comes in. Although there is not much one can do about it. one can try and 
soothe, as it were. the pain of having to live with one's unbridled. unadulterated. and 
therefore incommensurable. instincts. This soothing is done by means of a universal 
line. one which is to mark out injustice in its absolute form. Absolute injustice, 
accordingly. becomes the case in one's ineluctable tackling of rival players when it 
is in order to drive the rival players out of the game. Considering the anything-goes 
situation naturally anticipated on the basis of the dichotomy between the sensible 
and the intelligible. the line Lyotard has to draw is tantamount to declaring amidst a 
free-for-all, 'No hitting below the belt!' 
One characteristic instance, according to Lyotard, where transgression is absolute 
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is terrorism.s Terrorism, he elucidates, marks itself by what distinguishes it from 
war. Unlike the latter, terrorism is set to deny others even the mere chance of taking 
part in the game. The case that well illustrates this point, he indicates, is the much 
publicized kidnapping, in 1977. of a German industrialist, Schleyer, by the gang 
Baader-Meinhoff in order to pressurize the German Government. The terrorists 
threatened to kill Schleyer (they eventually did kill him) unless the Government 
freed their friends in prison. This, comments Lyotard, 'excludes the game of the 
just.' 
It excludes the game of the just because the Schleyer in 
question is obviously taken as a means here. He is threatened 
with death, but this threat is addressed to a third party, not to 
him.9 
An act of war, on the other hand, where rival players are fully engaged in the game 
with the essential untestability of the objectives that the sides have in the game 
intact, bears 'no relation' to the act of terrorism. lO For instance, in the case of the 
less publicized raid by the same gang on the American installation in Heidelberg 
and the subsequent destruction of the equipment there, we have a radically different 
picture, 'the group considers itself at war; it is waging war and it is actually 
destroying a part of the forces of the adversary.'ll In this picture, first of all, there 
are two sides involved which is what 'the rather exact game' of a war l2 is all about. 
The sides have their freedom 'complete,' because they are fully in the game. They 
both think just and do accordingly, considering, at once, the adversary to be 
thinking unjust and acting unjustly.13 In the kidnapping case, on the other hand, the 
'complete' freedom of the others involved is precisely what does not happen. The 
hostage is not 'treated like an adversary,'14 because the kidnappers themselves do 
not consider him to be part of the game. In a war, the same Schleyer would be 'at 
[the] risk of being killed in an attack, but that is not the same thing at all. Then he 
would have been treated like an adversary,'IS and therefore already a party in the 
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game. In the dichotomy of war and terrorism. much seems to be invested in the 
distinction between the 'means' and the 'adversary.' What states of affairs exactly do 
these conceptions correspond to? Do the means, as opposed to the target. and the 
third party, as opposed to the adversary. continue to remain serviceable once they 
become part of an ambitious fonnulation?16 What exactly is it that constitutes the 
side against which the terrorist gang is waging a war? In attacking the American 
defence interests in Germany, is it the American Government the gang is fighting? 
Is it an American-German alliance that is regarded as adversary by the terrorists? 
What side does the gang itself represent? Is Lyotard himself on a side when reading 
the Schleyer affair? Why is it that the gang chooses Schleyer to kidnap and not an 
academic in Paris? How many sides is it against which the gang is pursuing its war? 
Is it a multitude of wars taking place simultaneously yet clearly cut from each other, 
as in each case the game played must be the 'rather exact game' of a war with 'two' 
clear sides? 
The kidnapped man, Schleyer, was the person in charge of Germany's employers' 
federation. As Lyotard does record himself. Schleyer 'considered himself as being 
indeed at war; he had himself surrounded by armed bodyguards.'l7 And who were 
the terrorists? The Baader-Meinhoff gang set themselves the aim 'to hit the 
Establishment in the face.'18 On Lyotard's part. the kidnapping of Schleyer, the head 
of the employers' federation. by a gang seeking to fight the establishment does not 
seem to be a particularly apt example. He could have pointed out, instead, to the 
hijacking of an aeroplane, with unsuspecting German tourists, an event that took 
place at about the same time and in solidarity with the kidnapping of Schleyer. 
Would that make Lyotard's point more credible? The argument Lyotard pursues, 
however, is far from being clear altogether. He thinks of Schleyer not as 'part of the 
forces of the adversary,' while the American computer destroyed in Heidelberg is. 
The kidnapped man is simply a 'means,' as distinct from the 'adversary.' Then, 
however, Lyotard appears somehow to revise the case. Schleyer did think of himself 
as fighting a war. Does that mean, then, that the kidnapping could be an act of war 
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after all? It does not, answers Lyotard. Because, if it were really an act of war, 
Schleyer 'would [have] belen] taken as an adversary and destroyed as SUCh.'19 It was 
not a war, because the kidnapped was not treated as an adversary. And he was not 
treated as an adversary, because he was treated as a hostage. Schleyer and the 
Government are pictured by Lyotard as two radically distinct entities, the latter 
being almost a transcendental one. What the picture would be from the viewpoint of 
the gang, or of Schleyer, or of the Government, he is not particularly concerned 
about. What adds to that is the curious logic that, in an act of war the enemy force 
must simply and necessarily be destroyed, just as the equipment in Heidelberg. 
Once got hold of 'part of the forces of the adversary' one is not allowed to try and 
make the most of it. How do the confusions arise? The terrorism in question, notes 
Lyotard, 
is a politics that is absolutely 'immoral.' You understand what 
I mean. One is working in a tripatriate fashion, and the blow 
one delivers to the other is not a blow that weakens him. 
Whether Schleyer is alive or dead changes nothing to the 
economic direction of Germany ... 20 
One clue to how things get tangled up is the immoral in the paragraph in quotation 
marks. What he expects from his addressee is to understand (and of course we all 
do), that the absolute immorality he speaks of is but a figure of speech. Terrorism 
exemplifies the absolute unjust, yet this judgement is not generated by a morality 
outside inverted commas. A chain of confusions arise by the odd attempt on 
Lyotard's part to reach a point from which he could condemn terrorism without at 
once being moralistic. He could not condemn terrorism from a moral stance; if he 
did, that would have lost his argument its entire point. To avoid morality in its 
infirmness, incommensurability, he is forced, once more. to rearrange the grounds 
for his comment on the Schleyer affair. 'Whether Schleyer is alive or dead changes 
nothing to the economic direction of Germany .. .' One confusion delivers itself to 
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another. Here Lyotard gives the impression that he might be inclined to ignore the 
crucial distinction between the means and the adversary, and consider the 
kidnapping to be not absolutely unjust after all, had it been a 'weakening blow' to 
the German economy, the real adversary. Did the destruction of the equipment in 
Heidelberg - what was clearly an act of war - cost the adversary more than what 
it did in the kidnapping case, an act of terrorism? According to many, incidentally, 
the Schleyer affair was the 'greatest publicity triumph' of the gang;21 a gang which 
aimed 'to hit the Establishment in the face, to mobilize the masses, and to maintain 
international solidarity.'22 And even if the kidnapping were not a 'blow' to the 
adversary. would that not be strictly all to it? Why would the instance have to be no 
less than one of absolute injustice? 
'It is unjust; I rebe1.' Is that bound to be a moral objection in each case? Lyotard 
is bothered in the first place for he consistently reads the moral as that which is 
shallow and unruly (hence. his misled preference for the word 'game').23 The 
solution he comes up with is that absolute injustice is at issue when the game of the 
just is no more. This, for him. stretches safely beyond moral contingencies. What it 
also does, most remarkably, is to refuse staking freedom in the game: 'my opponent 
thinks that what I think and do is unjust. and I think that what he does and thinks is 
unjust. Well, his freedom is complete and so is mine.'24 We were told earlier that 
'freedom does not come first,'25 that it is always defined in terms of the prevalent 
narrative and that it can be anything but complete. But then, was ever the pagan 
rhetoric delivered earlier more than mere sacrifICe to the gods of non-
transcendentalist politics, a trace in the texture eventually overcome by that which 
underlay Lyotard's entire discourse? It now spins around the glittering word of 
freedom, rather in the fashion of the Enlightenment philosophers. It is a nice piece 
of oratory. if one does not mistake the time and the occasion. One who certainly did 
not mistake the time was Kant. the most influential of the Enlightenment 
philosophers. To Kant, it seems, the 'freedom of the will' meant precisely what 
'complete freedom' means to Lyotard. 'What else, then can the freedom of the will 
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be: declares the former. 'but autonomy. i.e .• the property of the will to be a law to 
itself?' 
The proposition that the will is a law to itself in all its actions. 
however, only expresses the principle [of the categorical 
imperative] that we should act according to no other maxim 
than that which can also have itself as a universal law for its 
obj ect. 26 
How is the will to be 'a law to itself,' if it has to be administered in the first place by 
a maxim. the categorical imperative? Injustice occurs if you do other than that 
which you wish to be a universal law. What is it that makes that particular maxim 
more equal among equal maxims of morality? Note the uncanny resemblance 
between the categorical imperative and the Lyotardian sine qua non in the form of 
the continuity of the game of the just. Where the imperative leads, the will becomes 
a law to itself and freedom complete. To disobey the categorical imperative is to 
disregard others' right to participate in the game. Is not the notion of fair play. 
which seems essential to Lyotard's conception of absolute injustice. merely another 
moral declaration among many. just as the categorical imperative of Kant is one 
among a multitude of moral maxims. though somehow 'more equal' than others? 
Does it have a basis that is firmer (supposing that can be said) than that of the 
terrorist (im)morality whose characteristic is to deny others their complete freedom? 
What is more. not letting others raise competing questions may well be part of the 
game (of the just). Indeed, is that not precisely the case in waging a war? Even in 
the case of the hijacked aeroplane with unsuspecting civilians, mentioned above,27 
one may have to think twice before one reasons that the abhorrence one has of the 
entire thing is beyond moralities, and that the dichotomy between the means and the 
adversary may in that case be employed as an absolute measure. Hijacking and what 
is associated with it seem to be as much established as robbery and ordinary 
homicide. It is not an act unsuspected, to force the grammatical possibilities of that 
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word. On the contrary, hijacking is clearly suspected in the taking of such pre-
cautions as guarding, policing, security systems, and so on. There is a game in place 
the rules of which are fairly known. If we are to take the notion of fair play as 
something more than a rhetorical figure, that is to say as an absolute line, then fair 
play must be considered to be achieved so long as the mutually known rules, 
patterns, of the game are not broken. And how can one break a rule unless breaking 
it has already become a rule itself?28 In other words, the grammar of the adjective 
unsuspecting resists to justify the absolution required of it. The difference, 
therefore, between the situation of the civilians of a town under enemy shelling and 
that of the tourists under terrorist threat is not a difference in kind. The border line 
between the two cannot be drawn without the much dreaded moralities, criteria, in 
place. Terrorism does not simply exclude the just. In the absence of political traces, 
namely the moralities based on an incessantly shifting ground, terrorism cannot be 
told apart from war. That is, indeed. where Lyotard perceives the pain of a supposed 
paralysis, and hence his quest for the holy grail of, if not the just, at least the 
absolute unjust.29 Disregarding, of course, that what he may come up with, as well 
as his very pain, is already grounded in, and simply a mouthpiece of, the trails of 
force. the criteria, which are already in place. They are in place. yet in a state of 
flux - read by Lyotard as unreliable. What makes terrorism foul play and war 
otherwise. however, seems to be precisely this slippery ground as opposed to a 
pinpointable line which would apply universally. A perpetually shifting frame of 
reference is what one bases one's judgements on in numerous everyday uses of 'it is 
unjust; I rebel.' The grammar of the very word reliability. appears to be a possibility 
of this so-called slipperiness rather than an exception to it. Attempting to stretch. as 
it were, beyond that grammar, and qualify its ordinary, everyday game as 
unreliable, is a characteristic abuse of that very word. 
Lyotard, however, is easily past the point of no-return in his abuse of language. 
And justice and judgement take the lead amongst the words to be characteristically 
misused. In terrorism, the game of the just is excluded. Whereas in the 'rather exact 
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game' of a war, the sides have their freedom 'complete.' Thebaud asks: 'And you are 
saying that, at this point, one is just and the other unjust?' Lyotard's reply is 
enlightening: 
JFL: No, I am saying that they are incompatible. I am not 
judging. 
JLT: You are not judging. 
JFL: No, 1 am describing. 30 
The word is solemnly avoided on account that it lacks for its content a firm, 
morality-free foundation. In so doing he simply reproduces the distinction that 
marks the entire mainstream of Western philosophy: what one sees and one's ways 
of seeing, description and judgement. It equally marks the established legal rhetoric 
in the fonn of a dichotomy between what is read, the law, and the ways of reading 
it, interpretation, adjudication. It is the old formulation by Parmenides ('seeing and 
being are the same,' to follow Heidegger's reading of itll) in reverse. A radical 
separation of seeing and being has probably its best known expression in the 
Kantian project - appearances and things-in-themselves. l2 Lyotard avoids the word 
judgement in exactly the same fashion as Kant avoids elaborating on the category 
he establishes as things-in-themselves, beings that are independently of how they 
are seen. Heidegger points out the centrality of Parmenides' fonnulation to Western 
philosophy.33 Philosophers who can be put squarely against Kant have nevertheless 
reread the same fonnulation from exactly the same angel. Unlike Kant, for instance, 
the fundamental idea in both Hegel and Marx is a unity between rational and 
actual,34 and ideology and economy,35 respectively. What puts Kant, Hegel, and 
Marx together. however, is their consistent reading of seeing and being as two 
essentially distinct orders. 36 
What is remarkable regarding the traditional dichotomy is the position of the 
Aristotelian phronesis, of which departure from the post-Socratic tradition I have 
already noted. I quoted from Aristotle and argued briefly that judgement as a human 
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capacity independent of criteria is a notion alien to him. Having reached a point of 
comparison, we can now clearly establish why that is so. Aristotle states: 
that which would be judged, or which has been judged, a 
greater good, by all or most people of understanding or by the 
majority of men, or by the ablest. must be so; either without 
qualification, or in so far as they use their understanding to 
form their judgement. This is indeed a general principle 
applicable to all other judgements also; not only tM goodness 
of things, but their essence, magnitude, and general nature 
are in fact just what know/edge and understanding will 
declare them to be. 37 
What Aristotle indicates as a 'general principle' seems very much to be the 
sameness, in its Pannenidean-Heideggerian sense, of being and seeing, a concept 
whose mimetic distillations generate the everyday operational distinctions between 
essence and knowledge, nature and understanding. They are neither logically 
unrelated elements, nor two distinct yet significantly related articles. The confusion 
of the mainstream post-Socratic philosophy may be explained by its disregard of the 
attached, criteria-imbued, character of the dichotomy between seeing and being. 
'The Rabbi wears a black gown.'38 When a person expresses her misgivings about 
the truth of a particular statement, is what she does to oppose the statement to what 
is considered to be its content, that is to say what transcends the talks, citations, 
designations of it? According to Aristotle, it seems, what that person does in 
objecting to the statement is merely to put against a piece of knowledge that which 
is simply another piece of knowledge, a possible 'hierarchy' between the two being 
an effect of the judgement 'by all or most people of understanding of by the 
majority of men, or by the ablest.' The repudiation of seeing and being as 
transcendentally distinct elements brings man, that who sees, to the forefront. 'It is 
the peculiarity of man,' states Aristotle, 'in comparison with the rest of the animal 
world. that he alone possesses a perception of good and evil. of the just and the 
58 
unjust. and of other similar qualities .. .'39 That which distinguishes man from the rest 
of animal world is that which makes Heidegger choose man as the subject matter of 
his work on 'to be' (Being). Man stands out from other entities in that he sees. 
'Being is that which is an issue for every such entity.'40 The emphasis in the 
Heideggerian statement on the word 'issue' indicates what to Aristotle is 'the 
peculiarity of man.' Man. in his very Being. has Being as an issue. Consequently, he 
is the only being among beings with what Heidegger calls a 'potentiality-for-Being.' 
He sets models and patterns. and establishes criteria. Most important of it all he is 
capable of choosing, though not in a criteria-free. free-floating (a favourite 
expression with Heidegger). manner. He is always his own possibility. Remarkably. 
in Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle lays great emphasis on man and defines justice in 
tenns of the just man: 'justice is that in virtue of which the just man is said to be a 
doer. by choice. of that which is just ... '41 The distinctness of the Aristotelian justice 
from that of Socrates in The Republic is striking.42 What is the nature of man's 
choice? 'Being is that which is an issue for every such entity.' The accentuation on 
Being in the statement by Heidegger situates man's essence (Wesen) in his 
existence.43 That which is called by Aristotle the 'peculiarity of man,' namely his 
perception. is not a free-wheeling possibility. but a very much confined one. Man's 
potentiality-for-Being is defined by his relation to Being. Aristotle himself is quick 
to make that very clear: 
It is the peculiarity of man. in comparison with the rest of the 
animal world. that he alone pa;sesses a perception of good 
and evil. of the just and the unjust. and of other similar 
qualities; and it is association in these things which makes a 
family and a polis.+4 
Choice. in other words. is not the capacity which Kant, for instance, would 
rationalize within the framework of a distinction between the intelligible and the 
sensible, seeing and being. For Aristotle, on the contrary, the potentiality of man for 
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choice bears the constitutive mark of the attachments within the association of 
which he is part. Association in the just and the unjust is a prerequisite of 
judgement. This is stated by Aristotle in a celebrated passage in Politics: 'Justice 
belongs to the polis; for justice. which is the determination of what is just, is an 
ordering of the political association. '45 He does not, of course, identify the just with 
what might be called the positive law of the political association. He clearly thinks 
justice (dike) greater than the law.46 And yet nor does he seem to understand by 
justice a transcendental. natural. order. It is true that in both Ethics and Rhetoric 
Aristotle distinguishes between the just of the particular association and a notion of 
the just which transcends locality.47 How is that duality to be understood? If 'man is 
by nature an animal intended to live in a poliS.'48 and if the polis. the political 
association. is in turn a condition for judgement. the capability to distinguish 
between the right and the wrong. how exactly is man to conceive of a non-local. 
non-political, notion of justice? 
One possible way of looking at the Aristotelian position is to take into account 
his pre-dominantly rhetorical objectives. That is to say, it may be more than simple 
discontinuity in the work attributed to him that Aristotle continually transposes 
himself between the tenns of such oppositions as associational and natural justice. 
written and unwritten law.49 rule by judge and by law.so The consistent 
transposition. on the contrary. may refer to a subtle denial of those very 
dichotomies. Law is, as he makes no secret of it in Rhetoric. a domain precisely of 
such subtleties. 51 The fears which Barker, for instance, expresses in his Introduction 
to Aristotle's Politics would hardly have made sense to Aristotle himself. Where he 
describes the character of the Athenean popular courts with hundreds of members 
assigned to determine to dikaion. Barker notes: 'from any strict legal point of view 
this system is of course defective: it remits what ought to be strict and impartial 
justice to the emotional pleadings of litigants and the fluid popular sense of 
justice.'52 Where Aristotle speaks of legislation we must remember that the nomos is 
invoked, a genre of juristic literature which no formalist would really call the law. 
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The nomoi, in other words, were not exactly the Benthamite guidelines. And where 
the law courts are at issue we have the dikasterion in which rhetorical skills 
('partial ... emotional pleadings') are perfonned to an audience of hundreds of judges 
who are to decide the just. What thus took place at the Athenean courts, according 
to Barker, was a 'subjective' justice as opposed to a 'legal' one.53 Note the affinity 
between Barker's fear and that of Lyotard: the fear of the ordinary and popular 
opinion of justice as distinct from the just transcending criteria. Aristotle. on the 
other hand. would probably be mystified to be told that what is not of the popular 
and ordinary could possibly foster a court outcome; that what is expected of the 
litigant is other than to play, by any means in stock. to the prejudices already in 
place in order to illuminate and bring forth the desired pattern. 
While another way of looking at the Aristotelian duality is to re-read what it 
considers to be the universal, that is to say that 'which is everywhere by nature the 
best, '54 as opposed to the parochialism the law of the po/is could threaten to tum 
into. 
Universal law is the law of nature. For there really is, as every 
one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that 
is common to all, even to those who have no association or 
covenant with each other. 55 
That which contrasts with universal law. according to Aristotle, is particular law, 
the law of specific community. 'Particular law is that which each community lays 
down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten.'56 
In the same book of Rhetoric, the written principles of particular law are referred to 
as 'speciallaw.'57 The term 'general law.' on the other hand. signifies the unwritten 
principles, 'principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere. '58 In 
Ethics, the just 'by nature' is distinguished from the just 'by human enactment.'59 
The two are specified also as 'one unwritten and the other legal.'60 Things that are 
just by nature are everywhere the same and the best. While those that are just 'by 
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human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the 
same ... '61 Although clearly inclined to think of the universally just as an unwritten, 
non-legal, kind of justice, Aristotle associates it curiously with the politeia 
(constitution). Things that are just 'are not everywhere the same, since constitutions 
also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the 
best.'62 In a different translation Barker renders the last phrase as a separate 
sentence: 'And yet there is but one constitution which is naturally the best 
everywhere. '63 Since natural justice is supposed to be distinct from the written, 
formal. patterns of the just and yet that 'which is everywhere by nature the best' is at 
once designated as politeia, the signification of the 'constitution' therefore posited 
must not go unnoticed. Does the politeia refer simply to the constitution of a 
political association, whether on the basis of written principles or of a formal 
tradition - a reference which would constitute an immediate paradox in the 
Aristotelian formulation? Or is what is intended by the politeia the elusive 
assemblage of attachments that are at work at any given moment within the 
association?64 What must not escape attention is the primeval associationality 
Aristotle seems to allot to the concept, a primordiality which in turn resists a non-
associational, non-grammatical, dichotomy of the political and the universal. He 
may seem to disagree with the ineluctable associationality suggested by the politeia. 
In the passage quoted above he describes 'a natural justice and injustice that is 
common to all, even to those who have no association or covenant with each 
other. '65 Associations and covenants between different communities, however, need 
not necessarily be in the form of technical contacts. Man's ineluctable fraternity in 
what Wittgenstein calls 'the natural history of human beings'66 - what the term 
'forms of life' also stands for when it means, beside social conventions, the 
'extremely general facts of nature, '67 facts that are taken for granted too great a 
degree to be conspicu0us68 - at once signifies a bond, a natural association, in 
things political. Although Alexander the Great, the barbarian (hence, 
cosrnopolitically spirited?) pupil of Aristotle's, crossed half the world at the time 
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and made it much smaller than it used to be, that was by no means necessary for 
someone in India to associate in forms of life which also Aristotle in Greece did. 
Man is born to a world with definite resources. It all takes place under one and the 
same moon. Most probably, for someone in Manchuria to fish in the sea there was 
no need for a technical contact with a community in Carthage from whom to 
acquire the practice.69 People get hungry in whatever part of the world they may 
find themselves. There appears to be the game of making a living and the 
unavoidability of it. If you slap someone in the face, the reaction to it. of the flesh. 
will not be drastic in different parts of the world. Men seem to have bodily 
functions not dissimilar no matter how distant the communities in which they live 
are to one another.70 The equally compelling fact that men have for the most part 
differed in their opinions of the good and the bad. the just and the unjust, proves 
only that the forms of life which are therefore universally shared constitute a 
relatively small number among other life-forms. Eating is safely just in all parts of 
the world and has always been, but exterminating people on racial grounds is not. 
The differences of opinion may start as soon as it comes to what to eat, how to eat, 
and how much to it. An yet differences of opinion are at once subject to the 
'universal' relations of force, the attachments which exert themselves more and more 
as the global association of the world becomes smaller. The need for associations 
and covenants which Aristotle dismisses for the universally just, therefore, may be 
more properly understood as the need for technical contacts and covenants between 
different communities. The universal justice he makes 'common to all' is as much an 
associational, grammatical, political, justice as the locally defined justice that is 
inconceivable without the polis. A cosmo-political one. perhaps. 
Man, according to Aristotle, owes his Being to the polis. The polis, he contends, 
is 'a species of association.' In view of associations such as household and village, it 
is the 'most sovereign and inclusive.'71 All other associations or 'forms of 
community are like parts of the political community;'72 they become what they are 
only in and through it. Where Aristot1e mentions the polis as a narrowly defined 
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political organization, this we must not perhaps confuse with what his formulation 
as a whole suggests by it. The political organization of the association seems to be a 
contingency with a prehistory.73 As a primordiality, on the other hand, as history of 
attachment, the polis is less a technically organized association, such as the State, 
than an elementary association of force. 74 The polis then is mere assemblage of men 
with forceful habits. Man achieves himself in his primordial association with others, 
a fraternity that is 'prior to the individual. '75 Being born into the polis, one in each 
case finds before oneself an already established world. Even to defy the criteria, the 
models and patterns already in place, one will have to have recourse simply to what 
is another set of criteria, habits, again made available by those with whom one 
primordially associates - the impersonal 'they' suggested by Heidegger, das Man 
(the French on). 
'The Others' whom one thus designates in order to cover up 
the fact of one's belonging to them essentially oneself, are 
those who proximally and for the most part 'are there' in 
everyday Being-with-one-another. The 'who' is not this one, 
not that one, not oneself [man selbst] , not some people 
[einige]. and not the sum of them all, the 'who' is the neuter, 
the 'they' [das Man].76 
To be, accordingly, is to be already in the house of the polis, a fundamental human 
condition in which '[e]veryone is the other, and no one is himself.'77 Such states as 
authenticity, a complication in the Heideggerian work,78 and intellectual privacy,79 
are to be understood as mimetic cultivations, that is to say as moods acquired 
through partisanship within the polis rather than independently of it. Aristotle calls 
those who are detached from the polis as beasts and gods. 
The man who is isolated - who is unable to share in the 
benefits of political association, or has no need to share 
because he is already self-sufficient - is no part of the polis, 
and must therefore be either a beast or a god. 80 
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To dissociate from the po/is is to dissociate. among other intellectual formations. 
from law and justice. That is because 'justice. which is the determination of what is 
just. is an ordering of the political association. '81 In detachment. man. the perfect 
animal. becomes 'the worst of all. '82 What Aristotle states. of course. is less an 
ethical bluff than sheer irony on his part. One who dissociates can hardly go so far 
as to be the worst of animals; the naming of the isolated as 'either a beast or a god' 
refers to the absurdity of the concept. Detachment is a refined mode of attachment. 
a possibility of the po/is. rather than an evasion despite and in the face of it. 
1.4 The Ordinary and the Extraordinary 
Paradoxically, that which corresponds to seeing in the presumed dichotomy 
between the prescriptive and the descriptive is not the latter. but the former, the 
prescriptive. As the assault on senses pursued famously by Descartes in the Second 
Meditation makes it clear. to see is to prescribe.1 While describing. the mere 
surfacing of that which is. is left to the intellect. Yet how does one locate the 
demarcation line between the two realms? In the absence of criteria how does one 
avoid the apparent arbitrariness that characterizes the class of propositions deemed 
prescriptive? 'Oh. one can always avoid it,' writes Lyotard. 
For my part. I prefer the thesis of pure and simple 
transcendence, that is. there is a willing. When I say this. I am 
answering like a pure Kantian. There is a willing. What this 
will wants we do not know. We feel it in the form of an 
obligation. but this obligation is empty, in away. So if it can 
be given a content in the specific occasion, this content can be 
only circumscribed by an Idea. The Idea is... 'the whole of 
reasonable beings' or the preservation of the possibility of the 
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prescriptive game.2 
What is surpassed by 'pure and simple transcendence' is the association of habits, 
models and patterns. The 'Idea' which thus secures the detachment of the judgement 
from the parochialism of the polis, the community, is that which we have already 
seen to distinguish war from terrorism, namely the idea of the continuity of the 
game of the just.3 What is new is the delayed acknowledgement to Kant. It comes in 
a project which has been anxious to employ for itself the refreshing seal of 
'paganism.' I have tried to draw attention to the markedly Kantian presuppositions 
of that most peculiar paganism. Here Kant comes in, surprisingly, as a novelty to 
supplant what has been said so far. 'I hesitate between two positions,' notes Lyotard, 
'while still hoping that these are not two positions. To put it quickly, between a 
pagan position, in the sense of the Sophists, and a position that is, let us say, 
Kantian.'4 One of the two points Lyotard finds the Sophists and Kant have in 
common is the sense of history, the inescapabiJity of history. or. to put it in 
Aristotle's language, the priority of the polis to the individual, the ineluctability of 
the pagan localism.5 The second point is the notion of time implicit in the Sophist 
thinking. a concept which does. according to Lyotard. a sorting out job similar to 
that achieved by the Kantian Idea.6 It is true that the Kantian opposition between 
things-in-themselves and appearances has history as its frame of reference; the latter 
term signifies phenomena in the mediation of history. In this account. however, the 
role of history is clearly reduced to the realm of senses which, for man, signifies 
only 'the side of his lower powers." By exercising his ethical agent, namely his 
reason, on the other hand. 'he distinguishes himself from all other things, even from 
himself so far as he is affected by objects. '8 Man, therefore, 
has two standpoints from which he can consider himself and 
recognize the laws of the employment of his powers and 
consequently of all his actions: ftrst, as belonging to the world 
of sense under laws of nature (heteronomy), and, second, as 
belonging to the intelligible world under laws which, 
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independent of nature, are not empirical but founded only on 
reason [autonomy).9 
The incommensurability which Kant assigns to things-in-themselves - and which 
he believed marked his departure from traditional metaphysics - serves in fact 
only to reproduce the idea of presence which is the defining characteristic of the 
tradition. 1o The idea of presence. as with the Cartesian conception of mind. is an 
assault on history rather than a submission to it. 1be Kantian historicism perceives 
the mediation of history only to emphasize man's disability to see beyond history. 
Furthennore, the disability seems to vanish in the matters of morals. Man as the 
force of the intellect, a notion - needless to say - that would hardly find room in 
the Sophist thinking, detaches himself from the contingencies of history; 'we 
transport ourselves into the intelligible world as members of it and know the 
autonomy of the will together with its consequence, morality.'ll Morality, the idea 
of a moral order, in other words. is conceivable because the intellect as '8 law to 
itself'12 is a possibility. Securing morality, indeed, is the objective behind all the 
conceptual trouble Kant puts himself into in the first place. From the Sophist 
viewpoint, on the other hand, it is precisely the anxiety (for moral order) on the part 
of Kant's project that is absolutely uncalled for. The universal imperative Kant 
comes up with in the end is a line which he simply picks up in an all-engulfing 
association of criteria, an association which he makes the mistake of taking as a 
repressible arrangement of loose ends. The Kantian misconception is typically 
reflected in Lyotard's approach. He compares the Sophist assumption of time as a 
regulator of morals to the Kantian Idea, to start with. As soon as he comes to think 
of the discrepancies between the two positions, however. Sophism becomes mere 
justification of what is in effect a condition of non-morality. a state in which 'one 
looses all capacity to make the slightest judgement about what ought to be done. '13 
The anxiety is ill-grounded not because a fetishized notion of time serves in the 
Sophist case as a substitute suprasensibility. The anxiety that characterizes the 
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Kantian-Lyotardian position, however, follows from a typical underestimation of 
the significance of what Derrida terms, in a reading of the Kantian notion of beauty, 
the frame. 14 In Kant's Critique of Judgement, the judgements of 'taste proper' based 
on the form of the object of art transcend the sensible qualities of the object exactly 
the way the Kantian-Lyotarclian judgements of morality proper based on the Idea 
transcend criteria. 'A judgement of taste, therefore,' notes Kant, 'is only pure so far 
as its determining ground is tainted with no merely empirical delight'lS In fact. 
according to him. no such thing as 'merely empirical delight' exists. That which is 
empirical about the object of art cannot be said to be delightful by itself, but it must 
owe its chann to the form. 
Even what is called ornamentation (parerga) , i.e., what is 
only an adjunct, and not an intrinsic constituent in the 
complete representation of the object, in augmenting the 
delight of taste does so only by means of its form. Thus it is 
with the frames of pictures or the drapery on statues, or the 
colonnades of palaces. 16 
In his reading. Derrida puts into question the hierarchy between the form of the 
aesthetic work (ergon) and its frame (parergon); the former as the pure aesthetic 
object of the work, and the latter as that which is purely accidental and 
supplementary about itP His reading focuses on the frame as 'the limit between the 
inside and outside of the art object,' between what is intrinsic to it and what is 
external. IS Since the purity Kant is after is what is left of the object of art after all 
the accidents, all the parerga, are stripped away from it, Derrida concludes that this 
stripping away in order to reach the pure beauty will in the end leave nothing of the 
object but its mere frame,19 What is a frame? 'There is frame [framing],' states 
Derrida. 'but the frame does not e x ~ t . . '20 Framing is the negation of a possible border 
between inside and outside, the sensible and the pure. As an association. however, 
of prevailing habits. models and patterns. a totality of attachments that is ultimately 
and uniquely responsible for the beauty or lack thereof of the object. the frame does 
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not refer to an exhaustible. pinpointable. circumscribeable sort of a (con)text; it 
'does not exist.' Framing is an event that cannot be fetishized or reified. The centre 
holds not only for the sake of the frame. as opposed to what would be the work-
itself. but also because the frame resists framing. a state of affairs that while 
affirming the transparency that defines the process at once yields to the energy of 
the very process and becomes elusive. 
The Kantian project of 'pure and simple transcendence'21 and the Sophist politics 
of involvement, of the parerga, the politeia,22 do not exactly indicate a strikingly 
common origin. Lyotard himself seems to forget all about the peculiar syncretism 
he attempts as he proceeds to state the basic disparity between the two. While the 
Sophist position clearly suggests a medley of equally authoritative opinions, and 
therefore confusion, the Kantian Idea makes genuine opposition possible. That. with 
Kant, one is subsequently enabled to judge between different maxims of the will. 
according to Lyotard. is particularly significant in view of the obviously hazardous 
instances of ethical and political choice. Contrary to the undecided character of the 
Sophist position. some such mechanism of an Idea can mark with required finality 
that which will never morally hold: 
in matters of ethics and politics. one can see quite readily that 
there is... a regulating Idea, that allows us, if not to decide in 
every specific instance. at least to eliminate in all cases (and 
independently of the convention of positive law), decisions, 
or, to put it in Kant's language, maxims of the will, that 
cannot be moral. 23 
The Sophist politics of persuasion, of 'opinion,' on the other hand. Lyotard 
designates as 'rule by convention.' According to that position, 'what is just in a 
collectivity of human beings at a given moment, is that which has been convened as 
just.'24 He adds, however. that the representation here, of the Sophistic account of 
morals, follows Sophism 'in [its] most banal, and probably most falsified, aspect. '25 
Why he does not try to reproduce a less banal picture of the Sophistic standpoint is 
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something of an enigma, unless, of course, one remembers that he considers the first 
part of his own discourse (where he dispenses with criteria in the exact fashion the 
Kantian Idea transcends the sensible) to be Sophistic, and less banal an account at 
that.26 That which makes Lyotard's better is, no doubt, that which also makes it 
virtually indistinguishable from the plain Kantian position. The banality he 
attributes, in turn, is not to Sophism in its corrupt and oversimplified 
representations. On the contrary, he conceives of no politics of opinion that would 
not at once be banal. And what does that mean? It means that Lyotard does not for a 
moment entertain the idea that his is partly 'a pagan position, in the sense of the 
Sophists, '27 that his discourse is one of two distinct themes. He does not intend to 
give Sophism a chance in the first place. And why a politics of opinion is banal 
when defined as rule by convention, he states: 'A rule by convention would require 
that one accept, let's get to the bottom of things right away, even Nazism. After aU, 
since there was near unanimity upon it, from where could one judge that it was not 
just?28 The argument here I cited at the very outset of the present reading and 
pointed out the complications it involves in more than one way.29 It takes for 
granted considerably more than it can actually account for. And that is so not only 
in terms of facts but also, and notably so, of logical evidence. In fact Lyotard cuts 
off the very branch on which he stands. The evidence of logic clearly betrays him as 
he, first, refuses to assess the Sophist position in its own terms, namely that a 
possible reversing of the dictate of convention will in each case be simply more 
convention rather than an exception to it. Secondly, 'since,' as he puts it, 'there was 
near unanimity upon [Nazism]' at the time in Germany, the fact that the concept of a 
suprasensible Idea, the 'pure and simple transcendence,' the exercise of what Kant 
calls the higher power of man, may therefore become so obviously locally defunct 
suggests in turn that what is suprasensible may require the right soil and the right 
method of cultivation - that is to say the right set of conventions - in order to 
survive. And finally, Lyotard misjudges the very logic of the Sophist rhetoric in its 
opposition to a suprasensible concept of the just. When Thrasymachus famously 
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declares to an outraged Socrates that justice is 'that which is advantageous to the 
stronger,'30 his statement may be taken to mean a good many things beside its 
obvious disbelief in the so-called higher potentiality of man, in suprasensibility, but 
it may hardly be construed as a celebration and justification of power. And this is so 
for a good reason. One thing the statement doubtless does is to refuse to glorify that 
which is just - easily the perfect attitude to resist, rather than support, a regime 
such as that of the Nazi Germany and especially the force of the masses mobilized 
behind the regime. That it can offer a better stance in resisting painful prejudice is 
palpable by the mere fact that historical Sophist arguments to counter slavery, 
xenophobia, sexual discrimination, zealotry, and so on, have not only proved 
effective in time but are now part of the human rights literature taken for granted.31 
The irony of all this, of course, is that, despite the spectacular failure on the part of 
the political choices of the later Athenean philosophers who shared on almost every 
issue the opposite camp, their original views of the Sophists, as smooth-talkers with 
questionable ethics, have survived. Consequently, it has been the Sophists, and not 
the others, to be customarily charged with siding, or being philosophically open to 
side, with the status quo. Hence 'the extraordinary danger' Lyotard senses,32 once 
the Sophist rhetoric is led to its consequences as politics of opinion. So did Locke, 
perhaps not surprisingly, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, who not 
only displays an almost identical perspective to draw attention to the 'danger' in 
'opinion: but whose sad bigotry is also significantly underpinned by his distrust in 
opinion: 
There is another [ground of probability], I confess, which 
though by it self it be not true ground of Probability, yet is 
often made use for one, by which Men most commonly 
regulate their Assent, and upon which they pin their Faith 
more than any thing else, and, that is, the Opinion of others; 
though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor 
more likely to mislead one; since there is much more 
Falshood and Errour amongst Men, than Truth and 
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Knowledge. And if the Opinions and Perswasions of others. 
whom we know and think well of. be a ground of Assent. 
Men have Reason to be Heathens in Japan. Mahurnetans in 
Turkey. Papists in Spain. Protestants in England. and 
Lutherans in Sueden. 33 
It can be stated with more sense. therefore. that the Nazis had better inspiration and 
support in the totalistic suprasensibility suggested by both Locke and Kant than in 
the unstationary. life and difference affinning. views of the Sophists. This seems to 
elude Lyotard. who subsequently holds on to a mood of anthropological pride and 
insists not to see that against the horrors of humanity the only security one has is 
that of the continuity of criteria. There is no conceptual security and one will find 
no use for the misguided optimism of a suprasensible Idea. That is probably how 
the Sophists would have responded to the Nazi case. Yet this is no pessimism. for 
the kind of optimism which defines Lyotard's search lacks grammatical connections. 
If that which follows from the concept of judgement that is in each case at the 
mercy. as it were. of habits. models and patterns is to be labelled pessimism. then 
pessimism is primordial. Optimism exists merely as a political refinement of this 
primordiality. of that which in each case criteria. and only criteria. have already 
taken care of. 
As he draws his conclusion, Lyotard opts. not surprisingly. for the proud concept 
of man. as one made in God's image. His is a choice for the extra-ordinary, as 
opposed to the phronesis, the circumspection, of the ordinary. the common. A non-
mimetic. absolute. dichotomy of the extraordinary and the ordinary. almost as the 
distinctive seal of the very logic of dichotomizing. is therefore affirmed. He sums 
up: 
My question then is: Can we have a politics without the Idea 
of justice? and if so, can we do so on the basis of opinion? If 
we remain with opinion. what will be just ultimately is that 
upon which people agree that it is just. It is common opinion. 
This is an extraordinarily dangerous position. If, on the 
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contrary, we take a Kantian position, we have a regulator, that 
is a safekeeper of the pragmatics of obligation.34 
The position here may seem as something of a shift, on Lyotard's part, from an 
anxiety radically to distinguish between the categories of descriptives and 
prescriptives to a prescriptionism that is not shy to preach: 'Can we have a politics 
without the Idea of justice?' As the common patterns of the just are consistently held 
in suspicion and contempt, it does not become a matter of concern whether the just 
one has by virtue of simply being in a position to discuss it, the discussion by 
Lyotard included, is based on a regulating, suprasensible Idea. Yet the omission in 
fact preempts the inquiry as a whole: no talk of justice will succeed to evade the 
ranks of the ordinary if it is to aim at once to convey sense and be understood. What 
would it be like to have a judgement which is not based on a prevailing pattern of 
the just? How would one recognize a judgement based on a suprasensihle Idea 
when one did see one? That the rhetoric turns into an overtly moralizing one hardly 
indicates a shift in the ongoing discourse as a whole for it is of one piece with, and 
an effect of, its main and most persistent objective: dispensing with the audience.35 
That upon which people do not agree can, and should, if so required, become that 
which is just. What would it be like to have, for the just, that which is not sensihle 
- meaning both non-judicious and suprasensible? Even unreasonableness, 
however, seems to be a state very much established and sensible, one can tell it 
when one sees it, a fact that compels a reassessment of the presumed polarity 
between the ordinary and the extraordinary. The dichotomy is assumed by Lyotard 
throughout his discourse on justice to provide a frame of reference for the binary 
oppositions it lays great emphasis on; the author and the audience, the /crites and the 
/criteria. Here for the first time Lyotard produces his example of how the ordinary 
could be avoided. A departure from common opinion could be achieved, he states, 
by attending not only to 'all of society as a sensible nature, as an ensemble that 
already has its laws, its customs, and its regularities,' but also considering what he 
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terms one's capability to decide, 
the capability to decide by means of what is adjudged as to be 
done, by taking society as a suprasensible nature, as 
something that is not there that is not given. Then the 
direction of opinion will be reversed: it is not taken anymore 
as a sediment of facts of judgement and behaviour; it is 
weighed from a capability that exceeds it and that can be in a 
wholly paradoxical position with respect to the data of 
custom. 36 
Hardly anything about the 'capability to decide' indicates that it is not simply 
another tag for what to Kant is the higher power of man. The point is how some 
such capability goes unaffected by the laws, customs and regularities one 
encounters primordially.3? To illustrate how a reversal of the ordinary could be 
achieved. how that which is not already there and given could be reached, Lyotard 
gives an example from Corax, the Sicilian rhetorician whose work Aristotle 
criticizes in Rhetoric. According to Corax. as Aristotle relates it from the former's 
An of Rhetoric, 38 a man accused of violent assault on someone stronger is best 
defended on the basis of common probability: it is not likely that the weaker should 
beat the stronger. In the case of the stronger accused of the same charge, however, 
Corax' strategy for defence is, once more, one of probability. It is unlikely also for 
the stronger to have committed it, simply because he must have been aware all the 
time of the current thinking that, being the stronger, he is likely to be suspected of 
it. And that is precisely what would refrain him from committing it. The 
anticipation the defendant has in the latter case, comments Lyotard. of the current 
thinking, enables him to reverse that which is the ordinary, common likelihood. 39 
The route Corax offers in the specific case exemplifies one effective way out from 
the standards of the audience. The criteria of society as a sensible nature are 
transcended. According to Aristotle, on the other hand, the argument by Corax is a 
good example only of a 'spurious enthymeme. '40 He finds it enough evidence on 
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whose basis to condemn an entire school: 'This sort of argument illustrates what is 
meant by making the worse argument seem the better. Hence people were right in 
objecting to the training Protagoras undertook to give them. It was a fraud .. .'41 
Lyotard and Aristotle seem to oppose one another on the argument by Corax. As 
will be recalled. the former refers to the latter's idea of prudence. the phronesis. to 
mark the moment of judgement without c r i t e r i a ; ~ ~ the example Lyotard provides of 
that moment. however. is what. to Aristotle. is the cardinal instance of the very 
imprudent. In the confrontation. Aristotle stands alone. Opposite to him are Kant 
and Corax brought together by Lyotard. 
In the idea that Corax attributes to his client. .. there is already 
all of Kant. at least all of the Kant of the Idea: I am likely to 
be found guilty if opinion remains what it is, but if I 
maximize and if I use my imagination, if I anticipate what the 
judge will decide on the basis of common opinion. then I may 
be able to reverse the likelihood. the verisimilitude.43 
I have argued that Lyotard's partnership with Aristotle in a project which entertains 
the idea of judgement without criteria is ill-grounded. So is. paradoxically. the 
parting of the two on the significance of the argument by Corax. That is because 
both Lyotard and Aristotle read Corax' defence in terms significantly underlay by a 
dichotomy of the ordinary and the extraordinary. For Lyotard. Corax' client reverses 
the common and arrives at that which does not ordinarily exist. And a similar mode 
of the extraordinary. the uncommon. is detected by Aristotle. He points out that the 
argument is mere fraud. for it makes a particular probability look like absolute 
probability. The immediate appeal of the argument, according to him, is 
based on the confusion of some particular probability with 
absolute probability. Now no particular probability is 
universally probable ... for what is improbable [such as the 
claim of Corax's client] does happen and therefore it is 
probable that improbable things will happen. Granted this. 
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one might argue that what is improbable is probable. But this 
is not true absolutely.44 
Aristotle sees rhetoric as an art 'to produce conviction. ... 5 It addresses the beliefs and 
prejudices of an audience and skilfully rea"anges them. As such, rhetoric consists 
in modes of persuasion. 'The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of 
the art: everything else is merely accessory.'46 Given this, it is enigmatic that he 
should go on and issue classes of good and bad arguments, ones that are so 
recognized by a sudden and mysterious omission of persuasion as the sole criterion 
of the art. By his original line of thinking, one reasons, Corax' argument should be 
considered at worst to be of poor persuasive quality. To Aristotle, however, it is 
definitely more than that - it is a fraud. Relevant to that mystery are two points, 
one he particularly emphasizes in the First Book of Rhetoric, and one less 
noticeably stressed yet with even further-reaching implications. 'A man,' notes 
Aristotle immediately after indicating persuasion as that which rhetoric is all about, 
'can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these [modes of persuasion], 
and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.'47 He himself offers in 
Rhetoric contradicting arguments in both making and defending cases, arguments 
whose examples I provide in the present study.48 This, however, he does not regard 
as duplicity because the morality involved is already secured by the prerequisite that 
the case defended be right: 'for we must not make people believe what is wrong. '49 
The paradox is that it will be, once more, but persuasion, as the sole criterion, to 
establish whether one is making in the specific instance the right or wrong uses of 
the modes of persuasion. How does one tell the wrong uses of persuasion from the 
ones that are right? If an argument is persuasive enough to win 'all or most people 
of understanding or ... the majority of men, or ... the ablest'so on its side, what 
possible sense will it make to consider the argument as essentially wrong? What 
would 'wrong' possibly mean in that case? If it is of persuasive quality, one will find 
nothing wrong with it; and if one does find something wrong, then it is of poor 
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persuasive quality. If Corax' argument were persuasive enough. on what possible 
basis could one relinquish it as the worst made to seem the better? If any argument. 
indeed. can be made to seem better vis-a-vis its audience. on whatever else can one 
plausibly rely to dismiss it as essentially-worse-turned-better? A refined concept of 
audience perhaps? To see what to Aristotle is essentially w o ~ e . . we will have to 
quote him in full: 'A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these. 
and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly ... What makes a man 
sophist is not his abilities but his choices.'s1 The dislike Aristotle has for the cynical. 
irreverent image of the Sophist rhetorician serves in his judgement rather like the 
dreaded end in a bad dream which occurs first but which nevertheless appears as a 
consequence of that which comes after it. The end gives rise to the story of which it 
wishes to be the culmination. He would not have made that very clear if he simply 
dismissed Corax' defence as bad rhetoricianship and of poor persuasive quality. He 
makes of it. however. an example of that which is fake and fraud. His anxiety is 
almost tangible when he makes a virtual leap from Corax' example to Protagoras. 
one which is quite unfit for his otherwise rigorous style. 
This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the 
worse argument seem the better. Hence people were right in 
objecting to the training Protagoras undertook to give them. It 
was a fraud; the probability it handled was not genuine but 
spurious. and has a place in no art except Rhetoric and 
Eristic.s2 
The vision of rhetoric as an art littered with articles that are not all genuine leads us 
to our second point, one which unless we take as a practical demonstration of the art 
Aristotle teaches. has tragic implications. He resists a radical separation of seeing 
and being. and the phronesis. as the mood of praxis. of the politeia. well testifies to 
it. It never quite puts out. however. a spark which stands in total contradiction with 
all that and which is almost an apology for the all-inclusive and infiltratable 
forestructure of the polis - of its illusory bleakness. Rhetoric becomes a term of 
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depreciation, and to serve as a basis for this a dichotomy of the genuine and the 
spurious is invoked. Aristotle notes: 
the whole business of rhetoric being concerned with 
appearances, we must pay attention to the subject of delivery, 
unworthy though it is, because we cannot do without it... All 
such arts are fanciful and meant to charm the hearer. Nobody 
uses fme klnguage when teaching geometry. 53 
The metaphysics of presence, a view of the world whose repudiation is implicit in 
the concept of phronesis, 54 filtrates back into Aristotle's formulation exactly the way 
it will later haunt the work of J.L. Austin, a philosopher who is as much, if not 
more, detennined to avoid the specific mode of metaphysics and who, as 
demonstrated in Dereida's brilliant reading of his work,55 ends up effectively 
yielding to it. In his investigation of language, Austin distinguishes between 
ordinary and what might be called fine instances of language, and the latter he 
points out as being 'parasitic' upon the former and in turn life-less, 'etiolated.'56 The 
etiolated performances of language, according to him, can be excluded from the 
investigation. They can be dispensed with, because a statement of a doing 'will, for 
example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage.'57 
That which marks the actor's statement on the stage is the lack of genuine intention 
on his part. The calling in of intention as an indispensable element in making sense 
of the language disregards the primordially grammatical, mimetic, quality of it. As 
Wittgenstein puts it, 'a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed,' 
even when one has the least complicated relationship with it (such as naming). 58 
And what one grammatically considers to be the intention of the speaker is an effect 
merely of that very mise en scene, rather than a state that transcends the specific 
performance. As Dereida formulates the Austenean paradox, if the staging is that 
which marks the parasitic side of the binary opposition, then the parasitic, the 
etiolated, the non-ordinary, the fictitious, must be prior to the non-parasitic, a 
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transposition that subsequently renders it impossible to tell which one of the two is 
parasitic, or supplementary, after all.59 It is not simply accidental that one should 
encounter also in Aristotle the staging quality of rhetorical delivery: 'when the 
principles of delivery have been worked out, they will produce the same affect as on 
the stage,'60 the staged standing for the etiolated. What Aristotle belittles as 
unworthy appearances are none other than the stage-setting, the criteria, or, as 
Derrida calls it in his reading of Austin, the iterability which is absolutely prior -
exactly the way the polis is to law and justice - to the event of signification.61 The 
simulated character of that which is performed on the stage is not only a quality of 
language generally, but it is also what makes signification, the exchange of senses, 
conceivable in the first place. The difference between the ordinary and fme 
instances of language, therefore, is one of simulation, of mimesis, of mimetic 
distillation, rather than an element that is independent of the actual pattern, the 
criteria, namely intention. 'Nobody uses fine language when teaChing geometry,' 
writes Aristotle.62 The opposition between geometry and rhetoric is equally 
precarious.63 If a person did not use fine language in geometry, it is dubious that 
anyone would understand or listen to that person (supposing a geometrician 
speaking a language other than that of his discipline is a possibility), even though 
that which is fine will be defined differently in different settings. The seminal work 
by Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, for instance, is devoted entirely to 
capture the logic of the fine in different settings in science.64 Again: if it is the 
fancifulness that makes rhetoric marginal, that is to say, of mere appearances, then 
charm, fancy and fine language seem to lie at the very heart of all arts and sciences. 
Science then will have to be understood none other than a mimetically refmed 
branch of the greater and primordial art of rhetoric. 
Turning back to Corax' defence, for Aristotle it is spurious because it is based on 
a particular probability rather than the absolute probability of the strong beating the 
weakling. It is fake because it spins around that which is pale and etiolated - that 
which is the extraordinary. The likeliest, the least likely. One wonders, were the 
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great detective stories of the early and mid-twentieth century entirely lifeless 
because they often took into the centre that which was a particular mode of 
probability? Yet they did always start the investigation from the likeliest. Do plots 
have minds of their own, as literary critics once suggested, which may lead 
themselves in directions that may radically challenge the reader's expectations, 
interests and prejudices? The likeliest, the least likely. Apparently the classical line 
of logic is quite hackneyed now and abandoned in crime stories. The stories need 
further twists to go on surprising. No particular probability seems to be an 
absolutely particular probability; nor is an absolute probability an absolutely 
absolute probability. That may be because probabilities are dependent on forms of 
life in which they are situated.6s What seems to keep things in an order of 
predictability in a mimetically redefined sense is the very fundamentality of these 
forms of life which are for the greatest part commonly practised, forms which are, 
in tum, the ultimate limits of the persuasive capability of Corax' rhetoric - and that 
of Aristotle's against him, for that matter. The latter's fears, consequently, of the 
dangerous and bogus charm of the Sophist argument seem to be groundless. Those 
fears are probably there to tell us an entirely different story of suspense. 
Although both based on the logic of the ordinary and the extraordinary, Aristotle 
is aware, unlike Lyotard, that Corax' lawyer will in no case be telling his audience 
that which they do not already know. As he puts it, 'what is improbable is 
probable.'66 Indeed, that which is improbable could not possibly be improbable if it 
were not already probable, that is to say if it were not already within the realm of 
the transparent, the iterable. The grammar of improbability is as much established 
as that of probability. According to Lyotard, on the other hand, the anticipation by 
Corax of that which is probable on the basis of prevailing standards enables him to 
reverse it in a way that is radical enough to lead him to that which is not already 
there. 
Corax anticipates a judge who... relies upon the already 
80 
judged [i.e., the pattern of the likely criminality of the 
stronger] in order to establish and judge the fact. Whereas 
Corax relies upon not yet judged to establish precisely that an 
act did not take place. This law [the pattern] ... is nothing but a 
custom. It can be turned. It suffices to anticipate it.67 
The rhetorician does, for Lyotard, more than simply to attempt to rearrange the 
attachments already in place. On the contrary, he goes 'beyond the boundaries of 
sensible experience. '68 And he does so by means of a suprasensible extension, an 
Idea, which 'rests upon something like the future of further inquiry: there is a free 
field left open to the reflective judgement's capability to go beyond the boundaries 
of sensible experience.'69 The future of further inquiry lies in what is 'not yet 
judged.' In the unreal field of this non-historicity, 'the reverse of what is believed'70 
is achieved. That is so, however, only if 'what is believed' can be reduced to what 
Aristotle calls an absolute probability, namely the likely criminality of the stronger. 
Does the reasoning Corax seems to pursue evade the domain of habits, beliefs and 
prejudices? It is bound to be defined by some common attachment, because the 
argument needs, after all, to be read by those to whom it is directed. Could the 
audience possibly grasp, or pay attention to, that which is a private experience of 
the rhetorician, even if it were possible for the rhetorician to have the experience? 
And what exactly is it that is not yet judged about Corax' argument? Is it the client's 
mere awareness of the current thinking that the stronger is the likely criminal? As in 
our day, in the ancient Greece people did not offend because they were not aware of 
what would follow. But they did so in spite of the consequences. Is the 
suprasensible, then, the client's anxiety71 of what would happen if he committed the 
crime? Is it his subsequent forbearance? And if the elements that add up to the 
argument Corax suggests are already out in the open, namely well established pieces 
of habit, custom, convention, then it is perhaps imprudent to reduce what is believed 
solely to Aristotle's absolute probability. That is not to say, of course, that there is 
no difference between Corax' argument, the likeliest the least likely, and what 
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Aristotle considers to be a case of absolute probability, the likely criminality of the 
stronger. Nor is it to say that since the difference is one merely of mimesis, of 
criteria, Aristotle is necessarily wrong to be disturbed by it. To conclude, on the 
basis of mimetic primordiality, that the difference between the two arguments, or 
what by common sense would be good and bad law, is no difference at all would 
either indicate a political parochialism of a rather senseless kind or commit the very 
mistake Lyotard seems consistently to make, namely to look for a basis that would 
be finner than that of morals. What follows from the primordiality of that which is 
ordinary, habitual, common, sensible, or mimetic, on the contrary, is that the 
rhetorician makes use of what is simply another trail of the common, another 
arrangement of habits, rather than surpassing, as Lyotard would have us believe, the 
laws, customs and regularities of society as a sensible nature. The logic of the 
likeliest the least likely is as much real, or, alternatively,jictitious, as that of the 
likely criminality of the stronger. It offers no exit from the standards of the 
audience. Privacy, authenticity - the extraordinary - are states to be understood 
only grammatically. 
In the following part I discuss some of the questions in theorizing how to read the 
law, an enterprise marked by a distinction between that which is read, namely the 
law, and the ways of reading it: the problem of interpretative strategies. 
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2 THE LAW AND ITS READINGS 
The fonnal sources of private positive law, according to Geny, are statute and 
custom. What is sometimes referred to as decisional law, on the other hand, is to be 
confined, as regards the problem of the sources, to the sole function by courts of 
initiating in law the customary rule, and thereby upgrading the unrecognized custom 
to one of the formal sources of law. l As individual holdings are thought to be 
'subject,' by definition, 'to variation and contradictions: a clear diChotomy between 
court decisions and the law is established. Individual decisions in the application of 
law lack 'the necessary guarantee of all law making. '2 Law requires the kind of 
steadiness ensured by the precipitates notably of generality and cohesion to be 
found either in the pronouncements of one single authority. the legislator, or in the 
anonymous and, thus, again. single, or perhaps non-, authority of the common 
practice. the custom. As he makes note of it, one principle which designates 
unequivocally 'the necessary guarantee of all law making' is the principle of the 
separation of powers. It marks not only the political constitution of France whose 
private positive law concerns Geny primarily, but it is also very much concomitant 
with such common sense ideas as constitutionalism and the rule of law. And 
because it makes court outcomes as part of the fonnal law inconceivable, the 'quasi-
legislative authority' of the English judge signifies an obvious departure from, or, as 
he puts it in a more telltale phraseology, makes 'a well-known fiction' of, that 
particular principle.3 Edouard Lambert, a countryman of Geny's, likewise, draws a 
not especially flattering picture of the English law. He notes that it is truly a 'vicious 
circle' the way the English go about it. The judge is supposed to rely upon the 
established law and avoid being arbitrary, there is however no law to rely upon 
before he himself establishes it.4 
In the principal point of his aiticism of American legal realism, Kantorowicz 
invokes the dichotomy between the law and its readings in very much the same way 
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as Geny. The realists receive a stem rebuke for not respecting the distinction 
between law and fact and 'teach[ing] that law consists of judicial decisions alone, 
and therefore of facts.'5 Geny does not have a particularly high opinion of the tum-
of-the-century German legal movement freies Recht, the free law, of which 
Kantorowicz is probably the best known representative. Paradoxically. he brings 
against the Free School almost the same charge as that which Kantorowicz brings 
against the realists: that the Free School recognizes no formal authority of law. 6 
What in fact the project of the Free School involves, as Kantorowicz elucidates it, is 
to try and re-establish the relationship between the formal law and that which the 
formal law cannot, and does not, do without, namely the free law. The free law 
consists in mere construction, if stylish, and application of the formal law. statutory 
and case law. For the proper functioning of the latter, its 'free' interpretation 
supported by the non-formal data of experience is needed. 7 
Geny himself is a champion of 'free search,' libre recherche scientifzque.8 The 
unique point, in fact. which distinguishes his position from that of the Free School 
is simply the exegetical attitude, of a peculiarly fleeting kind. which he favours 
before the statute, namely interpretation of the written law solely by the legislative 
will.9 Arguably no less subversive. however. is the obvious mechanism behind 
Geny's stance which is that the more strictly one reads the statute the less 
problematic it is to abandon the law altogether and be 'compelled' to go on to do 
one's own free searching. Free objective search for a rule, according to Geny, 
follows as a necessity from the simple fact that no text is conclusive or particular 
enough, by the very nature of writing, to cover for all the requirements of an elusive 
life. lo Statute and custom are sources only of the formal law. Likewise, 
Kantorowicz distinguishes between the formal and the free law. What seems to 
differ one position from another, therefore, is neither a free-floating flair by the 
Free School nor a water tight formalism on the part of Geny. The dichotomy 
between the law and its readings remains unchallenged. 
It is hardly questioned either by the realists, even though they are criticized by 
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Kantorowicz for doing so. That is because the realist disregard of the dichotomy 
appears less to be a dissolution of it than a mere displacement of the hierarchy that 
it traditionally establishes. Realism does not intend a challenge to the logic that 
operates the formalist view of law, even though it jeopardizes the entire point of its 
project in that. It intends instead to establish simply an 'anti-formalism' content with 
the terms put before it. II The dictum by UeweUyn (and Frank) is a good illustration 
of the realist duality: 'Before rules, were facts; in the beginning was not a Word but 
a Doing.'12 The dichotomy thus affirmed is as old as the history of metaphysics. A 
possible dissolution of it would entail the designation of the word as a doing also, 
the realm of the latter in turn redrawn. And that would amount to considerable 
attenuation of the practical consequences of the realist criticism. The theoretical 
practice, therefore, appears to have tangible interests in a radical distinction of the 
formal and realist views of law. 
Why a decisional law based system should look a 'vicious circle' obviously 
relates to what looks like a 'short-circuit effect' that is thought to occur when one of 
the terms of the duality the law and its readings is somehow defunct. Geny makes 
the full functioning of it a requirement of the principle of the separation of powers. 
Far from being simply a remnant of the orthodox theory, the distinction between 
fact and law, concepts that mark the respective spheres of reality and validity, is 
central to the French rhetoric. I) Law transcends the accidents of its individual 
applications. That which is immediately paradoxical, however, is the much greater 
significance of the dichotomy in the very decisional law based systems despite, on 
the one hand, the lack of a canonistic formulation of it as in France and, on the 
other, the 'short circuit' image which the system seems to inspire by definition.14 
The bulk of Anglo-Saxon legal philosophy from the divergent views of Blackstone 
and BenthamlS down to the Hart-Fullerl6 and the Hart-Dworkin l7 debates seems to 
have centred consistently around the opposition of the reality and validity of law. 
Traditionally J mechanistic jurisprudence takes for granted the distinction between 
the law and its readings by its very epiphenomenal conception of adjudication. The 
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views. therefore. that the language is essentially marked by an 'open texture,'18 or 
that law is essentially an 'interpretive concept.'19 reflect the discontent with the law 
understood in mechanistic terms. The very idea of interpretation. however. is at 
once inconceivable without the involvement of the dichotomy between the law and 
its readings. It is the difference between meaning (the letter. intention. principles. 
and so on) and extension, the former term being transcendent of. and thereby 
unaffected by. the latter.20 It is a postulate, in each case. of the absolute autonomy 
of the former term, that which is read, vis-a-vis the ways of reading it. 
In the preceding part of the present study I noted that the mainstream legal 
philosophy simply reproduces the metaphysics of presence dictated by the 
traditional distinction of seeing and being. 2 1 Geny clearly attempts to draw 
borderlines for law exclusive of individual 'seeings,' or readings, of it. For seeing is 
understood as mere emulation, a private and biased vision ('subject to variation and 
contradictions'). of that which is. that which is present and selfsame. In the 
decisional law based systems the distinction is lay even greater weight upon because 
of law almost canonically being defined as an interpretative enterprise. Reading and 
the law (uncovering and the meaning) are posited as two distinct states. 
Interpretation, in turn. becomes pure presencing. Fierce debates over it are often not 
a threat directed to its purity. but simply to particular strategies of pursuing it. 
That the dichotomy between the law and its readings is not likely to hold against 
a critical probing is what I aim to demonstrate in this part. Does its dissolution, 
however. necessarily suggest the destruction of its apparent value. grammatically 
understood? A conception of law that is irrespective of its individual readings has 
been so very persistent in legal thought. I have already noted. regarding the 
Aristotelian distinction between natural law and the law of a particular 
association.22 the possibly political undercurrents of such enterprise. '[T]he law of 
Nature ... plain and intelligible to all rational creatures' is put consistently in the 
tradition in contradistinction to 'the application of it to ... particular Cases.'2l Natural 
law as distinct from incidents and conventions that surround the particular pattern 
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seems to be the purest expression of the traditional notion of validity. 'What is well 
and in confonnity with order is so by the nature of things and independently of 
human conventions.'24 True it may be that the modern conception of law has been a 
poor substitute for a long lost divinity to whose disappearance man is yet to 
readjust. Will he, however, have to give up at once the comforting notion of a safe 
and securely organized life? The idea that prevails seems to encourage a misled 
faith in the workings of the law. But it may also be capable to function as a weighty 
political support for that which particular readings of the law have chosen to 
suppress and exclude. Is that. perhaps. an explanation for the appeal of the theories 
of rights. of recent? What exactly is the nature of the help. by way of rhetorical 
support. to counter discriminatory readings against minorities racial. religious, 
ethical. sexual. readings (and counter-readings) which after all seem to form almost 
the entire body of the material around which the interpretative controversy centres? 
That it is basically around such material may be revealing about the nature of the 
very interpretative controversy. What the actual material may inspire regarding the 
nature of controversy will contrast with the mainstream notion of interpretation as 
presencing where. because interpretation is thought to consist of such distinct. 
pinpointable. sequential elements as the law. the process of interpretation. and the 
strategies of interpretation. the issue is one merely of pursuing the right strategy. As 
it is characteristically stated in the First Programme of the 1969 report on 
interpretation by the Law Commission of Britain. the body that reviews and 
investigates the law with the aim of suggesting ways to improve and reform it. 
[t]he rules of statutory interpretation. although individually 
reasonably clear. are often difficult to apply. particularly 
where they appear to conflict with one another and when their 
hierarchy of importance is not clearly established.25 
The general idea with respect to the individual reading. therefore. may manifest 
itself as one of dealing with a conundrum. one whose answer is safely kept 
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somewhere. The thing to do, accordingly, is, as it were, to keep calm and search for 
the right way to go about it. The particular strategies to which the Law Commission 
refers are those of literal, ordinary-sensible (unless absurd, ordinary meaning to be 
followed), and purposive (mischief remedied to be considered) meaning.26 The 
interpretative views of law which seek to challenge the much criticized mechanistic 
jurisprudence do not seem to offer challenge to its very defining idea of 
adjudication in clear-cut, well-drawn, numbered sequences. Hence, the ever resilient 
concept of interpretative strategies. 
It is reported that '[t]he antinomy between strict, logical interpretation and more 
consciously policy oriented approaches to law is to be found represented in the 
continuum of judicial attitudes in all major legal systems. 'v Fascinated by the 
analogy, lawyers have been quick to point out the confirming interpretative pattern 
'[a]cross all of the great Western religions.'28 One way of looking at the thus 
emerging pattern is to try to uncover the 'rational order' that seems to underlie it in 
diverse legal systems. It entails, subsequently, the possibility of constructing a 
discourse to clarify and guide the practice.29 Another way of looking at the 
recurrent themes of letter and spirit, penumbra and core, meaning and intention, rule 
and principle, and so on, may be to treat the terms of the binary oppositions which 
therefore emerge as good and useful figures of shorthand; shorthand, not for 
strategies to obtain the answer, as it were, to the conundrum, but for positions 
racial, religious, ethical, sexual, recognizable solely on the basis of the individual 
reading. Is the foetus a person? Is a pushchair a vehicle? Is a pushchair a chair? In 
what may stenographically be called the literal and metaphorical readings of each 
one of the words categorized as problematic, entirely different games may be 
involved. A totalizing search for a common rational core, therefore, is likely to be 
deceptive. 
Furthermore, the procedural interpretations of the law ought not to be considered 
distinct from what would be the evaluations of it on a more recognizably critical or 
political basis. In what follows, the third chapter is devoted to a discussion of the 
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politics of interpretation. The present essay is intended to be an argument 
throughout, however, against the concept of a detached reader. It seeks to make 
clear the faUacy of the assumption that interpretation is pursued in a mechanic 
sequence of distinct processes. According to this positivistic concept, reading brings 
together the mutually exclusive domains of the text and the reader, whose eventual 
interaction may or may not involve that which is political, moral, or religious. 
Because this concept is fallacious, the idea of reading that permeates the present 
essay refers to the critical evaluations of the law as well as its procedural 
interpretations. That is not to say that a distinction between interpretation and 
evaluation cannot be maintained as a mimetic distillation on an individual basis. 
The distinction itself, however, will in each case be an evaluative one. What is 
more, for the purposes of the present study, a thematic distinction will obscure a 
reassessment of the very concept of evaluation. as well as that of procedural 
interpretation. For the present study seeks to negate. beside a concept of free-
wheeling interpretation. a detached notion of evaluation. or criticism. 
This second part is a reading of some of the motifs of Geny's Method of 
Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law.30 Although the interpretative 
concerns of Geny's book are confined primarily to the specific problems 
encountered in the application of the Code Napoleon, it has been one of the most 
discussed and debated works of jurisprudence this century across diverse terrains of 
legal thought. It is often said to have almost single-handedly formed a paradigm in 
its criticism of mechanistic jurisprudence. Geny's Method is a book produced at the 
cross-roads of the Continental European legal thought and thus the culmination, in a 
sense, of an intellectually busy period. But it has also had considerable 
transformative effect in shaping the rhetoric of the Anglo-American legal thought.31 
In what follows, I would like to read the major themes of the Method in order to try 
out a set of propositions I formulate. each under a separate heading, propositions 
which strictly constitute mere variations on the theme of the dichotomy between the 
law and its readings: (1) A text has no edges. The distinction, therefore, customarily 
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assumed between textualist and extratextualist positions is one of grammar. (2) 
Intention is not a state of mind. Every time a distinction is made and a hierarchy 
established between intention and extension, it is made grammatically. (3) The 
principle of the separation of powers is a principle of grammar. Distinguishing 
between law and politics, subsequently, is possible only on a political basis. (4) 
Realism is fonnalism. The difference between the two orders of legal methodology 
is one merely of grammar. 
2.1 The Text and Its Edges 
Perhaps the most compact statement of the themes of Geny's work is the battle cry 
by Raymond Saleilles in his celebrated 'Preface' to the Method: 'It is time to return 
to reality.'l I lay special emphasis above at the very start on the phraseology chosen 
by Geny to designate the authority of the English judge vis-a.-vis the principle of the 
separation of powers: fiction. Not by pure accident, Saleilles' call builds on the 
assumed tension between fiction and reality. As he proceeds to elucidate it. fiction 
appears to characterize the mechanical jurisprudence of the exegetical school, of 
which two main pillars are the principles of the authorial will in reading the law and 
of adjudication on the basis of rigorous logical deduction confined strictly to the 
text.2 Reality, on the other hand, suggests two alternative insights which sum up the 
entire message of the Method: the judge is urged to go 'through but beyond' the text 
of the law in its application (here Saleilles paraphrases Jhering on the Roman law), 
and she is to acknowledge, in so doing, the part that has to be played by science in 
her aid and guidance.3 Hence, the (a) free (b) scientific (or objective) search, fibre 
recherche scientifUJue.4 
As I have already indicated it, however, the notion of a free search does not 
necessarily mean the end of Gooy's commitments to a formal idea of law. He makes 
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it clear that he 'ha[s] no design to contest the recognized authority of written law.'5 
On the contrary, 
the interpreter's first rule of conduct is to submit himself 
completely to the statute which rises before him as a high 
wall, excluding ... any personal judgement and any evaluation 
which would tend to prejudice the application in practice of 
the norm enacted from above for everyone. I would never 
think of questioning either the importance of written law as a 
source of positive law, nor the need for its supremacy.6 
It is not, therefore, the so-called 'strict' reading of the law for which his project is 
critical of the exegetical school. What distances him from the traditional stance is 
what Geny calls the 'fetish of the written law' on the part of the latter. The fetishist 
attitude is marked by the notion that 'every decision has to be based on written 
law.'7 As such, the notion is the distinctive mark of the mechanistic view of law.s 
While a conception of life grounded on shifting relations of interest, according to 
Geny, resist the idea of the written law that is all-inclusive and once and for all. 
That which is written is always, necessarily, 'incomplete.'9 The written law is, 
therefore, conceivable as the sole legitimate basis only when one attributes to it a 
'divine origin.'lO So long as the authorship of an omniscient divinity is not the case, 
the written law needs 'supplementing or complementing.'ll And this is where free 
objective search comes in. It is, first, characterized by an unstationary notion of life 
as opposed to the stagnancy suggested by faith in a 'divine origin' that accompanies 
an omniscient idea of the text, the scripture. Free objective search as 
'supplementing,' secondly, stands in a curious dichotomy to the text of the law that 
is strictly the privileged term of the binary opposition. 
Insofar as its notion of the written law is anxious to contrast with personal 
prejudices, politics, and principles of the judge, Geny's project appears to confirm 
the traditional opposition in the controversy, in the United States of America, 
concerning the reading of the Constitution. Amongst the contenders for the naming 
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of the opposing leagues in the constitutional controversy are the titles original ism v 
nonoriginalism12 and interpretivism v noninterpretivism. 13 I choose to employ in 
this study the working titles of textualism and extratextualism, as a great deal of 
confusion seems to obscure especially what is usually understood to be the 
mainstream league of the opposition. Originalism (or interpretivism) is customarily 
thought to entail the idea of the priority of the (legislative) intention as well as of 
the text. 14 It at once appears in its certain significant patterns, however, radically to 
oppose the text to the intention that is extrinsic to it, such as in the parol evidence 
rule of the contract law and in the long-standing, and only recently relaxed, rule of 
the inadmissibility, in the reading of the English statutory law, of the Hansard, the 
Parliamentary proceedings in the making of an Act. A further complication arises if 
originalism has to incorporate also a position which, as with Geoy, combines an 
uncompromising notion of the text, 'originally' understood, with a supplementary 
requirement of free objective search when the text is absolutely silent. What may 
initially seem to be an odd eclecticism of two unblending positions (originalism and 
nonoriginalism) may be described, more accurately, as an ultra-originalism, one 
which is deeply rooted in the tradition. The Benthamite idea of interpretation, for 
instance, bears striking similarity to Geny's. Bentham distinguishes rather sharply 
between 'strict' and 'liberal' readings of the law. IS Liberal reading is stated also to be 
of two varieties, extensive and restrictive. 'In either case thus to interpret a law,' 
notes Bentham. 'is to alter it. .. '16 He at once combines, however. the position that the 
very idea of a law precludes its liberal reading with an acknowledgement of the 
supplementary (and that is the key notion) need for a liberal reading of the law. In 
that it would be 'ruinous' not to 'alter' the law in certain cases by a liberal reading of 
it so long as the 'alteration' is immediately reported by the judge to the legislature 
and a 'formal' alteration or a remedy thereof is requested. Not vetoed within an 
allowed period of time. the informally made rule of the judge is to gain the effect of 
the formallawP Geny simply reiterates the threat of 'ruin' formulated by Bentham. 
If the strict reading of the law is not supplemented by 8 free objective search, the 
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result will be either immobilization, impotency and defeatism, or, worse, under the 
sole possible cloak of a strict, mechanistic reading of the law, necessarily a 'most 
disorderly subjectivism.'18 Originalism in the American sense will choose to avoid 
the sort of originalism (ultra-originalism) favoured by Bentham and Geny for fear 
of lacunae in the law. And when the lacunae do get acknowledged, a position that 
gives the courts the go-ahead to fill in the gaps for themselves is likely to be 
regarded, not as originalism, but as the exact opposite of the originalist stance. 
2.1.1 Reading the Constitution 
Charles Fried. the Solicitor General of the United States, distinguishes between the 
authority of the law and that of the judge in very much the same way as Geny. 'My 
indictment runs against adjudication that seeks to escape the discipline of texts and 
doctrine, and substitutes the judge's own authority for the authority of the law .. .'19 
An absolute division of the realms of authority is a requirement of the rule of law. 
And for that division to make sense, reading on a textual basis is a clear 
presumption. 'At the very core of the rule of law is the conviction ... that legal texts 
have meaning. '20 Do the views that reject a textualist reading of the law claim an 
indeterminacy of legal meaning? 
The bulk of the positions that are not textualist would not appear to consider the 
reason for their dissent to be one of textual scepticism.21 A concept of the ambiguity 
of the text is naturally invoked. But it is professed also by the textualists. A 
textualist strategy by Edwin Meese, the former Attorney General, prescribes the 
reading of the Constitution in three hierarchically available phases. (1) It is the 
specific meaning of the text that is to be followed. (2) When the text is not specific 
but yet specifiable through a notion that is demonstrably part of the text, 
signification thus unveiled is to be the meaning. And finally (3) when there is 
neither clear, specific meaning attributable to the text nor is there an obvious notion 
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to guide it. the reading is to be pursued in accordance with the text of the 
Constitution as a whole. 22 
If a scepticism of great Cartesian scale is not at once invoked. therefore. an 
extratextualist view of the Constitution will have to be simply a contradiction in 
tenns. The very holders of the extratextualist positions could not agree more. 
Extratextualism. accordingly. is a stance that is merely marked by its opposition to 
textualism. John Hart Ely describes the latter as the view that 'judges deciding 
constitutional issues should conrme themselves to enforcing nonns that are stated or 
clearly implicit in the written constitution.'23 The distinction between the two 
positions. therefore. is one simply of whether or not the text in itself is complete as 
the sole authority on which to base the decision. In that respect extratextualism is 
clearly reminiscent of the Geruan idea of supplementing and absolutely far from 
denying the authority of the text. According to Ely. textualism is basically the right 
approach. yet it has to be supplemented. Supplementing it ought to be done by way 
of not extratextual value enforcement. but by a 'process-oriented' construction of the 
text.24 Paul Brest finds textual reading not wholly adequate, as a stagnant notion of 
the text falls short to tend to all the 'ends' which ought to be observed in a 
constitutional government and which are basically motivated by changing needs and 
values.2S According to Thomas Grey. though they may not be part of the text it is 
the 'basic national ideals' that the text will have to be supplemented with.26 
Likewise. for Michael Perry. the 'aspirations of American political community' will 
guide the text.l? That which will guide the text. according to Justice Brennan of the 
Supreme Court. is its very own 'transfonnative purpose. '28 
Brennan opposes an ex nunc. contemporary. reading of the Constitution to its 
'original' meaning as suggested by the standard textualist strategy. The relevant 
question. accordingly. is: 'what do the words of the text mean in our time?'29 Perry 
designates the text of the Constitution as 'polysemic.'JO Of one piece with Brennan. 
he makes the guiding 'aspirations: the concept he introduces, as the meaning 'in 
addition to the original meaning.'ll The problem that arises immediately is that of 
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distinguishing between meanings when there is more than one. And secondly, there 
is the question, supposing a distinction is at all JX>Ssible, of installing a hierarchy, an 
order of priority, between the different meanings of one and the same text. Brennan 
and Perry will venture, obviously, to determine the privileged meaning on the bases 
of 'our time' and 'our aspirations,' respectively. Whatever justification will there be, 
however, for abandoning an 'original' meaning for meaning that is not original? In 
both cases, complications arise when Brennan and Perry acknowledge the existence 
of a textual core, as it were, that has been preserved over time, however very much 
dated now. It is a meaning, in other words, that is not detennined by our time and 
our aspirations. The writers will be able to produce no good reason for their choice, 
not for the original meaning, but for what they call the 'transfonnative' or 
'aspirational' meaning. And the moment they start tracing their steps back and deny 
that original meaning is really original meaning, but it is, likewise, meaning in 'our 
time' and based on 'our aspirations' (not necessarily those of Brennan and Perry), 
they will be even less able to produce a good reason for what is their privileged 
term. 
ExtratextuaIist positions have always made good use of one textualist 
predicament. In that many of the principles that are now taken for granted in the 
reading of the Constitution could not be justified on a textual basis. Amongst the 
principles of the said nature are the principle of equal protection, one that is 
technically related to the fourteenth amendment, and the very principle of the 
judicial review of legislation.32 The latter is justified in Marbury v Madison]] as a 
requirement that comes with the very notion of a written constitution. J4 The former 
is employed in what is arguably the second most significant Supreme Court 
decision, after that of Marbury, to start a new social and political era in the history 
of that particular judicial domain. Brown v Board of Education 35 bases its anti-
segregationist decision on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
Alexander Bickel, who was a clerk to Justice Frankfurter when the segregation 
cases were first seen in 1952, relates the available evidence for a textualist 
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construction of the fourteenth amendment, and reaches the following conclusion. 
The obvious conclusion to which the evidence ... easily leads 
is that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment [where the 
equal protection clause is included], like section 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, carried out the relatively narrow 
objectives of the Moderates, and hence, as originally 
understood, was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor to 
suffrage, nor to antimiscegenation statutes nor to 
segregation. 36 
The textualist responses to the textuality of the decision in Brown are diverse. 
Herbert Wechsler symphatizes with the decision 'morally.' Legally, however, it is 
insupportable for its disregard for the 'neutral principles' that ought to govern 
adjudication. From a neutral point of view segregation should concern not the 
principle of equal protection but that of freedom of association. Accordingly, 
Wechsler finds the segregationist decision of Plessy v Ferguson,37 the decision 
Brown is thought to have reversed in effect,38 as legal. 39 Meese, on the other hand, 
charts the decision of Plessy as a defiance to the very textual idea, and Brown, in 
contradistinction, perfectly justifiable on textual basis. The decision of Brown, 
according to Meese, is of one piece with 'the clear intent of the framers of the Civil 
Law amendments to eliminate the legal degradation of blacks. '40 Raoul Berger, 
however, is inclined to make an exception of Brown on textual basis. It is not 
justifiable textually, but it has to be accepted.41 He criticizes the extratextual views 
for making an excuse of this exception to justify ideologically oriented readings of 
the Constitution. Those views, he maintains, confuse 'lawyering' with 
'philosophizing. '42 Robert Boric, on the other hand, finds the outcome in the anti-
segregationist decision of Brown not only in compliance with the text (the equal 
protection clause), but also a clear requirement of it.43 He objects, however, to what 
he thinks is the mood of the opinion. The disastrous fact,' he notes, 'was that the 
Supreme Court (itself] did not think [that it was the text of the Constitution that 
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dictated the decision]. The Court. judging by its opinion. thought that it had 
departed from the original understanding in order to do the socially desirable 
thing. '44 
That each textualist writer should ascribe to the text of the fourteenth amendment 
a meaning that is at once rejected by other textualist writers makes the textualist 
predicament no easier. The extratextualist positions. however. are equally strained 
by a similar difficulty. If the text is even partly to be allowed to 'dictate' the 
decision. as it presumably would if. to cite but one hackneyed example. the age 
requirements for the president were the case. it is hard to justify why the text should 
not dictate all the decisions where. as in the equal protection clause. it seems to 
have an opinion. As I have already pointed it out in the views of Brennan and Perry. 
the difficulty follows from a problematic notion of the text. It underlies not only the 
bulk of the extratextualist views, but it is also the very logic behind textualism: the 
text as the locus of meaning. 
Extratextualism is characterized by its opposition to textualism and not to the 
text. The legitimacy of textual reading to a certain extent has never been contested 
by extratextualist writers. As Perry states it. on the contrary. 
[t]here is a sense in which we are all originalists: We all 
believe that constitutional adjudication should be grounded in 
the origin - the text that is at our origin and. indeed. is our 
origin. But there is a sense too. in which none of us is an 
originalist: As Gadamer. for one. has taught us. we cannot 
travel back to the origin, no matter how hard we try ... 45 
Redefined. extratextualism redefines also the pivotal dichotomy. The difference. 
accordingly. is that of the text as the sole legitimate basis to the idea of the 
insufficiency of the text. As I have already noted it. Ely's 'objection to [textualism] 
is that it is incomplete. that there are clauses it cannot rationalize.'46 As such. 
extratextualism follows Geny's classic formulation in two ways. First, it posits a 
supplementarity which is at once a unequivocal affumation of a formal notion of 
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the law. In what I quoted above Perry expresses absolutely no qualms either about 
the 'origin,' that which is supplemented or complemented, or about a concept of 
adjudication which is 'originated' rather than 'original,' i.e. principled as opposed to 
free-wheeling (inventive, original). Then Perry makes the move which I anticipated 
above47 and expresses doubt that original meaning is really original meaning. On 
the contrary, it is original (inventive) as much as the extratextualist views that are 
not original (inventive). And it is not only a problem of the lost origin (as Perry 
thinks Gadamer suggests). But there is no origin to be traced further back than the 
connections in which the meaning is suggested.48 Original meaning, therefore, will 
have to be equally a meaning in both 'our time' and on the bases of our prevailing 
'aspirations.' Meaning as the moment of framing, to use the word Derrida favours, is 
non-extant. That is because framing does not operate on pinpointable borders.49 
Extratextualism, then, not only leaves unaccounted for the fact that the text goes 
simply uncontested in the majority of the cases and it therefore perfectly well 
'dictates' the decision, but extratextualism also leaves room for an apocalypse, an 
anything-goes, a Benthamite-Geruan 'ruin.' There is nothing for extratextualism to 
hold on to, when the origin, a formal notion of the text is no more. A discourse of 
apocalypse, paradoxically, is the characteristic of the rhetoric of textualism. I quoted 
above Fried distinguishing between the authority of the law and that of the judge.so 
Alongside him Wechsler, Berger, and Bork consistently invoke the binary 
opposition of the law 'or else,' of namely neutral principles and morals, lawyering 
and philosophizing, the text of the law and the 'socially desirable thing,' 
respectively. 51 Meese appears not to have any immediate objections to the much 
criticized political overtones of the decision of Brown. He, too, however, does not 
refrain from making it the very point of his message to distinguish between a 
jurisprudence of 'constitutional fidelity' and one of 'political results.'52 What 
extratextualism does, in response, is not to take into question the very dichotomy 
but simply reverse it Whereby the apocalyptic choice in the extratextual case 
becomes one of indispensable principles not justifiable on the basis of the text or, as 
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with textualisrn. the much dreaded else. 
The second way in which extratextualism follows Geny's model is its 
Benthamite-Genian ultra-textual ism which is inseparably linked to its concern with 
indispensable principles not justifiable on the basis of the text. The textualist 
predicament. accordingly, is that many of the principles that are now taken for 
granted in the reading of the Constitution cannot be justified on a textual basis. Now 
that we have redefined origins, following the very suggestion by Perry, as non-
extant, we are compelled to restate the predicament. The principles that are now 
taken for granted in the reading of the Constitution cannot be justified only on an 
ultra-textual basis. Restated, the predicament becomes a difficulty of 
extratextualism in almost more subversive a manner than it is as one. traditionally 
formulated. of textualism. Extratextualism is ultra-textualism in the sense that it is 
essentially underlay by an ultra-formal notion of the text. I have already noted that 
textualism in the American sense will choose to avoid the textual ism of the kind 
favoured by Bentham and Geny for fear of gaps in the law. Hence. Bork's keen 
embracing of the outcome in Brown. The free search of the sort which is pursued by 
the textualist judge will have to be regardless of the text as a formal source of 
constraints. With extratextualism. however. as well as with Geny. the free search 
(principles. aspirations. ends. transformative aims. refereeing. and so on) is strictly 
dependent on the very condition of an ultra-formal notion of the text. Geny JX>sits a 
formalism which is clearly stricter than that of the exegetical school so that he can 
open the way for free objective search. So does extratextualism. Its one of the 
earliest and most remarkable examples in the constitutional controversy is Frederick 
Douglass'. an ex-slave and abolitionist writer, reading of the Constitution. to the 
dismay of his fellow abolitionists. as a document of vice. 'a most cunningly-devised 
and wicked compact.'S3 Geny oPJX>ses the text with a 'divine origin' to the secular 
text of the law.S4 The dichotomy supplies him with a passage to the idea of the 
incompleteness of the written text and thus need for supplementing. In striking 
similarity. Douglass distinguishes between the man-made document and the 
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document that is 'from heaven.' The constitution which he designates as a clear 
instrument of slavery and suffering is of the former character. 55 William Goodell, 
on the other hand, writing in an abolitionist pamphlet at about the same time, finds, 
in stark contrast, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution 'amply 
sufficient in their provisions, for either the legislative or judicial abolition of 
slavery.'56 According to Goodell, the legislator and the judge who refuse to legislate 
or decide against slavery perjure themselves in the face of their oaths of 
profession. 57 
The Genian problematic that is reiterated in extratextualist positions manifests 
itself characteristically in the dichotomy between the divine and the secular. That is 
not because the divine, that which relates to faith, forms any of Geny's concerns in 
the Method, as it seemed, in the first part of the present study, to dominate Lyotard's 
discourse almost throughout. 58 As a matter of fact, my entire exposition of it is 
based merely on a brief and obscure footnote in Geny's voluminous work, one 
which occurs where he elucidates why 'the statute will always be incomplete.' The 
footnote which comes right after is as follows: 
Only those nations where the law has been considered of 
directly divine origin and therefore perfect and immutable, 
could admit the opposite idea ... 59 
Geny's is a duality of rhetoric. He does not appear to invoke a radical opposition of 
the workings of the divine and the secular law. The opposition is wholly and 
radically confinned, however, as soon as he returns from the footnote to the text 
(from the supplement to that which is supplemented) and takes up the 
incompleteness argument in order to establish his notion of authorship. Authorship 
is defined in terms of the subject ('the human mind'). And because the subject is 
characterized by privacy and authenticity, the text the subject produces is marked by 
a formal and autonomous existence. The text, accordingly, becomes a private affair 
of its author. A private affair is a secluded affair with sharp edges. And finally, 
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because its edges mean that the text has a life of its own, a segregated life, 
independently of anything that is extrinsic to it, the text is essentially defined by an 
irremediable defICiency in its fight of durability against time. To define the text as 
essentially 'deficient.' Geny will have to affirm the effICiency of the divine. Hence. 
the dichotomy between the divine and the secular. 
No matter how subtle the human mind may be. it is incapable 
of a complete synthesis of our world. This defICiency which 
cannot be remedied. is especially noticeable in law. where the 
total appreciation would suppose the previous knowledge of 
all the possible relations human conflicts of interests can 
create.60 
Quite apart from the peculiar notion of 'intention' displayed in the paragraph 
(intention as 'previous knowledge').61 Geny notably contrasts an unstationary notion 
of life to the stagnancy suggested by faith in a divine origin. Ironically. however. 
his very choice for life. as opposed to faith. is made possible by a distinctively 
stationary notion of life which mummifies. as it were, the text within its edges and 
for all times. Hence, the analogies. in the interpretative controversy surrounding the 
American Constitution. from scripture.62 The edges of the text are the edges of its 
manufacture. Its formal and autonomous existence thereby taken for granted. to 
make sense of the text in the face of its longevity will require that the metaphorical. 
symbolic. and ultimately faith-based methodology of the sacred texts be adopted; 
'through but beyond' the text.63 
Two other significant patterns of a formal idea of the text are to be found in the 
distinctions traditionally drawn between literal and metaphorical. and statutory and 
constitutional reading. Because constitutions are assumed to be marked not only by 
their longevity as positive law but also by the longevity of what they signify within 
their closed edges. it has been the established practice to distinguish between 
constitutional and statutory interpretation. In his comparative work, Constitutional 
Construction. Chester James Antieau lists the dichotomy as a universally professed 
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principle of constitutional reading.64 Lord Diplock lays special emphasis in Hinds v 
The Queen on the distinction to be observed between the strategies of reading 
applied customarily to 'ordinary legislation' and the interpretative methods suitable 
for 'constitutional instruments. '65 That he has in mind especially criminal and taxing 
legislation by ordinary legislation may seem to make his division almost self-
evident, 'express words are needed to impose a charge on the subject. '66 The 
division does, however, disregard the precision required in constitutional provisions 
to address such obvious matters as the requisites to become legislative 
representatives, terms of office for the president or the cabinet, or the respective 
authorities and responsibilities of state powers which are responsible for ordinary 
legislation such as criminal and taxing statutes and their enforcement and reading in 
the first place. In United States v Classic, the dichotomy is given its classic 
fonnulation: constitutional provisions, intended for long standing and 
comprehensiveness, are to be read differently from the ordinary laws which are 
expressed in precise and short-term language and 'which are subject to continuous 
revision with the changing course of events.'67 Intertwined with its fonnalism, the 
distinction clearly invokes the absurd notion of adjudication that requires the judge 
to switch, as it were, between different pairs of spectacles as different brands of 
texts come and go before him. What would one possibly mean by pointing out a 
constitutional provision cited in a decision of the Supreme Court and stating at once 
that the provision appears to have been read by a strategy that is rightly for statutory 
interpretation? What exactly would a confusion of the two distinct sets mean? Apart 
from the two basic facts that for the majority of judicial domains statutes usually 
outlive constitutions, and that a newly adopted text can create just as much 
interpretative controversy, the actual debates on statutory interpretation, pursued 
separately from constitutional exchanges, also show, as indeed does Geny's project, 
that it is very much the same set of arguments raised by a diversity of positions in 
statutory interpretation. 68 
102 
2.1.2 The Silly Rule 
The characteristic distinction which bears the seal of a formal notion of the text, 
however, is the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical. In what is 
probably the best known use of the dichotomy, St. Paul contrasts rabbinical 
textualism, literalism, to the extratextualism of the spirit whose history commences 
at the croSS.69 In order to bring textualisrn to a clOSUl'e, on the other hand, he at once 
has to assume a textualism on an equally, if not more, grand scale which 
presupposes a notion of the text with an absolutely still life. Paul's represents the 
pole of life against the sterility suggested by faith in the divine text. Can the letter 
kill, however, without at all certain traces of life behind it? 
Marks phonetic or graphic, from which all life has been sucked out, seem to lie 
at the heart of the traditional concepts of the literal. Introducing the subtleties of the 
French law to an Anglo-American audience, Rene David contrasts the letter of the 
law to its spirit, a division, he elucidates, habitually made by the French lawyer. 
'The French lawyer does not just consider texts literally. He seeks from their spirit, 
grouping, and combination the very principles of French law .. .'7o As he defines the 
literal, it becomes obvious that the literal is present only by its absence, absence of 
life. Literal meaning, accordingly, is signification 'in an objective sense, apart from 
any consideration of social utility or moral justification. '71 Considering that 
intention, purpose and moral orientation are denied to it, it is enigmatic that the 
literal should get charted as signification in the first place. In Marbury v Madison72 
John Marshall is thought to have established not only judicial review but also literal 
judicial review as he clearly points in the opinion towards the 'letter' of the 
Constitution. According to Thomas Grey. who relies on this fact about Marbury. the 
analogies in reading the Constitution from literary or religious texts cannot be 
accepted also because of the 'presumption of literality' that any legal text has as its 
part by its inherent logic.?3 He is quick to add, however. that the literality required 
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in reading the law by no means leaves out purposive or contextual references. It 
merely opposes the concept of 'the text as primarily figurative or symbolic.'74 Grey 
follows. like David. the Pauline path absolutely to etiolate the letter. even though. 
unlike the latter. he chooses to side with the letter and allow also a purpose and a 
sense of direction to it. He does take the same path simply by the uncompromising 
dichotomy of the literal and the figurative. The concept of literal reading is excelled 
to its limits. however, in the words of Jervis CJ. in Abley v Dale.7s Accordingly, the 
literal meaning of the text is to be adhered to 'even [if] it does lead to an absurdity 
or manifest injustice.' For abandoning the literal meaning for whatever reason is but 
to 'assume the functions of legislators.'76 The question that springs to mind. one 
skipped ordinarily owing probably to the fashion in which dictums tend to suppress 
the real dynamics behind them. is how the case so designated arises in the first 
place. How do you apply a law that is outright silly? 
In an often cited case the French Court of Cassation decided to ignore the law 
which sought to punish anyone who would get on or off a train while it was not in 
motion. n It is not particularly hard to imagine a situation in which the law would 
not be completely absurd. It might concern the squatters taking cover in a train 
carriage that is temporarily out of use. How is one supposed to understand. 
however. the zeal in the prosecution of a passenger who intended either to get on or 
off the train when it was still. presumably at a stop on the platform? How did the 
case come before the court in the first place? An equally interesting case involves a 
British-Canadian bye-law which dictates that 'all drug shops shall be closed at 10 
pm on each and every day of the week.' In the case R. v Liggetts-Fin/ay Drug Stores 
Ltd 78 the lawyer bases his defence on the point of the literal compliance of his 
client to the word of the law, who shut his shop at the specified time and reopened it 
a few minutes later. In WhitelY v Chappef19 the argument is whether or not a law 
that makes it an offence to personate 'any person entitled to vote' can relate to the 
personation of a dead man. Is the tricky point in the case whether someone who is 
dead is a 'person'? Or is it whether a dead person can be considered to be a 'person 
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entitled to vote'? Another case, Adler v George,8() concerns an Official Secrets Act 
provision which states that 'no person shall in the vicinity of any prohibited place 
obstruct any member of Her Majesty's forces.' The person involved in the case, 
however, is accused of obstructing, not 'in the vicinity,' but in the very prohibited 
place. Does the law cover the case? Might another case entail the rightful dumping, 
before the judge, of the 'corpse' of a person by his detainer at the lawful command 
of habeas corpus? 
Rupert Cross, who recounts the lawyer's defence, in R. v Liggetts above, of the 
literal compliance of his client to the bye-law to close the shop at 10 pm, notes: 
'This contention was dismissed with the contempt it deserved and with the 
observation that no-one but a lawyer would ever have thought of imputing such a 
meaning to the bye-Iaw.'81 Wittgenstein is known often to make the same point 
regarding philosophical reasoning as displayed in mainstream philosophy. In Zettel 
he notes. implying Moore's well-known common sense argument to prove the 
existence of an external world: 'No one but a philosopher would say 'I know that I 
have two hands' .. .'82 A more vivid illustration of the point is made in On Certainty: 
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden: he says again 
and again 'I know that that's a tree'. pointing to a tree that is 
near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: 
This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy.'83 
Wittgenstein is inclined. not necessarily by the logical consequences of his 
argument, to dismiss that type of reasoning altogether for being pale. It is somehow 
de-practised. as it were, or estranged. Another way of looking at it might be to treat 
it as an entirely different genre of practice. What the lawyer does in invoking the 
literality argument. therefore, might be considered to be a switching of the game 
rather than non-grammatical nonsense and therefore not, as Wittgenstein would 
have us believe, no practice at all. By sheer fraternity of the world, hardly anyone 
that is involved in the bye-law case would really seem to be unaware of the 
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connections that are at work in that particular instance as well as of the moves and 
motives of one another. A lawyer who would still be thinking to be in the same 
game as the enforcers and interpreters of the bye-law when suggesting the literality 
argument could hardly have been a lawyer in the first place because he would have 
been fighting the teaching of a fraternity that is absolutely vital for his survival. His 
argument does clearly bear the marks of some such fighting because of its bad 
rhetoricianship. That anyone would fall for its persuasive charm is hardly at all 
conceivable. His rhetoricianship is so very bad. in fact. that it might well be 
justifiable in the foreground of the specific qualities of the case which we seem to 
be no longer in a position to take into consideration. What appears to be beyond 
doubt. on the other hand. is that at no point does the lawyer's argument suggest a 
meaning from which life has been sucked out and which can somehow or other be 
related to the bye-law it purports to be part of. Neither is it a non-meaning. a 
grammatical abuse. It is a different game altogether. 
There seems to be only one possible answer. therefore, to the question 'how do 
you apply a rule that is outright silly?' Silly rules do not exist. The concept that 
makes silliness a quality of the text is fundamentally misconceived in that it 
presupposes a radically drawn opposition of the literal and the metaphorical. a 
formalism which refuses life to the former term. That which is literal, however. is 
somehow still counted as meaning. What is it that makes a sign literal, strict, 
narrow? By a curious coincidence both Heidegger and Wittgenstein reflect upon the 
sign of an arrow. Wittgenstein asks: 'How does it come about that this arrow q 
pOints?'84 In the same vein, Heidegger also makes an issue of the 'indicating' quality 
of it which has become almost the very paradigm of that which is narrow. His 
example is the small arrow sign sometimes displayed in a motor car to illuminate at 
turns and indicate the direction that is taken. 85 'What do we mean when we say that 
a sign 'indicates'?'86 What is the connection of the sign to that which it indicates? Is 
the narrow that which carries with it an essential quality of itself as distinct from the 
attributions of intentions. purposes, and moral orientations that are associated with 
106 
it? 'Doesn't [the arrow] seem to carry in it something beside itself?'87 That which a 
sign has with it 'beside itself,' or, what Wittgenstein sometimes calls a 'shadowy 
being'88 that accompanies the sign and is what might be called its ostensive 
predicate. is what seems to underlie the entire notion that allots silliness to the 
text.89 Wittgenstein's answer to his own question is: yes, the narrow exists; and, no, 
that which is narrow is hardly the being that simply shadows, as it were, the sign. 
The meaning of an arrow, on the contrary, is an artefact of the connections in which 
the arrow gets to have a use. 
How does it come about that this arrow ~ ~ points? Doesn't it 
seem to carry in it something beside itself? - 'No, not the 
dead line on paper; only the physical thing, the meaning. can 
do that.' - That is both true and false. The arrow points only 
in the application that a living being makes of it. 
This pointing is not a hocus-pocus which can be perfonned 
only by the soul.90 
Similarly. Heidegger designates the sign as made in a network of associations rather 
than something that is as such. He contends that. like the arrow sign in a car, which 
requires for its proper functioning as an indicator a totality of connections. any of 
the entities that are encountered in the world are meaningful only on the basis of a 
system of relations. This system he calls 'the worldhood of the world. '91 Just as 
Wittgenstein invokes 'the application' of it as that on the basis of which the arrow 
indicates, Heidegger notes that the content of the relations that make up the 
worldhood is detennined by such modes as 'in-order-to,' 'for-the-sake-of,' and 'with-
which.' It is essentially through such pragmatic modes that entities get 'involved' in 
the worldhood and become the subject of man's 'concern.' The narrow, accordingly, 
is not that which somehow evades that worldhood and has a transcendental rapport, 
a relation of 'baptism,' as Wittgenstein calls it elsewhere,92 with what it signifies. 
The difference which the narrow suggests to that which is liberal is not one of 
immediacy. The narrow, on the contrary, is grounded in such deeply rooted 
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everyday connections of worldhood that are simply too obvious to be felt.93 
That which 'kills' in the Pauline opposition of the letter and the spirit94 kills 
because it is very much alive and kicking. It is by no means devoid, as it were, of 
purpose and moral orientation. The interests to which it gives life, however, may 
not necessarily meet the demands of the mimetically distilled category of 'life' 
maintained by the interests of the opposing pole. The difference between the narrow 
and the metaphorical, therefore, is one merely of mimesis, of grammar,95 for what 
makes an arrow narrow is the 'n' that comes before it and that stands for the 
indefinite quantity of relations of which it is part in the fraternity of the world. A 
solemn consideration of the lawyer's argument. in the bye-law case,96 to be part of 
the rule (its 'literal' meaning) is in tum a defiance to this fraternity, the world of the 
polis. the politeia. Wittgenstein notes with particular emphasis in the above 
paragraph that 'pointing is not a hocus-pocus ... [of] the soul.' Likewise, Heidegger 
points out the Cartesian idea of worldhood as 'a case at the opposite extreme' of the 
worldhood that he describes.97 As with the mechanistic concept of adjudication 
which a formal notion of the text presupposes on the basis of the stern duality of the 
subject and the object, the idea of meaning transcendent of its worldly attachments 
(intention, purpose, moral orientation) shows obvious Cartesian origins. The 
stagnancy Geny quite ironically equates with the divine as opposed to the secular is 
the stagnancy that is in fact postulated by the Cartesian notion of signification to 
which he subscribes, a notion characterized by its denial of the world fraternity, the 
politeia, a world of faith and training, for its incessant mobility is hardly one of 
free-wheeling privacy. It is through such fraternity that the case comes before the 
judge in each case already read and determined. 
The literality of reading is often invoked in the reading of the United States 
Constitution with reference to the decision of Marbury. 98 Grey formulates his 
dichotomy of the literal and the figurative on the basis of this very decision.99 In 
McCulloch v Maryland,l00 on the other hand, Justice Marshall unequivocally 
introduces the primacy of figurative meaning: 
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Such is the character of human language, that no word 
conveys to the mind. in all situations, one single definite idea; 
and nothing is more common than to use words in a figurative 
sense. 101 
To make figurativeness the distinctive 'character of human language,' of every word 
in it, is to deny the text its physical edges. Where does the law. that is primarily 
'written,'102 commence, and where does it terminate, horizontally and vertically? Is 
the judge herself within the boundaries of it? Do the ratifiers also form part of the 
text? Is the law consisted of 'itself' and its interpretations, or is the law only its 
interpretations, exclusive of itselfl Just as these are the wrong, unhelpful questions 
to elucidate what actually takes place. so is to draw the conclusion, from the two 
opinions by Marshall, of an incoherence. A conclusion of incoherence would have 
to postulate the odd idea of adjudication that would occur in an interaction of the 
mutually unindebted103 elements of the subject and the object. Did Marshall decide 
under the contradicting spells, or visions (theoria) , of the literal and figurative 
presumptions in two different cases? That the both cases came before him 
prejudiced on the basis of a specific mode of world fraternity seems to be more 
likely. Justice Cardozo designates the forestructured quality of decision-making 
which thus becomes the issue as follows: 
Nine-tenths, perhaps more, of the cases that come before a 
court are predetermined - predetermined in the sense that 
they are predestined - their fate preestablished by inevitable 
laws that follow them from birth to death. 104 
The two decisions by Marshall do not indicate in the direction of a fundamental 
inconsistency because, first, it hardly seems to have occurred to Marshall in the first 
place that he at once excluded the figurative character of the language when he 
pointed towards its letter. In fact, does anyone ever do when invoking the letter? 
For the letter is in each case conceivable, narrow. only on a figurative basis. An 
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apparent duality of Marbury and McCulloch also takes place in Geny's account. 
According to him, the reading of the law is never to be pursued by such 
considerations as the transfonnation of society and changing circumstances, 'unless 
[the text] expresses a dynamic concept, such as for instance the concept of public 
policy.'I05 As soon as the dynamic is allowed for, however, the terms of the binary 
opposition of the static and the dynamic will have to be understood as the sub-
categories of some generalized notion of the dynamic. That which is static will be in 
each case conceivable only on a dynamic basis. Further still, opinion-writing might 
have to be regarded as a distinct game. A clear difference of rhetoric in two 
different cases decided by Marshall is confined not only to the pair of Marbury and 
McCulloch. For instance, in his decision in The Antelope,l06 Marshall distinguishes 
between the legal text and moral principles and upholds the former. 107 In Fletcher v 
Peck,lOS the earliest case in which a state law is invalidated for conflicting with the 
Constitution, on the other hand, he invokes the same dichotomy only to sustain the 
latter term against the statute which apparently has no regard for 'the reason and 
nature of things. '109 
Another significant dichotomy of rhetoric occurs in two opinions by Justice 
Warren. I discussed above the anti-segregationist decision of Brown v Board of 
Education 110 as an apparent predicament on the part of the textualist views of the 
Constitution. For despite its virtually uncontested ruling today, from the viewpoint 
of the bulk of the extratextualist positions the outcome of Brown is not justifiable on 
a textual basis. II I Some textualists appear not to disagree with that.112 Some are 
prepared, however, to defend the decision on a textual basis, even though they may 
not approve of the style of the Warren Court.Il3 That the decision of Brown was not 
dictated by the text, on the other hand, goes on to pose even greater an impasse for 
the extratextualist positions, as it seems to postulate the constraining capabilities of 
the text as a rule. Once those capabilities postulated, in turn, extratextualism would 
appear to have no good reason sometimes to bow to those constraints and 
sometimes simply eschew them.n .. Bolling v Sharpe,1l5 the segregation case of the 
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district of Columbia, decided on the same day as Brown, gives a clue as to how the 
textualist and extratextualist positions may be eternally trapped in their disregard for 
the prejudiced character of the case. It also gives compelling evidence how opinion-
writing may, in fact, have to be considered as a wholly distinct game. 
In Brown. the four state cases of segregation were put together. The Columbian 
case of Bolling. however. was decided separately. That was because the fourteenth 
amendment whose equal protection clause is the basis of the decision in Brown is 
applicable solely in the States and therefore not in the district of Columbia. The 
manner in which the Court overcomes the discrepancy is at once curious and 
exemplary. The opinion refers to the difficulty. and yet it proceeds to indicate. very 
succinctly, that where the notion of equal protection comes from. namely 'our 
American ideal of fairness,' comes also the notion of due procesS.1l6 Unlike the 
equal protection clause, the clause that expresses the principle of due process is 
contained in the generally applicable fifth amendment. It is enigmatic why. for the 
sake of rhetorical simplicity. the generally applicable due process clause was not 
made the basis of both decisions made on the same issue and on the same day. It is 
only enigmatic. however. if adjudication, just as noted before. is imagined in the 
mutually unindebted duality of the text and the interpreter, the object and the 
subject. Obviously the choice for the equal protection clause did have to do with the 
fact that the due process clause did not have at the time quite the substantive content 
which it seems to enjoy presently, in particular since Roe v Wade. 1l7 Considering 
that politically the case could be decided either way. it was probably less 
problematic to decide the state cases on the 'weightier' basis of the equal protection 
clause (some considerable 'weight' being invested in the very fact that challenge to 
segregation was pursued on what was practically its homeground118). The emerging 
discrepancy with Bolling. in tum, would become one of 'procedure,' an instance of 
technical insubordination, as it were, in view of the Constitution as a whole. Indeed. 
as the opinion itself points it out, it stands less than comfortably that segregation 
terminated on the basis of the Federal Constitution should be maintained in the 
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Federal Government domain. 119 
That a difficulty of the sort had to be overcome, however, is ample evidence of 
the distinct games that had to be played. Charles Black contrasts the difficulty of 
rhetoric the Court had in the segregation cases with the 'awkwardly simple' logic 
which was behind the decisions and which no one did really mistake. Segregation 
was simply a remnant of the belief in the white supremacy and had to be eliminated. 
'Simplicity,' however, writes Black, 'is out of fashion.'I20 That Geny and Uewellyn, 
for instance, would ally their free objective search and the Grand Style,121 
respectively, with the 'simplicity' Black invokes, as opposed to the rhetorical 
difficulty the judge sometimes has to go through under the reign of formalism, is 
almost without doubt. What is really entailed in the Court's difficulty may be rather 
a tricky question, however, as one can readily misidentify that which the Court had 
to address and overcome in its rhetoric for the textual constraints of the 
Constitution. It is, therefore, absolutely crucial to notice whether the Court's 
obvious difficulty of rhetoric was in regard to the text, the text of the Constitution, 
or in regard to the prevailing mood marked notably by a local and undecided instant 
of the world fraternity. 
The complicity of rhetoric, as opposed to the 'simplicity' of the drive that 
animates it, is always there. Its game seems to have to be played in each and every 
case. Once won, however, the complicity tends to get less and less conspicuous. 
That the difficulty of the Warren Court was not a difficulty of the text is well 
attested by the mere fact that in a series of decisions that followed Brown the Court 
declared segregation unconstitutional by simply referring to its decision in 
Brown ,122 even though the decision in Brown had made a careful note of it that its 
decision was strictly confined to the field of public education.12l The Court, 
therefore, got it right both in Brown and in the following decisions of anti-
segregation not because it gave a long neglected text its due reading. There is no 
such thing as due reading. But it simply followed the mood, which is in itself 
sufficient criterion for 'getting it right.' Neither did the Court have to devise certain 
112 
rhetorical strategies in order to evade or supplement the text, as the text as such 
could hardly be in the way. But it had to evade the constraints of the prevalent 
traces of what may tentatively be termed the mood. Brown could be decided either 
way. So could be the English case which seeks to answer the question whether the 
consumption by fire of the mortal remains of a human being is an 'industrial' 
activity. It could be decided either way even though the court's eventual answer is 
'no,' and the owner of the crematorium at issue is thereby decided not to benefit 
from a tax allowance. l24 The bye-law case discussed above,125 on the other hand, 
could be decided only one way so long as the players of the game would persist not 
to drift away and not to become participants of different games altogether. The text 
to which the individual case is 'technically attached,' however, hardly plays a part in 
securing the outcome for the case. On the contrary, the case seems to be prejudiced 
on the basis of a world fraternity where its particulars acquire a dictating 
significance - one of mood, nevertheless, not of the vision (theoria). Just as the 
literal and the figurative arguments attributed to Marbury and McCulloch, the 
arguments of equal protection and due process in Brown and Bolling indicate in the 
direction of a wholly distinct involvement. It had been an involvement of exactly the 
same kind when the decision of Plessy v Ferguson 126 had found no conflict in 
segregation with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
2.1.3 The Logic of Supplementarity 
What Geny casts in a marginal part, namely as that which is extrinsic to the text, 
therefore, appears eventuaIlyto occupy the centre stage. Given that he designates it 
as the very mission of his work to make the case for free objective search,l27 he 
hardly equates with obscure significance the extratextual affairs of the judge. A 
'logic of supplementarity,' as Derrida names it, characterizes the project. however. 
as free search is made possible on the originary basis of the text. The text of the 
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law. as distinct from the free search of the court. is the privileged term of the binary 
opposition he thereby establishes. As the dichotomy of the divine and the secular 
places the text of the law over the shifting and elusive ground of changing 
circumstances, a free search is in turn required for 'supplementing or 
complementing' it. l28 
Just as the Kantian beauty is defined in terms of the form of the object of art as 
opposed to the parerga,l29 the idea of an origin, a presence, as opposed to its 
supplement, defines both textualist and extratextualist approaches in reading the 
law. Derrida traces the workings of the logic of supplementarity in his reading of 
Rousseau, a philosopher whose work is marked throughout by oppositions such as 
speech and writing, and nature and education. l30 In each of the Rousseauean 
dichotomies the thing itself is contrasted with the secondary or marginal term that 
purports to substitute it or that complements or makes an addition to it. The logic of 
supplementarity, on the other hand, operates as an indicator of the mimetic nature, 
the grammaticality, of such borders. That which is in the centre in each one of the 
oppositions can be shown to be defined by the term which borders on or over the 
edge of the thing itself. That is because 'the thing itself' is in each instance a 
grammatical approximation. l3l The terms inside and outside presuppose an 
immediacy that is not obtainable except through a 'sequence of supplements: that is 
to say. a sequence of that which is present only by a countless multitude of non-
originary references.132 Textualism of the American constitutional theory seems to 
be the sole champion of the idea of an origin. An immediacy of presence on the part 
of the origin postulated. interpretation is understood as pure presencing. One 
important argument of extratextualism, on the other hand, has been to point out that 
the binary opposition of the original and the inventive which textualism invokes 
ought to be considered only grammatically, and that original meaning is inventive 
meaning in each case. Paradoxically. however. extratextualism has had to appeal to 
the idea of an origin with even greater zeal. for a sharper dichotomy of inside and 
outside-text has been more of a defining character of extratextualism. Just as 
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original meaning is inventive meaning in each case, it can be traced, in the logic of 
supplementarity of extratextualist positions, that that which dictates the decision is a 
'free' decision (or a decision based on principles, aspirations, constitutional ends, 
transfonnative aims, and so on) not only in 'hard' or marginal readings, but in all 
readings of the law including the provisions that contain age requirements for the 
representatives of parliament. 
A supplement either complements or makes an addition; the logic of 
supplementarity, on the other hand, is at once a denial of a clear-cut dichotomy of 
complementing and supplementing. As a questioning of the post-war literary 
criticism which sought to distinguish between the text and that which is extrinsic to 
it, notably the authorial intention,133 came to be a building ground for the newly 
emerging literary theories, literary critics who thereby had to concentrate on the 
various predicaments of textualism have noticed more readily the workings of the 
logic of supplementarity in reading the law. In the parol evidence rule of contract 
law, for instance, evidence that is extrinsic to the textual capturing of the agreement 
between the parties is refused, for its admission is thought to be running the risk of 
perverting the evidence of the text itself.l34 Fish and Walter Benn Michaels, both 
literary critics primarily, have put into question the very idea of the text itself, as 
suggested by contract doctrine, and whether a clear dichotomy of supplementing the 
text of the contract, as opposed to complementing it, can be maintained. Pointing 
out the similarity of arguments between literary formalism and that of the parol 
evidence rule, Michaels designates the anxiety behind both enterprises to be one of 
making interpretation as 'objective' as possible.135 What he goes on to argue is that 
the granting of such autonomy to the text, whether legal or literary, is problematic 
through and through. Its project is neither feasible nor really necessary for the 
purposes of securing impartiality or obtaining reliable knowledge. One significant 
exception to the parol evidence rule is when there is ambiguity or incompleteness in 
the text. Michaels puts into question the peripheral and supplementary position of 
the ambiguous along the lines of the parol evidence rule and inquires whether 
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ambiguity, as well as impartiality, are qualities of the text. 1J6 In one curious case he 
cites, the ambiguity seems to have arisen over the word 'chicken' in an overseas 
trade contract.137 Chicken, obviously, is not exactly one of the first few words that 
would spring to mind to exemplify ambiguity. Nevertheless, the case attests to a 
genuine disagreement between the parties involved over the Word. l38 Is ambiguity a 
property of the text? Will getting down as many details as possible help to keep the 
lid on the text? But even when no ambiguity is invoked in regard to the text of the 
contract, establishing this very fact seems to have to invite a notion of the text with 
no edges.1J9 
The basic mechanics behind the parol evidence rule. according to Fish, is very 
much paradigmatic of formalism in general. The choice it offers is either the 
binding authority of the text, or else. l40 Insofar as its argument contrasts the 
authority of the text with that of force, Fish finds in the parol evidence rule a 
succinct expression of Hart's notion of law. 141 Hart formulates his idea of law as a 
formal source of constraints against the Austinean view of legal obligation, a 
concept Hart equates with the brutal authority of a gunman. 142 Law's authority 
opposes that of brute force for its authority is essentially vested in the text. Fish 
points out that for both the parol evidence rule and the Hartian notion of law, 'the 
foundations of law are linguistic.'143 Having postulated an awkwardly formal basis 
for the law. Hart introduces his notion of 'open texture' so as to mark his departure 
from the ultra-formal. as it were, concept of the mechanistic jurisprudence. Open 
texture as a general characteristic of human language leads him to the idea of 
reading on the dual bases of core and penumbra of meaning. Because the 
'uncertainty' of legal language is thereby allowed for and because a formal notion of 
the law will in turn have to cope with its 'staticness' and 'inefficiency,' the rules of 
the law will have to be 'supplemented.'l44 'But if the rules are uncertain and require 
supplementation, how can they be rules?'145 As soon as it has to allow for that which 
is supplementary, namely the ambiguous, the parol evidence rule is forced to betray, 
in very much the same fashion as Hart's project does, its linguistic foundations. 'The 
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document' of the contract. notes Fish. 'is neither ambiguous nor unambiguous in and 
of itself.' 
The document isn't anything in and of itself, but acquires a 
shape and a significance only within the assumed background 
circumstances of its possible use. and it is those circumstances 
- which cannot be in the document. but are the light in 
which 'it' appears and becomes what 'it,' for a time at least, is 
- that determine whether or not it is ambiguous and 
determine too the kind of straightforwardness it is (again for a 
time) taken to possess.I46 
What distinguishes textualism from extratextualism, therefore, is hardly that one of 
them limits itself for all times to the text, while the latter sometimes goes 'beyond' 
it. As I have already recorded it, in his preface to Geny's Method, Saleilles 
paraphrases Jhering to mark the new methodology in the face of the mechanistic 
jurisprudence of the exegetical school: Through the Civil code; but beyond the 
Civil code [Par Ie code civil, au-deld. du code civil].'147 The text. however, does not 
appear to be confined within its fonnal edges. In that respect. cipher would seem to 
be about the right word to designate the interpretative existence of the text. namely 
as a non-entity.l48 Yet the text as a non-entity may at once hold immense weight. 
But that is when the text is in the company of particular positions racial, religious. 
ethical. sexual. recognizable solely on the basis of the individual reading. Reading 
in that sense is not a presencing. but a negation of the text as a non-entity. Through 
reading. the text becomes an entity. and the reading. de-ciphering. 
The constructed quality of meaning denies the text its presence as the unique 
shrine of signification. And a diversity of positions take the centre stage as that 
which distinguishes between positions turns out to be not a matter of whether or not 
to go beyond the text, but whither to gO.149 That a generalized category of faith (in 
the form of the primordiality of positions of prejudice) appears eventually to be the 
very adjudicator of the divine and the secular, the dichotomy Geny invokes 
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fundamentally, hints simultaneously at the limits, however uncircumscribeable, of 
the original as the inventive, and of the free as not only the quality of decisions in 
marginal cases but generally. The inventive and the free isolated from what they can 
signify grammatically will only reinstate what Fish finds admirably economically 
expressed in the parol evidence rule and what he considers to be the characteristic 
dilemma of formalism: it is either the authority of the text or else. ISO Clare Dalton, 
for instance, demonstrates ably in her reading of contract doctrine how its rhetoric is 
entangled throughout in a sequence of aporias created by binary oppositions such as 
private and public, objective and subjective, form and substance, and manifestation 
and intention. l5l In the parol evidence rule, that which is marginalized and 
secondary. namely extrinsic evidence. comes to determine that which is in the 
centre and primary not only in the cases of recognized ambiguity and 
incompleteness. but generally and necessarily. Because supplementary evidence is 
required. first, to determine the 'finality' and 'scope' of the text, secondly for its 
general 'interpretation.' and finally for ascertaining its 'legitimacy.'152 Further. 
because the text as a formal source of constraints is no more. on all of those 
accounts the court will have effectively to intervene and cross between the domains 
of the private and the public. the objective and the subjective. and so on. The image 
the contract law has of itself as 'one of a neutral facilitator of private volition,'153 
therefore, hardly emerges from its analysis. A brilliant reading of the dynamics 
behind the formalism of contract doctrine comes paradoxically to confirm its most 
basic trait, however, when, in the absence of the authority of the text. the event of 
decision-making has to be accounted for. Content with the terms put before it, of 
fonnalism. as either the authority of the text or else, Dalton's analysis does no better 
than that of Hart and goes on to designate as one of its conclusions the 
'indeterminacy' of judicial decision-making. l54 As a certain predictability of judicial 
outcomes, by the evidence of experience. has to be acknowledged. however, she 
ventures to recover her position by introducing the ironical dichotomy of 'doctrine-
as-rule-system' and 'doctrine-in-application.' a duality whose latter term being 'after 
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all determinate.'lSS The very binary opposition that marks the parol evidence rule, 
namely the text and that which is extrinsic to it, comes to be reiterated in a reading 
that otherwise aims to dissolve it, as the supplementarity of application in the face 
of the text of the law is called forth. Because the text of the law is defined in tenns 
of a presence,l56 in the absence of such pure immediacy the text, as it were, 
undergoes a loss of memory. It drifts away from what is made of it, namely its 
applications, and yet still seems to retain a being somehow to be conceded. What 
could possibly be the being of a restaurant bill other than that which one makes of 
it? The parol evidence rule grants the text exactly the sort of being which Dalton 
herself ends up bestowing on the text of contract doctrine. The former warns against 
the perversion of the text, yet allows extrinsic evidence supplementarily. Dalton's 
reading establishes the indeterminacy of the text and allows the extrinsic counter-
evidence of its applications, again, supplementarily. It is crucial to notice that, 
despite its commitments to the contrary,lS7 Dalton's discourse, just as Lyotard's 
before,lS8 shares, in some elusive, yet significant, level, the typical objectives of 
formalism both in law and in literature, namely those of disinterested purity and 
scientific maturity.1S9 Indetenninacy is invoked when the picture theory of truth that 
underlies those objectives fails to make out of the text a gallery of signification. 
Hence, the characteristic dilemma, suggested by formalism, of the text as a formal 
source of constraints or a state of anything goes. Just as the extratextualist views of 
the Constitution will always find it hard to rationalize why the text should 
sometimes dictate the decision and sometimes not, having affirmed a dichotomy of 
the law and its readings, Dalton will be at loss to explain why the reading of the 
contractual text by the court should be any more indeterminate than the reading of a 
restaurant bill. or, better, her very essay. As that which makes possible in the first 
place the free and the original, that is to say, the primordiality of positions of 
prejudice, is construed into a state of indeterminacy, what Dalton also does is to 
reverse her own dissolution of the dichotomy between the public and the private in 
contract doctrine. For so long as both the private and the public are defined in terms 
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of a greater category of that which is public, namely the politeia, a world of 
mimesis and fraternity, the free and the original as free-floating - indetenninate -
modes of reading will not be conceivable. 
2.2 Intention and Extension 
The history of philosophy, according to Derrida, is that of 'the determination of 
Being as presence.'l The idea of presence is characterized by a 'presumed 
suppression'2 of the connections in whose fraternity anything at all is. I attempted 
above to shorthand the multitude of connections thereby at work as that which 
makes an arrow narrow.J The logic of supplementarity serves the 'subversive' task 
of a grammatical reminder in the text of philosophy, of the connections in place, as 
philosophy traditionally defines supplementarity in terms of (either a lack or 
perversion of) presence. The binary opposition which attests to supplementarity and 
which marks the particular brand of Western metaphysics, for Derrida, is the 
opposition of speech and writing. Writing, he notes, is 'the supplement par 
excellence since it marks the point where the supplement proposes itself as 
supplement of supplement, sign of sign, taking the place of a speech already 
significant.'4 That 'taking place,' or substituting,S on the part of writing, indicates the 
mode of being that defines it, namely absence. Writing, accordingly, is merely for 
the links that it has to speech. While the latter is the very paradigm of the moment 
of presence where voicing. hearing, and comprehending,6 all take place without the 
kind of rupture that characterizes writing. Just as with the supplementarity of the 
instances of incompleteness and ambiguity in the parol evidence rule, on the other 
hand, Derrida points out that the frowned upon supplementarity of rupture and 
repetition defines not only the marginal instances of writing, but also those of 
speech. Iterability, as opposed to privacy, and derived immediacy, as opposed to the 
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concept of pure presence. are the qualities not only of the graphic sign. but of sign 
generally.7 
In the face of the traditional privileging of speech over writing. another 
supplementarity. the parol evidence rule of contract doctrine, a rule that establishes 
the supremacy of writing over the evidence of 'parol: is paradoxical. The logic of 
supplementarity which displaces the priority of speech. however. does no such thing 
as simply to reverse the hierarchy traditionally installed between the two.8 What it 
does, instead, is to make both speech and writing derivative of a worldhood. a grand 
narrative, that is a play of the workings of 'secondary' terms such as supplement. 
ambiguity, incompleteness. rupture, repetition, substitution. and so on. Because 
writing is the term customarily defined by all these marginal qualities that are 
characteristically indicative of absence, as opposed to presence, Derrida names the 
worldhood that makes both speech and writing conceivable in the first place a 
generalized notion of writing. namely archi-writing. Archi-writing is 'writing as the 
disappearance of natural presence.'9 In a hierarchy established in reverse. that is to 
say, when writing is given precedence over speech. as in textualism. the concept of 
pure presence. as opposed to derived immediacy. is as much in place as in the 
traditional pattem. IO 
Derrida traces the distrust towards writing as far back as Plato. I I It may be 
possible to trace distrust towards speech just as far back. What Hobbes considers to 
be 'another Errour of Aristotles Politiques.'12 for instance, is the latter's concept of 
'well-drawn laws' so as to leave no room for passion and personal interests to have 
an obscuring impact on the judgement.13 I have already recorded Barker's 
dichotomy, in commenting on Aristotle. of judgement that is properly legal and 
judgement that is obscured by the rhetorical skills and not 'impartial' but 'emotional 
pleadings of the litigants' in the Athenean dikasterion.I4 The 'well-drawn laws,' 
therefore, are in a sense a guarantee of impartiality. As with the parol evidence rule, 
however. Aristotle is inclined to supplement the 'well-drawn laws' that are passion-
free and embody impartiality with the handy flexibility of 'the lead rule used in 
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making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is 
not rigid:1s The binary opposition which thus emerges is clearly vulnerable to the 
workings of the logic of supplementarity. The curious point, however, is that it 
points in the direction of a dichotomy of writing and speech where speech is the 
category defined in terms of the rupture of passion and personal interests, the 
mediated quality that characterizes in the traditional opposition not speech but 
writing. 
What in fact occurs is truly revealing. When Hart places the text in the centre in 
defining legal obligation against the Austinean concept of it on the basis of powecl6 
(or in the Aristotelean concept of government by 'well-drawn laws,' as opposed to 
the Hobbesean notion of it on the basis of force I7), that is because his thinking 
ascribes to speech, in the first place. aprivacy of personal passion18 and immediacy, 
as opposed to the common. monitored iterability. In view of the desired 
impartiality, in tum. privacy turns out to be a liability. While in the traditional 
opposition of speech and writing it is that very privacy, that very immediacy. that 
makes speech the privileged term of the opposition. What is seemingly paradoxical 
in the supremacy of the text, therefore, is but a consequence of the privacy speech is 
conferred upon customarily. The liability in the Hartian view of law regarding laws 
impartiality is intention. The evidence contract doctrine ignores is that of personal 
passion behind the 'parol.' And the guidance English law excludes in reading an Act 
of Parliament is that of private motives and interests behind parliamentary speeches. 
That there should be qualms about intention is mystifying, given that the concept 
has often seemed to be synonymous with meaning. Geny designates the intention 
behind the law as 'its essence and reason. '19 Considering the unhappy involvements 
of the private doctrine of contract law. as indicated in the preceding chapter. in a 
slightly uneasy analogy from the reading of a private will, Geny notes: 
the interpretation of a legislative text strongly resembles the 
interpretation of a private legal document. .. As the private 
will is the soul of the legal document it created. so the 
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legislative intent alone should animate the statutory fonnula 
in which it is expressed. This intention can be the only 
essential target of any statutory interpretation in the proper 
sense. 20 
It clearly defies common sense that intentionalist arguments have to be made and 
defended in the first place. It is hard to conceive contrary positions which would 
ditch, as it were, the intention of the law, without simultaneously abandoning the 
law altogether. Charles Fried, the Solicitor General of the United States, points out 
the inseparability of the concepts of the intention and the rule of law.21 It is, again, 
perplexing that one should have to state that. In the debates of statutory 
interpretation, likewise, Earl Maltz criticizes those who hold counter-intentionalist 
positions, such as Dworkin, but who would not at once give up the principle of 
legislative supremacy.22 Samuel Thorne, who provides a panoramic view of the 
development of the idea of interpretation in the Anglo-Saxon law, draws attention 
to the manner in which the intention of the legislator came to supplant the 
previously reigning arguments of equity. surmised purpose, and reason.23 'It is ... 
significant that only during the middle years of the sixteenth century did the 
intention of the makers begin to form the justification for extending a statute 
beyond its WOrds.'24 As he indicates the parallels between the growing significance 
of the Acts of Parliament and the advent of intentional arguments, Thorne also notes 
that, although having been used earlier, it is for the first time in Plowden's 
Commentaries (circa 1571) that the word 'interpretation' is taken to mean 
'extensions of the words of statutes.'25 It would be extraordinary, indeed, if 
interpretation and intention did not suggest a natural bond historically. 
In addition to authorial intention, Umberto Eco points out two other notions of 
intention that emerge in the act of reading. They are the reader's intention and the 
'intention of the text' (intentio operis).26 Because he designates reading essentially as 
an uncovering of the intention, however not necessarily the right intention in each 
instance, Eco appears to confirm the common sense view that it is simply 
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paradoxical to oppose meaning to intention. However, just as Aristotle and Hart 
who vest the authority in the text as opposed to men, and just as the logic that 
operates both parol evidence rule and the rule of the inadmissibility of Hansard, Eco 
is at once motivated in his fonnulation by fear of the passion, personal interests and 
fancies of the interpreter. What man's privacy may most undesirably precipitate in 
reading, he terms 'overinterpretation.tT/ The intention of the text, on the other hand, 
suggests 'that there are somewhere alteria for limiting interpretation. '28 That there 
are criteria somewhere, no one would seem to disagree. As he excludes the authorial 
intention for not being either available or relevant,29 and as behind 
overinterpretation is but private passion, Eco appears to include where the 
interpreter stands, whether she is after the authorial will or simply her own, not 
within the confines of that which holds 'criteria for limiting interpretation.' In other 
words, according to Eco, the limiting criteria have a definite and formal residence. 
And where they reside, the criteria exist independently and irrespective of the 
perverting prejudices of what would be the outside connections. The criteria are an 
artefact of a prior limiting of the spheres of outside and inside. They reside within 
the text. 
I have argued that extratextualism as advocated by Geny and the American 
extratextualists of the Constitution presupposes a notion of the text which has more 
formal a basis than textualism. What is usually categorised as extratextualism, 
therefore, is very much an ultra-textualism in disguise.30 It should come as no 
surprise, in a similar reversal, that counter-intentionalism typically exemplified here 
by Eco's position suggests intentionalism on a more private basis than the straight 
intentionalism represented by Geny's argument. In a remark which curiously 
reminds of Wittgenstein's above contention that it is 'not a hocus-pocus ... [of] the 
soul' that makes a sign signify, 31 Geny makes intention the 'essence' of the written 
law just as a 'private will is the soul of the legal document.'32 The 'hocus-pocus' is 
no casual phrasing on Wittgenstein's part as he often draws attention to 'the occult 
character of the mental process. '33 TIle idea of the 'intention of the text' which £CO's 
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counter-intentionalist argument invokes. however. leaves Geny's intentionalism pale 
by comparison in that. quite apart from the textual presence it presupposes. it 
suggests an intentional occultism of twofold. It holds the typical view of the 
authorial intention as an elusive draught in the corridors, as it were, of the authors 
brain, and therefore 'very difficult to find out and frequently irrelevant for the 
interpretation of a text'J4 And secondly comes the notion of overinterpretation, an 
act of interpretation induced basically by the wrong kind of intentions of either the 
author's or the reader's own. Because of the evasive quality of the fonner, there is 
not really a difference between the two. In both cases the reader pursues 
interpretation on the basis of that which is his and private and which therefore 
escapes the criteria that essentially limit interpretation. 
In fact, in his tripartite fonnulation of intention. Eco only confirms the trilogy 
which has manifested itself in the present study in Lyotard's grouping of the three 
orderings of justice: those of autonomy, heteronomy, and faith.35 Just as Lyotard 
dispenses with autonomy, Eco dismisses authorial intention. Faith will not do, nor 
will the intention of the interpreter: incommensurability comes in one of them with 
blind faith and with privacy in the other, a state of affairs that covers and blinds in 
very much the same way. And finally, Lyotard declares the incommensurability 
argument on a prescription-shy. subjectivity-fearing logical positivist basis, and the 
intention of the text which Eco advocates is but a textual positivism with strikingly 
similar anxieties. Because in each instance it is merely a political representation of 
that which is acquired through one of the two other categories. neither writer finds 
in the first one (autonomy or the authorial intention) a distinct category. The 
distinction, therefore. is one that is. once more. between the secular and the divine. 
or between textual intention and the intention of the interpreter. Considering. 
however. that in order to judge whether the intention put before one in a particular 
instance is the right kind of intention one will have absolutely no criteria other than, 
again, those of habits. a category of the divine, the prejudiced. the terms of the 
binary opposition will have to be redefined. 
125 
I discussed in the first part the argument suggested by the rhetorician Corax in 
defence of a person who is accused of violent assault on someone physically less 
capable. J6 It seeks to establish the less likely criminality of the stronger for his 
simply being the likelier on the basis of common probability. According to Aristotle 
who cites it, on the other hand, Corax' argument is 'not genuine' but designed to 
deceive, and fit, therefore, for 'no art except Rhetoric and Eristic. '37 But how does 
one distinguish between eristic and dialectic? In eristic one is not supposed to be 
concerned about truth. All that one is concerned about is to win the argument 
Suppose I think to myself of an argument someone has just put to me: it is a good 
argument, but not genuine. One can admire and appreciate a piece of furniture 
which is not 'genuine.' In an argument that seeks to make a point, however, it seems 
to be a contradiction in terms to be at once good but not genuine. If one may think it 
is not genuine, it has failed to make the point, and that alone will be the end of it: it 
is not a good argument. And where does intention, which is supposedly the sole 
difference between dialectic and eristic, enter into it'? That which distinguishes 
between dialectic and eristic, namely the persuasive efficacy of the argument, 
distinguishes also between textual intention and the intention of the interpreter. The 
right intention is the intention that will pass for the right intention. And if one 
seems to have no criteria other than that which is common and habitual, the binary 
opposition both Lyotard and Eco suggest will have to be defined in terms of the 
primordiality of positions of prejudice, that is to say, of faith. 
The anxiety typically exemplified by Eco is therefore to do primarily with the 
disregard of his discourse for the primordiality of the positions of prejudice in the 
face of persuasion. The narrative which is maintained on the one hand by a 
dissolution of the dichotomy between the secular and the divine, and on the other by 
persuasion as the sole distinguishing criterion, does not suggest a sterile circularity: 
the very 'overinterpretive' readings which receive the rebuke from Eco attest to that. 
Less does it suggest a free-floating privacy of passion to justify a dichotomy of the 
intention of the text and the intention of the interpreter. 
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2.2.1 Parliamentary Evidence 
The idea of constraining criteria within the secure edges of the text is the panicked 
answer to the anxiety over the unrestricted passion of the interpreter. Hence. the 
long-standing. recently relaxed. English doctrine that confines the search for 
intention in interpreting an Act of Parliament 'within the four comers of the Act. '38 
Heydon ~ ~ Case39 prescribes 'for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in 
general' the duty of uncovering '[w]hat remedy the Parliament hath resolved' with 
the particular instrument Tindal CJ designates as the 'only rule' of statutory 
interpretation. in Sussex Peerage Case. 40 interpretation 'according to the intent of 
the Parliament which passed the Act' The parliamentary proceedings. however. are 
historically left out from the material to guide the interpretation where intention is 
not clear for exactly the same reason Eco emphasizes the priority of the text: where 
she stands. the interpreter essentially evades criteria.41 The criteria come with the 
text. According to Lord Watson in Saloman v Saloman.42 the 'legitimate' intention is 
merely that which is derived either from the 'express words' of the statute directly. 
'or by reasonable and necessary implication.' The Sussex opinion. however. finds it 
safe for the interpreter to make use of the pre-Parliamentary evidence to establish 
the mischief the statute sought to remedy.43 In his well-known and widely-
supported opinion in Black-Clawson International Ltd. v Papierwerke Waldhof-
AschafJenburg AG.44 Lord Reid. likewise. confirms the use of pre-Parliamentary 
evidence to find out the ratio legis. Pursued in the pre- and past-Parliamentary 
phases of the law, therefore. in an obvious paradox, Parliament turns out to be the 
only place where the uncovering of the Parliamentary intention is not pursued. 4S 
Just as the passion. personal interests and fancies of the interpreter. the judge, are 
held in suspicion for their elusive immediacy. the words of the members of 
Parliament are distrusted for leaving open the possibility of not being straight. 
unruptured. renderings of the speakers' immediate passion. 
Anxiety over the lack of genuine intention in oratory has been ever-present 
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irrespective of the attitude to the use of parliamentary evidence in a particular legal 
domain.46 In two separate opinions composed by John Marshall, the 'words' of the 
Constitution are described as the sole location where 'the spirit is to be collected.'47 
and the 'language' of the Constitution as the sole bearer of that which was or 'was 
not in the mind of the convention when the article was framed. '48 Geny harshly 
criticizes the German Free School for setting loose the 'personal feeling' of the 
interpreter in the face of the 'formal authority' of the text. 49 The strict reading of the 
written law which he favours suggests at once a notion of intention framed within 
the physical confines of the text. 50 
I have already referred to J.L. Austin's anxiety over the lack of genuine intention 
infine language.51 It is in his reading of Austin's work that Derrida introduces his 
notion of iter ability as the prerequisite of sign generally. 52 The former excludes the 
fictitious and the theatrical from that which is ordinary in the performances of 
language for their lack of genuine intention. While the very project of his work is an 
understanding of language as manifested in its uses. It opposes the mainstream, 
metaphysical notion according to which language essentially transcends its 
performances. In pointing out a reversal of basic commitments on Austin's part 
when he invokes intention, Derrida, needless to say, does no such thing as to 
challenge the difference of grammar that prevails between the theatrical and that 
which is not. Just as Wittgenstein says nothing of the inner sensation that occurs in 
one's state of pain when he advances his argument against the assumed privacy of it. 
and designates the meaning of 'pain' on the bases merely of its iterable signs as 
opposed to its so-called mental state. 53 As far as the performances of the word pain 
go. what is considered to be the inner sensation of it is 'irrelevant. '54 In his vivid 
words. 'a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of 
the mechanism.'ss What Derrida demonstrates in his reading of Austin, therefore. is 
that it is the very secondary, the very 'parasitic,'56 left out by the latter from the 
investigation of language. that is essentially behind what Wittgenstein calls the 
mechanism. Intention plays no part in it. And. as I have already pointed it out,57 
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Aristotle only anticipates Austin in the latter's predicament when he marks rhetoric 
with its qualities of 'delivery' and 'staging,' and opposes its 'fine language' to the 
straight, unruptured medium of geometry.S8 The 'appearances' which constitute 'the 
whole business of rhetoric' and which are essentially 'unworthy,' however 
indispensable, 59 therefore, not only turn out to be central in the event of 
signification. but they also form the sole criterion that distinguishes between 
rhetoric and dialectic. A parliamentary piece of oratory deemed to have saved the 
appearances has saved it all. It has saved it all, because there is no other criteria 
available for validity, not only of parliamentary rhetoric, but generally. 
That the appearances are the sole conceivable bases of validity, however, seems 
to have escaped even those who have often argued against the inadmissibility of 
Hansard in the interpretation of Acts of Parliament. In his opinion in Hadmor 
Productions v Hami/ton,6JJ Lord Denning ventures to discover 'what Parliament 
meant when it passed s.178 of the Employment Act 1980' because the case suggests 
unusual difficulty. 'In most of the cases in the court, it is undesirable for the Bar to 
cite Hansard or for the judges to read it. '61 The recent decision of Pepper v Hart62 
formally relaxes the exclusionary rule.63 Where ambiguity or absurdity are at issue, 
references to Hansard are to be permitted in order to discover the true mischief 
resolved. The parliamentary material to be admitted is pointed out in this milestone 
decision, however, as merely 'the statement of the minister or other promoter of the 
Bill. '64 On what possible basis can one exclude the material that can sell itself as 
relevant? On what possible basis can one exclude an interpretation that can sell 
itself as convincing? And if the specific interpretation cannot do it, what difference 
does it make whether the interpretation originates in Hansard or elsewhere? Or 
whether it relies, within Hansard, on the speech of the promoter of the Act? 
Ironically enough, both sides in the controversy over Hansard do believe that it does 
make a difference either way. 'I always look at Hansard,' says Lord Hailsham. 'The 
idea that we do not read these things is quite rubbish. '65 What is it he gets out of 
Hansard he could not otherwise have had? Will reference to Hansard be more than 
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merely supportive of that which has already been interpreted? Vera Sacks pursues 
in an essay the admirably operational objective of finding out whether recourse to 
Hansard (alongside other preparatory material) would have made a difference in a 
variety of cases with interpretative difficulty.66 That she finds herself further 
enlightened in virtually no instance with regard to the problematic readings67 is 
hardly a surprise. She finds, however, that consulting Hansard still gives the 
'valuable insights not available elsewhere' of discovering that sometimes no 
intended meaning is involved in the first place, that the ambiguity is at the very 
source, and that as far as the interpretation of an Act is concerned often everyone is 
meant to be for himself.68 And yet, from another angle, the inadmissibility rule is 
pointless, as only few seem to feel constrained by it.69 Then, is the final word that 
references to Hansard could not possibly make a difference? The references would 
make a difference, according to Sacks, especially if they had a 'selective' quality 
about them. 'What must be strongly condemned is selective reading from 
Hansard. '70 Lord Browne-Wilkinson's opinion in Pepper which formally 
commences a post-exclusionary era, does so only to retain a private notion of 
parliamentary intention insofar as the opinion allows references only to the material 
by those who stood behind the Act.71 The prevalent anxiety at once underlies Sacks' 
warning against selective reading. It brings out intentionality, namely the private 
passion on the part of the interpreter, exactly the way it emerges in J.L. Austin's 
exclusion of the pretending perfonnances of language. Justice Frankfurter, likewise, 
expresses caution against the '[s]purious use of legislative history' at the cost of the 
words of the actual legislation.72 It is enigmatic, however, how the anxiety over 
passionate reading is justified, for that which will be decided eventually is but that 
which can be decided. Obviously, parliamentary references can have considerable 
political weight. That is so in particular in a case where either way the result will 
come as no great surprise. The political support of the reading, selective or 
otherwise, however, will only be for that which is decidable. And the specific 
reading will hardly have had a part in determining the decidable in the first place. 
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The notion of dramatic outcomes, with or without Hansard, and in any order or 
selection of it, follows from the occult idea of intention that is at the bottom of the 
anxiety over oratory and passionate interpretation: intention as a private state. The 
underlying opposition is that of intention and extension where a covering up of its 
constitutive connections makes the former term one of presence which at once 
transcends its epiphenomena or that which merely extends from it. The dichotomy 
of intention and extension, therefore, is simply another variation of the binary 
opposition of the law and its readings which appears to characterize the entire 
project of the mainstream legal thinking. 
2.2.2 The Silly Intention 
How is it that what sounds like simple common sense, namely the absurdity of a 
distinction between meaning and intention, becomes problematic in reading the 
law? William Goodell makes it the duty of the legislator and the judge, in an era 
before the thirteenth amendment, to legislate or decide against slavery.73 And he 
does so on a constitutional basis. Does he invoke, in so doing, the meaning of the 
Constitution against the intention behind it? 'We the People of the United States,' 
opens the Constitution. Does 'the People' refer also to the blacks? What would it 
mean to respond, 'it does not, intentionally, but it does by meaning'? Or that both by 
meaning and intention the blacks are also included in 'the People'? Whose intention? 
That of the 'founding fathers,' who wrote it, or that of the adopters of the thirteenth 
amendment, who took steps to include the blacks in it? Or, perhaps, that of the 
Warren Court, who is thought to have brought the black people more in line with 
the rest? What does it mean for an expression to change its meaning? What does it 
mean for it to change its intention? Did the expression of the Preamble change its 
intention? Did the intention of the founding fathers go away, as it were, and did a 
new one take its place? And where is the place? 
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One example of the distinction between the intention of the law and its meaning 
is the reading by the Conseil d'Etat of a Vichy s t a t u t e . 7 ~ ~ The law which declared 
administrative decisions of a particular type to be absolutely without remedy was 
interpreted not to leave out ultra vires because its exclusion had not been made in 
specific terms. 'Although the true intention of the law-giver was known to all. an 
argument drawn from an omission in the text enabled the court to find the 
'objective' meaning of the statute. '75 If an original meaning, as opposed to the 
'objective' meaning. does not uniquely. necessarily and at all times accompany the 
law (which appears it does not. as the court was able to supplant it with a new 
meaning). why suppose the intention of it. namely that which was ignored by the 
court. accompanies it uniquely. necessarily and at all times? Could an objective 
intention not be obtained from the law? Could the court not change the intention of 
the law the way it changed its meaning'? A variety of odd questions arise because 
the so-called objective meaning is considered to be somehow of that which it in 
effect settles scores with. namely the Vichy law. And a dichotomy of meaning and 
intention is introduced to cover up the fact that it is two distinct intentions. and not 
one meaning and one intention, that confront on the particular issue. It is a 
confrontation in which the third party of afontUll statute hardly takes part. 
The suggested opposition dissolves itself in its clumsy suppression of that which 
is decidable. I discussed it above regarding the literality argument which is 
characterized by the same impasse: 76 how do you follow an intention that is outright 
silly? The occultism postulated by counter-intentiona1ist positions enables not only 
an opposition of meaning and intention. but it also makes possible an opposition of 
intention and intention. In what I quoted above from Sussex Peerage Case 'the 
Parliament which passed the Act' is indicated as the sole holder of the intention. T7 A 
certain reading of the Act may also be rationalized, however. on the basis of the 
intention of 'the present law-maker,'78 a holder of intention that can be present in 
parliamentary form or as a purely ideal supposition which intends no silly things. 
An 'objective' intention in contradistinction to the original intention. therefore, may 
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well be conceivable. And yet another counter-intentionalist dichotomy is one of 
intention and purpose,79 a distinction whereby the silliness of the former over time 
can be compensated for by the unstationary aptitude of the latter. 
That the intention of the law can be silly as such, and that a silly intention can 
somehow find its way into that which is decidable, are concepts entertained 
characteristically by counter-intentionalist views. When the Napoleonic codes were 
created, writes Rene David, 'it was at first thought that they should incorporate the 
very principles of reason. '80 That which pervades the idea of legislation in France, 
he notes, is that it 'embodies reason. '81 In his celebrated speech at the centenary of 
the Civil Code, Ballot-Beaupre, the first president of the Cour de Cassation, 
invokes the dictates of 1ustice and reason' in the face of the possible silly 
consequences of the historical intention.82 The question gone unasked, however, is 
how one could possibly conceive what legislation that did not 'embody reason' 
would be like. The law that does not 'embody reason' does not exist, except that the 
reasonable entails a variety of trails which more often than not may cross over one 
another. The decision of Grey v Pearson83 concerns the interpretation of a will, the 
legal document in whose interpretation Geny finds the inspiration for the 
construction of the legislative text.84 The well-known opinion in Grey cautions 
against the silly meaning that may emerge in the interpretation, for the silly could 
not have been intended.85 In River War Commissioners v Adamson,86 Lord 
Blackburn confirms the 'golden rule' of the former, and rules out 'inconsistent,' 
'absurd,' or 'inconvenient' intention: the 'ordinary' meaning that suggests a silly 
intention on the part of the legislator is to be avoided. In his opinion where Justice 
Marshall designates the text of the Constitution as the locus of intention,87 he also 
states that the 'plain meaning,' when manifestly 'monstrous,' is to be abandoned as 
the intention, 'because we believe that the framers... could not intent what they 
[appear tol say. '88 
That the silly intention does not exist is expressed most remarkably by Hobbes in 
the Leviathan.89 The dichotomy of the literal ('the Letter') and otherwise fthe 
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Sentence') is to be understood only grammatically ('men use to make a difference 
between [the two]'), for neither will be functionally extant ('the significations of 
almost all words, are ... ambiguous') without the greater category (of reasonableness, 
the 'Equity') that houses them.90 Arguments in its interpretation, subsequently, can 
be made on the basis of that which is categorized as literal, or otherwise, whichever 
best suits the occasion. 'but there is onlY one sense 0/ the law.' namely its 
intention.91 Establishing the intention of the law involves making sense of it in a 
way that is equitable.92 For if what emerges is not equitable it cannot be the 
intention of the legislator. 
Now the Intention of the Legislator is always supposed to be 
Equity: For it were a great contumely for a Judge to think 
otherwise of the Soveraigne.93 
The terms in which Hobbes conceives the inequitable intention are akin to the terms 
in which Aristotle leaves room for those who are free of the association of the 
polis:94 the isolated, namely gods and beasts, give a good idea of the sort of 
interpreter who would come up with a sillY intention of the law, namely none. A 
silly intention does not exist. The silly, on the contrary, seems to be the concept that 
the intention of the law needs the cautions, protections, and assurances of rules such 
as that of Grey v Pearson95 against that which is unreasonable, to start with. What 
also follows from the Hobbesean notion of intention as a concept of reason in each 
case, albeit within a fairly wide range of conflicting traces. is that in no instance 
intention signifies a private state. The decidable has never been a stationary concept. 
I have pointed out the paradoxical character of the intentional controversy in that 
counter-intentionalist positions such as that of Eco suggest a somewhat greater 
commitment to intention as an essentially private occurrence in whose terms they 
would otherwise like to describe the opposing views of intentionalism.96 The reason 
Eco dismisses authorial intention is the reason he condemns the intention of the 
interpreter. namely the elusive and unbridled quality of intention in the face of the 
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common awareness of the text. Ironically, however, the holders of intentionalist 
views have hardly ever invoked as the locus of intention anything other than the 
text. 
In his defense of intention against Max Radin's famous counter-intentionalist 
argument, James Landis suggests the preparatory material of the law beside its text 
as the place where the intention is to be sought. 97 According to Henry Monaghan 
and Robert Bock, who advocate an intentionalist reading of the Constitution of the 
United States, intention is to be collected in the text of the Constitution.98 The text, 
Monaghan designates as 'the best evidence of original intention. '99 The decisional 
interpretations of it 'by courts nearer in time to the origin' should also throw 
considerable light on the intention borne by the text. lOO Against the counter-
intentionalist arguments which posit the elusiveness of intention especially over a 
time gap of centuries as in the case of the Constitution. Bork draws attention to the 
fairly uncontroversial element of original intention in interpreting on a textual basis 
the views of ancient authors such as Plato and Aristotle. IOI In this respect, an 
elaborate view of authorial intention on the basis of the text has been maintained by 
E.n. Hirsch in literary criticism,102 whose project has inspired work also in law.IOl 
An yet another intentionalist position, held by Gerald MacCallum in his essay 
where he discusses the Radin-Landis dispute, is based on a notion of common 
awareness which is textual, but which does not appear to subscribe to a crude 
fonnalism that would confine intention within the four edges of the text.104 The 
legislator is able to convey sense in the first place. he writes, as he deliberates 
through the common medium of language, whereby 'he can anticipate how others ... 
will understand [his] words. The words would be useless to him if he could not 
anticipate how they would be understood by these other persons. '105 
Intentionalist positions certainly do confirm a dichotomy of intention and 
extension. Landis, for instance, distinguishes between 'intent' and 'purpose. '106 
Unlike the private experience of the latter, the former can be looked for in the 
legislative records. MacCallum agrees with Landis on the distinction. As he is 
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resolved to perceive intention as mere extension. in each instance. of the 
transparency that characterizes language. he at once feels compelled to entertain a 
concept of legislative 'purposes' where the immediate experience of intention is to 
be deposited.I07 Bode. likewise. distinguishes between the intention of the Framers 
and 'the principles they intended: that which manifests itself in the text being 
merely and amply the latter. lOB In short. a dichotomy of intention as extension in 
contradistinction to intention as presence is implied by intentionalism as well as 
counter-intentionalism. Intentionalist positions, however, would appear to 
emphasize the extensional character of the idea postulated in intentionalist 
arguments. and disown a notion of intention based on the immediate. occult 
experience of the legislator. 
The concepts of silly intention and of its possible threat to infiltrate. as it were, 
that which is decidable have been characteristically harboured by counter-
intentionalist views. on the other hand. as they have consistently presupposed 
intention to be a private. closed experience. Because it is designated as a term of 
presence in the first place. claims to intention on an extensional basis have been 
criticised either for their delusions of it or for their use of the concept as a f a ~ a d e e
for an interest-ridden. political interior. 
2.2.3 Intention as a State of Mind 
In his classic essay on statutory interpretation Radin introduces the standard 
counter-intentionalist arguments to disclose the false project of intentionalism.109 To 
start with, intentionalism is a venture 'to enter into the mind' of the legislator and is 
therefore utterly unrealistic. llo Secondly, even if it were possible to turn inside out 
the legislative mind, intentionalism would still have no case, for the legislator is but 
a fiction. it 'does not exist.'lll The legislator is an abstraction to signify a collegiate 
lxxIy of many minds. The chances that of several hundred men each will have 
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exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given 
determinable, are infinitesimally small.'1l2 In an equally memorable essay, John 
Willis distinguishes between the 'actual intent' of the legislator and 'the social policy 
behind the Act: and warns, in similar vein, against the delusions of the former, for 
'a composite body can hardly have a single intent. '113 The point is confirmed in yet 
another essay of note by Douglas Payne insofar as 'the legislature being a composite 
body, cannot have a single state of mind and so cannot have a single intention. 'll" 
The idea of the elusiveness of intention on a collegiate basis has not ceased in more 
recent literature of statutory interpretation to be the principal argument against 
intentionalism.115 And in constitutional interpretation, its point has been made with 
equal vigour. I quoted in the preceding section from Alexander Bickel on the 
original understanding of the equal protection clause, the textual evidence that was 
made the basis of the anti-segregationist decisions of the Supreme COurt.1l6 In 
another inquiry into the same subject before the anti-segregationist decisions, the 
writers express confusion over the point of searching for a unitary intention 
amongst 218 Congressmen with a variety of distinct interests. 117 The equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was adopted at a truly tempestuous 
time. But '[e]ven if the times had been calm and conditions static, the general 
phrases of the Amendment could not have meant even approximately the same thing 
to all who voted upon them ... 'll8 Justice Brennan, one of the fiercest opponents of 
intentionalism on the bench, likewise, questions the idea of an historical intention 
also for the dubious nature of the enterprise that seeks a single, original intention 
behind 'a jointly drafted docurnent. 'll9 
True to the intellectual spirit which characterized legal thinking in the first half 
of the century, 120 but which permeated primarily the studies to evaluate propositions 
in science,121 Radin refuses to take into account the existence of the legislator, for 
its existence is merely afigurative existence. The legislator does not exist, for it has 
no presence as such. His argument does not make it clear, however, why one should 
suppose that intention, in contrast, is marked by a moment of presence. The 
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legislature does not correspond to a definite. unitary entity. actions taken in its name 
and references to which. therefore. are bound to be lacking the definite and 
verifiable content in order to be the basis of a judgement. As he points out a 
complex. multi-minded organisation. and at once a confusing blend of affIrmations 
and negations. for which the word 'legislator' stands and without which it would 
have no existence. one could readily indicate too the numerous instances of 
intention in each one of which the word signifies an entirely different meaning and 
without which it would hardly be present. What Radin seems to disregard in the 
first place. therefore. is the primorcliality of that which makes intention. as well as 
the legislature, concepts 0/ extension. of namely a world fraternity. The concepts 
extend not from what would represent some selfsame, immediate being on the part 
of what they signify, but from the attachments that constitute a fraternity. Collegiate 
intention is inconceivable only when intention is perceived in terms of pure 
immediacy. pure presence. Intention is collegiate intention. not only in the case of 
the legislature or in a contract where the participants of conflicting interests could 
intend the execution of one definite thing. but generally, insofar as intention will 
make sense only as much as it relates to a world fraternity. An initial paradox of 
many-minds-and-one-intention manifests itself because intending is considered to 
be an artefact, not of those attachments always already in place, but of what 
Heidegger calls the 'cabinet' of mind. l22 The supposed paradox of collegiate 
intention, with whose sole weight Radin launches 'the most famous anti-
intentionalist argurnent,'123 is put with admirable precision and then duly dismissed 
in what is ironically the earliest treatise known in English on the interpretation of 
statutes. 
The seconde case whereby the statute shall be taken is ex 
mente legislatorum for that is chiefe to be considered, which, 
althoughe it vane in so muche that in maner so manie heades 
as there were, so many wittes,' so manie statute makers, so 
many myndes; yet, notwithstadinge, certen notes there are by 
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which a man maie Icnowe what it was .124 
The paradox would arise not only over the question of many minds. Postulated as a 
concept of presence, it would seem to be equally mystifying to entertain the idea of 
intention, even on an individual basis, to aim ambiguity or silence. Sacks finds in 
her investigation into the preparatory material of certain statutes that ambiguity is 
sometimes intended by the Parliament.125 Intentional vagueness or imprecision is 
often said to be a major source of interpretative issues in different legal domains. l26 
How does one intend ambiguity? How does one imagine it, in the sense of having a 
mental image of it? And what is the mental image of silence, a state of affairs which 
can be intentional and which, in certain legal systems, can have significant 
consequences?l27 In stark contrast to the Cartesian epistemology which makes 
Icnowing something 'a process of returning with one's booty to the cabinet of 
consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it,'l28 Heidegger points out that 
'[e]ven the forgetting of something'l29 is in each instance an extension. It is an 
extension of one's attachments to a primordial world which defies a dichotomy of 
one's pure immediacy on the inside and a mediated common awareness on the 
outside. Does the immediate mental image of silence occur as the mind goes blank? 
Neither intending silence nor going blank in the mind, however, would seem to 
acquire sense, even for the very immediate actor of the experience, in reference to a 
state of mind. 'I didn't mean that when I said it!' exclaims one. 'I know well what 
you meant!' responds the other. Is the argument possibly about the content of the 
mind that produced the disputed statement? Sir Thomas Egerton of the afore quoted 
treatise, for one, would not regard either of the two disputants as the necessarily 
privileged party to have exclusive hold of the meaning intended in the statement. 
The argument is possibly over a confusion, between the two, of what he calls the 
'notes' regarding the statement, namely its fraternal attachments. Or perhaps it is an 
altogether different game. 
As the attachments of the statement to an association already established 
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constitute its sole bond to that which is intelligible, or that which can be, and that is 
so not only for the listener but more significantly for the utterer also, fraternal 
meaning is the actual meaning of the statement. When Willis distinguishes between 
the 'actual intent' of the legislator and the policy borne in the Act,l30 what his 
distinction disregards in the first place is that actual intention in each instance is but 
act-ual intention, in the sense that it is in each case essentially enveloped in what 
Egerton calls certen notes about it. It is none other than, and correctly, those notes 
that are invoked when a writer states at the outset of his book on a concept by 
Wittgenstein that his 'main aim in this book is to give a clear and accurate account 
of what Wittgenstein actually thought ... 'l3l Wittgenstein himself would be ftrst to 
oppose that he had a necessarily privileged hold over his actual thinking.l12 In 
Philosophical Investigations he relates the example, provided by William James, of 
a man who reportedly had thoughts before he was able to speak. The latter aims to 
show by the example the essentially separate functioning of one's thought from 
language, the fore structuring house of one's attachments to a world already 
established. The man who had the thoughts later put into writing what his thoughts 
had been about. 'Are you sure - one would like to ask _,' comments Wittgenstein, 
'that this is the correct translation of your wordless thought into WOrds?'133 The 
witticism by Wittgenstein indicates the enigma that suddenly appears as that which 
is intelligible is claimed to be so without fraternal attachments. What the claim in 
fact does is simply to invoke another fraternity which would be alternative to that 
reflected in the language, rather than exemplify thought without fraternal 
attachments. Hence, the 'translation' Wittgenstein points out. 
The primordial fore structuring of those attachments is well attested in the 
decision, by the Queen's Bench Divisional Court, of R v Registrar General. ex parte 
Charlie Smith.l 34 The statute in question135 makes it possible for the adopted 
children of 18 years of age and over to obtain on application a copy of their original 
birth certificate. In the present case, however, the Court chose to refuse the 
applicant the information about the identity of his natural parents. The High Court 
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reading of the law is at once striking and exemplary. The particular applicant had 
been sentenced to life imprisonment for a murder which had been virtually without 
motive. He had committed another murder while serving the sentence, this time 
having taken the victim for his adoptive mother. The Court held in perspective what 
it considered to be disturbing facts about the applicantl36 and decided that a positive 
response to the application in the specific case could note have been the intention of 
the legislator. 
It is, we think, beyond belief that Parliament contemplated 
that an adopted child's right to obtain a birth certificate should 
be absolute come what may. The public at large, knowing the 
essentials of the facts, we consider would, we have no doubt, 
be outraged if that were so.I 37 
The opinion is remarkable on more than one account. First, it defies a dichotomy of 
meaning ('plain meaning') and intention, and confirms that the silly could not have 
been intended. Secondly, it refers in so doing to a legislative intention which at least 
in the present case could not be taken for a state of mind. Thirdly, a continuity, a 
common awareness, is hinted at insofar as what the Court refers to is also that in 
which the statute must have been conceived in the first place. And finally, unlike 
many over-zealous High Court opinions, it discloses in unequivocal terms the 
element of persuasion that underlies the decidable. That which is not decidable, in 
other words, is that which the court could not get away with. As the Court outrules 
the concept of silly intention, it at once suggests the actual intention of the statute as 
that which is constituted by the fraternal attachments of the statute. It invokes the 
very experience of intention on the part of the Parliament as an extension of a 
common awareness. 'It is, we think, beyond belief that Parliament contemplated 
that. . .' The firm conviction of the Court is an effect of that with which Egerton 
dismisses an initial paradox of intention, namely certen notes l38 about it. And what 
could provide a firmer conviction? What is particularly crucial to notice in what 
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occurs is the constitutive part played by those notes even for the immediate actor of 
the experience. Radin's argument makes the project of intention impossible because 
legislative intention is a collegiate intention. l39 The paradoxical conclusion that 
emerges from a critical probing of his argument. therefore. is that intention is 
possible because it is in each case a collegiate. fraternal intention. And that is so not 
only for the intention of the legislature. but generally. 
The German jurists who advocated at the tum of the century a free search for the 
right remedy when required. as opposed to a mechanistic notion of jurisprudence. 
also pointed out. not infrequently. the extensional character of meaning. The work 
of the German school is sometimes associated with that of Geny. The latter. 
however. as I have noted it.l40 fiercely opposed the extensionally inclined views of 
the fonner. Paradoxically. the idea of intention postulated by Geny as the sole basis 
on which to interpret the statutory law141 is virtually defenceless in the face of 
arguments such as those of Eco and Radin. because basically it clings itself to a 
dichotomy of intention and extension142 even though the traditional intentionalism 
of Geny and of many others presupposes considerably less occultism. to borrow 
once more the word from Wittgenstein.143 than the counter-intentionalist views of 
intention. 
According to Kohler. on the other hand. interpretation seems to be conceivable 
only on an extensional basis. Thought as 'a complete slave of our will,' and thus as a 
radically distinct category from that which is extensional. 'is a common error' of 
conviction. l44 He refuses the privacy suggested by an occult notion of thought 
insofar as 'our thinking is not merely individual but also social; what we think is not 
our own product.'145 That which is expressed in language is. first and foremost. part 
of a common. all-encompassing awareness. As such it 'has a life of its own 
independent of the person who thinks or expresses it. '146 His concept of the text. 
therefore. clearly excludes the idea of a private and privileged hold on the part of 
the scribe. It emphasizes the fraternal attachments that define authorship as well as 
interpretative thought. '[T]he author of the statute ... is not more the master of the 
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thought than thought in other instances is the mere slave of the will ... 'l47 One would 
like to think from Kohler's analysis that the thinking which Gerty condemns for its 
unrestrained liberalism and which the former's approach crudely falls into not really 
implies a free-floating journey. but that. on the contrary. it almost compensates for 
the vulnerability that characterizes Gerty's idea of intention. A dichotomy of 
meaning and intention. as suggested by virtually all the counter-intentionalist 
positions. will not hold. in that both categories of signification originate through the 
transparency of an underlying fraternity. As his enigmatic distinction between 
thought and will immediately gives it away. however. a dichotomy of intention and 
extension equally defines Kohler's project. 
Hence we may say. statutes are not to be interpreted 
according to the ideas and intentions of the legislator. but 
should be interpreted sociologically. as if they were the 
products of the entire people of which the legislator was but 
the organ. l48 
As his notion of thought precludes an occult privacy. the will remarkably evades the 
connections that forestructure thought. To hold. naturally. that a sociological 
reading must take precedence over intentional reading is to presuppose at once that 
what is intentional would somehow escape the fraternal attachments whose 
primordiality inspires a sociological idea of reading in the first place. The 
sociological idea of interpretation loses its point. therefore. at the very moment a 
non-sociological notion of interpretation is conceived. 
I noted above that the figurative quality Radin allots to the legislature is a general 
quality that signifies the relationship between language and its other, namely what is 
taken to be its c o n t e n t . l ~ ~ A variety of distinct instances equally characterizes 
intention. It appears to have in common in all its uses merely what Wittgenstein 
calls a 'family resemblance.' One single feature could not be found to underlie all its 
instances. even though there will be strong. individual resemblances between 
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them. ISO For different instances of the word intention to convey sense. therefore. 
different aiteria. or what Egerton would call different 'notes. 'lSI are required.152 
although the difference goes often unnoticed. for the fraternal attachments in place 
have already eliminated all but its present instance. The confusing range of the 
instances of intention is pointed out by Austin. He points out to its varying uses 
such as in the intention of contractual intention alongside the intention of the 
legislator. He nevertheless concludes that 
[iln each of these cases. the notion signified by the term 
'Intention' may be reduced to one of [two] notions ... namely, 
a present volition and act, with the expectation of a 
consequence; or a present belief, on the part of the person in 
question, that he will do an act in future. 153 
Both notions sketched out by Austin essentially reflect an accompanying state of 
mind. In either case, however, the criteria which come after the concept of presence 
and which are clearly secondary to the immediacy of the concept would appear to 
be perfectly capable in their supplementary position, and alone. to perform the game 
to the effect as would be desired. Does really the presence of a volition, or an 
expectation. or a belief. on the part of the intention-holder. make a defining 
contribution to the term? 
In the vein in which Kohler draws attention to the extentional character of 
interpretative thought. Kantorowicz questions the notion of will as suggested by 
what he calls the 'accepted doctrine.'l54 Accordingly. what essentially defines a 
transaction. for instance. is but an overlapping of states of mind on the part of the 
transactors. In a commonest example of 'willed transaction' which he provides. 
however, the will appears to be produced by criteria, and not, as the traditional 
theory would have us believe. vice versa. 
If I board an omnibus the law requires me to conclude a 
contract of carriage with the company running the omnibuses. 
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and this, according to the accepted doctrine, requires two 
internal acts constituting a consensus 0/ minds; but if I pay 
my usual fare absent-mindedly because I am reading a novel I 
have nevertheless done all that the law requires me to do and 
the conductor cannot turn me out on the ground that I have 
not made a payment in the legal sense of a willed transaction, 
but merelY made external movemelllS o/my fingers. ISS 
A transaction. in short. is a performance. It is an exchange of actions and not minds. 
Through a figurative notion of will. criteria. and criteria alone. execute the entire 
game. That which prompts Kohler's dichotomy of sociological and intentional 
reading. namely an underlying opposition of inside and outside. however. comes to 
mark Kantorowicz's argument too as he proceeds to confine the primordiality of 
criteria within the sphere of law. Citing Kant on a distinction of legality and 
morality. he defines the former in the modest terms of 'mere conformity of external 
conduct.'l56 Justice also, he adds, is situated in the realm of extension. The 
conformity which therefore characterizes both law and justice, he makes part of 
what he calls 'quasi-morality.' 
By this word we mean a purely external conduct which as to 
its content complies with moral rules and which therefore 
would be moral if it were dictated by a good motive .157 
It is mystifying that if the notion of a right motive is eventually to be retained why it 
should be eliminated in the realm of law and justice. What is more puzzling, 
however, is what extra part intention is supposed to play in morality as opposed to 
the quasi-morality of law. As with Radin, that which is figurative gets charted unfit 
by Kantorowicz to be the basis of what is genuine. A figurative notion of intention 
underlies transaction. Intention as presence alone, however, makes genuine 
morality. Will not the very notion of 'a good motive' convey sense only through the 
criteria of 'a purely external conduct'? As Wittgenstein would put it. how on earth is 
one supposed to have learned what 'a good motive' is in the first place? What can 
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possibly rationalize the notion that genuine morality is more than that which will 
pass for genuine morality? 
It can be rationalized only in one way. What the argument by Kantorowicz 
suggests is neither simply nonsense nor a transference, as it were, from afigurative 
notion of intention in law to intention as presence in the realm of morals, but a shift 
from one figurative notion of it to another. He switches the game. 
2.3 The Tame and the Freakish 
That which is primarily anticipated in the conceptions of silly rule and silly 
intention is the silly judgement. The post-war years saw the advancement of 
arguments by the holders of natural law views drawing attention to the hazardous 
implications of a mechanistic application of the law without considerations of a 
moral content. 1 I discuss in the present study the concept of the just which defined 
the Nazi law to point out the primordially opinionated - in the sense of opinion-
based and at once dogmatic - character of jUdgement.2 In a curious reversal, 
writers with a positivistic stance over the reading of the United States Constitution 
have argued against moral considerations in the application of the law by issuing a 
similar warning. According to the judges Rehnquist and Bork, the notion that 
dictated the calamitous decision of Dred Scott v Sandford3 followed simply from a 
confusion on the part of the Court between the categories of the moral and the 
legal." That which is immediately paradoxical in view of the naturalist warnings of 
the earlier era against a positivistic notion of the law is the positivistic uses, in 
counter-warning, of what was a significant precursor to the Nazi pattern of the just. 
The decision of Dred Scott, for Bock. is an expression of the judge's private ethics 
as opposed to a dictate of the law. In it 'the politics and morality of the Justices 
combined to produce the worst constitutional decision of the nineteenth century.'s 
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Amongst the decisions that are equally bad this century. he cites those of Lochner v 
New York6 and Roe v Wade.' It is self-deleting. according to him. to give support to 
one of the decisions with a core of infiltrated politics and condemn the rest. 'Who 
says Roe must say Lochner and Scotto'8 Bork's contention bears unwittingly the 
insight that it is for the most part a war of fleeting positions of rhetoric. rather than 
a confrontation of elaborate and coherent generalizations. that characterizes 
competing arguments of constitutional review. That which is a 'progressive' 
argument in Roe may not necessarily be so in Lochner. 'There is no reasonable 
ground for interfering with the liberty of person... by determining the hours of 
labor ... '9 That could well be from a decision to recognize the woman's right to 
choose and determine her own 'hours of laror.' Only it happens to be from a 
decision that finds non-emancipatory the state regulation of maximum working 
hours to protect the interests of New York bakery workers. That an interchange of 
the arguments in two different decisions, one absolutely discredited the other not 
very much so, is conceivable at all hints at the elusive quality of that which is a bad 
decision. A transposition of similar kind defines the terms in which the majority, 
pro-choice. opinion of Roe refuses the originaiist argument for the foetus as a 
person: 'that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal 
abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word 
'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unbom.'lO 
Unlike that of Roe, however, the decisions of Dred Scott and Lochner are more than 
simply controversial. They are disgraced decisions. Justice Taney's majority opinion 
in Dred Scott reads: 
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors 
were imported into this country and sold as slaves, become a 
member of the political community formed and brought into 
existence by the Constitution of the United States. and as such 
become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and 
immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen ... We 
think ... that [the Negro] are not included. and were not 
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intended to be included under the word 'citizens' in the 
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and 
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to 
citizens of the United States. On the contrary. they were at 
that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of 
beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, 
whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their 
authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those 
who held the power and the Government might choose to 
grant them. I I 
I referred above to a certain reading of the Constitution by Frederick Douglass. an 
ex-slave. 12 His views of the Constitution and of its framers - which ironically, and 
strikingly. match Taney's - were already in publication when Taney's opinion was 
composed. What the opinion considers to be the standpoint of the Constitution and 
of its authors and supporters must have found agreement, therefore. amongst the 
very abolitionists as well as those who saw the Negros fit for no inalienable rights. 13 
And that alone seems to place the decision of Dred Scott safely within the range of 
the decidable. What Bock does in denying its decision even historical decidability is 
not simply to glorify that which is decidable. His sole point of criticism in the 
opinion of Brown v Board of Education 14 is that it reflects the subversive view that 
the Court may legitimately part with 'the original understanding in order to do the 
socially desirable thing.'IS Therefore. the resistance by Bork to recognizing in the 
decision of Dred Scott the very epitome of his dichotomy between the original 
understanding and the socially desirable thing indicates sheer brazenness on his 
part. beside mediocre rbetoricianship. There is something wrong,' notes Bock. 
' ... with a judicial power that can produce a decision it takes a civil war to 
OVertum.'I6 That the decision of Dred Scott was not decidable. however. hardly 
necessarily follows from the fact that it had to be reversed at the cost of a civil war. 
Without the privacy with which the passion behind the decision would have to be 
defined one would be at loss to account for its freakish conception by Taney and 
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others in the fIrst place. But what exactly was freakish about it? Was the decision 
freakish in its consequences. as opposed to its report. its opinion. supported by the 
very testimony of none other than the opposite camp of Douglass. of the original 
understanding? Obviously. the Court could reverse the effects. for the present case. 
of the sentiments that had been behind the choices of the authors and immediate 
supporters of the Constitution. A reversal of those effects would have been equally 
part of the attachments in place. The sentiments for the consequences of the original 
sentiments. however. seem to have been as much part of the attachments in place as 
the Court opinion in its report of the original sentiments. That the effects that denied 
the rights and privileges of citizens to the blacks were very much part of the 
consensus is well attested by. of all people. Justice Harlan's support, at the time. of 
the outcome in Dred Scott,I' who, by a stark contrast. would later go in his 1896 
opinion of dissent in Plessy v Ferguson 18 further than the 1954 decision of Brown 
for an uncompromising condemnation of racism and the segregation. The civil war 
hardly took place to eradicate the sentiments so widely shared in the society. An 
altogether different set of motives. ones which a reversal of the decision in Dred 
Scott stood for. meant probably in the fraternity of the prevailing attachments 
considerably more than a mere overturn of the judicial endorsement of white 
supremacy. On the contrary, and despite the ensuing civil war amendments. the 
decidable at those particular connections would entail the endorsements. in one way 
or another, of white supremacy for at least another century. When Bork observes 
'something wrong' with the 'judicial power' that produced the decision of Dred 
Scott, therefore, a dichotomy of the law and its readings thereby postulated is only 
intended to spare one the embarrassments and pessimism of a primordially 
opinionated concept of that which is decidable. 
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2.3.1 The Countennajoritarian Objection 
A concept of freakish judgement underlies characteristically what is sometimes 
known as the 'countermajoritarian objection' to judicial review. Antidemocratic 
implications may suggest themselves. accordingly. in the judicial review of 
legislative acts19 or in the judicial substitution of the legislature where the law is 
non-extant or unclear.2O Is 'majority' represented by the majority 0/ the present 
legislature. the majority that passed the statute. or in the Constitution. a document 
often defined by a supreme order? Where exactly does the court stand? In response 
to Justice Peckham's question in Lochner, where a state statute is declared invalid. 
'are we all ... at the mercy of legislative majorities?'21 Bork states, 'yes: that about 
sums up the American way.22 The unquestioned supremacy of the legislative 
majority is recognized. however. only when the Constitution is deemed to be 'silent' 
on a particular issue.23 Consequently. why majorities should be ignored when they 
challenge what would be considered to be the choice of the Constitution seems to 
leave in the argument of majoritarianism an irreparable hole. In other words. the 
countennajoritarianism displayed by Peckham in Lochner. for instance. and 
despised by Bork. is at once the principle that is behind constitutionalism. One 
solution, of course. would be to distinguish between the countennajoritarianism of 
the Constitution and that of the judge. just as a distinction is installed between the 
law and its readings. The dichotomy is taken for granted by James Thayer in his 
classic argument for majoritarianism.24 The sole basis of the designation. by 
Learned Hand. of instances of judiciary as a usurpation of the legislative power. a 
'third chamber.' presupposes that same dichotomy.25 It alone makes possible the 
Wechslerian conception of a 'neutral' judiciary.26 And Alexander Bickel. finally. in 
a seminal exposition of the subject. condemns what he considers to be the 
countermajoritarianism of the Court by confirming a prior dichotomy of the law and 
its readings and thus for an ensuing fear of thefreakish, 'judicial review is a deviant 
institution in the American democracy.'27 
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As a dichotomy of the law and its readings appears equally to mark the positions 
that resist the idea of a timid judiciary, on the other hand, the paradox of 
countermajoritarianism turns out to be one with two sharp edges. When John Hart 
Ely confers upon the court what he calls a 'refereeing' duty28 whose example he 
finds in the perfonnance of the Warren Court, a court in the centre of the 
controversy over the political involvements of the judiciary,29 he at once opposes 
the refereeing pursuits of the court to a value-imposing, partisan, position, namely 
one which would risk the freakish. William Brennan, in a condemnation of what he 
calls an '[u]nabashed enshrinement of majority,' points out as the American way 
quite the opposite of the plain majoritarianism suggested by Bork.30 He refers, 
instead, to a tradition in the order of which 'certain values transcen[d] ... the reach of 
temporary political majorities. '31 What a distinction between the majority and the 
transcendent values primarily places on the side of the (majority) readings, in turn, 
is a capacity to turn freakish. According to another writer, Philip Bobbitt, a 
countermajoritarian threat will not be the issue unless judicial review ceases merely 
to safeguard the legitimacy of the Constitution and becomes instead politically 
motivated.32 The political, in contradistinction to the constitutional, therefore, 
stands for the freakish. And Michael Perry, in his view of an active judicial 
involvement in the recognition and preservation of what he calls the constitutional 
'aspirations,' yields to the countermajoritarian paradox as he ventures to sidestep 
it. 33 In one attempt. he distinguishes between the 'extraconstitutional' and the 
'contraconstitutional.'34 Extraconstitutional policy-making by judiciary poses no 
immediate problems of legitimacy insofar as stretching beyond the original 
understanding does not necessarily invite a countermajoritarian difficulty. While the 
latter, the contraconstitutional, clearly stands for that which is freakish. In another 
attempt Perry neutralizes the problematic implications of that which is 
extraconstitutional by a distinction between the aspirations in the text and those that 
are extratextual. 'My argument is merely that a judge should bring to bear, in 
constitutional cases, only aspirations signified by the text.'J5 Being charted 
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'aspirations' even though not in the text, extratextual aspirations necessarily suggest 
weight. The aspirations in the text, on the other hand, will be aspirations some of 
which weight-less, that is to say weight-less as such, for the significance of some of 
the textual so-called aspirations will be merely a textual significance36 - a further 
distinction which Perry himself indeed does proceed to make; textual aspirations are 
divided into those that are 'worthwhile' and those that are not.37 What he ignores 
entirely, of course, is the troublesome conception of an instance, a constitutional 
case, in which the judge would have to choose to give voice to an aspiration that is 
not worthwhile but is in the text, in the face of a worthwhile but extratextual 
aspiration. Does the choice in Dred Scott signify some such confrontation? If, on 
the other hand, the conception by the judge of that which is freakish is not a private, 
independent, solitary, event, but very much in while, in that case the argument will 
have a hellish difficulty pinpointing what exactly it is about the judgement that 
makes it freakish. If it is in while, it is worthwhile. As with the decision of Dred 
Scott, the freakish will be possible only on the basis of a dichotomy of the law and 
its readings, a concept whereby a particular reading could be tested against an 
unmediated and value-free presence that is the law. 
The countermajoritarian objection indicates in the direction of a paradox for the 
positions that are majoritarian, for countermajoritarianism stands at once right 
behind the very idea of constitutionalism. And it forms a paradox also for the 
positions that favour an inspired, as it were, notion of judicial review in that these 
positions simply are for being ill at ease with the constitutional principle that is 
countermajoritarianism par excellence. One curious effect of the paradox seems to 
be that often one and the same argument will appear to make the entire stock in the 
controversy irrespective of the differences that define the sides. In one such instance 
Paul Brest puts into question the very authority of the Constitution. 'What authority 
does the written Constitution have in our system of constitutional government?'38 
He points out the English case of a successfully accountable constitution without a 
written document and emphasizes the propriety of the question. 'We did not adopt 
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the Constitution, and those who did are dead and gone.'39 He presupposes, naturally, 
that the text of the Constitution has a binding value for the American political 
association that is greater than that which its constitutional documents have for the 
English system. Needless to mention the blurred notion of a comparison with 
England where overlooking the text, as far as there is one, and as far as the rhetoric 
goes, has hardly ever been the case. Whether ignoring it (if that is what Brest 
means) or doing away with it altogether, will not the entire point of the concept of 
judicial review also go with the Constitution? A certain coherence of logic on the 
part of Brest's argument, however, must not go unnoticed. Writers who have 
dismissed originalist objections have often done so without at once questioning the 
authority of the Constitution.40 Instead, the originalist criticisms of a politically 
adventurous judiciary have been met with the counter-objection of the dubious 
political neutrality of the original choice.41 The counter-objection, however, hardly 
sufficiently rationalizes the so-called departures from the original meaning. As Bork 
has shrewdly indicated it, originalism does not claim political neutrality. Its choice 
is in each case a political choice.42 The simple point, however, is that, once an 
'original' choice is acknowledged. in the professed company of the principle of 
constitutionalism the consistency of a 'non-originalist' position becomes 
questionable. Is the general and absolute force of a specific set of choices, made at a 
specific point in time, not simultaneously acknowledged and disdained? To question 
originalism is to question constitutionalism. Yet, as Brest avoids the predicament by 
challenging the authority of the Constitution altogether, he does so only to invite the 
paradox of the counterrnajoritarian objection. 'We did not adopt the Constitution, 
and those who did are dead and gone.'43 Bork questions the authority of jUdiciary, 
where it seems to be overinventive, from a majoritarian point of view.44 Curiously, 
a majoritarian point of view equally marks Brest's questioning of the authority of 
the Constitution. Bork fails, subsequently, to account for the constitutional principle 
that is fundamentally counterrnajoritarian. And, likewise. Brest will not succeed to 
explain why an audacious judiciary that is the epitome of counterrnajoritarianism is 
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indispensable even though the Constitution is not. 
The countermajoritarianism of imaginative judicial review transforms into 
majoritarianism, and majoritarianism into the countermajoritarianism of 
constitutionalism, in the fashion in which textualism and extratextualism,45 and 
intentionalism and counterintentionalism,46 turn out to be metamorphic, and defy 
categories that are clear-cut and generally assertable. What appears to characterize 
arguments on either side in any of the binary oppositions. in this respect, is a 
consistent oversight of the nature of that which is decidable. A typical example of 
the omission is the apology with which a departure from the traditional formula of 
the separation of powers is advocated in the comparative work by Cappelletti.47 Its 
argument draws attention to the contemporary phenomenon of judicial growth, 
especially in the European domain, as the modem government rapidly expands and 
more and more problems are brought about by the expansion. And one lesson 
learned from the comparative experience, he points out, is that the difficulties thus 
encountered can be held under control least problematically by giving judiciary the 
upper hand over a complicated network of government and legislative functions. 
That it upsets the traditional formula, on the other hand, points simply in the 
direction of the long overdue task. for the theory, to think less of its 'dogma' and try 
and come to terms with 'reality.'48 Come to terms with reality, however, 
Cappelletti's own argument does very little. Although judicial creativity 'has its own 
modes of accountability,' in that the adjudicator is in a clear distance from, and yet 
at once part of, the community (hence her impartiality and at the same time 
closeness to the heartbeat of thingS),49 that the democratic accountability is risked in 
some level has to be conceded. 50 What defines the 'mighty problem' of 
countermajoritarianism, according to Cappelletti, is a 'contradiction' that cannot be 
overcome but that one can learn to live with.51 Cappelletti misses the point about 
the nature of that which is decidable. however, as he acknowledges the dramatism 
of a choice between the 'reality' and the 'principle' of the separation of powers. By 
acknowledging a choice, a dichotomy between the two is professed to be equally 
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part of reality, a notion in which a good deal is invested. The apology which marks 
the argument, therefore, signifies the tragedy, as it were, of a choice that has to be 
made between two different orders of reality. And the contradiction that is 
'insoluble' but that has to be accepted is none other than away, for Cappelletti, to 
save the soul of his argument in the face of the pragmatic choice it is compelled to 
make. 
2.3.2 An Inconspicuous Concept of Judiciary 
The all soul instance, famously, has been the French delegation of powers. One 
early undertaking of the Revolution was to separate the realms of judiciary and 
executive. According to a decree issued before the end of 1789, '[the administrators] 
cannot be disturbed in the exercise of their administrative functions by any act of 
the judicial power.'52 It was confirmed the following year by a law53 which also 
established absolute judicial restraint with regard to the legislative functions. The 
courts 'shall not take part, either directly or indirectly, in the exercise of the 
legislative power, nor impede or suspend the execution of the enactments of the 
legislative lxxly .. .'54 'Of the three powers above mentioned,' writes Montesquieu, 
whose ideas reflected and influenced the thinking that was behind the Revolution, 
'the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing: there remain, therefore, only 
twO .. .'55 In view of the traditional rhetoric, therefore, it is hardly a surprise that the 
judiciary is designated in the 1958 Constitution as an 'authority,' 56 rather than a 
power. Subsequently, the administrative tribunals are considered to be part, not of 
judiciary, but of the organisation of the executive. 57 For the same reason, the 
conformity of laws to the Constitution, before their promulgation, is decided upon 
by a 'council,' not by a court. 58 The French diffidence of creative judiciary is usually 
explained by the abuses of the notion under the ancient regime.59 The regional 
appellate courts of the pre-Revolutionary era, the Parlements, had not been exactly 
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the objects of popular affection with their law-making powers. Under the new 
regime, therefore, the courts were designed to play no more than a technical role in 
the delivery of justice.60 Customarily, their relative insignificance within the system 
has been emphasized with contrasting references to the part played by courts in the 
common law tradition.61 In certain civil law systems, however, a notion of the 
separation of powers is retained even though the system at once empowers the judge 
in some cases to legislate after the exact fashion of the legislature.62 For that reason, 
it ought to be less than accurate to make the two opposite poles on the issue of 
judicial creativity those of civil and common law systems.63 The customary division 
is upset even more profoundly by the frequent envy, on the part of the very 
common law jurist, of the unstrained manner in which statutory interpretation is 
pursued in France.64 The relaxed performance of the courts has been explained by 
the drafting style of the French legislator which apparently concentrates on the 
general lines and leaves it to the judge to fill in the details.65 One significant 
indicator of the judicial manners that goes beyond the particular character and style 
of the statutes is a rhetoric that refuses to concede gaps in the law.66 It is intended to 
be a categorical negation of judicial participation in the making of the law.67 Yet its 
strategy seems to have worked out to bestow upon the French judge an ease of 
attitude in handling controversial cases,68 one that lacks in the common law 
adjudication probably, and paradoxically, because the common law judge does not 
have what some might consider to be the excellent cover of rhetoric which a system 
that refuses gaps conveniently provides. The conviction that the law yields solution 
for every conceivable question seems to have abandoned the common law rhetoric 
since the days of Blackstone. In that sense, an almost Blackstonian view of the law 
has been very much the defining character of the mainstream rhetoric in France. It 
is judicial creativity that is ultimately encouraged, rather than simply a teleological 
view of law, in the well known Civil Code provision that makes the 'denial of 
justice' (deni de justice) by the court on the grounds of 'silence, obscurity or 
insufficiency' of the law a punishable offence.69 The system whose negation of 
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judicial participation in the legislative functions means its refusal of court opinions 
as part of the law, as reflected in the canonical dichotomy of law and fact, 
stimulates at once a judicial independence from precedence, a state of affairs which 
in turn saves the rhetoric tiresome manoeuvres and a busy industry of interpretative 
strategies. It is, not the civil, but common law rhetoric that an overworking junction 
of interpretative ploys seems to characterize, unless it is the no-nonsense 'Grand 
Style' favoured by Uewellyn.70 An impersonality is ensured in the 'all soul' rhetoric 
of the French law not only by a distinction between the law and its readings, but 
also by the fact that only a limited number of court opinions ever get published, and 
that the opinions are kept as short as possible, often only a few lines expressed in a 
monotonous formula, not signed, and never accompanied by dissenting views.71 In 
warning against a 'dangerous confusion' of judicial creativity and legislative 
functions, '[o]nly bad judges,' notes Cappelletti, ' ... would act as legislators.'72 
Perhaps the impersonality which the French rhetoric seeks to establish ought to be 
understood in the light of the inadvertent insight of Cappelletti's statement. The 
secret of an unstrained judiciary in reading the law probably lies in an 
inconspicuous, 'nullified,'73 notion of judicial power. And that may be so not 
necessarily because what is a convenient illusion of rhetoric provides the judge with 
more room for manoeuvre without at once disturbing the sleeping dogs. But perhaps 
'null' is the true mark of judicial authenticity, the freakish, at large, considering the 
primordially, and unavoidably, attached quality of adjudication. 
That 'the interpreter feels especially assured in his work' under the unobtrusive 
concept of judiciary entertained by the traditional rhetoric is indicated also by 
Geny.74 The 'illusory' character of legal rhetoric has often been discussed. 
According to Mark Tushnet, a notion of 'neutral principles' to characterize the 
judicial process, alongside a textualistic view of the law. is what the legal project of 
liberalism is all about.75 The neutral principles, as conceived by Herbert Wechsler, 
promise a morality-free, non-discretionary, bound, and objective legal reasoning.76 
Towards the far end on the heart-warming side, one particular theory of law 
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expresses as its principal point the view that 'there is a right answer to all scientific 
queries and moral dilemmas. '77 On the more realistic side. Walter Weyrauch 
concedes 'masking' as a fact of law.78 Unmasking the legal reasoning. however. may 
mean more trouble than good. 'Such insight might make [lawyers and judges] 
cynical and eventually ineffective in their tasks ... '79 In response to more recent 
criticisms of legal self-image and concealment. again. 'the need for the illusion of 
order'80 has been suggested. 'I have no difficulty.' writes Geny. 'in recognizing that 
the traditional method has. in certain aspects. serious advantages which should make 
us think before we begin to undermine its foundations. '81 Interpretation as 
principled reasoning. and adjudication as detached application. as suggested by the 
traditional rhetoric. accordingly. have a significant part to play in bringing about 
'the indispensable security of legal relations. '82 Similarly. Felix Cohen 
acknowledges positive uses of concepts as masks in a seminal criticism of what he 
calls 'a special branch of the science of transcendental nonsense.' namely the 
traditional rhetoric. As he puts it. 'myths may impress the imagination and memory 
where more exact discourse would leave minds cold. '83 A cool mind. however. is 
precisely what a study of the workings of legal phenomena requires. In this respect. 
law's self-image as reflected in the traditional rhetoric is 'entirely useless.'84 In the 
face of the 'stabling' benefits created by its illusory rhetoric.85 Geny. likewise. points 
out the gross inaccuracy on the part of the tradition regarding its account of the 
legal mechanism. To exemplify the illusion that characterizes the traditional 
rhetoric. Geny cites Liard. the University of Paris rector. on legal education. 
According to Liard. as Geny quotes him: 
'Law is written law. Hence the mission of the Faculties of 
Law is to teach the interpretation of the statute law. The 
method is. therefore. deductive. The articles of the code are 
theorems; their mutual relations have to be demonstrated and 
the conclusions drawn from them. The true lawyer is a 
geometrician. '86 
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The dichotomy between law's self-image and what actually happens, according to 
Geny, is not merely an academic concern. On the contrary, he questions law's self-
image in order to assist to improve the actual state that it conceals.87 The 
concealment, he maintains, works out ultimately to bring about an 'immobilization 
of the law,' a resulting 'impotency to satisfy the needs of life,' and finally a 'most 
disorderly subjectivism' as objectivity displayed in the self-image provides at once 
an excellent cover.88 In so doing, Geny simultaneously invokes and refuses a notion 
of judicial authenticity. Authenticity manifests itself in the possible, unbridled, 
subjectivity of the judge under law'sfalse self-image, yet at the same time what is 
merely a self-image succeeds to exert constraints on the judge to cause in turn a real 
stagnancy. 
That which makes tricky a designation of the traditional rhetoric as illusory - a 
dichotomy of the illusory and the real is problematic - exposes at once that, for 
perhaps the wrong reason, the traditional rhetoric may not be too wide off the mark 
in its promise of continuity on the basis of a nullijied89 concept of jUdiciary. In the 
classic phraseology of the principle of the separation of powers, 'there is no liberty' 
if the powers be not safely clear of one another.90 To read the 'liberal' as the 
freakish, and identify the elusive house in which all three powers would 
primordially repose as none other than that of the polis, a world fraternity, would be 
one way of reading into the Montesquiean formula the attached, as opposed to free-
floating, quality of that which is decidable. Reading the liberal as the freakish only 
to outrule it by no means signifies a negation of the liberal, but a redefinition of it in 
terms of its grammatical potentialities. 
2.3.3 The Dworkin-Fish Debate 
What judicial licence may entail perj'ormatively is made the pivotal point by Fish in 
his debate with Dworkin, an encounter that is arguably a milestone in recent 
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theory.91 'The true lawyer,' says Liard, as quoted by Geny, 'is a geometrician.'92 
Geometry has been a paradigm of unerring knowledge for sciences since the 
classical times. I have already discussed the Aristotelian dichotomy of geometry and 
the 'fine language' of rhetoric.93 Descartes, famously, lays great emphasis on the 
centrality of the plain and infallible methods customarily used by geometricians to 
his ideas.94 That in a much discussed literary analogy Dworkin lets the 'fine 
language' of literature replace geometry as an exemplar, however. does not 
necessarily signify his departure from the tradition. The literary analogy has the 
rhetorical charm to compliment the most obvious demands of the contemporary 
legal theory. The literary traditionally conveys an elusive quality, one which 
somehow rationalizes the discord that often ensues over its significance. and yet a 
heart-warming end is often assured as the whole thing seems ultimately to yield to 
some ineluctable judgement. In fact, the ultimate judgement is thought to be there 
and present all the time, obscured as merely one of the discordant voices, until its 
vindication is complete. Crudely put, Fish agrees entirely that the ineluctable is 
there in each case. The sole connection between that which is judged and the right 
judgement, however, is an assemblage of contingencies rather than some quality 
intrinsic to the object of judgement. In addition to the primordiality of the 
ineluctable, that is to say. Fish's contention suggests two basic effects. First, because 
judgement has a contingent quality, the ineluctable may comprise more than one 
trace. When it does so, different traces will have equal ineluctability. a balance that 
can be upset by persuasion only. And secondly, guidelines which would seek to 
manipulate, as it were, the process will not hold, as the guidelines themselves will 
be read ineluctably, that is to say, in terms of the attachments that are already in 
place. As he notoriously puts it, 'theory has no consequences.'95 Dworkin's response 
to Fish to counter what he deems to be an intolerable picture of things suggested by 
the latter bears significant clue to what has effectively been the defining quality of 
Dworkin's entire project. 
In his comment on Dworkin's original essay, Fish draws attention to a 'pattern' 
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that forms out of several of the mistakes committed in the text.96 He points out that 
Dworkin often subscribes to views on an issue that are in fact wildly incompatible. 
He appears to qualify meaning as a selfsame substance to be collected by a neutral 
agent from a transcendental source. In the same breath, however, he at once 
attempts to introduce meaning as an artefact of the very interpretative position the 
agent holds.97 In his second contribution to the exchange, Fish treats to an entire 
section of his essay the subject of 'the vague and slippery nature of Dworkin's 
writing and thought. '98 He notes that Dworkin often 'shifts back and forth between 
lines of argument that are finally contradictory .'99 Picking one's way on either side 
of an argument is hardly a new ploy. As I have already mentioned it,lOO in Rhetoric 
Aristotle guides the counsel 'to employ persuasion ... on opposite sides of a question' 
in order to vindicate that which she believes is right. IOl 'If the written law tells 
against our case,' he advises, we invoke the spirit of the law and the universal 
justice. 'If however the written law supports our case,' amongst the arguments we 
can put to work are 'that not to use the laws is as bad as to have no laws at all,' or 
'that trying to be cleverer than the laws is just what is forbidden by those codes of 
law that are accounted best. '102 In another example, he suggests arguments that can 
be used for or against the text of a contract. The significance of that which is written 
is emphasized if it speaks on our side. If the text does not support our case, 
however, 'in the first place those arguments are suitable which we can use to fight a 
law that tells against us ... Again, we may argue that the duty of the judge as umpire 
is to decide what is just, and therefore he must ask where justice lies, and not what 
this or that document means.' He adds, 'whichever way suits US.'103 And yet another 
example Aristotle cites is perjury. If it is you who is implicated in the crime, you 
can split your words of oath from your intention of it: lacking the volition, you 
could not have committed a wrongdoing that has to be voluntary. But if it is your 
opponent that is implicated, you make of him an 'enemy of society.'l04 The ability to 
advance lines on either side of a question may make a good rhetorician. Introducing 
lines on opposite sides at once, however, makes a mockery of the art of rhetoric. 
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What Fish observes to be a fascinating feature of the two essays by Dworkin, in 
fact, has been the distinctive seal of the latter's entire work. 
Dworkin's early work has often been evaluated with a focus on its critique of the 
Hartian view of law. Of the two traits that characterize his project, in fact, one can 
be said to be its proliferation of the most basic feature of Hart's work, and the 
second, its dissent from what it proliferates. Geny's criticism of the mechanistic 
jurisprudence holds that its simulation of geometry risks a 'most disorderly 
subjectivism.'los That happens because in what may be called hard cases the 
geometrical model falls short of issuing constraints to guide the judge. Hence, the 
hazardous prospect of a concealed, free-floating, judiciary. Dworkin criticizes Hart's 
work for exactly the same reason.106 The view of law as rules suggested by the latter 
risks subjectivism for it calls for judicial improvisation in hard caseS.107 By 
definition hard cases concern positions that are marginal within the community. For 
a concept of law not to incorporate a mechanism to secure the minority interests 
involved in those cases ought to be a major defect. lOS What Hart's model does, on 
the contrary, is to try and rationalize the loose, unbridled institution of judicial 
discretion,109 a notion that serves as a seal of defeatism on the part of the system. 
The mechanism which Dworkin suggests in hard cases, on the other hand, is the 
working out, by the judge, of the principles behind the rules.110 The refutation, in 
his later work, of what he calls the 'plain-fact view of law' simply restates this. The 
disagreements within the legal community, according to the plain-fact view, are not 
on the matter of what the law is. But because often the solution of the law is only 
one of the moral positions that can be held on the specific issue, the disagreements 
are on the point of what the law should be. l11 Dworkin rejects the plain-fact view 
for the same reason he dismisses Hart's notion of law. It is also the reason Geny 
finds intolerable the rhetoric of mechanistic jurisprudence. The plain-fact view 
suggests defeatism, immobility, and subjectivism in dispensing justice. ll2 
That which Dworkin finds wrong with the Hartian work, namely a dichotomy of 
rules and discretion, paradoxically, haunts throughout Dworkin's own project. The 
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duality Hart establishes is made possible by a set of concepts the exact equivalents 
of which can be shown to lie at the heart of Dworkin's own work. It is a hollow 
claim, in the first place, that a dichotomy of rules and principles suggests a notion 
that is fundamentally different from that of rules and discretion. Whether the 
decision of Riggs v Palmer1l3 reflects the outcome of a principled inference, or 
discretion, or even legislation,114 hardly indicates a key divergence between the 
holders of the respective positions. Could anyone really entertain a notion of 
judicial discretion that would be unprincipled? How is the difference to be told 
between principled interpretation and legislation? Where the principles involved 
tum out to be more than one, in tum, we only have Dworkin's word that a state of 
conflicting principles on a particular issue somehow differs from what he terms the 
plain-fact view of the law. The ensuing notion, in that case, is that of the right 
principle.1lS The right principle is the principle that fits better into what is already 
settled about the law. An opposition of the settled law and the law of hard cases 
once more simply reproduces a variant of the Hartian dichotomy, namely the core 
and penumbra of a rule, the meaning of whose latter term is to be ascertained on the 
basis of the former. 1l6 The 'open texture' of the language of rules is thus conceded 
by Hart. 117 Dworkin, in a similar vein, designates law as an essentially 'interpretive 
concept.'llS What exactly is the settled law on whose basis to pursue the 
interpretation and work out the right principle? What defines, according to 
Dworkin, both the Hartian position and the plain-fact view is the 'thesis that 
propositions of law describe decisions made by people or institutions in the past.'119 
If an illusion of the past is the defining feature of those positions, what is the motive 
behind Dworkin's own condemnation of discretion other than an imminent threat to 
break up with what is obviously some concept of the past? 
The past, indeed. has been more and more a pivotal concept in Dworkin's view 
of the law. l20 If one major theme in his thinking has been a critique of judicial 
discretion, the second has been a refutation of the notion of intention, one invoked 
in particular in the constitutional controversy.121 What is in some sense the past, 
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therefore, is at once postulated and disqualified. His later fonnulation of 'law as 
integrity'l22 signifies a combination of the two themes: a historical continuity that 
precludes the freakish, and an interpretative emphasis that at once incapacitates 
historical appeal by disconnecting the text of the law from what is effectively its 
past. 123 The non-argument of law as integrity becomes reality, therefore, as the two 
themes cancel out each other. 
The pattern which marks Dworkin's relation to Hart's work marks his relation to 
a whole range of subjects. The two themes that amount to his argument on the 
matter of authorial intention and that end up deleting each other are, first, intention 
as a 'state of mind,' and second, 'certain complexities in that state of mind,' 
complexities which make the characters 'intended' by the author in a narrative 'seem 
to have minds of their own.' 
Intentionalists make the author's state of mind central to 
interpretation. But they misunderstand, so far as I can tell, 
certain complexities in that state of mind ... This is sometimes 
(though I think not very well) expressed in the author's cliche, 
that his characters seem to have minds of their own. 124 
He adds: 'a legislator'S intention is complex in similar ways.'125 The latter theme 
points out the extensional quality of intentionl26 and therefore questions the privacy 
('state of mind') suggested by the fonner, while the fonner, at once, indicates the 
limits of the intentionalist project by denying the transparency implied in the latter. 
On the subject of the text, again, a play of two themes that are uncomfortable with 
each other equally pervades the argument. The model of law as rules is rejected for 
its strict textualism. For what ensues the textualist, positivistic, approach is an 
implicit call for the exercise of discretion, a 'most disorderly subjectivism.'12? That, 
paradoxically, is the standard argument invoked in the constitutional controversy by 
textual positivists such as Rehnquist, Bork, Monaghan, and Berger, writers whose 
positions Dworkin would otherwise despise. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
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abortion issue of the controversy, for Dworkin, centres around the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the clause central to the principal textualist, 
and pro-life, argument in Roe v Wade. l28 Consequently, it is the chief textualist 
concern that is primarily answered when Dworkin, commenting on the case, 
delivers the judgement that '[a] fetus is not a constitutional person.'129 That the 
foetus is not a person, he emphasizes, is the answer to a legal question, as opposed 
to a moral one, even though 'it does involve moral issues.'l30 The premises shared 
by Dworkin and Bork on an issue they fiercely diverge are crucial to notice: first, 
the centrality of the text, the distinctive mark of positivism, and second, what is the 
very epitome of positivism, namely a dichotomy of the legal and the moral. l3l 
That the foetus is not a person is the right answer, according to Dworkin, because 
its solution 'fits better with other parts of our law.'132 The scepticism of right 
answers, he explains, is based simply on a 'demonstrability thesis' which precludes 
the notion if the right answer is not demonstrable, 'after all the hard facts that might 
be relevant to its truth are either known or stipulated.'133 Theoretically, however, the 
possibility of the right answer cannot be refuted just because the answer is not 
demonstrably SO.I34 'For all practical purposes,' concludes Dworkin, 'there will 
always be a right answer in the seamless web of our law.'135 It is worthy of 
consideration whether he is led to the notion of a right answer occasioned for all 
practical purposes because it is theoretically not impossible, or the very possibility 
of a right answer is occasioned by its practical purposes. What happens is that he 
takes no chances and rationalizes the notion of a right answer at once on both sides 
of the argument, the pattern established in his critique of the Hartian discretion, that 
is to say, at once pragmatically ('[flor ... practical purposes') and epistemologically 
(by exposing the fallacy of the demonstrability thesis). But what does it mean to say 
that the notion is theoretically not impossible? There must be (or 'might be' -
Dworkin uses the two modes interchangeably) a right answer to the question 
whether God exists even though we shall never know. The proposition is senseless 
not because it would fail some verification test, of the logical positivist kind, but 
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because, bearing the mark of a logic suggested by Dworkin, it refuses beforehand 
the attachments in which and only in which its question will make sense. l36 The 
divine inquiry, in fact, is paradigmatic of many of the inquiries encountered in the 
interpretative controversy, that of abortion being one of them. What abandons the 
argument even before its sense when the attachments are repressed, however, is its 
integrity regarding 'rights.' The right answer thesis is introduced in the first place to 
counter the subjectivism of the Hartian discretion and thus provide better protection 
for the rights of individuals. What it ends up diminishing, however, is the concept 
of difference, heterogeneity, an effect of the locality of individual attachments. 
Paradoxically, a notion of difference is lay great emphasis upon in the celebrated 
inaugural lecture by Hart, where the context and distinct forms of life are suggested 
as basis for legal analysis.137 One would think it self -evident that an awareness of 
the difference between the majority and a minority as merely rhetorical, as opposed 
to something to be abrogated in favour of what would be the 'right' practice, would 
undermine the majority complacency and at once boost the morale and the standing 
of the minority,138 I have already indicated the accomplished history of the 
difference-emphasized rhetoric, starting from the Sophists, in the protection and 
improvement of individual rights, as opposed to the poor record of the mainstream 
rhetoric of homogeneity .139 
It is not that Dworkin does not recognize the case to be so. He does try to 
maintain a heterogeneous theme. The propositions of law are true, for instance, if 
they are just. 140 Justice, on the other hand, is an interpretative concept. 141 He panics, 
however, as he notices the circularity that defines the process. What therefore 
follows a heterogeneous theme is one that supplies an exit, as it were, by 
temporarily divorcing justice from its provinCiality. Accordingly, 
we must treat different people's conceptions of justice. while 
inevitably developed as interpretations of practices in which 
they themselves participate, as claiming a more global or 
transcendental authority so that they can serve as the basis for 
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criticising other people's practices of justice even, or 
especially, when these are radically different.142 
Circularity must be avoided if critical reflection is to have a progressive value. 
Transforming the provinciality of justice, for convenience's sake, into a 
transcendental notion is to repress the grammaticality that marks distinct forms of 
life, the difference, a notion which makes rights defensible whatever the odds in the 
first place. A ware of the difficulties the two themes by Dworkin inflict on one 
another, David Brink attempts to provide an elaboration of the former's concept so 
that 'genuine disagreement' between different forms of life can be possible without 
at once upsetting the heterogeneous theme of the concept. 143 The circularity 
Dworkin observes in a local notion of the just distresses him because it is perceived 
as an option, to start with. And Brink seeks a way out, for he ignores in the first 
place that what appears to be a circularity exists only as a generalized category, that 
which is ordinarily circular and that which is not being merely the sub-categories of 
it. There is definitely a choice, therefore, not to be circular, even though the 
primordiality of a generalized category of circularity is conceded. In another 
attempt to hold on to the heterogeneous theme, Dworkin invokes 'circumstances' as 
criteria for the just. 'I believe, for example, that slavery is unjust in the 
circumstances of the modem world. ' 144 Circumstances, however, is a poor word to 
convey the primordiality of the ineluctable. It bespeaks cynicism where it should 
voice concern. Voice concern, the second theme does. 'A moral philosopher who 
denies that slavery can be really or objectively unjust does not wish to be 
understood as holding the same position as a fascist who argues that there is nothing 
wrong with slavery.'145 That the two positions do not suggest a difference of kindl46 
is a depressing thought for Dworkin because it somehow attenuates the force of the 
rhetoric against slavery. The second theme, therefore, intercepts the heterogeneous 
theme of the 'circumstances' to form the non-argument of what is considered to be a 
genuine disagreement. The depressing notion of the lack of criteria to distinguish 
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between the two instances is an effect at once of the suppression of the mimetic, 
rhetorical, difference between the two instances asfake, as opposed to genuine, or 
inadequate. What is disregarded, as with the panic about circularity, is that the 
'fakeness' that would in that case define the difference between the two positions 
would only be so as a generalized category, that is to say, as an ontological 
primordiality, the genuine and the fake, grammatically understood, being in tum the 
'genuinely' divergent sub-categories of it. 
A play of two themes that end up cancelling each other out is established as a 
pattern in the critique of the Hartian discretion. That which is presupposed in the 
argument against discretion is a dichotomy of inside and outside the law. What a 
notion of law as rules risks. accordingly. are incursions in hard cases from outside. 
whereas principles signify resistance in the face of infiltration and subversion. 
Dworkin, therefore. not only reproduces the supplementarity of discretion in the 
Hartian scheme through principles. but also that which inspires the notion of law as 
rules to start with. namely the concept of silly judgement. stands right behind his 
criticism of discretion. Paradoxically. however. an inconspicuous judiciary. the kind 
that underlies Dworkin's critique of discretion. as I have already indicated it. 
encourages judicial improvisation rather than diminish it. 147 In this respect. the 
congruence of rhetoric between the French brand of the separation of powers, an 
account of it which refuses to acknowledge gaps in the law. and Dworkin's notion 
of law must be noticed. The highly personalized aporias and bad rhetoricianship on 
Dworkin's part ignored, the view of the law closest to that of Dworkin therefore 
would be Blackstone's: the law. unmade, and informally prevalent. provides an 
answer for every question. 
Fish would be first to agree: the judge does not, and cannot, make the law, and 
that which thus prevails impersonally involves no gaps: there is always a right 
answer. To be more exact, the law does not have the imagined formal existence in 
order to entail gaps. What would appear as gaps would be complications in the 
elusive assemblage of variables that is the life of the community. As a matter of 
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fact, rather than contradicting its conclusions, Fish offers in his comment on 
Dworkin's essay, to take the strain off its overwrought rhetoric. I have already 
related his insight of the dilemma that characteristically underpins formalism. l48 He 
reads it in Hart's discourse, and yet finds it more succinctly expressed in the 
immediate logic behind the parol evidence rule of contract doctrine. What their 
solutions ensue in each case is an offer that cannot be refused. That which one turns 
down in accepting Hart's offer is the brute force of a gunman that symbolizes the 
Austenean notion of validity. And the parol evidence rule is a choice against the 
'general disaster'149 that would follow were casual extratextual criteria to be 
admitted to determine the terms of a contract. Dworkin's rhetoric is wound up for 
exactly the same reason. And the words of threat that characterize its discourse are 
not dissimilar to those of Hart and the parol evidence rule: it is either 'a system of 
principle,' or else. The concluding paragraph of the Law's Empire describes the 
desired attitude as one which 'aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over 
practice ... 'lSO It is tempting to point out, once more, the idea of an interpretive spirit 
(a keen heterogeneity) on the one hand, and that of a practice without principles (a 
markedly homogenous notion of existence, namely existence as a free-for-all, and 
thus something to be tamed) on the other, as two themes uncomfortable together, 
yet pronounced in the same breath. But it is at once an argument that is terrified at 
the sound of its own threats: the hermetic spirit haunts, out of nowhere, a practice 
that is all smoke and eerie. On the less Gothic side, 'a freewheeling judicial 
discretion,' indicates Dworkin, signifies his idea of hell. It stands right opposite 'the 
vision of the Constitution as a system of principle.'lSl Accordingly, one either 
recognizes the system of principle 'the Constitution creates,' or one chooses to see 
the Constitution as nothing more than 'a set of independent and historically limited 
rules' to be utilized to conceal the passion, the real drive, that is behind the reading. 
He writes, 
treating the Constitution as only a set of independent and 
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historically limited rules masks a freewheeling judicial 
discretion that is guided only by a justice's own political or 
moral convictions, unchecked by the constraints that treating 
the Constitution as a charter of principle would necessarily 
impose. 
That vision of the Constitution as principle, whose 
importance I have been emphasizing, is a jurisprudential 
conviction rather than a distinctly liberal or even moderate 
position.1S2 
The originalist zeal which Dworkin therefore opposes to his view of the 
Constitution as principle 'masks a freewheeling judicial discretion' in the exact 
fashion in which mechanistic jurisprudence provides a front for what Geny calls a 
'most disorderly subjectivism.'ls3 The dilemma thus formulated, Dworkin introduces 
in the second paragraph what he would otherwise associate with the plain-fact view 
that is characteristic of the rhetoric of originalism, namely a dichotomy of the legal 
and the moral. Since its sole alternative is a hellish state of 'freewheeling judicial 
discretion,' his vision is not a jurisprudential position, as he modestly puts it, but the 
jurisprudential position available. It is in order to emphasize the political neutrality 
of what he, again, modestly terms his 'conviction' that he goes on to cite Justice 
Harlan, a judge with 'conservative' politics, and yet with the same vision of the 
Constitution: the Constitution as principle. l54 The formalistic scaremongering and a 
dichotomy of the legal and the moral, of course, are intertwined. They form 
together the theme which is, once more, challenged with the promised heterogeneity 
of the theme that follows, namely law as an interpretative concept. In the paper Fish 
comments on, Dworkin states: 
My apparently banal suggestion (which I shall call the 
'aesthetic hypothesis') is this: an interpretation of a piece of 
literature attempts to show which way of reading (or speaking 
or directing or acting) the text reveals it as the best work of 
art. ISS 
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What the aesthetic hypothesis amounts to is something that seems to be very close 
to Fish and at once something that could not be further away. That good 
interpretation is paradigmaticl56 interpretation is one of the things it says. As such, 
it is a statement about the primordiality of what Fish would call the 'institutional' 
quality of the perfonnance, rather than a suggestion as to how to get the 
interpretation right. That it is no word of advice is evident by the fact that Dworkin 
introduces it as a 'hypothesis' on the workings of the aesthetic judgement. It is 
crucial to establish this distinction because it is simultaneously the case, where Fish 
stands, that, once acknowledged the distinction cannot be maintained. In other 
words, the way it happens, it could not be otherwise: all interpretation is 
paradigmatic interpretation, and all interpretation is therefore good interpretation. 
What Dworkin does not do, however. is to lead the hypothesis to its consequences. 
That, he does not do, even though he goes one step 'further' than Fish on the wild 
side, as it were, and notes that the aesthetic hypothesis is formulated in order to 
avoid the problems involved in maintaining such notions as objectivity and 
subjectivity. He states that, 'since people's views about what makes art good art are 
inherently subjective, the aesthetic hypothesis abandones hope of rescuing 
objectivity in interpretation except, perhaps, among those who hold very much the 
same theory of art, which is hardly very helpful.'157 It is one step further. because, 
where he stands, it seems that Fish would not dream of questioning the operational 
efficacy of a dichotomy of objectivity and subjectivity. But then, further in what 
direction? It is only when Dworkin declares ideas of beauty as 'inherently 
subjective,' and objectivity as a lost paradise, that one is compelled to go back to his 
formulation of the aesthetic hypothesis and realize that he really believes it to be so 
himself, when he introduces the formulation with the words '[m]y apparently banal 
suggestion ... 'l58 He does believe it to be banal. unless the word 'apparently' is 
accentuated with the weight of his entire opus and thereby the aesthetic hypothesis 
rendered as much homogenous. It is therefore the end of the 'interpretive concept,' 
and the beginning of the theme 'principle over practice.' Instead of getting out of the 
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way, consequently, problems offirm knowledge avoided earlier come to dominate 
the argument of the literary analogy. If the aesthetic undemonstrability means that 
aesthetic judgements are subjective, holds Dworkin, 'then of course they are 
subjective. But it does not follow that no normative theory about art is better than 
any other .... 159 That their value is not independently assertable is by no means to say 
that different positions on an issue, whether aesthetic or otherwise, cannot be 
ranked. In this respect Dworkin is right. Ranking can be problematic, however, if 
one's discourse is already set on an epistemological basis. l60 What makes one 
position better than another, while neither has an independent value in whose terms 
to compete and rank, Dworkin will be at loss to tell. The literary analogy refers to 
the model of a chain novel where several authors work on one coherent story. The 
authors, however, have to remain inconspicuous in their personal contribution so 
that the combined work can emerge as a unified piece. 'Deciding hard cases at law,' 
writes Dworkin, 'is rather like this strange literary exercise. '161 The authors of the 
collaborative project of law are represented by judges in the chain. The performance 
in the chain differs from the exercise of judicial discretion in that discretion does 
not involve, as such, the sort of commitment that characterizes the judge in the chain 
from the moment she chooses to be part of the chain enterprise.162 The constraining 
character of the chain venture does not end at the choice to partake. The 
performance of the judge is constrained during the process, first, in terms of its 
integrity with the ongoing work (formal constraints), and, secondly, regarding the 
quality of the work produced (substantive constraints). 163 For either set of 
constraints disagreement between the members in the chain is possible to a certain 
degree. Yet, nothing that would personalize the combined work is allowed. Lest he 
might be thought to be underplaying the peculiarities of style that would normally 
be the case on the literary side,l64 Dworkin takes no chances and introduces the 
dichotomy of the political and the artistic. The individual performance should 
comply with the enterprise as a whole both formally and substantively. In other 
words, 'it must both fit that practice and show its point or value. But point or value 
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here cannot mean artistic value because law, unlike literature, is not an artistic 
enterprise. Law is a political enterprise .. .'165 This latest move is particularly 
revealing about the nature of Dworkin's discourse. It creates one predicament when 
positions in aesthetics are designated as essentially subjective. Because subjectivity 
is understood in epistemological terms, namely as unbridled privacy, it becomes 
impossible to account for theory choice, on which he lays much emphasis, 
epistemologically. That predicament Dworkin simply eschews. Although he appears 
to betray it frequently, often for perversely pragmatic solutions,l66 an 
epistemological reasoning nevertheless gives his discourse its most persistent theme. 
It is, therefore. the undeniably epistemological quality of his reasoning that seeks to 
leave nothing unconsidered, no gaps unfilled. on the theoretical level. when he 
ventures to distinguish between the artistic and the political. The dichotomy. 
however, is at once absurd and inaccurate. It is absurd insofar as it anticipates 
artistry as a problem to be addressed in law, a distinct form of life. The dichotomy 
seems to lend no practical avail unless Dworkin himself could conceive of a judge 
whose perception of himself would be that he were a living incarnation of Andy 
Warhol with a mission to revolutionize law. Before one could conceive of that 
judge. one would have to conceive of a legal establishment that would have 
allocated that person a place on the bench. And if that is not likely (if it were likely, 
Dworkin's dichotomy would still be redundant; there would be no possible criteria 
on whose basis to challenge the conception of the legal therefore recognized by the 
legal establishment or defy the way the system wishes to define itself at large), 
anything short of Warhol will be considered to be perfectly legal, as opposed to 
artistic, by many within the same form of life. even if the particular performance is 
not supported by all. In other words, if the performance has succeeded to take place. 
it has already had a place. The performance already licensed in practical terms. 
including it in a form of life alien, as it were, to law would be either senseless. or an 
entirely different game. such as a pejorative remark. Secondly, the distinction is 
inaccurate, for it attempts to repress the artistic attachments of the political and the 
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political attachments of the artistic. The artistic is as much legal in the sense of 
forestructured, prejudiced, and dry. And the legal involves a good deal of artistry in 
that like any other institution it is staged and performative. The (a) absurdity and (b) 
inaccuracy of the concept of the freakish that is responsible for a dichotomy of free-
wheeling discretion and principled interpretation, as well as that of the artistic and 
the legal, have been two principal arguments of Fish's work.167 
'A judge's duty,' writes Dworkin, 'is to interpret the legal history he finds, not to 
invent a better history.'l68 The freakish is postulated in the dichotomy between 
interpretation and invention exactly the way it is responsible for the distinction 
between the legal and the artistic. In another rendering, 'a fresh, clean-slate decision 
about what the law ought to be' is put in opposition to mere interpretation, a 
'difference on which,' notes Dworkin, 'I insist.'169 The 'ought' issue designated as an 
element that can, and, perversely, ought to, be discarded, simply reproduces the 
feature attributed by the author himself to the plain-fact view. 170 And yet another 
formulation of the dichotomy confers upon the judge the duty 'to advance the 
enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own.'171 The 
privacy that makes what is artistic subjective, equally characterizes the passion of 
the judge whose performance is political. The politics assigned to the judge, 
however, is one of working out the choices that he 'finds' and that are 'in hand,' 
rather than a politics 'of his own.' I mentioned above the defence of the originatist 
rhetoric by Robert Bork on the very same basis: the politics that is found is what 
marks the judge's performance, not, as often understood, an absence of politics.l72 
The curious thing about Bork's argument is that it is in order to counter the criticism 
by, of all people, Dworkin that original ism represses the fact that its choice is 
political. 173 'It certainly is,' responds Bork, 'but the political content of that choice is 
not made by the judge: it was made long ago by those who designed and enacted the 
Constitution.'174 As a non-grammatical, absolute, privacy describes the subject, that 
which is freakish is rationalized. In each case an apocalyptic free play sets in as a 
consistent feature of the tradition whose concept of man recognizes no fraternal 
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attachments.175 It is crucial to notice where the respective rhetorics by Dworkin and 
Bork converge - the apocalyptic that in the absence of fraternal attachments 
defines the fantastic possibilities of man, the judge. 'But is there in fact any such 
possibility?' asks Fish. 
What would it mean for a judge to strike out in a new 
direction? Dworkin doesn't tell us, but presumably it would 
mean deciding a case in such a way as to have no relationship 
to the history of previous decisions. It is hard to imagine what 
such a decision would be like since any decision, to be 
recognized as a decision by a judge, would have to be made in 
recognizably judicial terms. A judge who decided a case on 
the basis of whether or not the defendant had red hair would 
not be striking out in a new direction: he would simply not be 
acting as a judge, because he could give no reasons for his 
decision that would be seen as reasons by competent members 
of the legal community. (Even in so extreme a case it would 
not be accurate to describe the judge as striking out in a new 
direction; rather he would be continuing the direction of an 
enterprise - perhaps a bizarre one - other than the judicial.) 
And conversely, if in deciding a case a judge is able to give 
such reasons, than the direction he strikes out in will not be 
new because it will have been implicit in the enterprise as a 
direction one could conceive of and argue for. This does not 
mean that his decision will be above criticism, but that it will 
be criticized, if it is criticized, for having gone in one judicial 
direction rather than another, neither direction being 'new' in a 
sense that would give substance to Dworkin's fears. 176 
The invented, as well as the interpreted, regarding a particular reading, therefore, 
will have to be already within the range of that which is decidable at the particular 
instance. If one sense conveyed grammatically by the inventive is that it refers to 
that which is fabricated, in another sense the inventive signifies mere 
disparagement. It will be a grammatical abuse to confuse the two. Invention as 
mock interpretation, as conceived by Dworkin, exemplifies precisely some such 
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abuse. The abuse becomes the issue not because the inventive indicates a pejorative 
designation for a given interpretation. On the contrary, in its pejorative use the 
inventive creates a specific game based on a grammatical possibility of itself. The 
abuse occurs when the game is misqualified. The game, according to Fish, when 
someone charts a particular reading inventive, as opposed to interpretative, is 
simply that the reading so recognized differs from the one that is favoured by the 
person who does the charting. 'One man's 'found' history,' as he puts it, 'will be 
another man's invented history.'I77 In the absence of independent criteria against 
which to test the respective readings, a dichotomy of the inventive and the 
interpretative will be opinion-based in each case. 
That the dichotomy is in each case rhetorical scandalizes Dworkin as he 
understands by it two things that are, now characteristic with him. uneasy with each 
other: first, that a rhetorical distinction means that one has no criteria by which to 
distinguish between the interpretative and the inventive. and. second. that 
persuasion as a criterion (there is a criterion after all) suggests circularity. In 
inquiring the first. he once more invokes two themes that are fiercely contradictory. 
'How do we distinguish between interpreting and inventing?' he asks. emphasizing 
the 'dO.'178 It is a pragmatic question and yet seeks desperately an epistemological 
answer. How one does distinguish, he is in fact hardly 'genuinely' interested in, as 
he relates Fish's account of the actual workings of the distinction with a decidedly 
epistemological contempt. 'There can be no genuine distinction: he rephrases Fish, 
'between interpretation and invention, and if two interpretations are each 
recognizable as interpretations - if they are both 'institutional possibilities' - one 
cannot be said to be any better than the other.'179 The genuine stands opposite the 
illusory. 'Fish's general argument,' he writes, '[is] that the distinction between 
interpreting and inventing is always illusory.'ISO 
I pointed out above how Dworkin goes one step 'further' than Fish to disqualify a 
dichotomy of the objective and the subjective; a step. in fact, not quite in the same 
direction. lSI The rhetoricity that marks the dichotomy. as far as Fish is concerned, is 
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not to be scorned on the grounds that the terms of the binary opposition thereby 
cease to be operational. but that. on the contrary. rhetoricity is the very condition on 
which the terms are operational. As Dworkin himself regards his move with the 
aesthetic hypothesis as a step towards Fish. however, his response to the latter's 
criticisms is one of obvious frustration over the eventual fiasco. '[Fish] thought. 
when he began my essay,' writes Dworkin, 'that I was joining him and his skeptical 
colleagues in rejecting the idea that interpretive judgements could be 'purely 
objective.' But then he discovered. to his disgust, that I was actually relying on 
rather than making fun of the right-wrong piCture.'182 A disillusionment is what 
characterizes the brazen blocking out of the fiasco on Dworkin's part, even though a 
non-grammatical theme of right-wrong did characteristically co-inhabit his venture. 
The blocking out takes the form of projecting. His response to Fish bears the title 
'Please Don't Talk About Objectivity Any More.' The addressee of the request is not 
Fish (nor Michaelsl83) not because, as Fish later points it out,l84 not once does Fish 
refer to the problems of objectivity in his essay, but because the addressee could not 
be anyone other than a disillusioned and self -disgusted ('to his disgust') Dworkin 
who retains a non-grammatical notion of objectivity and yet at once ventures into 
the grammatical. the interpretative. The contradiction of the original essay is in fact 
still manifest even when seeking to suppress it in the response to Fish. The 
'rejection' he acknowledges to have occurred in the first essay of what he calls 'pure 
objectivity' simply reproduces in the form of a dichotomy of objectivity and pure 
objectivity the apocalypse that marks the aesthetic hypothesis of the early essay: a 
rejection of 'pure objectivity' not only assumes a category of pure presence. 
however inaccessible, but it also, and more significantly, minimizes the efficacy of 
objectivity termed not pure. The force of objectivity attenuated in favour of that 
which is subjective, it is Dworkin who appears to 'make fun of' a dichotomy of 
objectivity and subjectivity. not Fish. And because the dichotomy is played down 
on the basis of an apocalyptic privacy that describes the subject in relation to the 
object of inquiry, the 'skepticism' he speaks of is an attribute. not of Fish's position, 
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but of the tradition in which Dworkin himself writes. 
It is precisely the scepticism inherent in the specific tradition that entertains the 
notion of invention as mock interpretation. 'How do we distinguish between 
interpreting and inventing?' asks Dworkin. i85 In most cases a distinction between 
the two will not be problematic. And when it is problematic, it will not be a 
problem of deciphering, textual or otherwise. To make it an epistemological 
problem is to invoke a scepticism that is notoriously insoluble: the freakish, a 
concept that describes the possibilities of the subject in her relation to the object of 
inquiry. That the dichotomy cannot be maintained epistemologically, however, 
hardly means that it is 'illusory' every time a distinction is drawn between 
interpretation and invention. If the illusory stands for the political, the ordinary 
categories of illusory and genuine, to put it once again, will be conceivable only as 
sub-categories of the illusory. The illusory, as a generalized category, will be 
primordial because it will be the prerequisite of distinction per se - the sign. In 
other words, iterabilityl86 is what a primordial category of the illusory signifies; a 
transparency, as opposed to the privacy that characterizes the tradition in which 
Dworkin writes. Where Fish stands, therefore, the illusory in the sense of political, 
or opinion-based, is what makes difference, the constitutive quality of the sign, 
possible in the first place, rather than diminish it. In turn, because signification is 
opinion-based, the difference will in each case be one of grammar. Every time a 
dichotomy of the inventive and the interpretative suggests 'stability,' as Fish puts it, 
it is a grammatical stability, 'its force is felt from within interpretive conditions that 
give certain objects and shapes a real but constructed - and therefore unsettleable 
- stability.'187 
Opinion forms the sole criterion of stability not in an optional manner, but 
primordially. I noted above Dworkin's panic over the circularity suggested by the 
interpretative theme to which he subscribes on and off.i88 He once more notices the 
circularity that comes with persuasion as the criterion of stability. 'No one,' he 
writes, 'who has a new interpretation to offer believes his interpretation better 
178 
because it will convince others because it is better.'189 As the primordiality of 
opinion is ignored, a radical distinction of the self and the others is assumed. The 
privacy thereby conferred upon the self makes of her an essentially detached reader. 
Dworkin's remark about the circularity of the opinionated criterion comes in an 
essay which seeks, alongside responding to Fish, to reply to a comment by Walter 
Benn Michaels where the idea of a politics of interpretation is refuted for appealing 
to an interpreter who somehow evades the primordiality of politics.1OO Dworkin 
assumes an interpreter who is detached not only from the constitutive association of 
the others in the house of the polis, but also, and more significantly, from himself. 
He can put before him and contemplate his convictions as he would his hat. 
Michaels points out in his comment on the original essay, on the other hand, the 
fallacy of the presupposition that interpretation is pursued in a mechanic sequence 
of processes. In the course of the act, according to the mechanistic concept, one first 
interacts, and gets, as it were, acquainted, with the object of interpretation, each side 
recognizable in its own terms; and, second, through a stage that follows, one weighs 
the choices that are available, and finally one does the interpreting. The mechanistic 
concept supposes 'a moment in which one simply has no beliefs whatsoever, no 
sense at all of what is true.'191 An instant of vacuum-like existence is anticipated to 
conceive of a non-grammatical, non-opinion-based, idea of weighing. 'Believing 
nothing, he chooses to believe whatever he wants to believe, or rather whatever 
seems morally responsible to believe.'192 Weighing, therefore, is carried out on the 
basis of an historically non-extant self, a pure rationality that transcends senses. 
Unless persuasion as the criterion of stability is defined in mechanistic terms, on 
the other hand, circularity as an incidental category will hardly necessarily foHow. 
'The whole point of being convinced,' notes Michaels, 'is that we cannot help 
believing whatever it is we are convinced of,' a state which resists a non-
grammatical concept of choice.193 A concept of choice that free-floats and that 
entails among its possibilities the freakish is refuted; the circularity which thereby 
receives primordiality, however, rather than necessarily suggest a sterile circularity, 
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makes possihle the everyday grammatical, the ordinary, categories of that which is 
not circular, as well as that which is circular. 
To 'see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it,' warns 
Heidegger, when expounding the Jorestructure of understanding where 
interpretation is grounded in the first place, is to miss the meaning of 'the act of 
understanding' altogether.194 'What is decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to 
come into it the right way.'195 The circularity that characterizes understanding, he 
points out, is no less than constitutive to the Being of man, the earthly entity. 'An 
entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, 
ontologically, a circular struCture.'l96 The circularity of understanding, however, is 
not to be confused with the circularity that is merely one of its grammatical 
possibilities: 'If, however, we note that 'circularity' belongs ontologically to a kind 
of Being which is present-at-hand (namely, to subsistence [Bestand]), we must 
altogether avoid using this phenomenon to characterize anything like [man's Being] 
ontologically.'197 
That which a dissolution of the distinction between the self and the others also 
discloses is the extensional character of the authorial Will,198 whose negation, as I 
have already noted it, forms one of the principal objectives of Dworkin's project. l99 
The Dworkinean refutation of reading on the basis of intention, Fish points out, 
presupposes intention as a 'private property' on the part of the scribe.2OO Intention as 
a private state, however, not only ignores the circularity of understanding, the 
primordial hermeneutic condition, but from a more immediately striking angle, it 
also entertains a concept of reading which is wildly at variance with the everyday 
experiences of reading. Every time one reads, Fish points out, one ineluctably and 
constitutively situates the script in an intentional context. Unless that is so, 
regardless of the kind, length or style of the particular script, one will not be able 
even to begin to make sense of it. The act of reading, Fish elucidates, is in each case 
preceded by an 'assumption that one is dealing with marks or sounds produced by 
an intentional being, a being situated in some enterprise in relation to which he has 
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a purpose or a point of view.'201 The mistake that is made customarily is to suppose 
that the placement achieved through the intentional assumption constitutes merely 
one of the ways of reading, possibly the soundest one. The truth, however, is that 
reading without having already synchronized, as it were, the text with a specific 
intention would not be conceivable. 'One cannot understand an utterance,' writes 
Fish, 'without at the same time hearing or reading it as the utterance of someone 
with more or less specific concerns, interests, and desires, someone with an 
intention.'202 What one synchronizes the text with, however, is not a state of mind 
that would settle the text in a private but definite manner. This is not so even for the 
scribe himself. But one in each case synchronizes the script with another text; one 
which engulfs the private script but which resists edges for itself. 
The vanishing of the script engulfed in the elusive text of history, a world 
fraternity, crudely describes Fish's position regarding the interpretative 
controversy.203 Because the formal script ceases to exist, in the sense that in order to 
be meaningful in each case it has to be enveloped and un-edged, as it were, in a 
setting that is perpetually shifting and uncircumscribeable, as such no text is 
capable of issuing constraints to guide or restrain the interpreter. The play of 
meaning that can be the issue with a specific text will hardly be a free play, 
however, as the attachments in whose fraternity the specific text is in each case 
placed will at once be the dissolution of a non-grammatical distinction between the 
self and the others. 
Conversely, the kind of constraints Dworkin invokes204 will not be achievable 
because that which is 'settled,' as it is put, about the combined enterprise in the 
chain model, and which is supposed to provide constraints for hard cases, will itself 
have only an interpretative, constructed, existence.205 In fact the characteristic 
mistake Dworkin makes is a non-grammatical, non-interpretative, dichotomy of 
plain and hard cases. Because he understands the settled practice as an effect of the 
system of rules that is the fonnal law, hard cases designate instances where the law 
as a system of rules fails to function. F"1sh points out that the appeal to the plain, 
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settled law will not work, for it misunderstands the nature of the settled law in the 
first place. The settled law, just as the plainest of everyday notices that instructs one 
to keep off the grass, is within, rather than an evasion of, the engulfing of the 
elusive text of history. 
A plain case is a case that was once argued; that is, its 
configurations were once in dispute; at a certain point one 
characterization of its meaning and significance - of its rule 
- was found to be more persuasive than its rivals; and at that 
point the case became settled, became perspicuous, became 
undoubted. became plain. Plainness. in short. is not a property 
of the case itself - there is no case itself - but of an 
interpretive history in the course of which one interpretive 
agenda - complete with stipulative definitions, assumed 
distinctions, canons of evidence, etc. - has subdued another. 
That history is then closed, but it can always be reopened. 
That is, on some later occasion the settled assumptions within 
which the case acquired its plain meaning can become 
unsettled, can become the object of debate rather than the in-
place background in the context of which debate occurs; and 
when that happens, contending arguments or interpretive 
agendas will once again vie in the field until one of them is 
regnant and the case acquires a new settled and plain 
meaning.206 
The imperceptibility of the opinion-based character of that which is settled, 
consequently, tells merely how very settled the opinion on the subject is. That in 
each case opinions, and nothing 'firmer,' as it were, underlie the enterprise. 
however, by no means questions the settled quality of the practice when it is 
considered to be so. In other words, a dichotomy of the settled law and hard cases 
does not necessarily have to be defunct following a grammatical redefinition. There 
is no reason, in turn, why the settled opinion should not guide and constrain 
interpretation in hard cases. The concept that it could be otherwise, according to 
Fish. is precisely what is wrong with formalism - not only that of Dworkin, but 
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that of an entire tradition. As a matter of fact. Dworkin himself does appeal in the 
literary analogy to the inescapeabi/ity of that which is settled - the chain. 
'Deciding hard cases at law,' he writes. 'is rather like this strange literary exercise ... 
Each judge is then like a novelist in the chain.'207 The chain symbolizes not only the 
organic structure within the particular domain. but also the absurdity of trying to 
break loose from it Yet a typically self-deleting Dworkin at once introduces a 
second theme in order to recast a primordial hermeneutic condition. the chain. as a 
strategy to guide and constrain interpretation: the freakish that 'strikers] out'208 of 
the settled practice of the chain is presupposed in order to bestow upon theory. once 
again, a privileged hold over practice. Fish draws attention to the elitistic overtones 
of Dworkin's project generally, which are in fact pre-empted by its simultaneous 
discourse of chain, or integrity. He notes in a review of Law's Empire that the book 
'urges us to adopt 'law as integrity,' but since that is the fonn our judicial practice 
already and necessarily takes, the urging is superfluOUS.'209 Because that which is 
invoked in a dichotomy of the tame and the freakish is really a distinction between 
two different traces of the tame, one rhetorical effect of Dworkin's otherwise void 
discourse may be its attack, as I have already noted it.210 on the concept of 
difference. Its political support for a generalized. non-historical. reason that has 
been known only too well for its rationalization of repression and suffering is 
inconspicuous enough. considering the political position Dworkin happens to hold 
regarding minority interests. That. however. by no means neutralizes the alarming 
implications of a rhetoric of homogeneity that is intolerance par excellence. 'Not 
that we would not fight and die for [our own difference] if important' in a state of 
heterogeneous awareness. if one may cite Justice Holmes writing at a time when a 
world war was on. '- we all. whether we know it or not. are fighting to make the 
kind of a world that we should like - but that we [would] have learned to 
recognize that others will fight and die to make a different world, with equal 
sincerity or belief.'211 It is not accidental that the words by Holmes come in an 
awesomely insightful review of Geny's Science et technique.212 The review 
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comprises just over four pages where not once either Geny or his work is 
mentioned, though a footnote to the title, 'Natural Law,' records that the piece has 
been inspired by Geny's recently published book, a work whose project seeks to 
outline a model of adjudication for hard cases which is principled (technique) on the 
bases of relevant empirical data and weighable morals (.science) and in order to seal 
the way for good for what is a 'most disorderly subjectivism,'Z13 the frealdsh, a 
concept thought to be risked so long as law is understood merely as a system of 
rules. 
2.4 The Real and the Formal 
Llewellyn ascribes what he calls 'the cold-shouldering of the great Geny by Holmes' 
to the latter's impatience to read enough of Geny.l In fact, an apocalyptic free play 
is invoked not only by the markedly transcendentalistic rhetoric of writers such as 
Hart and Dworkin.2 But it seems to be equally anticipated in some of the positions 
that have been fervent opponents of a fonnalistic understanding of the workings of 
law. Notably, the 'reality' of a free play, especially in the appellate readings of the 
~ a w , , has been lay much emphasis upon by legal realists, who, in pointing it out, 
have made much use of the argument by Holmes, considered to be a precursor, 
about the generality of the propositions of law.3 'General propositions,' notes 
Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Lochner v New York, 'do not decide concrete 
cases.'4 In a private letter he reiterates the point, and adds: 'I will admit any general 
proposition you like and decide the case either way.15 
A paradox of the generality of the propositions of law in relation to cases that are 
particular and unforeseen is indicated by Paul de Man in his reading of the Social 
Contract.6 'In a word,' writes Rousseau. where he describes the form laws can 
possibly take within the meaning of the concept of a general will. Ino function 
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which has a particular object belongs to the legislative power.17 Generality, de Man 
reads, is the defining quality of the text of law.8 Amongst the antinomies to which 
law yields in order to achieve itself, in tum, are those between rules and rights, and 
legislative action and history, or time.9 Law appears to mark itself as a generality 
through its negation of the individuality of rights and the elusive manifestations of 
history. While it is conceivable only as a timely enterprise and applicable only on an 
individual basis; perversely, in order to remain in this capacity. at once law has to 
resist time and that which is individual. lo IThe indifference of the text with regard to 
its referential meaning: writes de Man. lis what allows the legal text to 
proliferate ... lll The law will apply so long as it transcends its particular applications. 
Of the generality paradox as formulated by de Man. a dichotomy of the law and 
its readings is clearly a prerequisite. I have already referred to a set of antinomies a 
reconciliation between the tenns of each one of which is central to ooth Hegel and 
Marx. 12 The fonnal guidelines which represent the law will fail in their task unless 
they avoid being specific and at once have the teleological dimension to unfold 
from a compact. timeless generality to specific and unforeseen instances. The 
Hegelian antinomy of the rational and the actual is dissolved as the rational 
becomes actualized in its specific manifestations; while at the same time. that which 
is specific, the actual, is already contained. as a germ. so to speak. in what is 
rational. A phenomenological unfolding of the legal text seems to bring aoout not a 
dissimilar reconciliation: the phenomenological aspect makes the idea of law 
possible as it ensures textual longevity in the face of history and thereby the 
continuity of the fundamental. timeless, idea encapsulated in the text; and the 
resulting reconciliation that is the matching of the pre-existing law with the 
individual event signifies the concept of the rule of law. The phenomenological 
manifestations of the law in scholarly. as well as judicial and formally binding. 
constructions. applications. readings. comments and criticisms will therefore 
involve. beside more frequent overlappings, contradictions that are inevitable and 
that are equally constitutive to the process. 'Thou shall not kill: says the law. Is the 
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historical instance of terminating foetal life at a certain stage of pregnancy, in a 
twentieth century society, covered by it? One way of maintaining a unified concept 
of law appears to be not only to take for granted the uninterrupted efficacy, as well 
as relevance, of the law, but also consider the opposing arguments on the question 
to be equally valid manifestations of it, even though the law itself will not be 
reduced to any of its individual extensions. 
One conclusion that may be drawn from the generality argument points in the 
direction of an aporia in the prevailing concept: the idea that the general and not 
readily amendable texts should govern cases which are individual and in time, hints 
at the profoundly metaphysical foundations of the concept of law that we have. 
Because the condition that is inherent in the concept of law makes the whole 
enterprise of text-government impossible, it at once signifies the inevitability of a 
free play which in reality defines the process of reconciliation. Hence, the principal 
realist themes. Hagerst:rOm's legal writing, for instance, which has been immensely 
influential,13 is seized throughout with a questioning of the metaphysical 
assumptions that underlie legal notions. And the project which the American realists 
have pursued following a critical examination of the concept of rule-government 
has been a redefinition of the reconciliatory process as subjective and unpredictable. 
The crucial point, however, is that, before the supposed paradox of generality 
that marks the concept of law, which consequently stands in the absurd need of a 
phenomenological reconciliation, which in tum invites a free play, the notion that 
detects the paradox in the first place is defined by a dichotomy of the law and its 
readings. Realism arrests the wrong person for a crime uncommitted. Just as the 
earlier antinomies by Hegel and Marx, namely the rational and the actual, and the 
public and the private, the 'estrangement' which de Man detects between the general 
and the individual in the Rousseauean concept of lawl " is not conceivable unless a 
binary opposition of two radically distinct categories is presupposed. 
In the Social Contract, the model for the structural description 
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of textuality derives from the incompatibility between the 
fonnulation and the application of the law, reiterating the 
estrangement that exists between the sovereign as an active, 
and the State as a static, principle. 15 
In questioning the claim of the legal text to uncontested monopoly over its meaning 
and thereby unsurpassable mastery in dispensing justice (an 'active,' delegating. 
general will). in that the constructed quality of the legal meaning is played down 
within the framework of a formal or mechanistic concept of law (a 'static' political 
machine whose relation to the general will is merely technical), de Man is at once 
trapped into the very delusion that characterizes the ideology of the legal text: a 
dichotomy of the law and its readings. The typical realist-New Dealist criticism of 
the state of law has been a fine example of the kind of mistake that is ultimately 
self-refuting: that the law lags behind the reality.16 While at the same time the very 
realist concept is built upon the impossibility of such discrepancy between the twoP 
2.4.1 Fonnalism as Subjectivism 
The impossibility of a fonnal concept of law has been a persistent theme of the 
realist rhetoric. I referred above to one of the seminal pieces of the realist literature 
in the fonn of Saleilles' preface to the Method. 18 It fonnulates. perhaps for the first 
time in such clarity. a binary opposition of fiction and reality; and declares: 'It is 
time to return to reality.'19 The fiction designates the legal ideology that confines 
adjudication within the strict boundaries of fonnal guidelines and what can be made 
of them through inquiry into the legislative will and exegetical uncovering.20 
Because the ideology of a mechanically guided adjudication is but a fiction, 
however, the reality it opposes does not indicate a process that is radically different. 
In other words, the dichotomy between the two positions is hardly that reality does 
not have its way with the formal concept. The formalists. on the contrary. are just as 
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good students of reality. if not by conviction. by the sheer force of the place which 
they occupy officially and which often compels them to go beyond formal 
guidelines and detached logical deductions in pursuit of sound judgement. The 
dichotomy between the advocates of the tradition and the realists. therefore. is one 
not of doing. but of acknowledging that which is done. The formalists. as Saleilles 
puts it. 'do it without admitting it. Even more. and out of loyalty to principles. they 
pretend that they do not do it. '21 The reality to be 'returned' to. subsequently. is one 
of rhetoric on the part of the tradition. rather than one of bringing into line the 
somehow discrepant levels of law and reality. Does that mean. then. that the realist 
vision consists of setting merely the record straight? Because a merely rhetorical 
objective could diminish the force of the realist discourse itself. however self-
refuting. theoretical designs for the reality of the law often follow. 'For more than a 
century.' writes Saleilles. 'we have lived under a fiction which had brought forth all 
the advantages it was designed to, and from which we have now for a long time 
gotten only inconvenient results. It is time to return to reality.'22 Just as de Man. 
Saleilles refuses the text a binding authority that would make possible a fonnal 
concept of law in contradistinction to the reality of it. Once the only difference a 
formal concept of law could possibly make is established to be merely rhetorical, 
however. at the cost of self-falsification. the authority of the text is restored in order 
to hold responsible for the 'inconvenient results' a formal concept of law -
formalism is possible after all. 
If there is a crime committed in the form of a dichotomy between the law and its 
readings. and an ensuing free play. formalism ought to be understood as the sole 
remedy to it rather than responsible for its inoonveniences. Once the effects of 
fonnalism are admitted as real. and thereby formalism as a doctrine of constraints is 
established to be in good working order (as indeed it is done in the dichotomy of the 
law and its readings). there can be no good reason to abandon it: reshuffle the pack. 
change it. add some cards. leave out some; but remember. this is a game of cards. 
And if. on the other hand. the crime is not committed, as implied by the realist 
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contention that fonnalism is a rhetorical effect rather than a practicable strategy, 
then fonnalism is held either for the wrong reason or without reason whatsoever: 
the inconveniences spoken of refer merely to different traces of reality, as opposed 
to the artificially imposed effects of some category that would be non-reality. What 
sounds like an impropriety of logic, therefore, is at once an accurate depiction of the 
realist predicament: the wrong person is arrested for a crime uncommitted. 
That the realist aitique pertains to the record rather than the process is 
emphasized repeatedly by Gerty. The Swiss legislator is praised in the second 
edition of the Method for the 'frankness' of the Civil Code of 1907, a code which 
concedes the exhaustibility of the fonnal sources of the law in the very first article 
and confers upon the judge rule-making powers. The principal merit of the Code, 
according to Geny, is an 'ethical' one; its authors have 'sincerely recognized the 
limits of their ability and the need to supplement it by other means. '23 Although the 
traditional method is basically about misrepresentation, on the other hand, just as 
practical inconveniences follow the rhetorical argument of Saleilles. Geny too 
points out that 'in the hypocrisy behind which [the traditional method] operates' lie 
hazards which are very much real.24 'When one considers the practical aspects,' he 
writes. 'one notices at once the capital defect of the system: the immobilization of 
the law and the stultification of any new ideas.'2S Immobilization becomes an issue 
as the tradition recognizes no rule other than the 'fonnulae positively enacted by the 
legislator. and [the] principles construed on their basis.'26 Even though realism is 
defended on the sole basis of its ineluctability in the first place. the formalistic 
concept of the tradition is made to give realism the lie by eluding its ineluctability. 
In its choice for the vacuum-packed dictates of formal guidelines. and against 
reality. fonnalism as a doctrine of constraints turns out to be more than mere 
promise after all. On the contrary, it succeeds to keep everything regarding the law 
absolutely frozen, as Geny cares particularly to emphasize it, 'at the moment the law 
was passed. '27 The text of the law does its bit on the side of the method by tolerating 
its liberal interpretations up to a point only, where its existence begins to develop a 
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brittle quality.28 When this happens. according to Geny. there are two things the 
interpreter can do. One thing she can do is to defer the matter to the legislator. 
which often means a slow, 'difficult' and 'inconvenient' course. apart from 
signifying 'a defeat of the legal method and a confession of its impotency to satisfy 
the needs of life.'29 Now the perverse logic of Geny's argument must not go 
unnoticed. In designating the legislative will as the only basis for interpreting the 
(written) law, as I discussed it above,lO he upholds fervently the principle of the 
parliamentary supremacy against the Volksgeist considerations of the historical 
school.31 In the argument about defeatism. however. deference to the parliament is 
despised. among other reasons, for promoting the idea of a submissive judiciary. 
And this is where the argument once again shows a truly paradoxical quality. The 
entire point of the Method is to prove the fallacy of the traditional claim to 
completeness and perfection in its formal guidelines. But now for the legal method 
to have qualities less ambitious than those of the legal text, namely the qualities of 
omniscience and omnipotence. is considered to be a shameful defect. The second 
course is marked by a similar displacement of logic. The other course that the 
interpreter can take, according to Geny. when the law shows a brittle quality is to 
abandon the law altogether and substitute for it her own freely acquired rule. 
[The] lack of adaptability imposed by the positive law - for 
me the basic defect of the purely legalistic and deductive 
system of interpretation - is aggravated by another defect 
which offers an opportunity for a more precise criticism. 
While it appears to remain faithful to the statute and its spirit. 
the traditional method leaves in reality a place for the most 
disorderly subjectivism. This is a necessary consequence and 
almost the price for the precise and restrictive procedures 
which it alone considers legitimate. When it is necessary to 
ascribe to the legislator an idea he has not expressed. nor 
perhaps conceived, or frequently could not have harboured at 
all. the interpreter tends by the very force of the 
circumstances to substitute his own ideas for those he does 
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not find in the legislation. 32 
In the first course the interpreter finds herself before a set of rules that are frozen in 
time. What that means first and foremost is that the rules are bendable only up to a 
degree. The point that ought to be noticed therefore is that to the process Geny 
describes in the first course it is absolutely crucial that the state of the bendability of 
the rules is an accountable, monitored matter. In the second course that follows, on 
the other hand, a more drastic action on the part d the interpreter, namely the 
abandoning of the law altogether, is taken, yet this time with less or even no 
concern at all regarding its accountability. How is that? How is it possible within 
one and the same system of law that one interpreter's mere touch of the legal text is 
felt within the monitoring audience to a degree where the text is recognized as 
becoming brittle, while one interpreter's skipping of it entirely goes unnoticed? If 
the 'basic defect' of formalism is its 'lack of adaptability,' we are told, even more 
horrendous is its 'necessary consequence' and 'price,' namely a 'most disorderly 
subjectivism.' If subjectivism necessarily follows the lack of adaptability on the part 
of the law, it is not clear how formalism is held responsible for causing subjectivism 
and immobilization in the workings of the law at once. The paradox, however, is 
that if formalism is cleared on one of the two charges, it is cleared of both. If it is 
responsible for immobilization, that only shows that formalism wom; and it works 
as the sale remedy against the freakish that underlies the realist charge about 
subjectivism. If it fails, on the other hand, in sustaining immobilization, and instead 
subjectivism reigns, then formalism simply does not work; failed its rationale, it 
does not exist, and can hardly. therefore, be responsible for any of the things that 
happen. 
The preliminary draft of the Swiss Civil Code, made about the same time Geny 
was fmishing the Method,33 uses the same argument against the traditional method: 
formalism risks subjectivism, because its cloak of a purely mechanistic reading of 
the law provides the perfect cover for the personal whims of the interpreter.34 The 
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Code bestows upon the judge the authority to make the rule where legislation and 
custom are silent Acknowledging the rule-making powers of the judge, however, 
does not necessarily mean a widening of the powers he already holds. On the 
contrary, it signifies an openness whereby the process becomes more accountable 
and the interpreter a lot more restricted than he would be behind the closed doors of 
formalism. Because formalism is precisely where 'the most questionable tricks of 
interpretation' are employed to beat meaning into the text of the law.35 
Not surprisingly, the equation that holds together formalism and subjectivism is 
reproduced by Uewellyn. As he opposes the Grand Style of the common law to the 
Formal Style, the former distinguishes itself as a 'tradition,' and thereby a 'duty,' to 
ensure the continuity of practice on a principled basis, while the deductive and 
exegetical manners of the latter are simply make-believe and therefore devoid of 
capability to constrain. In the early work, The Bramble Bush, Uewellyn formulates 
the risk involved in abandoning the realist tradition of the common law for a formal 
concept in terms not dissimilar to Geny's formulation of it for the Napoleonic Code. 
'Lacking full realization of the duty, the method, the tradition, the appellate judge 
can come and to some extent is coming to see himself as free - and that way lies 
disaster.'36 In elucidating the traditional suspicion towards the immediacy behind 
speech, which is paradoxical for speech is usually the privileged term for exactly 
the same reason, I referred above to the Aristotelian concept of government by well-
drawn laws as opposed to government by men.37 I also related the Hobbesean 
objection to the dichotomy which he designates as 'another Errour of Aristotles 
Politiques. '38 What is crucial to notice is how central the dichotomy is to a 
formalistic notion of law. In the mature work by Uewellyn. The Common Law 
Tradition. the equation that makes subjectivist disorder a consequent and price of 
formalism is invoked on the basis of the very dichotomy that is the epitome of 
formalism. 
[F)irst, the Grand Style is the best device ever invented by 
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man for drying up that free-flowing spring of uncertainty, 
conflict between the seeming commands of the authorities and 
the felt demands of justice. Second, when a frozen text 
happens to be the crux, to insist that an acceptable answer 
shall satisfy the reason as well as the language is not only to 
escape much occasion for divergence, but to radically reduce 
the degree thereof ... Third, the future-directed quest for ever 
better fonnulations for guidance. which is inherent in the 
Grand Style. means the on-going production and 
improvement d rules which make sense on their face. and 
which can be understood and reasonably well applied even by 
mediocre men. Such rules have a fair chance to get the same 
results out of very different judges. and so in truth to hit close 
to the ancient target of 'laws and not men.'39 
The three features that are listed in fact only proliferate one fundamental antinomy 
of laws and men, or the law and its readings. which is made conceivable by a 
distinctive concept of world fraternity where the freakish is anticipated as the 
attachments constitutive of the event of signification are suppressed. The 
'commands of authorities' are put. in the first feature. in opposition to the 'demands 
of justice' in an anticipation of the freakish, even though the 'seeming' installed 
before the 'commands of authorities' aims to attenuate the effects of the dichotomy 
which is ultimately threatening to the sole realist rationale in the game. Yet, in the 
second feature introduced. the dichotomy is only reiterated in the form of an 
opposition between the language of the law and reason, a diversity that can be 
rationalised only on the basis of a concept of silly rule.4I.} And finally. a distinction is 
made between the immobile character of formalism and a progressive qUality that 
marks the Grand Style. which not only reproduces the basic dichotomy. but which 
does so, as with Geny before, at the cost of the concept of a 'free-flowing spring of 
uncertainty' whose remedy is the unique contribution of the Grand Style. Formalism 
is held responsible at once for immobilization and a free-flowing subjectivism. 
What brand is the concept of world fraternity presupposed in the argument for the 
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Grand Style? 
Llewellyn repeats Geny with little or no difference in not only drawing a radical 
and ultimately problematic distinction between the Formal and the Grand Styles. 
but he also reproduces the latter's concept of a free scientific search. where statute 
and custom are exhausted. in defining the nature and the procedure of the Grand 
Style. The realism of the Grand Style signifies a 'conscious seeking' of the right rule 
with a careful observance of precedent and statute, while the subjectivist interpret« 
accommodated within the Formal Style is expected to find a fourth category in 
which to make presentable his passion and whims. 
To recognize that there are limits to the certainty sought by 
words and deduction. to seek to define those limits. is to open 
the door to that other and far more useful judicial procedure: 
conscious seeking. within the limits laid down by precedent 
and statute. for the wise decision. Decisions thus reached, 
within those limits. may fairly be hoped to be more certainly 
predictable than decisions are now - for today no man can 
tell when the court will. and when it will not. thus seek the 
wise decision. but hide the seeking under words. And not only 
more certain. but... more just and wise (or more frequently 
just and wise).41 
The words Llewellyn emphasizes in the text signify the three categories that are 
available as a basis for the decision: the first two are precedent and statute; and the 
third. a 'recognition' of the limits of the first two. contained in. and followed by. a 
'conscious seeking.' The conscious seeking. for Geny. is what free objective search 
is all about where statute and custom (which is technically a species of decisional 
law) do not provide an answer for the case in hand. A free search can be pursued, 
however. not only when there is no answer, but also when the answer, or in 
Llewellyn's delicate phraseology, the 'seeming'42 answer. is not up to the required 
standard. As Getty puts it, the judge is justified to take the place of the legislator in 
the specific case when an 'absence or insufficience of formal sources' is the issue . .o 
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Because subjectivist disorder is in a sense the very inaugurator of the quest for a 
realist methodology. it is enigmatic why a choice of such significance on the part of 
the interpreter should be left out of the general distrust of personal whims and 
passion. Geny finds the project of the Savignean historical school 'dangerous' 
precisely for leaving it to the choice of the interpreter to decide whether the law is 
right foe the specific occasion. AB he relates with scorn the thinking of the historical 
school ..... 'if the thought of the legislator as it appears from the natural sense of the 
text is repugnant to what the interpreter according to his personal feeling considers 
to be the expression of the collective conscience of the people. he will not hesitate 
to apply the statute giving preference to the direct revelation of the common and 
profound source over its imperfect statutory expression. '45 What is particularly 
revealing is the fact that the position of the historical school. which would be 
perfectly justifiable from a certain point of view 'for drying up that free-flowing 
spring of uncertainty. conflict between the seeming commands of the authorities 
and the felt demands of justice'46 (the word 'felt' having its own story there). is 
frowned upon for. not drying up. but inducing uncertainty.47 'To authorize such 
freedom.' writes Gerty about the choice the interpreter exercises within the meaning 
of the historical method. 'is nothing less than to suppress the precision and stability 
which are the capital merit and salient advantage of the written law. '48 Without 
making it clear how exactly the interpreter of the free objective search differs in his 
decision of the insufficiency of the formal sources of law from the interpreter of the 
historical method. Gerty declares objectivity as the backbone of the realist 
methodology: 
in order to prevent any arbitrariness, he must eliminate as 
much as possible any personal influence ... and base his 
decision on objective elements. This is the reason why it has 
seemed to me that his activity could be properly labelled 'libre 
recherche scientifique': free search. because it is outside the 
reach of any positive authority; objective search, because it 
can be solidly based only upon objective elements which 
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systematic-scientific jurisprudence alone can reveal. 49 
Of the scientific disciplines to guide the search. Geny cites sociology as one of the 
utmost significance. 'If this science should ever realize the hopes that have been put 
into it. I think it would suffice to provide us with the necessary clear information.'50 
However. 'at least for the time being.' the interpreter must be allowed the benefit of 
the scientific disciplines amongst which are 'general philosophy: 'psychology: 
'individual and social ethics: 'political theory: and 'political economy.' History. in 
its broadest sense. is a natural contributor to the process. Thus I say that in the 
absence of formal source. which are certainly the most exact and finn indicators for 
the interpreter, he can find the necessary and sufficiently secure directive in the 
purely scientific data.'si The concept of the purity of data would seem to be uneasy 
with the idea that the data should at once provide the directives. What the search 
entails in its scientific project. however. is to ascertain merely the rule in the 
specific case which Geny designates as the 'means.'S2 The 'direction,' on the other 
hand. which transcends the particular application of the rule. is determined. not 
empirically, but on a rational level. The direction of the search, accordingly. is its 
'goal,' while the specific rule is an instrument to make it happen. 53 The goal that is 
founded on rational principles, Geny explains, is 'absolute justice.' And excitingly. 
absolute justice finds evidence for its conceptual validity in the authority of 'our 
great Montesquieu, neither the clarity nor the power of whom can be questioned.'54 
As Montesquieu states in The Spirit of Laws that 'I have not drawn my principles 
from my own prejudices, but from the nature of things,'SS Geny not only takes the 
fonner's word for what he claims to have done, but, more surprisingly perhaps, he 
also considers the former-s mere appeal to the nature of things to be suffICient 
evidence for its validity as a concept. 'Montesquieu indicated clearly,' writes Getty, 
'that the nature of things from which he declared to have drawn his principles, did 
not consist only of phenomena. facts and contingencies, but rested on a more solid 
foundation. which is the work of reason and represents absolute justice.'56 
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Interpretation on the basis of free search, therefore, is indeed principled in its 
scientific project insofar as it merely seeks ways to achieve on a phenomenal level 
that which is just independently of phenomena. Interpretation, according to Geny, is 
motivated by 'the principle of justice in itself, which implies a certain order in 
human relations to be sanctioned by the social power, imposes itself absolutely, 
[and which] is recognized through reason, and every act of legal interpretation 
involves automatically its finding and proclamation. '51 Justice, he elucidates, 
belongs to an order that is about human experience but that, at the same time, 
transcends its sensory ties. The guidance that is required in an objective search, 
therefore, is not to be sought in the ordinary, sensory domain. The right rule in the 
absence or insufficience of formal directives will be inquired within an independent 
realm where discordant claims for the just and the right can be resolved with 
finality. 
Here is an absolute prerequisite for a firm basis for 
interpretation in the sphere of free objective search: beyond 
and above the positive nature of things, which consists of 
physical and dynamic elements, we must refer to a higher 
nature of things, which consists entirely of rational principles 
and immutable moral elements. 58 
Transcending criteria, which belong to the realm of senses, on the uniquely firm 
basis of a suprasensibility refers us back to the themes we have already explored 
with Lyotard.59 The conscious seeking that defines realism appears, rather 
revealingly, to correspond to Lyotard's notion of 'anticipation,'60 and the realist 
'reason' to his 'capability to decide. '61 Better still, Lyotard designates the moment of 
transcendence, in an intricate and therefore more striking overlap, as a hunch, '8 
matter of feelings. '62 rather than concepts. 'General propositions do not decide 
concrete cases,' writes Holmes. The decision will depend on a judgement or 
intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise. '63 Geny too refers to an 
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'instinctive feeling' for the right decision in the specific case, as opposed to 
principled reasoning.64 Geny's reference. however. comes in a discussion of such 
matters as the principle of bona fide in Roman law and. notably. the part played in 
the English system by equity, a concept defined as 'an inarticulate and not reasoned 
feeling about the exigencies of law. '65 Geny expresses regret that the French system 
does not offer equivalent notions. or that their existence in practice is not 
acknowledged. Regardless of its context. the appeal to 'instinctive feeling' has been 
usually construed in the interpretations of Geny's work as an implicit support for the 
notion of hunch.66 What is mistaken for a notion of awareness within the elusive 
attachments of a world fraternity. in the sense Holmes means it. however. is none 
other than the Kantian rationality. which. just as the Lyotardian hunch. Geny 
entertains within the meaning of a binary opposition of heteronomy. namely the 
lower. sensory side of man, and autonomy. his rational and higher being.67 Not 
surprisingly. therefore, in the second edition of the Method. Geny takes pains 
clearly to distance himself from the idea of a mode of awareness which is other than 
a rational suprasensibility. 68 What brand is the fraternity presupposed in the 
Genian-Lyotardian notion of awareness in the search for that which is right? 
Llewellyn reproduces Geny's formulation of the means and the goal in an aware 
pursuit of the right decision in his concept of 'reason.' A distinction he makes 
between what he calls the 'situation-sense' and 'wisdom' in the specific case 
encapsulates the idea that characterizes the crucial. Genian dichotomy of the domain 
of senses and absolute justice. Combining the sensory with the transcendental. and 
at once dictating a frankness of rhetoric regarding the way the two are in league 
within the enterprise. Uewellyn's reason is a concept that captures the whole 
message of Geny's project for a free objective search. 
Situation-sense will serve well enough to indicate the type-
facts in their context and at the same time in their pressure for 
a satisfying working result. coupled with whatever the judge 
or court brings and adds to the evidence. in the way of 
198 
knowledge and experience and values to see with. and to 
judge with. Wisdom will serve well enough to indicate a goal 
of right decision weighted heavily with and for the future. 
Reason I use to lap over both of these. and to include as well 
the conscious use of the court's best powers to be articulate. 
especially about wisdom and guidance in the result. 69 
In the awareness reason signifies. therefore. the interpreter finds the third category. 
after statute and precedent. OIl the basis of which to justify the particular reading. 
What gives away the brand of fraternity that defines realism. on the other hand. is 
the fact that. given the frame of reference it anticipates. there simply cannot be a 
fourth category for the formalist interpreter within the confines of which to 
introduce her private passion. The passion. in other words. will have to take a form 
that would allow it into one of the three categories if it is to merit consideration at 
all. Paradoxically. however. when the passion unleashed under the permissive cloak 
of formalism does therefore enter the game. it at once falls out of use for 
consideration. for its reality is then but anon-reality. as. having already secured a 
place in one of the three non-passionate categories. its mode of being as pure 
passion will be, not one of reality. but one of a state of mind. Realism betrays its 
very rationale. as it presupposes a non-grammatical distinction between seeking and 
conscious seeking. or between whimsical and conscious seeking. whereby the not-
conscious to be deposited into a category that is 'dangerously supplementary' to the 
three legitimate categories of statute. precedent. and reason. Realism does assume a 
fourth category. a category that fails reason. but it does not tell us what the 
unreasonable interpretation a judge might come up with would be like. The concept 
of a fourth category that is non-manifest yet dictating is at once that which enables 
Groucho in the Marx Brothers joke to tell which partner exactlY has been left out 
when Zeppo misses a Hungadonga in the title of a letter to the lawyers 
Hungadonga. Hungadonga. Hungadonga & McCormick. The supplementarity of 
the fourth category. namely the personal whim. transcends the reality of itself. 
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which it abandons in one of the three non-passionate categories. and survives by and 
in itself as pure intention with no necessary connections with the reality of itself. its 
extension. to go on being an impending. if non-real. hazard to the workings of law. 
The reality so heartily championed therefore leaves realism. just as intelligibility 
does the phrase 'its extension: where no essential connections between 'it: namely 
the intention. and the extension. can be conceded. The non-fraternity of a fallacious 
Cartesianism. consequently. appears to be what defines realism. 
A non-grammatical. absolute. dichotomy between intention and extension makes 
conceivable the realist equation of formalism and subjectivism. thereby lending 
force to its rhetoric for a better order. Perversely. however. what the dichotomy at 
once does is to nullify the sole rationale for realism. namely that formalism is 
impossible. The ineluctability of realism pre-empts the question: what sort of 
positive attitude does realism require? The history of realism. nevertheless. has been 
a long and frustrated answer to the question of what to do. 'I am - I make no secret 
of it - a reformer: declares Franlc.7o In Science et technique. Geny contrasts 'blind 
practice' with an 'enlightened practice.' To argue that 'theory is without influence on 
the actual development of legal practice.' he writes. in an anticipatory response to 
the notorious thesis by Fish,?1 '[that] method is more a matter of pouvoir than of 
sa voir: is 'a sheer sophism.'72 The Genian dichotomy between the enlightened and 
blind instances of practice is reproduced in what I quoted above from Llewellyn. as 
he distinguishes a tomorrow that is wiser and less uncertain from the 'today' and 
'now' of formalism where wisdom is scarce and the reign is that of uncertainty.73 
According to Llewellyn. the concept of law that defined what he terms the 'Formal 
period,' whose end interestingly coincides with the rise of realism.74 comprised 'the 
mere rules of law. And in action. the whole drive of the Formal Style was toward 
making sure. so far as might be. that it should be just those phrased rules which did 
do the deciding. 075 That in turn meant a 'wooden and literal reading' of statutes in 
the Formal period.76 While 'in the period of the Grand Style of case law statutes 
were construed 'freely' to implement their purpose. '71 Uewellyn. therefore, 
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subscribes to the idea of phases of practice that are radically distinct, even though 
the 'steadying factors' and the 'craft' which he also includes in his account78 are 
clearly uneasy with the concept of a blind. unprincipled or misguided practice. 
Enigmatically. however. the styles are at once introduced as those, not of reading, 
but of opinion-writing,79 a process held distinct from the actual reading and placed 
instead within a genre where performance is measured by the capability to 
persuade.80 Uewellyn points out the 'impossibility' of the deductive reading 
advocated in the Formal Style.8l Its impossibility, however, is quite another matter 
from its use as a mode of persuasion. 'An opinion written in the Formal Style,' he 
notes. 'has no need to reflect a deciding done in like cold deductive manner. for in 
such an opinion no other factor which may have been at work in the deciding rates 
mention or even hint. '82 As the Formal Style is redefined in terms of rhetoric. to 
observe the Grand Style at work. likewise. we are urged to go to the 'law reports of 
the 1830's or 1840'S.'83 We are referred, in other words. to that which is repeatedly 
designated as a different genre of practice rather than an account of it. The 
difference between the Grand and the Formal Styles is. one. therefore. not of genre, 
but within genre. Even if, at the expense of further problems for the theory. the 
Grand Style were somehow to be left out of the genre in which is the Formal Style, 
and considered instead, to be an account of the actual process; rather than implying 
a non-grammatical difference between the two instances of practice, the frankness 
of rhetoric on the part of the Grand Style would only justify the question I posed to 
start with: does the realist vision, then, consist merely of setting the record straight? 
2.4.2 Realism About Realism 
If so, where formalism signifies first and foremost a record-oriented enterprise, and 
where it is the realist rhetoric that makes good record-keeping the key issue of its 
project, even though a dichotomy of the law and its readings is out of the question 
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(meaning, practice is what counts and it has its own mode of continuity) and records 
constitute only a different genre of practice rather than an independent venture to 
depict the workings of practice in a detached manner, realism simply mimics 
formalism. And because its zeal in that case far exceeds that of formalism, realism 
may be better designated as an ultra1ormalism. And, conversely, if realism seeks 
not only to record accurately but also to alter, guide or manipulate that which it 
records, and therefore presupposes a distinction between fonnalist and realist phases 
of practice, then every single feature that is attributable to formalism can be shown 
to mark the very project of realism with, again, a far greater zeal. If a formalist 
rhetoric is pinpointable, (a) in its belief in managing practice by means of fonnal 
guidelines; (b) in its belief in the fantastic that is dangerously at large in the absence 
of fonnal constraints, hence subjectivism and unpredictability in court outcomes; 
and finally (c) in its belief in a dichotomy between the legal and the moral, or 
between as realists often put it, is and ought, underpinned by a fonnal concept of 
language in the fonn of a logical positivist verificationism, accompanied by a 
fonnal (picture) theory of truth; then realism can safely be regarded as an instance 
of, not merely fonnalism, but, again, ultra-fonnalism. 
In the early essay 'Some Realism About Realism,' Llewellyn points out amongst 
the major constituents of a 'common core' for a variety of realist positions the idea 
that rules are not 'the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions.'84 The 
duality this early essay (co-authored by Frank) establishes in the fonn of rules and 
supplementary factors must be considered at the heart of many of realist 
predicaments, even though, apart from the early formative period, the duality has 
not always remained unquestioned. What realism appears to do after abandoning a 
formal notion of validity is to substitute for it a patchwork notion of validity. In this 
hastily arranged concept, it is hardly clear why rules should be operative in court 
decisions at all, or why some rules should fail to exert constraints while some 
should succeed. The crucial point is that if rules are to be conceded to work even 
with a minimal success, ultimately that will be a vindication of fonnalism, rather 
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than a refutation of it: the possibility of its concept proved, its specific application 
can be improved; rules can be formulated with greater precision.85 When Llewellyn 
states in that same essay that 'the authoritative tradition speaks with a forked 
tongue, '86 his contention bears the mark of four unrealistic presuppositions at once. 
First, it anticipates an interpreter in the position of Zeno's arrow, out of time and 
place, and overwhelmed with the presence of forks of meaning to choose between, 
rather than one single command mechanically to apply in the particular case.87 It 
fails both a realistic concept of interpreter and a realistic concept of choice.88 
Secondly, the statement anticipates one single right answer in the specific 
assemblage of contingencies; an answer that is lost in the imprecision of the 
solution provided by the rule, and yet can be attained by the judge in the specific 
case if only he were to be allowed to go about it free of the constraints of the rule. It 
fails a realistic concept of conflict and of its remedies, and becomes 
indistinguishable, at least in one significant aspect, from the notion of a right, 
natural answer. Thirdly, the deceptive quality of law's imprecision, namely its 
'forked tongue,' invokes a concept of deception whose wildly unrealistic character I 
have already emphasized with the deceptive quality of the command of Lyotard's 
rabbi:89 the reality of deception is far less open-ended than realism would have us 
believe. The unrealistic character of all three is surpassed, however, as, fourthly, the 
self-proclaimed authenticity of the speech of rules is taken for granted. That 'the 
authoritative tradition speaks,' in fact, supplies formalism with more evidence than 
it actually needs to assert its validity. Later in the development of his thinking, even 
though his approach modified, Llewellyn can be seen still to retain the notion that it 
is the authoritative tradition that speaks. His refusal of intentional argument in 
statutory interpretation, for instance, is motivated solely by fear that intentional 
reading will be one of recovering the authentic speech which will be uselessly 
archaic 'as a statute ages. '90 
The duality of the authentic speech of rules and the supplementary factors, 
however, need not be limited to its unequivocal statements. Even when rules as 
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constraints are rejected altogether,91 realism hardly dreams of questioning the rule-
related authority of at least the court and its officials. That is to say, a minimum 
authority of rules has to be designated as given even in the extremest of realist 
positions. As for the supplementary factors of the realist duality, within the meaning 
of a patchwork concept of validity, their rationalisation has been conspicuous 
merely by omission: the improvised solution in the absence of a concept to 
assimilate factors other than rules has been to equate the dreaded prospect of 
subjectivism withformalism. and shout it as loudly as possible in the hope that it 
drowns out the criticism that it is the realist rhetoric that leaves the charges of 
subjectivism unanswered for in the first place. The void in the realist concept of 
validity for factors other than rules is filled in The Common Law Tradition with the 
notion of the 'craft. '92 The elements that are supplementary in court decisions are 
vouched for by means of the 'steadying factors' which the craft offers to secure its 
continuity.93 The supplementary elements, in fact, grow to challenge the very 
centrality of rules and assimilate the entire process in Llewellyn's later formulation. 
In the end the duality is abandoned altogether. 'It is not, I repeat, necessary,' he 
notes, 'that there be any rule. Neither is it necessary that there be any effort to 
formulate a rule, nor even that there be effort to phrase a justification. The matter 
goes instead to an attitude, an attitude in first instance internal to the actor. '94 The 
primordiality of attitude is emphasized, with interesting comparison, in a middle 
period study which Llewellyn undertakes with the anthropologist E.A. Hoebel and 
which is based on the field investigations carried out amongst the Cheyenne people 
of the Native Americans, The Cheyenne Way.95 The Cheyenne way, Llewellyn 
detects in an examination of the narrative accounts of the 'trouble cases,' displays a 
notable similarity to the workings of the common law system. It is for the most part 
'intuitive,' lacks rule-based law, and yet at once exhibits a 'juristic precision.' The 
continuity attested by the native cases, Llewellyn observes, is clearly one of attitude 
rather than a rule-imposed phenomenon. 
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It may well be that a very large degree of the regularity and 
predictability which we ourselves now enjoy in things of law 
is actually due not to the rules of law to which we have long 
been ascribing it, but to underlying legal institutions of our 
own which are as inarticulate, but which in their own way are 
as effective as those one can observe at work in the Cheyenne 
cases.96 
I recorded above Lyotard's fascination with the narrative tradition of the Amazon 
Indians.97 That Uewellyn should be equally dazzled with the Cheyenne Indians tells 
more than a simple coincidence. In both instances the pagan attitude is emphasized 
as a condition of human existence and therefore ineluctable. The ineluctability of 
paganism is at once ignored by both writers, however, as a radical dichotomy 
between the pagan attitude and the Jewish pole (the German pole, in Uewellyn's 
case, a category that epitomizes [the formalist] faith) is introduced. In the very 
context he refutes the centrality of rules to a system, Uewellyn seeks to illuminate 
the significance of the Cheyenne way within the framework of a contrast between 
the German and the Anglo-American attitudes, a distinction that can hardly be made 
on a level other than that of the centrality of rules.98 In the common law attitude, he 
elucidates, the judge plays the central part, while in the German attitude the most 
significant part is played by the legislator and the scholar. As the latter tends to 
emphasize 'articulation,' with the former a 'feeling' on the basis of the particular case 
always comes first. 99 Uewellyn finds 'the great Romans' closer in this respect to the 
Anglo-Americans than the Germans for the Roman preference also was for the 'case 
by case' work.loo Since the continuity of attitude and the steadying factors of the 
craft should not cease with the Germans just because they like articulating more 
than the Anglo-Americans, it is hard to see on what basis other than that of the 
centrality of rules the distinction is drawn. Unless, that is, Uewellyn wishes to 
stress a difference of rhetoric between the two traditions, as opposed to a difference 
in decision-making. Does the title of The Common Law Tradition refer, then, 
simply to a tradition of rhetoric? Where does the Cheyenne rhetoric come in? What 
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does it mean to say that the German rhetoric refuses to work on a 'case by case' 
basis? 
I pointed out above the age-old distrust towards speech, which is paradoxical 
because, as Derrida teaches us, speech has been the privileged term traditionally.lOl 
The rankings of speech and writing in apparently discordant patterns, however, 
complies with one consistent motif which eventually dissolves the paradox: the 
privacy that marks speech serves a function similar to the distance that defines 
writing; in both cases an anticipated immediacy, pure presence, underlies the 
distrust. I have no way of knowing the true nature of the relation between what you 
say and what you have in mind, that which you have in mind being private; a 
similar discontinuity is brought about by the distance that characterizes writing. It is 
impossible not to notice the two apparently paradoxical rankings of speech and 
writing at work at the same time in Llewellyn's dismissal of the articulate. In the 
distinction between that which is felt and that which is articulated, which indicates 
the dichotomy between the two attitudes, the articulate clearly represents the 
alienated. On the other hand, the articulate is also written. And the written 
represents the alienated in its frozen, prejudiced archaicness. While that which is not 
written signifies adaptability and freshness in the sense that it enables articulation 
on an immediate, or as Llewellyn puts it, 'case by case,' basis. 
What is really perverse, of course, is the fact that at the very time the Cheyenne 
Way was being composed, Llewellyn was busy also articulating the famous 
Uniform Commercial Code, part of whose aim, to give the lie to the conclusion 
drawn from the Cheyenne cases, was 'to simplify and modernize and develop 
greater precision and certainty in the rules of law governing commercial 
transactions. '102 The Code's approach differs from that of the Swiss Civil Code, 
whose Article 1 Geny considers to be 'the best summary of my arguments,'103 as 
Uewellyn's strategy, and not concept, of the legislative will differs from Geny's.l04 
'This Act,' states the Section 1-102 (1) of the Uniform Code, 'shall be liberally 
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.'105 Unlike 
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the Swiss Code, law-making by the judge, as opposed to liberal reading, is not 
introduced in the Unifonn Code, for Llewellyn chooses simply to skip the problem 
of the legislative will in favour of the 'underlying purposes and policies' of the 
legislation, a phraseology which technically satisfies the requirement of legislative 
intention while at once suggesting an interpretive tool to operate on a liberal basis. 
Gerty, on the other hand, urges the interpreter to read the law on the basis of the 
historical will in the first place, then she can abandon the law altogether, if, 
originally understood, it does not provide an answer in the specific case or if the 
answer it provides is not satisfactory. The Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code reads: 
Application of the law. - The statute detennines all legal 
issues covered by its text or interpretation. 
If no rule can be drawn from the statute, the judge shall 
decide according to customary law and, when even that is not 
available, according to the rule he would make as legislator. 
In this he shall follow established doctrine and decisional 
law.l06 
It is not hard to see why Geny would consider Llewellyn's solution a compromise 
that renders pointless the long and painful struggle on the part of realism against 
technical confonnism and for frankness of rhetoric. Perhaps not surprisingly, Jaro 
Mayda, Geny's English translator, in his follow up on the system of the Swiss Code, 
finds the Swiss practice, since at least 1948, guilty of abandoning the realism of the 
Article 1 along the Genian lines, and adopting instead an approach similar to 
Llewellyn's.107 The Swiss tend to read the Code liberally, irrespective of the 
historical intention, the codified need for judicial law-making where the law, 
originally understood, does not provide, thereby being aborted. The great irony, of 
course, is in the fact that a senseless zeal over the mechanical application of that 
which is written, regardless of the effects, is precisely what that which is written, 
namely the Article I, is designed to abrogate in the first place. In tenns of the 
effects, which are in a strong sense what realism is all about,l08 on the other hand, 
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the decisions of the Swiss Federal High Court, whether pursuing interpretation on 
the basis of a mechanistic guidance of the Article I, or disregarding it altogether for 
a liberal reading of the specific law, do not exhibit a particular quality. In other 
words, the two modes of reading the Court is said to apply are distinguishable only 
when they have their name tags on. The 1948 'Suisa' decision which is thought to 
signify a turning point in the practice of the Federal Court designates judicial law-
making as confined merely to 'cases of extreme need.'l09 Other than those cases, the 
'analogous use' of the prevailing law is considered sufficient instrument with which 
to address new issues. The idea of judicial gap-filling in cases other than 'extreme 
need,' according to the Court, stands uncomfortably with the concept of the 
separation of powers. IIO The dramatic change of policy on the part of the judiciary, 
however, does not necessarily amount to a change in the effects of the ongoing 
practice. Mayda notes that one result, if at all, has been in fact quite the contrary; 
'under guises and fictions,' the judiciary has performed the impressive functions the 
Code lays out for it with renewed strength.l11 Its promised subordination, he 
observes, has been one to changing circumstances, and not one to the legislator. ll2 
Was not Geny being hasty in his designation of the mechanistic jurisprudence as 
merely worshipful of the written? How efficiently has the formal guidance of the 
Article 1 managed the practice in Swiss courts? Judging from the effects which the 
'Suisa' decision seems to have failed to produce for a change of direction in practice, 
the change of direction intended by the Code in the first place imposes itself as an 
issue. Has the Code provision made a difference in the workings of Swiss judiciary? 
'Most commentators agree that it has not,' answers Mayda. ll3 A Swiss jurist he 
quotes remarks that the free-searching formula of the Article 1 should be 
understood less as a remedy thought up for the inconveniences of formalism than a 
fair description of the long established practice of Swiss courts.1l4 To re-read the 
established practice he refers to as the established theoretical practice may help to 
explain the rhetorical success of Geny's formula in Switzerland while failing in 
France, even though we have every reason to believe that the established practice in 
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France could not possibly be operating differently from the Swiss courts before or 
after the Code. I IS The Turks adopted the Swiss Code in 1926 with negligible 
alterations. 11 6 The rhetoric of the Code did not only appeal to the elitist 
revolutionaries of the young Turkish Republic, but the established theoretical 
practice, in particular the institution of ijtiluid, which characterizes interpretation 
within the meaning of Islamic law, II? offered the formula of the Swiss Code the 
rhetorical support which it could not have in France. 118 
Paradoxically, however, the rule-sceptical track of realism converges with the 
rule-centred formalism of the French rhetoric in anticipating the unruly in the 
absence of rules as formal constraints. Realism shares the most basic tenet of 
formalism as it invokes an anthropologism to mark judicial process. 'Behind 
decisions stand judges;' writes Llewellyn (with Frank), 'judges are men; as men they 
have human backgrounds.'119 He opposes, once more, government by laws to 
government by men, and dissenting from the judgement of his later work,I20 points 
out government by men as a primordiality.l2I I emphasized above the subjectivist 
concept presupposed in the formulations of Saleilles, Geny, and Llewellyn, where 
rules are naturally imprecise, and therefore devoid, in at least fringe cases, of 
capability to constrain, and where a well thought-out method to address that which 
evades the formal law is lacking. Frank, many of whose later ideas the other realists 
do not concur with, makes a free-floating subjectivism a condition which transcends 
the particular juristic position or method held. I22 After rigidly distinguishing 
between fact and fiction, especially at trial courts, he adopts an attitude regarding 
the handling of facts by the court not dissimilar to that of Descartes' all-doubting 
sceptic. For him, the unpredictability of court outcomes is accounted for by what he 
calls the 'unknowability' of the true nature of the facts in the specific case. I23 He 
draws attention to the manner in which facts are established in court. 
The actual event, the real objective acts and words ... do not 
walk into court. The court usually learns about these real, 
objective past facts only through the oral testimony of fallible 
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witnesses. Accordingly, the court, from hearing the 
testimony, must guess at the actual, past facts ... There can be 
no assurance that. .. that guess will coincide with those actual, 
past facts. l24 
Fact-finding is a process ruptured in the mediation of 'fallible,' passionate, witness 
testimonies. The unknowability, however, does not only pertain to the nature of 
facts, but the finding of facts, 'the way in which [the court] 'found' those facts,' also 
forms an instance of unknowability.125 The word Frank has for the general 
uncertainty which therefore marks the judicial fate of the specific assemblage of 
facts is 'chanciness.'I26 What is more, the uncertainty regarding facts is coupled in 
the process with the passion and prejudices of judges and jurors; prejudices that are 
'concealed, publicly unscrutinized, uncommunicated ... secret, unconscious, private, 
idiosyncratic. '127 Cohen, on the other hand, opposes not only Frank's account of 
judicial predictability, but he also dissents from the antbropologism which 
characterizes the early Uewellyn's approach. 'Actual experience does reveal,' he 
writes, 'a significant lxxly of predictable uniformity in the behaviour of courts. Law 
is not a mass of unrelated decisions nor a product of judicial bellyaches.'l28 The 
unpredictability argument, according to Cohen, arises from an antbropologism 
which is misguided in its emphasis on individual personality. The assumed privacy 
ignores the fundamental condition of human existence. An anthropocentrist notion 
of decision-making, therefore, cannot be accommodated with the assumptions of 
realism. 
A truly realistic theory of judicial decisions must conceive 
every decision as something more than an expression of 
individual personality, as concomitantly and even more 
importantly a function of social forces, that is to say, as a 
product of social determinants and an index of social 
consequences. A judicial decision is a social event. l29 
The private dissolved within the social, you would not expect the unruly, central to 
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the positions of both Llewellyn and Frank, to procure basis in Cohen's thinking. The 
unruly becomes equally central to Cohen's project. however, as he makes an 
exclusion of the unverifzable from the conceptual order of law the primary task of 
the realist enterprise. The concepts that are unverifiable are those 'which cannot be 
defined in terms of experience, and [yed from which all sorts of empirical decisions 
are supposed to follow.'l30 How exactly does the unverifiable elude the realm of the 
social, or of experience, while doing so is plainly out of the question for that which 
is private? Is the private simply reintroduced into the argument in the mode of the 
unverifiable? In fact, when Uewellyn (and Frank) emphasize 'the need of a more 
accurate description. of Is and not of Ought' in the studies of law.l31 that which 
transcends the domain of is is clearly equated with the private. Accordingly, for the 
inquiry to be pursued on the basis of a distinction between is and ought, apart from 
the initial choice, signifies no less than being kept 'as largely as possible 
uncontaminated by the desires of the observer or by what he wishes might be or 
thinks ought (ethically) to be.'132 The distinction is listed as one of the elements that 
form the 'common core' of realism,133 The telltale phraseology ('uncontaminated'), 
on the other hand, betrays the extent of the realist trouble stuck in the metaphysical 
mud it sets out to eliminate. 
The conceptual order that defines the traditional theory, according to Cohen, 
'serves only to obstruct the path of understanding with the pretense of 
knowledge.'134 Its knowledge is one of pretence, because it presupposes for its tools 
of inquiry a conceptual universe that is closed up in itself and yet at once eternally 
self-sufficient. It does not bear organic connections to either the realm of morals or 
that of experience. 'Jurisprudence, then, as an autonomous system of legal concepts, 
rules. and arguments, must be independent both of ethics and of such positive 
sciences as economics or psychology. In effect, it is a special branch of the science 
of transcendental nonsense.'135 Such supposedly unadorned concepts as corporate 
entity, property, contract, due process, malice, conspiracy, title, fair value, 
proximate cause, and so on, accordingly, often present themselves as open-ended 
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conundrums, simply because they purport to convey a fixed and verifiable content 
pertaining to the legal practice, while within the meaning of the transcendental 
principle that is pivotal to the system. in most cases they are invoked. what they 
factually correspond to is but a big void. In one example Cohen provides to 
illustrate the logic that encourages riddles in its effort to maintain the ideological 
front of the system. the particular riddle concerns the ascertaining of a corporate 
address so as to enable litigation against it.136 The corporation in the specific case 
holds an office in New York. where the litigant actually sought legal action. but is 
chartered in the State of Pennsylvania. As he reads the opinion of Justice Cardozo 
deliberating on the issue at the Appellate Court of New York State (at once 
considering an opinion by Justice Brandeis at the Supreme Court who pursues in a 
similar case an inquiry along the parallel lines137), Cohen remarks that the typical 
attitude in resolving the question is a consistent suppression of the extent of law's 
inability to provide an answer on the conceptual level, a realistic acknowledgement 
of which might mean the tackling of the conflict of interests involved on a head-on 
basis. Because the law's principled self-sufficiency is taken for granted. however. 
the traditional mentality is typically expressed in the question, 'Where is a 
corporation?' Both Cardozo and Brandeis go to great lengths in their deliberations 
on the subject to avoid doing the realistic thing. Whereas the question on which the 
entire inquiry is built instead 'is, in fact a question identical in metaphysical status 
with the question which scholastic theologians are supposed to have argued at great 
length, 'How many angels can stand on the point of a needle?"138 Given that the 
question of the personality of the foetus in the ongoing debate over abortion is very 
much in the same mode of inquiry,139 Cohen's point seems as topical today as it was 
in the heyday of the American realism. But is he being perhaps unrealistically 
optimistic? Is, perhaps. the breakthrough he evidently anticipates following a 
realistic acknowledgement of incapacity rather hasty? What if the traditional 
muddle on the conceptual level reflects a factual confusion (in some cases at least. 
such as in the personality of the foetus) over what should stand as law? Does the 
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realistic acknowledgement of a gap, instead of a pretend puzzle-solving, not 
presuppose a formal concept of law where the problem tackled does not invite 
immediate controversy? Does the whole issue of verification not centre around the 
meaning attributed to the question 'Where is a corporation?' Is the question not read 
in a distinctly formal way? Is its suspected verifiability not to do with the fact that 
its rhetorical character is suppressed? Is that suppressing perhaps revelatory of the 
nature of the entire argument regarding the unverifiable, in that the elusiveness of 
the relationship between the word and what it is about (its other) is wildly 
underrated to be reduced to a photographic correspondence? As with the question 
'Where is a corporation,' would one not have to refuse the mediation of the 
attachments in place, before one were to declare nonsensical the scholastic 
argument? And would that be realistic? As I have already discussed it, a 
verifiability which would have to transcend the criteria of fraternal attachments and 
seek instead 'firmer,' as it were, ground, would fail not only the angels on a 
needlepoint, but also what Cohen would presumably consider the very epitome of 
verifiability, namely the mathematical or pictorial reality.l40 
In expounding the verificationist principle, Cohen calls in such diverse names as 
Pierce, James, Russell, Wittgenstein ('the protagonist of logical positivism'), and 
Camap, who do not always agree with one another's views, but who 'in one 
fundamental respect... assume an identical position. This is currently expressed in 
the sentence, 'A thing is what it does. II 141 It is dubious that Russell and Camap 
would readily give their blessing to Cohen's formulation. Doubtless, however, the 
two do receive their share of say in the combined enterprise. 'Any word that cannot 
pay up in the currency of fact, upon demand,' writes Cohen, 'is to be declared 
bankrupt, and we are to have no further dealings with it.'142 The tension between the 
two themes, one pragmatist (use),143 one verificationist (truth), is hardly the kind to 
be suppressed. '[I]nstead of assuming hidden causes or transcendental principles 
behind everything we see or do,' he notes, 'we are to redefine the concepts of 
abstract thought as constructs, or functions, or complexes, or patterns, or 
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arrangements, of the things that we do actually see or do. All concepts that cannot 
be defined in terms of the elements of actual experience are meaningless.'l44 Surely, 
the two sentences cancel each other out. If there are to be concepts outside 
experience, albeit 'meaningless,' then the transcendentality ascribed to the traditional 
theory is not excluded but invoked (as it is in the Tractatus in the case of logic, God, 
ethics, and aesthetics145 - the part of the work, according to Wittgenstein, that is 
'unwritten: yet more significantl46). And conversely, the concepts of the traditional 
theory are busy concepts. The idea that certain concepts elude experience for they 
do not do what they promise is fallacious, because the process is the other way 
around: as we are reminded of it by none other than Cohen himself, concepts do not 
make promises in an abstract manner, but they are what they do. Yet their 
operational capability is not on the basis of experience, Cohen objects, but on the 
basis of/aith. The traditional concepts 'do not have a verifiable existence except to 
the eyes of faith.'147 The faith metaphor has performed a key part in the present 
study. Its employment by Cohen only completes the pattern. What his argument 
does in distinguishing between verificationism and faith is to appeal in the former 
term to an order which transcends the attachments 0/ a world fraternity, the 
primordial human condition, resulting in a brand of metaphysics which he would 
otherwise like to attribute to the traditional theory. The idea of a higher order, the 
hallmark of the traditional theory, in fact proliferates in Cohen's argument. 
'Intellectual clarity requires: he notes, 'that we carefully distinguish between the 
problems of (1) objective description, and (2) critical judgement, which classical 
jurisprudence lumps under the same phrase. '148 Far from violating the distinction, I 
have already quoted Cohen pointing out a non-grammatical dichotomy between the 
descriptive and the prescriptive as a fundamental character of the traditional 
theory.149 Accordingly, what defines the rules of law first and foremost is an 
objective quality that is unpenetrable by either the dictates of ethics or scientific 
data. The ought terms do not automatically enter the 'is' castle of the law for just 
being commendable, but require the gate-keeping consent of the legislator. In 
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contrast to the natural law positions, a dichotomy of is and oUght has always been 
the undeniable feature of formalism. I noted above the equation Llewellyn and 
Frank establish between the ought tenn and that which is private. ISO In a further 
reproduction of the concept of a higher order Cohen comes to affinn what he 
originally tenns a pretension of the traditional theory, as he posits a dispassionate 
discourse in the studies of law. 'The realistic lawyer,' he writes, 'when he attempts to 
discover how courts are actually dealing with certain situations, will seek to rise 
above his own moral bias and to discount the moral bias of the author whose treatise 
he consults.'151 The unruly is thereby named the passionate. And individual passion 
designated as dispensable, the individual is conferred upon a split constitution, the 
non-passionate, non-moral, non-dispensable half of which in tum signifying her 
higher being. As Cohen ends up dissolving his own dissolution of the dichotomy 
between the social and the private, the anthropologism of Frank and Llewellyn 
earlier refuted becomes reinstated. 
A verificationist criticism of the conceptual order of the traditional theory has 
been central to the writings of the Scandinavian realists.152 In a dissolution of the 
dichotomy between positivism and natural law theory, HagerstrOm reverses the 
peripheral position of the latter by pointing out what he terms the 'natural law 
notions' that underlie the conceptual order of positivism.153 In the introductory 
chapter of his work on the Roman concept of obligation,l54 Hagerstr6m draws 
attention to the vulnerability of notions such as right, duty, and will, to a critical 
probing. He ventures to find out whether the particular concept signifies anything 
that is essential to it in the face of varying instances of its use within the system, a 
paradigmatically verificationist approach whose repudiation in the later work of 
Wittgenstein I have already mentioned - the idea of family resemblances.155 
Family resemblances, as a notion that is the basis of the elusive relationship 
between the word and its other, yields to the idea of the grammar of the particular 
word, as opposed to the presupposition of pictorial correspondence between the 
word and that which it is about. A pictorial correspondence, rather than the 
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grammar, forms the object of Hagerstr6m's search in his investigation of the 
conceptual order of formalism, as he declares the lack of a common element in 
different instances of a legal concept at the heart of legal discontinuity. Concepts 
such as the right of property, personal right, and legal duty do not correspond to 
facts in reality.l56 '[T]he insuperable difficulty,' he writes, 'in finding the facts which 
correspond to our ideas of such rights forces us to suppose that there are no such 
facts and that we are here concerned with ideas which have nothing to do with 
reality.'157 As with Cohen, the Hiigerstr6mian realism invokes transcendentalism in 
its notion of non-real ideas rather than exclude it. The latter, however, offers a 
formulation which is not dissimilar in its accommodation of the transcendental to 
that of the early Wittgenstein. As the non-reality of the concept of duty is added to 
that of rights, Hagerstr6m notes that 'we are inevitably led to the view that the 
notion of legal duty cannot be defined by reference to any fact, but has a mystical 
basis, as is the case with right.'l58 That the 'traditional ideas of mystical forces and 
bonds' are the place where the 'roots' of the concepts of law are to be sought159 
constitutes the celebrated thesis of Hagerstr6m's legal work. The significance of an 
enlightened study of Roman law, in turn, derives from the fact that in Roman law 
'we may expect to find the ideas [prevalent today] presenting themselves in a more 
naive form.'l60 In other words, concepts prevalent today are defined by a semantic 
continuity, a promise, which transcends the contemporary, historical, usage. Is the 
very Hagerstr6mian project of magic-busting not made possible by a concept that 
itself sounds oddly magical? 
That words make promises which they sometimes cannot keep dominates equally 
the writings of Lundstedt and Olivecrona. According to Lundstedt, 'all the 
conceptions of legal ideology are metaphysical.'161 Amongst the words he suggests 
'not be used even as terms or labels' (meaning not be used even figuratively?) are 
justice, right, duty, wrong, wrongful, lawful, obligation, legal relationship, fault, 
guilt, claim, and demand.162 'But I think it will be impossible: he adds with regret, 
'in the common practice of law ... to eradicate them.'163 The project for eliminating 
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the concepts of the traditional theory is justified on the basis of a distinction 
between 'value judgements.' which lack an empirical context. and 'proper 
judgements.' which are of scientific value. l64 Closer to the fonnulation of the early 
Wittgenstein. value judgements are designated. not as nonsensical (as Cohen so 
deems following a vulgar version of logical positivism). but as 'neither true nor 
Ja/se.'165 They emanate from the 'feeling' one has of a thing. and are. in this respect. 
unverifiable. l66 While proper judgements are based on 'the thing itself in an 
unmediated manner and qualify to be the subject of scientific interest. 167 Lundstedt 
divides the judgements of value which fonn the entire conceptual order of 
jurisprudence into three categories. namely those of ought. guilt. and justice. all 
three being the expressions of personal emotions about reality. rather than reality 
itself.l68 Consequently. all judgements of value are subjective. 'For only that is 
objective which can be determined independently of our feelings.' 169 The 
transcendentalism which vacuum-packs. as it were, the Hagerstromian concepts to 
survive the sensory is reproduced by Lundstedt as he defines the personal in tenns 
of a privacy. In turn. the undeniable metaphysics of a dichotomy between the 
personal and the proper makes conceivable his own anti-metaphysical stance. 
A milder form of verificationism characterizes Olivecrona's work. as a view of 
language somewhat similar to that of J.L. Austin is at once POSited. 170 In that 
respect, his approach is comparable to that of Cohen in its blend of pragmatist and 
logical positivist themes. l7l Olivecrona distinguishes between descriptive and 
directive uses of language without. however. the tension which defines Austin's 
distinction of constatives and perfonnatives.172 While descriptive instances of 
language correspond to fact-situations of reality in an austere manner, directive 
instances do not signify a content that is factually analyzeable; they 'actually denote 
nothing, not even imaginary entities.'}73 The words in directive uses of language are 
'hollow' for they are no more than code-marks which represent nothing as such, but 
which serve in certain combinations as 'points of reference' for performances that 
are established and operational within the habitual life of a community.174 The 
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language of law, according to Olivecrona, must be understood as a medium of 
perfonnatives. 
Legal language is not a descriptive language. It is a directive, 
influential language serving as an instrument of social control. 
The 'hollow' words are like sign-posts with which people have 
been taught to associate ideas concerning their own behaviour 
and that of others. 175 
Olivecrona's distinction lacks the tension in Austin's fonnulation as it leaves 
unaccounted for a whole range of directive (perfonnative) presuppositions required 
in order to draw a distinction between the descriptive and directive instances of 
language in the first place. The expression 'I end my case,' in one example Austin 
provides,176 may be designated as a directive instance in the sense of perfonning a 
ritual action, a habit, or it may be designated as a descriptive instance whose content 
can be factually analyzed. A local combination of doings is, in each case, even 
when it is not immediately detectable as in the present example, required 
beforehand, to ascertain whether the expression is (1) an abstract promise, a picture, 
whose content mayor may not overlap with what it claims to depict, of independent 
reality, (and therefore true or false); or whether it is merely (2) a doing to be 
understood on its own tenns (and to which a verifiability test, of the non-
grammatical kind, is irrelevant). The hollowness, in other words, is a general 
quality of language which makes conceivable a grammatical dichotomy of 
descriptive and directive in the first place. 'Taught-to-associate' is an attribute, not 
only of legal language, as Olivecrona would have us believe, but of language 
generally. 1 n 
As he disregards the primordiality of stage-setting not only for the directives, but 
also for the descriptives,178 Olivecrona misses out on two significant consequences. 
First, even though a dichotomy between the two may have a grammatical validity, 
or a practical use, the primordially directive quality of language signifies that the 
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sole guarantee for the continuity of the dichotomy in the specific case is the criteria, 
the mise en scene, concerned. The very descriptive, just as the ambivalent statement 
of 'I end my case,' therefore, cannot be decided with the finality which 
verificationism aims to secure for statements as a condition of validity.179 When 
Olivecrona notes that 'the word 'right', as used in jurisprudence as well as in 
common discourse, lacks semantic reference. It does not even denote something 
existing in imagination only,'l80 he assumes a radical dichotomy between the 
semantic operations of the word 'right' and, for instance, the word 'chair.' The word 
'right,' does not baptize, to use Wittgenstein's expression,181 a fixed entity the way 
the word 'chair' does. The relation of the latter word to its other (i.e. what it is 
about), accordingly, typifies the relationship of truth that can be resolved with 
finality. The second consequence of the primordiality of stage-setting is the 
forestructured quality of judgement. Because Olivecrona attributes stage-setting as a 
prerequisite exclusively to the directive instances of language, thereby ignoring the 
primoridally attached character of experience, what he observes in the absence of 
rules as formal constraints is a state of anything goes - the most fundamental 
assumption of formalism which he would otherwise have nothing to do with. 
In a review... Alf Ross reproaches me for paying so little 
attention to the statements of Radbruch and Kelsen on the so-
called 'will'. He defends their use of the term 'will' as a means 
of 'figuratively personifying the systematic unity of the legal 
order'. In his view it serves to emphasize that the legal order 
is 'an order, a unity, and not only a conglomerate of rules'. 
I cannot agree with this opinion. Think of the English 
common law. Is it anything but a conglomerate of rules? As 
everybody knows the precedents are subject to many different 
interpretations. It seems to be not only useless, but highly 
misleading, to ascribe a fictitious unity to the mass of 
precedents by means of the figurative talk of a Will. 182 
The dichotomy between the real and the figurative features also when he, in another 
219 
context, objects to Ross for contending that 'the words are tools for presenting, in a 
simplified manner, underlying rules about the use of force.'183 In ascertaining the 
significance of concepts such as right and duty, accordingly, Ross puts the 
figurative before the real. While, for Olivecrona, 'the role of such words as 'right' 
and 'duty' has to be explained in a realistic way.'l84 Furthermore, he detects in Ross' 
reasoning a combination of two distinct positions 'that cannot be reconciled. '185 On 
the one hand, he explains, Ross holds (a) that a word such as 'right' labels no 
definite entity, it corresponds to no fact; yet, on the other hand, he also claims (b) 
that statements of rights may refer to situations that are rea1. 186 It would be 
minimizing the extent of frustration on Olivecrona's part to note simply that he fails 
to appreciate how absurd it would be to try and hold, of a word that is in circulation, 
one of what he considers to be two distinct positions on the relation of the word to 
that which it is about, while refusing the other. That the word 'chair' does not make 
a promise in an abstract manner, namely the statement in (a), by no means amounts 
to conceding that it does not refer to real situations. On the contrary, the word 'chair' 
has an operational capability in the first place, because it does not primordially 
'baptize' an entity. Besides, in formulating the directive character of legal language 
Olivecrona himself adopts the 'two positions' at once. The descriptive instances of 
language make promises that are verifiable. The directive instances, on the other 
hand, are 'hollow' in that, lacking an empirical content, they serve merely as code-
marks 'taught to associate,' as he puts its,I87 with real situations. Even as he points 
out Ross' so-called contradiction, in that very context, he fails to make sense what 
exactly he means by a dichotomy of the real and the figurative. Since he clearly 
affirms the proposition in (a) (or almost so, for he subscribes to a picture theory of 
signification in the case of descriptives) , one assumes that he rejects the one in (b), 
namely that the statements of rights refer to actual situations. The fact that he 
acknowledges then and there, however, that the word right 'is constantly used to 
convey information... in such manner as to imply that the word has got some 
semantic reference,'l88 makes it difficult to infer that he (always) does reject the 
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proposition in (b).189 'There seems to be a dilemma,' he then notices the 
predicament.l90 And he attempts to resolve it by synchronizing the 'hollow' 
statements of rights with the attached, as opposed to free-floating. quality of 
experience (earlier refuted in the English caseI91): as a habitual event in one's social 
being. rights 'are to us as real as horses and dogs. '192 The staged character of life 
ensures the reality of rights eventually, while failing, for some inexplicable reason. 
to confer upon the English law a unity and order. 
2.4.3 Following a Rule 
According to Ross. on the other hand. the staged quality of experience resists a non-
grammatical dichotomy of descriptives and perfonnatives.193 That the criteria 
experience provides are constitutive of understanding (and of, therefore. 
interpretation and judgement). in tum. redefines the wayward quality of 
perfonnatives. as opposed to the tamed character of descriptives. to exclude a 
notion of privacy. and thereby the idea of a free-wheeling practice. suggested by 
Olivecrona and other writers in the absence of rules as fonnal constraints. Ross 
challenges the verificationism that is almost the distinctive seal of his generation of 
realists in terms of the plausibility of its concept of pictorial correspondence as a 
condition of validity. and questions the notion that a dual feature. descriptive 
(verifiable) and performative (non-verifiable). defines language in its different 
instances. l94 'Many delusions and illusory problems of metaphysical philosophy,' he 
writes. 'spring from the ~ l i e f f that words represent objectively given concepts or 
ideas. whose meaning philosophy should discover and define. '195 The questions that 
typify metaphysical inquiry in its classical mode often concern the reference of 
notions such as truth. beauty. and goodness. l96 A word such as 'table.' however. may 
be equally subject to the same fallacious logic with the presupposition that, as a 
COf'cept. the word 'table' is marked by a fixed, abstract promise - a promise 
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transcends its uses. 'What does the word 'table' signify in English?' Ross asks.197 
What it signifies. according to him. is the elusive. yet dictating. grammar it displays 
in a good deal of utterances in which it lends use. Questions about the true reference 
of the word irrespective of its performance in the particular usage. on the other 
hand. exemplifying the customary logic of metaphysical inquiry. hardly form a 
realistic objective. 'There is ... no point in inquiring what a table 'really is."198 The 
grammar of the word designated as the basis of the relationship between the word 
and that which it is about. not surprisingly. Ross is aitical of writers such as 
Lundstedt and Olivecrona for overlooking the primordiality of the figurative. As 
with Olivecrona. he points out behind the reasoning of Duguit and Lundstedt in 
refuting the reality of the concept of rightl99 'the naive idea that a word has an 
immanent meaning that cannot be changed.'200 As the word is expected to perform 
one invariable promise which, in Wittgenstein's word, it is 'shadowed' with at all 
times.201 irrespective of its different instances, both Duguit and Lundstedt declare 
the word non-real when it fails to feature one essential element that is common in 
all its uses. The question. according to Ross, on the other hand. that is the key to a 
true appreciation of the reality of the word is 'to ask what is characteristic of the 
situations designated as 'rights."202 The figurative reality (the only reality there is) of 
the word is completely missed out on by both writers. 
Neither author offers an analysis from this point of view. 
Neither of them is aware of the value of the concept as a tool 
of presentation. nor of the various legal relations that can be 
distinguished in a situation of rights. It is paradoxical that 
these ardent denouncers of the metaphysical ideas involved in 
the C<?ncept of rights uncritically accept the idea of the right 
as a single and undivided entity - although this very idea is 
the most palpable precipitate of the banned metaphysics.203 
It is not difficult to see how the 'banned metaphysics' pops back into the realist 
argument. As I have stated repeatedly. realism has as its sole rationale the absurdity 
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of fonnalism in its claim mechanically and sufficiently to manipulate practice. The 
attached quality of practice is therefore invoked by realism. and the fonnalist 
dichotomy between the law and its readings is repudiated. The repudiation. 
however. is confined within a hunch. as it were. in the pre-departure stage of the 
realist argument where it is hardly carefully thought out to assert itself in later 
stages. Not surprisingly. the dichotomy is reintroduced as realism goes on to 
emphasize individual readings of the law by the judge in a clear opposition to a 
fonnal concept of law. Law is thereby bestowed on a detached existence in the face 
of its practice. and fonnalism is restored to its status as a possibility rather than an 
absurd project The manipulative capability of fonnalism conceded. the attached. 
and at once dictating. quality of practice leaves its place to a concept of practice that 
free-floats in the absence of fonnal guidelines. The binary opposition of rules and 
practice. in turn. is reproduced in the verificationist argument between the word and 
its other where the word does not suggest a one-to-one correspondence with that 
which it is about: lacking an immanent meaning. what the word gives rise to by way 
of reference is a state of anything goes. While Ross observes the metamorphic 
tension within each one of the binary oppositions. Just as descriptives and 
perfonnatives are redefined as mere extensions of a generalized category of 
perfonnatives. namely the staged quality of experience; the staged quality of 
experience as a generalized category of individual readings. at once. redraws the 
opposition between the law and its readings. The typically deconstructive. to use 
Denida's word. displacement and the transfigurational effect the redrawing 
achieves. Ross describes as 'like looking down the endless vista of parallel 
mirrors. '204 The opposition. of the law (validity) and its readings (fact). so very 
essential to the rhetoric of both formalism and realism. will not hold. for 
whether we take our point of departure in the historical acts 
by which the law came into existence or in the historical acts 
by which it was applied. the thesis will in both cases land us 
in the antithesis. The consideration of it as a fact will 
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necessarily change into a consideration of it as validity, and 
the reverse.20S 
I mentioned above the minimal rule-formalism invoked even by the most rule-
sceptical of the realist positions: where the binding force and sufficiency of rules are 
refuted, leaving unaccounted for the evident force and sufficiency of rules at least in 
assigning the interpreter constitutes a fonnidable predicament on the realist part.206 
The 'experiences of validity,' as the staged, attached, and attaching, quality of 
practice, on the basis of which Ross dissolves the dichotomy between validity and 
fact. resolves the realist paradox by accounting for rule-following as a 
fundamentally attached enterprise: just as reading is in each case reading 
figuratively, insofar as a generalized category of performatives always precedes that 
which is grammatically descriptive or perfonnative; that which is read in rule-
reading is none other than the elusive, uncircumscribeable dictates of experience, 
sometimes temporarily settled - an event in which the formal existence of the rule 
takes no essential part. "The principle of dissolution,' writes Ross ' ... consists in 
introducing. instead of 'validity' in the sense of a category radically discrepant from 
reality, the experiences of validity (in the sense of certain actual behaviour attitudes) 
underlying this rationalisation and symbolised by it. '207 Ross elucidates his concept 
to leave out a crude behaviouralism. As he puts it, 'a tenable interpretation of the 
validity of the law is possible only by a synthesis of psychological and 
behaviouristic views. '208 The psychological dimension highlights the role of 
individual motivation. Yet it carefully avoids a conception of privacy that 
traditionally underlies the ideas of individual motivation; 'in his spiritual life, ' notes 
Ross, 'the judge is g o v e r n ~ ~ and motivated by a normative ideology of a known 
content.'209 Despite the considerable barrier of terminology and method between the 
two authors, the similarity of Ross' solution on the matter of rule-following to that 
of Wittgenstein. a much debated aspect of the latter's work,210 is striking. 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be 
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determined by a rule, because every course of action can be 
made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if 
everything can be made out to accord with the rule. then it 
can also be made out to conflict with it And so there would 
be neither accord nor conflict here.211 
Indeed. the word paradox is the key to the emerging pattern in that the contradiction 
it refers to simply reiterates the paradox Olivecrona detects in Ross' argument for a 
figurative concept of language: the word 'right' corresponds to no fact, yet its 
reference may be at once as real and finn as that of the word 'chair' - 'two 
propositions,' according to Olivecrona. 'that cannot be reconciled.'212 The relation of 
the word to that which it is about. Olivecrona assumes to be an immanent one: the 
word is defined by a promise that is abstract but that is at once factually 
analyzeable. The assumption which brings about the paradox in following a rule. 
likewise. characterizes the relationship between the rule and that which accords with 
it as immanent. 
In The Blue and Brown Books. Wittgenstein distinguishes 'being in accordance 
with a rule' from 'involving a rule.'213 Asked to square the numbers in the row 1. 2. 
3. and 4, one is likely to come up with the answer 1. 4. 9. and 16. This is what 
obeying a rule is. The game performed. however. is less one that intrinsically 
involves a rule. than one that is merely in accordance with it. '[B]ut it obviously is 
also in accordance with any number of other rules; and amongst these it is not more 
in accordance with one than with another.'214 Producing the row 1. 4. 9. and 16. 
after the row 1. 2. 3. and 4. does not suggest an essential involvement on the part of 
the rule of squaring, for some other regularity that is attributable to the order 
" between the numbers in the.first row might well have been repeated in the particular 
case to work out the second row. which happens also to conform to the rule of 
squaring. Even if the mode of calculation that 'belongs' to the rule of squaring was 
used to produce the second row (namely. 1xt. 2x2. 3x3. 4x4). it would still not 
signify an intrinsic involvement on the part of the rule. An altogether different rule 
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held in the privacy of mind, as it were, of the calculator, might have dictated a 
calculation similar to that in the rule of squaring up to number 4 (where our row 
ends), after which, however, an entirely different mode, such as 5+5, 6+6, and so 
on, might have to be adopted. 'We shall say that the rule is involved,' draws the 
conclusion Wittgenstein, 'in the understanding, obeying, etc., if, as I should like to 
express it, the symbol of the rule forms part of the calculation. (As we are not 
interested in where the process of thinking, calculating, take place, we can for our 
purpose imagine the calculations being done entirely on paper. We are not 
concerned with the difference: internal, extema1.)'215 Clearly, the idea of the 
involvement of the rule counts on an intentional, 'internal,' argument, namely rule-
follOwing as a private experience.216 The difficulties the privacy argument raises, in 
tum, are far greater than those of the so-called paradox of rule-following on the 
basis of the 'symbol of the rule,' namely its common criteria. The choice, to be more 
exact, is not between two arguments to eliminate the more problematic. Rather, 
within the concept of the predicament of other minds the traditional argument yields 
to, the acquisition and performance of the game rule-following cease to be 
possibilities in the first place. 
The third formulation of the paradox, which completes the pattern, is one with 
which the present chapter commenced, namely that of the generality of law which 
de Man reads in Rousseau's Social Contract.217 Law survives as a force in history so 
long as it negates history. "The indifference of the text with regard to its referential 
meaning,' writes de Man, 'is what allows the legal text to proliferate ... '218 That it 
forms on aporia on the part of the law that is irreconcilable, however, is an idea 
which misses the fact that .the negation at issue is more exactly an affirmation of 
history. The ineluctable affirmation of experience precludes a distinction of the text 
and its interpretations not only for the text of law, but it is what makes language as 
a medium conceivable in the first place. The fundamental assumption entertained by 
the paratJoxiclJl view of law (that of de Man, beside others, even though he would 
wish to disassociate from the assumption), on thl other hand, is a diChotomy 
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between the meaning of the text and the meaning that is read into it. In fact, where 
Wittgenstein states the paradox, he also points out the dichotomy the paradox 
presupposes between the rule and its interpretation, a paragraph that elucidates his 
actual stance beyond reasonable doubt, yet somehow omitted in the grand 
controversy surrounding his notion of rule-following.219 'Hence there is an 
inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation,' he notes 
after relating the paradox. 'But we ought to restrict the term 'interpretation' to the 
substitution of one expression of the rule for another. '220 The rule, in other words, is 
not a term privileged, as it were, over its interpretations. It does not possess a 
quality that transcends its individual readings. Conflict and accord do not exist as 
fixed, permanently settled, essential states in the application of the rule, because the 
rule as a fixed, permanently settled, essential state is not a possibility of language. 
The paradox arises because a pictorial, as opposed to figurative, view of validity 
assumed makes compliance on the part of the particular action a relation that is 
intrinsic to the rule. Yet, rule-following is a game performed and recognizable 
precisely because there is no immanent relationship between the rule and that which 
accords with it. That the rule is in each case that which it is made of, namely its 
interpretations, however, by no means amounts to a state of anything goes which the 
formal ideas of validity presuppose in the absence of an immanent concept of rule-
following; 'a person goes by a sign-post,' notes Wittgenstein, 'only in so far as there 
exits a regular use of sign-posts, a custom. '221 The freakish as an interpretative 
possibility cannot be entertained unless the attached quality of understanding is 
suppressed. 'Interpretations by themselves,' writes Wittgenstein, 'do not determine 
meaning.'222 My reaction .. to the sign-post will in no instance be a detached 
interpretation of a sign which I come upon; on the contrary, 'I have been trained to 
react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. '223 It would be 
inconceivable for someone to interpret the sign-post in a private, detached way.224 
Just as the rule in the fonnal sense is not a possibility of language, on the contrary, 
language is possible p n . ' ~ i s e l y y because its perfonnances are not fonnally confined; 
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nor does meaning associated with the rule equal the personal whim of the 
interpreter. It will never be so, even though the particular interpretation may not 
always be consented by all. And just as consent regarding the action does not stem 
from a source that is fixed and permanently settled, namely the rule. nor is consent 
to be understood in the mode of a formal, public approval. Consent, according to 
Wittgenstein, is in forms of life. the fraternities, whose paths often uncomfortably 
cross that of one another, but yet even the crossing forms of life are capable of 
fitting into one greater form of life - best reflected in language as a common 
medium. 
240. Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians. 
say) over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. 
People don't come to blows over it, for example. That is part 
of the framework on which the working of our language is 
based (for example. in giving descriptions). 
241. 'So you are saying that human agreement decides 
what is true and what is false?' - It is what human beings say 
that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. 
That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. 
242. If language is to be a means of communication there 
must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as 
this may sound) in judgements. This seems to abolish logic. 
but does not do SO.225 
The primordial hermeneutic condition Wittgenstein points out seems to elude the 
positions of both formalism and realism. The traditional theory conceives the 
delivery of justice within ~ e e meaning of a dichotomy between government by rules 
and government by men. t.:feaning. accordingly, is vested in the rule. The absence 
of rules as formal constraints. on the other hand. signifies the reign of the 
interpreter.226 Classical formalism. therefore, oscillates between the two sources 
where, according to Wittgenstein, meaning will be sought only in vain. Realism. in 
this respect. mimics the traditional theory to perfection. Formalism is emphasized to 
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be a possibility of language as it constitutes a working alternative to realism. The 
formal concept is acknowledged not only in this negative sense, namely that it may 
impede a more realistic solution in actual decision-making. but also in a positive 
sense, in that a minimal rule-fonnalism is consistently left unaccounted for by 
realism. Where the rule as the source of meaning has neither a constraining 
capability nor sufficiency, on the other hand, realism entrusts the interpreter with 
the meaning. Even when the interpreter is thought not to be detached (as with 
Llewellyn's craft>, the formalist tenet is affinned on the basis of a muted 
epistemology that it could possibly be otherwise - not at all 'muted' in the case of 
the so-called hazards professed by realists to be involved in· fonnalist readings. 
'This seems to abolish logic,' is how Wittgenstein points out yet another paradox -
one which follows from the primordiality of consent. The logic it abolishes is none 
other than that of the Cartesian (non-)fratemity whose concept within the 
framework of a non-grammatical dichotomy between the text and the interpreter 
.confers on each term a suprasensible identity. Hence, the mutual exclusion between 
the text and the interpreter, and more significantly. the preclusion of consent within 
the community of interpreters. 
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Conclusion: The Same and the Similar 
The oscillation between the text and the interpreter. which is constitutive of 
realistic, as well as more traditional, legal positions, and yet which. according to 
Wittgenstein, misses out on the true locus of meaning, namely the elusive, 
uncircumscribeable house of life-form(s).l equally underlies what may be termed 
after the Dostoyevskean character a Kirilov complex in recent theory. 'If there is no 
god. then I am a god.'2 The appeals in the past decade to a Kirilov-like reasoning by 
otherwise unanchored names such as Sanford Levinsonl and Mark: Kelman,4 the 
latter. notably, representing the attitude of a group of writers with an unmistakable 
style. induced impassioned debates over a growing rhetoric of nihilism in legal 
theory.5 One writer. Owen Fiss, designates the 'new nihilism' which recognizes the 
absolute reign of the interpreter where the law is in each instance an interpretation 
of itself as 'the deepest and darkest of all nihilisms.'6 Another writer questions the 
integrity of the jurists who hold nihilistic views about law but who are at once 
professionally engaged in its teaching.7 
In the essay where he invokes a 'Nietzschean interpreter,' Levinson states: 'I 
increasingly find it impossible to imagine any other way of making· sense of our 
own constitutional universe. '8 In that universe. accordingly, the interpreter reads the 
text of the Constitution in each case in terms of his own experience, thereby a 
generally valid vocabulary of the 'correct' and the 'wrong' to designate particular 
instances of reading being rendered impossible. (The telltale· phraseology Levinson 
employs to describe that which he deems anticipated in a possible concept of a 
critical vocabulary is the 'knowability of constitutional essence. '9) As an 
epistemological privacy clearly marks Levinson's Nietzschean interpreter, the 
circularity Nietzsche seeks to express as the defining character of the act of reading 
is in fact pre-empted; 'man finds in things,' as Levinson quotes him, 'nothing but 
what he himself has imported into them.'lO In Ecce Homo, when accounting for the 
less than exuberant reception of his own work, Nietzsche once again posits the 
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circularity of understanding as a primordial condition. 'Ultimately,' he writes, 'no 
one can extract from things, books included, more than he already knows. What one 
has no access to through experience one has no ear for.'ll And that is so quite 
literally. Elsewhere Nietzsche defines the very act of hearing in tenns of a 
circularity.12 One can only hear that which one has already heard.13 'When we hear 
a foreign language,' he explains, 'we involuntarily attempt to form the sounds we 
hear into words which have a more familiar and homely ring: thus the Germans, for 
example, once heard arcubalista and adapted it into Armbrust.'14 Unlike the 
apparent idiosyncrasy of Levinson's Nietzschean judge, Nietzsche himself points 
out the staged quality of experiencelS in the very context he relates the circularity of 
hearing; at bottom, 'one is much more of an artist than one realizes.'16 That one's 
hearing is in each case a rehearsed hearing, rather than private, is merely to 
rephrase the idea of circularity. The 'uncommon' does not exist. It is hard to see how 
one could maintain a hermeneutic circularity as a primordial condition if one were 
at once to hold the view of the privacy of the interpreter, namely the view of the 
subjective, subject-centred, quality of what the interpreter might import into that 
which he interprets. That is because it is precisely the idea of privacy that offers the 
unique access to an order that is higher than that of senses; elevated above 
experience, the interpreter will be in a position to transcend the dictates of his own 
experience, rather than necessarily be confined within that domain.17 
The Nietzschean repudiation of the notion of a high order18 is read by Levinson 
as the order of the interpreter exactly the way Kirilov infers in the absence of a 
received, all-present, order the absolute reign of the subject. The oscillation between 
the two orders, once more, excludes that whose suppression, paradoxically, 
Nietzsche equates with nihilistic values,19 namely the order of life - as with 
Wittgenstein, the true locus of meaning. That which underlies the idea of the order 
of the interpreter, Nietzsche in fact designates as 'the hyperbolic naivete of man: 
positing himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things.'20 Man's status 
as the criterion of values21 is dependent on a constant negation of the fraternal, 
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attached, condition which he is in. Nihilism is a negation of existence-as-it-is for a 
mode of it that is not 22 Levinson's negation of experience as will to power, in 
Nietzschean terms, is for a formal concept of it fjust as the ultimate negation by 
K.irilov, namely his suicide,23 is a testament to the concept of a high moral order 
that is in Dostoyevsky's head), a position he might otherwise like not to have 
anything to do with. Meaning is not a possibility unless within a formal mode of 
experience. That is to say, unless meaning, in exact opposition to Nietzsche's 
definition of it as will to power,204 which Levinson, again, cites.25 is the property of 
a thing. The mode of nihilism Levinson's writing displays, therefore, is not so much 
one which Nietzsche goes along with as one he despises for its nay-saying, life-
negating oscillation between the mutually exclusive realms of the subject and the 
object. 
In this respect, Fiss himself, who designates Levinson's approach as nihilistic. 
hardly eludes the nihilism whose distinctive seal is a negation of the order of life. 
What Fiss identifies the writings of Levinson, Brest. and the 'deconstructionists' 
with26 is not in fact dissimilar to what, according to Gerty, is a constituent of the 
'nucleus' of all historical-school-inspired ideas: the 'personal feeling' of the 
interpreter in the specific case supplants the formal authority of the law; a 
displacement whose hazardous ramifications Geny compares to the dangers 
immanent in the stagnancy of a formal concept of law.2' In rejecting the notion of 
law as a 'mechanical activity,' Fiss concurs with Geny.28 'Adjudication is 
interpretation,' as he puts it29 - swapping, just as Uewellyn before.30 the idea of an 
all-encompassing method, where the text ends, with that of interpretation. Agreeing 
with Geny, once more, Fiss·lays out. radical contrast of objectivity and subjectivity 
as the basis of interpretation;31 legal interpretation. accordingly. is a process that is 
relatively objective,12 for, though law is interpretative, it cannot be said to be 
interpretative the way literature is33 - law is organized-interpretative; it has its 
'disciplining rules' to set standards for it and an 'interpretive community' to enforce 
those rules;34 a quality Fiss, for some reason, denies literature.35 'Legal \ ~ x t s , ' ' he 
232 
notes in marking the difference, 'are prescriptive,' as opposed to the texts of 
literature (thus turning a semantic difficulty suggested by Levinson, and especially 
by the 'deconstructionists,' into one of whether or not to obey a text that is 
semantically unproblematic, i.e. 'prescriptive').36 The idea of the autonomy of the 
text abandoned through an interpretative notion of it to start with (a good indicator 
of the force of the trend even in the attempts to counter it) makes an ultimate return 
to Fiss' argument, therefore, when he has to distinguish between law and literature 
- a distinction that screams no to the idea of a generallY organized, dictating 
quality of experience, the Nietzschean life-energy,37 which is in fact what underlies 
the concept of interpretive communities as fonnulated by Fish38 (and Kuhn39) in the 
first place, borrowed by Fiss, and made simply a sad travesty of. The dichotomy 
between law and literature is that of the orders of the object and the subject. While 
the order of common experience (promised fleetingly in the notion of an 
interpretive community) is left entirely out of the event of signification. Fiss 
reproduces the very nihilism that marks Levinson's concept of interpretation - the 
only nihilism there is. 
According to Heidegger, however, Nietzsche's formulation of nihilism is not an 
altogether happy affair.40 If nihilism, an apparent negation of fraternal attachments, 
and of therefore the hermeneutic circularity, is what seems to underlie the 
traditional oscillation between the text and the reader, or between the object and the 
subject; Nietzsche's very doctrine of it goes on merely to reproduce the traditional 
polarity. First of all, the order of the object as a category that is radically distinct 
from the domain of the subject, namely as presence. is affirmed, as nihilism is 
defined in terms of values .. ~ l l Nietzsche's concept of nihilism, as it is laid out at the 
very outset of his notes in The Will to Power, where he elaborates it, is one of 
valuation. In nihilism, as he puts it, 'the highest values devaluate themselves.'42 The 
idea of a re-valuation is borne out of it, however, as, secondly, in a move that is 
characteristic of nihilism (as displayed by Levinson and Fiss), Nietzsche appears to 
perceive in the de-valuation that is nihilism t ; ~ " ! ! potentiality of a 'transition to new 
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conditions of existence: a transformation made conceivable through an essentially 
detached concept of the subject (a concept. again. shared by both Levinson and 
Fiss). 'Dissatisfaction. nihilism: writes Nietzsche. 'could be a good sign.'43 
Actually. every major growth is accompanied by a 
tremendous crumbling and passing away: suffering. the 
symptoms of decline belong in the times of tremendous 
advances; every fruitful and powerful movement of humanity 
has also created at the same time a nihilistic movement. It 
could be the sign of a crucial and most essential growth. of 
the transition to new conditions of existence. that the most 
extreme form of pessimism. genuine nihilism. would come 
into the world. This I have comprehended. 44 
The re-presencing that is the creation of 'new conditions of existence' is pursued on 
the basis of will to power. a mechanism. according to Heidegger. that mimics 
uncannily that of consciousness within the meaning of the Cartesian epistemology; 
it 'unfolds its pure powerfulness without restraint in man.'4S Heidegger points out 
what he calls an 'essential inner connection' between the positions of Descartes and 
Nietzsche.46 As a matter of fact. we have already recorded clues in this study as to 
the brand of metaphysics Nietzsche entertains. I mentioned just now the circularity 
he posits regarding the reception of his work.47 'What one has no access to through 
experience one has no ear for.'48 Clearly. however. Nietzsche's own experience. in 
the form of his work. evades the boundaries of common experience: circularity is so 
formulated as to leave Nietzsche himself out. That which is his. in other words. is 
the artefact of an experience that is radically discrepant from that of his own 
audience.49 The grand evasion that is the distinguishing mark of his work. however. 
is that of Christianity. which. again. I have already mentioned. 50 Just as that which 
is his escapes the sphere of common experience. the primordial transparency; 
Christianity eludes the primeval pagan condition to epitomize that which is formal 
or that which is not life; an evasion Qrle should hardly think to be possible within 
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the framework of what is undoubtedly the most significant consequence of his 
rhetoric as a whole, namely the ineluctability of the natural. In this respect, 
Nietzsche anticipates both Lyotard and Llewellyn, who, not accidentally, invest 
much in a dichotomy between the pagan and the formal, or between the natural and 
the prejudiced.51 Paradoxically, because the natural appears ultimately to require an 
active involvement on the part of man, as opposed to being simply ineluctable, the 
evasion becomes at once that of man. A prejudiced (i.e. consciouS52) transcendence, 
in a characteristic reversal, therefore, turns out to be the defining quality of that 
which is pagan, as well as that which is Christian (hence the eclecticism of the 
pagan primordiality and the Kantian transcendence in both Lyotard53 and [through 
Geny] Llewellyn54). Man's ultimate evasion, Heidegger points out, signifies 
Nietzsche's relation to Descartes in both positive and negative senses. 'We must 
grasp Nietzsche's philosophy,' he writes, 'as the metaphysics of subjectivity.'55 
Nietzsche adopts the concept of man as the subject in terms of the body - bodily 
drives and energy. What the subject redefined in terms of the world achieves, in 
turn, is that which the Cartesian subject, borne into a world that is still very much 
scholastic, as opposed to modem, fails to realize, namely 'absolute prominence 
among beings. '56 The notion of overman as paradigmatic of ultimate evasion, 
according to Heidegger, achieves just that. 'In that doctrine,' he writes, 'Descartes 
celebrates his supreme triumph. '57 Hence Nietzsche's paradoxical distance from the 
former's project; 'he turns against Descartes only because the latter still does not 
posit man as subiectum in a way that is complete and decisive enough. '58 While the 
Nietzschean evasion signifies in its completeness and certainty the very culmination 
of modem metaphysics, one whose distinctive feature is an essentially detached 
concept of man within a world of picture or view. 59 Heidegger declares the closure 
of Western metaphysics in the sense of its ultimate consummation, not surprisingly, 
in his reading of Nietzsche's doctrine of nihilism. 'As the fulfillment of modem 
metaphysics, Nietzsche's metaphysics is at the same time the fulfillment of Western 
metaphysics in general and is thus - in a correctly understood sense - the end of 
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metaphysics as such. '60 Nihilism. therefore. is a characteristic of modern 
metaphysics which engulfs. rather than elude. Nietzsche's own fonnulation of it. 61 
Nietzsche's concept of nihilism is itself nihilistic for it is a concept of presence in 
the mode of de-presencing. On the other hand. its potentiality as re-presencing. in 
the form of a 'transition to new conditions of existence.'62 sets a pattern to which. 
perversely. Heidegger himself owes the mode of re-presencing that forms the 
metalanguage of Being and Time. The connection Nietzsche establishes between 
what he calls 'the most extreme form of pessimism. genuine nihilism' and a 'most 
essential growth'63 is uncannily reproduced in Being and Time between anxiety and 
authenticity; with genuine anxiety '[e]veryday familiarity collapses.'64 and Dasein. 
There-being, man. becomes 'individualized.'65 Genuine scare makes one jump. as it 
were, out of the common. inauthentic. skin one wears ordinarily. 'This 
individualization brings Dasein back from its falling [a feature of the primordial 
ontological state in which man is lost. dissolved. in others and in his worldly 
concem66], and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are 
possibilities of its Being.'67 The dichotomy between authenticity and inauthenticity 
is that of the same and the similar; that which is similar in each case betrays, in both 
senses of the word, namely as both representation (disclosure. giving away) and 
misrepresentation (concealment. violation). that which it simulates, namely the 
(self)same. In a pattern set therefore by Nietzsche nihilism as nullifying pessimism 
and at once as transition. that is to say. nihilism as de-presencing and re-presencing. 
signifies a mode of presence anticipated in the concept of the same, the authentic. 
Nihilism as anxiety provides Heidegger in distinguishing between authenticity and 
inauthenticity with that which is other than simply more inauthenticity.68 That 
authenticity can be marked out on the basis of a frame of reference that is other than 
simply more inauthenticity, in turn. indicates Heidegger's own brand of nihilism. 
Simulation is betrayal in the sense of violation. Mimetic violation becomes the seal 
of modem times for Heidegger as he declares representation. the representlllio, in 
the celebrated lecture 'The Age of the World View,' as a modern concept that is a 
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consequence of. and on a par with. the concept of man as the subiectum.69 The 
obvious dichotomy presupposed by Heidegger between that which is and its 
representation. or between representation and misrepresentation. however. merely 
puts back into his argument. rather than repudiate. the idea of man as the subiectum 
- the genuine. the authentic. in Being and Time. Mimetic hostility affirms the idea 
of presence and therefore the evasion of man in the rhetoric of philosophy rather 
than avoid. or indicate an awareness of. it 
The oscillation that characterizes nihilism. in other words. is between two 
concepts that are metamorphic: those of presence and evasion. What mimetic 
uneasiness that appears to define Heidegger's position in its affinnation of the 
concept of presence through its appeal to a dichotomy of that which is and its 
representation eludes therefore is the primordially staged. mimetic. quality of 
experience. The difference between the same and the similar is at once that of a 
series of binary oppositions: representation and misrepresentation, reality and 
fiction. science and ideology. truth and politics, law and literature. and so on. 
Paradoxically. the mimetic. notably poetry. is at once the unique house. for 
Heidegger. in which the modes of authenticity are explored,7° What seems to be 
mere contradiction is in fact part of the pattern established in the very formulation 
of nihilism. In the face of a clear detestation of the fictitious. the oratorial, not only 
is the staged equally emphasized by Nietzsche, as I have already recorded it.71 but 
whose work, famously. resides in the very margins of language. There are. 
therefore. two intertwined paradoxes to the pattern: (1) nihilism as re-presencing 
while de-presencing. and (2) a mimetic uneasiness in the face of a discourse that is 
at once committed to the idea of the primordiality of the mimetic. 
Rhetoric 
The pattern is well illustrated in two recent examples. In one of them Petec 
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G<XXlrich borrows from Nietzsche the distinction between the two senses of 
nihilism. Nihilism may mean decadence in the sense Christianity was to 
Nietzsche.72 But it may also mean 'an active historical and political consciousness' 
which refuses to recognize the traditional rationality.73 Nihilism in the latter sense 
contrasts with the mainstream perceptions of it as merely another word for 
aimlessness, and becomes instead a method of inquiry. As a way of reading nihilism 
is anything but despair and cynicism.74 What is unavoidably linked to the nihilistic 
paradox is that of the mimetic. The privilege consciousness is bestowed upon as a 
constitutive and transformative force at once signifies an end or an exception to the 
primordiality of the mimetic: the difference of the similar to the same penneates 
Goodrich's critical writing to form almost a textbook example of mimetic hostility. 
His reading of legal 'simulacra' is a hot pursuit between the assumed categories of 
reality and myth, or truth and fable - a distinction he finds suppressed in the 
intrinsic symbolism of law and for which he once again, and now hardly 
surprisingly, draws on Nietzsche.7s In so doing, Goodrich characteristically reverses 
his own commitments to a (notably Derridean) concept of the primordiality of the 
staged, the mimetic, the iterable, the archi-written. He ends up affirming the very 
binary opposition on whose dissolution his whole critical project hinges to start with 
-the real and the mythical in the rhetoric of law. 
In the second recent example of the pattern, Christopher Norris, who also 
professes commitment to a Derridean primordiality of the mimetic, reverses his 
position, as he declares in an attempt to counter Fish's brand of mimetic 
ineluctability that it is wrong to '[treatl rhetoric entirely at the level of 
straightforward performative effect. '76 The mimetic paradox of Norris' essay is once 
again typically and inseparably linked to another paradox, one which he observes to 
emerge curiously in an essay on Nietzsche (by de Man) and which distinguishes 
between two senses of rhetoric: rhetoric as de-presencing and re-presencing. The 
effect of rhetoric on the performative level, accordingly, is forever unstationary and 
therefore in a mode which constantly de-presences itself. This is rhetoric with its 
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'shady reputation,' namely rhetoric as persuasion. n The rhetorical effect may take 
the form of re-presencing. however. as rhetoric may be utilized to (de-)de-presence, 
as it were, its own mood as a linguistic performance. Rhetoric in the latter sense. 
namely as a 'study of linguistic tropes and devices,' as pointed out by de Man, 
according to Norris, may cease to be a mere mimetic instance that conceals by 
definition in order to persuade; instead. it 'can have precisely the opposite effect of 
exposing - and thus counteracting - this insidious persuasive power.'78 The mere 
mimetic is qualified as 'insidious,' following. in a characteristically nihilistic 
reversal, and through a logic of betrayal, the establishment of rhetoric as re-
presencing: the similar betrays. in the sense that it violates and thus conceals that 
which is the same, but it at once discloses and gives away. 
Discourse as also re-presencing. rather than merely an unstationary and yet 
ultimately circular concept of de-presencing. is intended in the essay by Norris, a 
literary critic, to be a tip to the beleaguered writers of the movement known as 
critical legal studies79 in the face of objections notably by Fish. What the latter 
reads in the writings of those writers and what he terms the 'anti-foundationalist 
theory hope' is precisely the mood for a mode to enable the specific discourse to 
survive the consequences of its own rhetoric; a mode to re-presence while de-
presencing, a mode to elude the mimetic and thereby obtain a non-grammatical. 
non-performative. validity. while at once invoking the primordiality and 
ineluctability of the mimetic.so As Norris commences to explore Fish's position on 
the uses of theory, however, and as this goes on and on and the essay nears its end, 
one finds that what the author does in fact is more like getting himself painted more 
and more into a corner, and that Fish's objections sound rightly worrisome not only 
against the naive theoretical endeavour of lawyers whom the author aims to help 
out, but are perhaps as much valid for literary studies. Curiously. in an essay whose 
primary aim is to counter Fish's argument on the theory mood, the sole evidence is 
introduced only in the closing paragraphs. IBut his objections would entirely miss 
the mark.' Norris produces the bombshell. albeit in a tone not striking for its self-
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confidence. 'if applied to de Man's very different account of what constitutes a 
rhetorical reading. '81 His tone is markedly dramatic for he knows only too well that 
a binary opposition of concealing and exposing. namely the two senses of rhetoric. 
which he reportedly finds in de Man's essay. would dissolve at the slightest probing. 
before Fish. by the very deconstructionisrn which he himself champions and which 
he considers to be de Man's device in the specific essay.82 But what exactly does de 
Man say? 'Considered as persuasion.' he is quoted by Norris. 'rhetoric is 
performative but when considered as a system of tropes. it deconstructs its own 
performance.'83 Hence two distinct senses of rhetoric. Norris is the author of a 
monograph on de Man (as he is also the author of one on Derrida). 84 The fact that 
when quoting de Man he chooses to suppress the very following sentence where de 
Man goes on actually to repudiate the duality that has just emerged. however. 
hardly makes a good testament to Norris' prowess as a writer of monographs. To 
quote de Man in full: 
Considered as persuasion. rhetoric is performative but when 
considered as a system of tropes. it deconstructs its own 
performance. Rhetoric is a text in that it allows for two 
incompatible, mutually self-destructive points of view, and 
therefore puts an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any 
reading or understanding. The aporia between performative 
and constative language is merely a version of the aporia 
between trope and persuasion that both generates and 
paralyzes rhetoric and thus gives it the appearance of a 
history.8s 
Where Norris sees 'two distinct meanings'86 de Man sees an aporia. one that is 
'insurmountable.' And that is so, according to him, for 'any reading or 
understanding - that which betrays betrays. That which violates and conceals. and 
that which is violated and concealed, in other words, may be exposed. But 
disclosure, giving away, is at once, and in each case, a performance that violates 
and conceals. Violation and concealment, namely the mimetic, after all, are the 
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prerequisite of language rather than 'insidious' elements87 simply in the way of a 
more proper, as it were, functioning of it. Hence the binary opposition of 
performatives and constatives, the deconstructive tension between whose terms I 
have already noted in this study, 88 being a 'version' of the two assumed senses of 
rhetoric: a greater category of perfonnatives, of context-bound, not wholly 
pinpointable deeds staged through or for language. is in each case presupposed in 
order to distinguish the constative instances of language. instances where a 
measurable effect of disclosure is exercised. from pedonnatives. In this respect, 
Norris' affinnation of the dichotomy in the 'two distinct meanings' of rhetoric. not 
as a mimetic refinement, but as an exception to that which is mimetic, an evasion to 
which Fish's objections on the theory mood would not apply, makes his concept of 
language one that is, certainly not Derridean, and not Austenean (for, as I have, 
again, already made a note of it in this study, the tension, the aporia, to which de 
Man refers, is felt and acknowledged within J.L. Austin's theory of perfonnative 
and constative instances of language), but pre-Austenean and nihilistic: it is 
presence-thinking in its exclusion of fraternal, mimetic attachments in constative, or 
verifiable, instances of language. and anthropological in its subsequent notion of 
the meta-mimetic, meta-discursive. meta linguistic. 
The 'theory' in another essay by de Man. The Resistance to Theory.'89 is read by 
Goodrich as 'openness to context.'90 The resistance to theory is the resistance of 
legal tradition to critical reflection and disclosure. Norris. who construes the 'theory' 
as a 'kind of reflective and meticulous close-reading,'91 makes the title of de Man's 
essay part of the title of his own where he takes issue with Fish on theory, 'Law. 
Deconstruction. and the Resistance to Theory.' The 'resistance' becomes a 
description of the pragmatist, Fish-like. opposition to theory-talk. Whereas that 
which de Man designates as 'non-reading' in the original essay, namely theory 'as 
the rooting of literary exegesis and of critical evaluation in a system of some 
conceptual generality.'92 agrees with Fish's notion of the0ry93 in one very significant 
aspect.9-4 He does. however. reproach FISh for 'empty[ing] rhetoric of its 
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epistemological impact,'95 which ultimately affinns Norris' interpretation. What 
Fish overlooks in his understanding of theory as rhetoric on a purely performative 
level, namely as persuasion, accordingly, is that its modes may be 'of the order of 
persuasion by prool as well as 'by seduction. '96 In an essay where he explores the 
possibilities and fresh perspectives the classical trivium may offer for the 
contemporary debates of methodology in humanities, de Man's dichotomy between 
persuasion by proof and persuasion by seduction seems merely to reproduce the 
classical dichotomy between eristic and dialectic - a distinction that can be made, 
as I have already argued it in this study,97 only on an intentional basis. 
Norris regards Fish's position in assuming theory in each case a mimetic artefact, 
rather than a possible evasion of the mimetic, as 'basically conservative.'98 The 
phraseology is hardly Derridean whose reproductive insights Norris intends to 
benefit lawyers in the face of the sterilizing, as it were, effect of Fish's writing. As a 
matter of fact. Derrida and Fish are not put in opposition to one another, but put 
together, at least in one aspect. within the framework of what is a specific vein of 
thinking represented in Norris' phraseology. Not unlike the way Norris qualifies 
Fish's position, Derrida is classified (alongside Bataille and Foucault) as a 'young 
conservative' by a philosopher of somewhat different order, Habermas,99 whose 
work, paradoxically, strikes Norris in his monograph on Derrida as one virtually 
indistinguishable from that of the latter. In other words, Derrida eludes the charge 
Fish receives, as far as Norris is concerned, for a good reason. His is a Derrida 
already neutralized. According to Norris, a 'ceaseless problematization of the 
principle of reason' on the part of Derrida's work does contrast with the confident 
rationalism of Habermas' rhetoric. 1OO Yet despite the obvious discrepancy of 
methods, just as the latter's work, the work by Derrida, particularly the recent work, 
'seeks new grounds for the exercise of enlightened critique through an idea of 
communicative competence which allows for specific distortions in present-day 
discourse, but which also holds out the possibility of grasping and transcending 
these irrational blocks. '101 Haberrnas himself could barely be more Habermasian. 
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you may think. The affinity between Norris' nihilistic paradox, namely the two 
senses of rhetoric, one 'insidious: derivative, secondary, dependent, and marginal, 
and one meta-mimetic, and Habermas' distinction of what Norris relates as the 
'irrational blocks' in communicative action and the 'possibility of grasping and 
transcending these irrational blocks' is evident. It is dubious. however, that the 
dichotomy in either case relates to Derrida's thinking. In a review of Habermas' 
theory from the standpoint of Derrida's project Jonathan Culler finds the former a 
poor instance of exactly that on whose repudiation the latter is built.10l And Culler 
should know. He is the writer whom Habermas chooses in his (later) critique of 
Derrida's work as the latter's special envoy.t03 Habermas' venture rationally to 
reconstruct communicative competence. according to Culler, is merely 'one of the 
weaker versions of the classic metaphysical attempt to separate intrinsic from 
extrinsic or pure from corrupt and deem the latter irrelevant.'l04 The tradition from 
whose vantage point Fish is countered and which is clearly pre-Austenean in its 
mimetic hostility is only Derridean, therefore. when Derrida is considered, as Norris 
does. to be pursuing. alongside Habermas. a 'fulfillment' of what the latter terms 'the 
project of modernity,' a brand of rationality thought up and materially inaugurated 
by the Enlightenment philosophers for everyday life and which remains to be 
'completed' in its absolute engulfing of everyday social and political practice. lOS 
(Ironically enough, Habermas' call to complete the project of the Enlightenment 
comes in an address delivered at the award ceremony of a prize named after 
Adorno.) Conservatism, in this respect. is disbelief in, or mere indifference to, the 
logic and ideals of the Enlightenment rationality. a particular concept of (non-) 
fraternity whose distinguishing marks are evasion and distance. that is to say a 
specific trend of anthropologism and a presumed suppression of the mimetic. 
The assumption behind what Norris qualifies as a position 'basically 
conservative,' namely that theory will remain mimetic in each case, is famously 
entertained in the concept of ideology as false consciousness. 106 This concept. 
however, is not to be confused with what is termed the 'negative' aspect of theory, 
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or ideology. by writers such as Goodrich and Kerruish. A theory. according to 
Valerie Kerruish. ceases to be Ineutrall when it seeks to Ijustify' the relations it 
recOnstructs. 107 It is an obviously problematic notion, however, that theory should 
frame. define. limit. situate. without at once justifying. Theory, by definition. seems 
to be an attempt to rationalize. In Goodrichls distinction, likewise, the negative 
aspect of ideology signifies la system of ideas which falsely represents or mystifies 
individual and collective relations to the material conditions of existence.IIOS While 
in its positive aspect ideology is la programme or a strategy in relation to the terms 
of social life: a vehicle for organization and transforrnation,l09 Ideology as false 
consciousness. on the other hand. unlike either of the aspects pointed out by 
Kerruish and Goodrich. refers to an epiphenomenal. purely mimetic, passiveness. 
What is often thought to be the dreary, sterile conservatism of the latter concept has 
haunted Marxist thinking since at least its evasive, undecided, ultimately 
problematic statement by Lukacs on the basis of a notion expressed by Engels in a 
letter. 110 Yet its so-called crude positivism is to be found perhaps most memorably 
manifest in the famous Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy. lIt is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the 
contrary. their social being that determines their consciousness.IIII Lukacs fleetingly 
points out the drastic implications the concept of mimetic ineluctability professed 
by dialectic materialism holds for the validity of its own discourse. and yet chooses 
to bury the question in an irresolute rhetoric. The primordiality of the mimetic, 
accordingly. does not necessarily signify an effective redundancy of the concept of 
conscious act in history, even though the awareness that defines it will always be a 
partial one: rather than simply abrogated in an linflexiblel polarity of true and false, 
c o n s c i ~ ~ is to be treated as ultimately part of a 'historical totalityl and therefore 
worthy of analysis.1l2 Deliberately vague and evasive though its mood is. Lukacsl 
statement clearly challenges the catechismic conservatism, the so-called economic 
reductionism or determinism, of the Second International. Amongst the writers in 
the years between the two world wars with an aim to rid the theory of the stagnancy 
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of the concept of ideology as mere shadow is Gramsci. whose revised notion of 
ideology. ideology as a constitutive. transjormative consciousness. that is to say. 
rather than simply a passive element. ideology as an instrument of 'hegemony' 
within society. a device to sustain the system and a program. is the basis of both 
aspects of ideology indicated by Goodrich.1l3 What might therefore be called an 
active concept of ideology along the lines suggested by Gramsci has been 
elaborated by Althusser. a student of psychoanalysis and structuralism. 1 l .. 
That which defines the concept of ideology as false consciousness in the first 
place is an emphasis on the inevitably attached character of consciousness. Behind 
the 'falseness: the supplementarity. of the concept. however. are the assumptions at 
the same time of an essentially detached concept of understanding (the 'true' 
consciousness) and an intertwined notion of presence. of non-mediation. l15 What 
may seem to be the appeal of the concept to that which is primordially mimetic. 
therefore. is ultimately very much an uneasiness. on its part, of the mimetic. 
Althusser, on the other hand. objects to the principle of false consciousness for both 
its passive nature on a mimetic basis and. paradoxically, its assumption of the 
mimetic as historical. that is to say dispensable. And based on his critique of the 
two paradoxical aspects of the principle is Althusser's own paradoxical position. 
He does affirm the duality of Marx' formulation expressed in the Preface to 
Political Economy (consciousness is tied to the economic practice. to put it in his 
terminology. 'in the last instance'1l6). But the duality effectively disappears as he 
attempts to fonnulate a non-ideal. non-anthropological concept of ideology 
(ideology with 'a material existence'117). and postulates it as a primordial 
ineluctability that is constitutive ('ideology has no history'llS). The 'paradox' that 
characterizes Althusser's position. therefore. is the resistance of his formulation for 
its frame of reference to a polarity of epiphenomenal and constitutive. or 
autonomous. concepts of consciousness. He ventures to lead the theory out of a 
vulgar positivism. as it were, not to an anthropologism fhumanism') that is inherent 
in the positions of most of the dissenters regarding the principle of false 
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consciousness,119 amongst whom notably (as far as Althusser is concerned) is 
Lukacs, but to a positivism, for the want of a better term. that is loyal to its most 
significant presupposition. the primordiality of the mimetic. Ideology, for Althusser. 
is a matter more of the unconscious than of consciousness. l20 The choice for the 
unconscious is a choice against evasion and distance. that is to say against 
anthropologisrn and the suppression of the mimetic. notions that characterize. as 
with Haberrnas. the traditional criticisms of positivism. Althusser reaches the 
concept of ideology as the unconscious through an inversion of the concept offered 
in The German Ideology. an exposition of it where the truth of ideology is merely 
that of an 'illusion.' a 'drearn.'121 The dream-like truth of ideology, according to 
Althusser. is the only clear and complete formulation of ideology available in the 
Marxean corpus; a 'positivist' one nevertheless. rather than 'Marxist.'l22 Its (vulgar) 
positivism. however. is an effect of its pre-Freudean concept of the dream as 
nothingness. The dream as the unconscious. on the other hand. is hardly the concept 
with which history always takes place elsewhere. The unconscious, on the contrary, 
is a condition for history insofar as history is reproduced through the unconscious. 
The 'link.' according to Althusser. between the inverted supplementarity of the 
unconscious and ideology is an 'organic' one. 123 Rather than having its history, its 
truth. in each case outside itself; just as the unconscious, the reproductive mediation 
of ideology is very much constitutive of that which is history. 'As St. Paul 
admirably put it, it is in the 'Logos'. meaning in ideology. that we 'live. move and 
have our being'.'I24 The moment ideology signifies. therefore. has neither a before 
nor an after. 'If eternal means,' writes Althusser. 'not transcendent to all (temporal) 
history, but omnipresent, trans-historica1 and therefore immutable in form 
throughout the extent of history. I shall adopt Freud's expression word for word, 
and write ideology is eternal, exactly like the unconsciOUS.'12S Althusser affirms the 
primordiality of the mimetic as he repudiates ideology as a concept of supplement. 
In what may be called a 'deconstructive' reversal. the hierarchy between history and 
ideology. a dichotomy he reads in The German Ideology, is displaced, and the terms 
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of the binary opposition are redrawn on the basis of a greater, eternal, concept of 
ideology. 
The dualism of The German Ideology is deconstructed, however, only to be 
replaced by what is simply another version of it. The dissolution of the dichotomy is 
pursued through a concept which is not clearly formulated by Marx, not even 
(according to Althusser) entirely grasped by him, yet which is based on a period of 
Marx's work that contrasts with the work of the earlier period. The 'discovery' of 
what he calls a 'rupture' in the development of Marx's thinking, an 'epistemological 
break' he situates in 1845, enables Althusser to carry out a critical reading of the 
earlier, 'ideological period' of Marx's work through the frame of reference provided 
by the work that signifies his later, 'scientific period. '126 The ideological period, 
accordingly, includes The 1844 Manuscripts, The Holy Family, and the work 
produced before. While The Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology form 
'the Works of the Break.'I27 Yet as he pursues a dissolution of the 'positivist' 
dichotomy, that of history and ideology, on the presumed basis of the later work; 
paradoxically, the later work, as Althusser reconstructs it, appears to be marked by a 
similar dichotomy. 'The theoretical practice of a science,' writes Althusser, 'is 
always completely distinct from the ideological theoretical practice of its prehistory: 
the distinction takes the form of a 'qualitative' theoretical and historical 
discontinuity which I shall follow Bachelard in calling an 'epistemological 
break'.'I28 The concept of a true consciousness, namely science, the privileged term 
of a binary opposition of science and ideology, is an implicit affirmation of the 
principle of false consciousness rejected earlier. A reproduction of the mimetic 
paradox becomes the distinguishing feature of Althusser's reading, as the dichotomy 
between history and ideology. the crude positivism of The German Ideology, turns 
out to be merely supplanted, rather than dissolved, with that of science and ideology 
- the substitution of one variation on the theme of the same and the similar for that 
which is simply another variation. Because a distinction between the two is 
conceivable only on the basis of the re-presencing effect of evasion and distance. it 
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is none other than the supplementarily of ideology that makes a return to Althusser's 
argument. If ideology as the historical unconscious. on whose basis the dichotomy 
between history and ideology is dissolved. indicates the de-presencing mode of 
ideology - for. instead of being a passive looking glass of history it defines history 
in terms of undecidable absence. dream. illusion. nothingness - ideology as 
science signifies it in the mode of re-presencing. By exempting its discourse from 
the consequences of its own rhetoric. l29 ideology as science completes the nihilistic 
paradox. a swerve once again concurrent with the mimetic reversal. 
Simulation 
It seems perverse that simulation. a concept central to Goodrich's project. should be 
related to the Althusserean ideology. in contradistinction to science. for the former 
practically identifies simulation with the pretences of science and objectivity in 
contemporary theory.l30 Yet Althusser's own attack on positivism, a 'false' 
epistemology which the claims of scientific rigour and objectivity are all about. is 
very much towards a mimetically hostile dichotomy of science and ideology. By 
science. after all. Althusser hardly has in mind the so-called scientific method. The 
special mode of validity Althusser's science implies, precisely that which Norris 
perceives as the exposing effect of rhetoric,131 is already presupposed in the concept 
of simulation. Perhaps not surprisingly. therefore. one of the main sources behind 
Goodrich's uses of the concept. Michel Pecheux's Language, Semantics and 
Ideology. is an Althusserean study of language. a rather orthodox statement of the 
dichotomy between science and ideology}32 In turn. the notions of evasion and 
distance. that is to say the basis of science in the Althusserean sense. are equally 
pivotal in Goodrich's own discourse. His project seeks. within the meaning of what 
is termed postmodernity, 'a break with the temporal charter of tradition, a breach of 
the contract, a free or irreligious association of Words.'133 Postmodernity seems to 
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define itself in terms, not of the primordiality of positions of prejudice, the mimetic 
ineluctability, but of the very distinguishing marks of the project of modernity, 
evasion and distance. 134 The problem that faces critical legal studies,' he writes, the 
statement comes in an exposition of nihilism in the mode of re-presencing and 
refers, perversely, to Nietzsche indicating the primacy of the mimetic. 'is that of 
reappropriating the space of interpretation, the space of the sublime, and so of 
recreating the distance necessary to communication, to the overflow of 
communication.'l3S The idea of distance underlies a variety of oppositions Goodrich 
establishes between two distinct categories of concepts; one which includes the real, 
the historical, the genuine; and one amongst whose tenns are fiction, representation, 
simulation, simulacrum, similitude, semblance, image. imitation, emulation, mark, 
icon, symbol, form, shadow, appearance, visibility, spectacle, religion, faith, and so 
on. Goodrich contrasts the law as a 'system of rules' with the law as a 'system of 
images: which is not really a dichotomy since the former is merely an effect of the 
latter, a self-image. Subsequently, a grasp of the legal tradition may only mean an 
analysis of the law as a 'sign.' 
In cultural and so also semiotic terms a tradition, legal or 
otherwise, is not an historical discipline, it is not a rational, 
proven or evidenced sense of the past but much more a 
mythology, an unconscious reservoir of images and symbols, 
of fictive narratives and oracular (or immemorial) truths. A 
semiotics of common law must thus pursue the tradition 
through its images, through the forms in which it is seen, 
precisely because it is an image, as a sign that law is 
recognized, accepted and lived. It is not as a system of rules 
that the individual is born into and adheres to the law as an 
aspect of everyday life. The law as a structure of material life, 
as an institution, is a system of images, and it is through its 
symbolisation of authority and through its signs of power that 
the law dwells within the subject. The law is in that sense 
nothing other than its image, no more and no less than a sign; 
it is the spectacle of the scaffold, the aura of judgement, the 
249 
sense of the normal. l36 
The concept which is not only distance par excellence but which also once again 
relates Goodrich to Althusser is the unconscious, the idea of the 'unconscious of a 
science,'137 a borrowing from Foucault who employs it interchangeably with what 
he calls the 'archaeological level' of knowledge. l38 The concept designates the layer 
of discourse where the exposing effect of rhetoric is pursued. Both psychoanalysis 
and archaeology aim to unearth. as the verb implies. that which is in both cases 
already there and that which survives time. In both psychoanalysis and archaeology, 
therefore, a distinctive mode of presence, of continuity, is postulated. 
Distinguishing the unconscious from the conscious, Freud declares the former as 
present, out there, though physically 'inaccessible to US.'139 Revealingly, he 
compares the unconscious with the Kantian category of things-in-themselves, a 
mode of presence which is paradigmatic of mimetic hostility and which, as the 
unadorned same, stands behind each one of Goodrich's binary oppositions. Yet the 
project of psychoanalysis differs from that of the Kantian epistemology in one 
aspect, elucidates Freud. insofar as the unearthing of the states of 'inner perception 
does not present difficulties so great as [those] of outer perception.'l40 (Note the 
professed dichotomy of the inner and the outer, on whose repudiation. at once and 
perversely, is built the very principle of the unconscious.) The logic of unearthing is 
that of betrayal in the sense of disclosure yet without at once betraying, a distance 
ensured by archaeology as a study quite literally of hard facts and by the idea of the 
un-conscious as the deep, underlying. mechanism, the noumenal motivator. 
Althusser himself exercises choice for the term the unconscious hardly for the single 
reason of avoiding the anthropologism of the concept of ideology as consciousness. 
An equally seductive reason perhaps is that the unconscious uniquely signifies 
distance while being inseparably involved. allowing thereby a special mode of 
validity - a notion that in turn makes conceivable a radical dichotomy of science 
and ideology. The concept of parochial attachment ideology becomes in Althusser's 
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formulation as the primacy he confers upon the 'Logos' with Paul 141 is reversed is 
represented in Goodrich's reading of the common law tradition, a distinct order 
whose logic is one of 'memory' rather than 'theory,'I42 by what Goodrich tenns 'a 
technique of faith'143 - a manner of reading which precludes evasion and distance. 
Of one piece with one pattern the present study has sought to point out,l44 faith, a 
metaphor for the prirnordiality of the positions of prejudice in reading, contrasts in 
Goodrich's formulation of it with 'reason'l45 and 'life,'l.t6 that is to say evasion and 
distance in the exact Enlightenment tradition. It is the tradition, one must notice, 
that brings together projects as diverse as those of Goodrich and The Federalist 
where, famously, government by 'reflection and choice' is opposed to government, 
or non-government, founded upon 'accident and force.'I47 
Consequently, the indispensability of a non-grammatical dichotomy between 
faith and life to the exceptional mode of validity pursued induces Goodrich to 
dismiss the approaches inspired by Wittgenstein's concept of language-games, a 
concept of the primordiality of a greater category of faith, of the grammatical, the 
mimetic. for 'trivialis[ing] the social and political.'l48 The perspective from which 
he argues reflects at once an unmistakable affinity with that of Norris in 
reproaching Fish (a 'basically conservative standpoint') 149 or the manner in which 
Habennas classifies Derrida (a 'conservative').ISO The words Goodrich appears to 
have to describe the possible termini of the Wittgensteinean assumption of 
attachment, the concepts of language-games and rule-following, however, are less 
than uncomplicated considering the centrality of the very notions that underlie those 
words, namely distance and evasion, to Goodrich's own discourse in the first place. 
They are 'anthropologism,' 'subjectivism,' and 'psychologism. '151 A further swerve 
on his part does little to help as he proceeds to contrast the Wittgensteinean mood of 
attachment with the mode of detachment that is 'objectivity'152 - a concept that is 
the apotheosis of distance and evasion in its traditional sense, one designated earlier 
as mere positivistic pretension, while in a less orthodox sense as a notion of 
transparency, non-privacy, postulated by Wittgenstein, rather than opposed. A 
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concept of objectivity closer to its fonner, more traditional. sense. is affinned as 
Goodrich goes on to define objectivity as a special mode of validity. an effect of 
'the critical use of linguistic methodologies,'153 once again precisely that which is 
suggested by Norris (writing after Goodrich) as the exposing effect of rhetoric. 
exposing without at once repressing or concealing. namely rhetoric as a 'study of 
linguistic tropes and devices.'lS4 What a critical analysis of language seeks to 
achieve. according to Goodrich. where a Wittgensteinean approach would simply 
lock the particular formation in a circle of incommensurability is to disclose the 
mechanism through which power determines meaning fonnations within specific 
performances of language. 'The process in which such determination occurs,' he 
writes. 'may be analysed objectively (as opposed to anthropologically or 
psychologically) through the critical use of linguistic methodologies.'155 It is not 
clear how exactly anthropologisrn is brought about by what is in effect an apathetic 
concept of reading on Wittgenstein's part. And if it is an active concept, rather than 
apathetic. conversely. attributing anthropologism to it is simply to ignore the 
chiastic relationship Wittgenstein clearly assumes between language-games. where 
man seems to be the master. the 'measure of things,'l56 and life-forms - a chiasm 
more systematically formulated in the Heideggerian oeuvre where it is termed 'the 
event of appropriation,' a primorcliality 'in which man and Being are delivered over 
to each other.'157 That the most significant characteristic of the Wittgensteinean 
concept of rule-following (the very key to the famous 'paradox') is a clear resistance 
to the traditional oscillation between the orders of the object and the subject. the 
reader and the text. man and Being, I have already noted. ISS What lies in that 
resistance is hardly an immediately striking form of anthropologism or 
psychologism, but rather an inevitable preclusion of that which is very much the 
epitome of the notions of evasion and distance and which seems to be a constitutive 
part of Goodrich's project for disclosure, disclosure without at once concealment -
the idea of metalanguage. Not surprisingly, therefore, the unique paradigm for an 
analysis of the language. of the 'inner perception,' of that which is present, without 
252 
at once becoming simply another piece of language. namely the idea of the 
unconscious. is subsequently invoked by Goodrich to explain how exactly that 
which eludes faith. the Wittgensteinean mode of attachment. is captured in an open. 
life-orientated. analysis of language. 'Linguistic structure itself encodes inequalities 
of power and is also instrumental in enforcing them... [T]hese implicit or 
unconsciously regulated operative meanings are accessible to study through their 
expression in the lexicon. syntax and semantics of the text. '159 
That access to what would be the linguistic unconscious is through a formal 
concept of the text is an affirmation on Goodrich's part of the traditional dichotomy 
between the text and the reader. the text and history. 'It is language in the end which 
remembers ... '160 That it is the language which remembers. the obvious positivism of 
the concept that makes meaning an effect of the marks on a page or of sound 
patterns.161 present. as with Freud's 'inner perception' awaiting simply to be 
collected through an act of reading that is willing to dig the right way and place. 
wildly contrasts with the commitment Goodrich professes to an unstationary 
concept of the text, one which has no 'outside. '162 Two distinct veins that are 
simultaneously at work in Goodrich's discourse. therefore seem to contribute to a 
dialectic that is less than productive: one which resists a dichotomy of the same and 
the similar and defines that which is the same in terms of a greater category of 
similitudes. and one that seeks to unearth or reconstruct that which is the same. the 
present. through an analysis of the similar. a category that is secondary and parasitic 
- one vein. in other words. that is post-semiotic, and one semiotic. What happens 
eventually is that the two simply cancel each other out. An illustrative instance is 
where Goodrich refers to the postal rule in contract law, a rule which makes an 
acceptance pursued by letter take effect the moment the letter is posted - a 
metaphor for what is the prime example of the concept of a contract, the social 
contract, the law.163 One remarkable consequence of the postal rule, Goodrich 
points out. is the fact that one may become party to a contract and be bound by its 
terms without being aware what exactly it is to which one is party. 'It is possible 
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that the letter fails to arrive at its destination, or that it arrives late, and yet a binding 
contract none the less subsists.'l64 The addressee, naturally, is the person who has 
made the offer to start with; furthermore, the parties' apparent intentions are by no 
means preceded by the postal rule - details that may spoil the metaphor. Ignoring 
the details for the sake of simplicity, as indeed Goodrich himself does, the metaphor 
is a statement of the primordial undecidability of that which is sent, of non-
presence. The law, just as the letter. does not exist; it is what you make of it: it 
resists a dichotomy of that which is and its representation. That is what the 
metaphor is about. At a parallel level. however. one knows at once that the author 
does not really mean it, that the letter will never really fail to arrive at its 
destination, and that there is no such thing as lost letter. For the letters deemed lost 
are merely ones addressed to the author. The unconscious is where they are retained 
temporarily eventually to tum up at the analyst's couch for the analyst (thereby 
affirming two distinct positions, famously those of Derrida and Lacan, at once165). 
The assumption that the law is what you make of it is cancelled out by another 
which is entertained simultaneously and which makes the law a formal process 
whose terms are created and put into effect by one of the parties while the other 
party is absent spatially and temporally. Just as that of the postal rule, the logic of 
the text of law is a non-logic, one absurd consequence of which is that '[i]t is 
possible ... to be bound by texts that one has not read, to be engaged in a relation 
with the institution on terms that have been established in advance'l66 - the 
generality paradox de Man reads in RousseaU.167 (It is again Rousseau, incidentally. 
whom Goodrich reads where he analyzes the postal rule.) 
The difference between the two veins that permeate Goodrich's work may be a 
subtle one on the surface. but its oonsequences are dramatic. Just as a confusion 
between two philosophical positions on language (both famously represented by 
Wittgenstein) has been responsible for much of legal realist philosophizing, for a 
dichotomy of the real and the non-real;l68 not infrequently. the post-semiotic 
positions. notably that of Derrida (apparently for its dismantling. subversive effect 
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on the text) have been construed as an instance of mimetic hostility which in tum 
presupposes a dichotomy of the same and the similar. 169 In an essay where he reads 
Heidegger's 'The Age of the World View,' the lecture in which the latter discusses 
representation,170 Derrida relates the anti-mimetic attitude with admirable economy: 
'representation is bad.'171 It is never that a series of binary oppositions Goodrich 
establishes on the basis of a dichotomy between the same and the similar cannot be 
maintained grammatically. that is to say as a mimetic refInement. They will hardly 
hold. however. if the secondary term in each one of those binary oppositions 
appears to be so designated because it is mere similitude. As Derrida puts it. 
a criticism or a deconstruction of representation would remain 
feeble, vain. and irrelevant if it were to lead to some 
rehabilitation of immediacy. of original simplicity. of 
presence without repetition or delegation. if it were to induce 
a criticism of calculable objectivity, of criticism, of science, 
of technique, or of political representation. The worst 
regressions can put themselves at the service of this 
antirepresentative prejudice. 172 
In fact mimetic hostility simply restates what Derrida demonstrates as the traditional 
prejudice against writing. I7] Writing is thought to lack the moment of presence 
which defines speech. Simulation. 'the fiction of appearance. of semblance,'174 is a 
characteristic, in this respect, customarily attributed to writing. And just as writing. 
defined as 'the disappearance of natural presence,'17S simulation. what is a mere 
synonym for Goodrich for fake and fraud, is a prerequisite of both the categories of 
the same ~ o m - ) ) and the similar ~ o m - ) . . being and seeingP6 The absence simulation 
implies. the paradoxical distance (for. just as writing. simulation is defined in 
terms of distance - inverted distance -, disparity, difference. impersonality, 
reproducibility) and evasion (undecidability. unpinpointability), is not simply an 
attribute of the law as a sign. but it is a condition for sign generally. I have recorded 
in this study the perverse privileging of writing in the parol evidence rule in view of 
255 
the traditional hierarchyP7 In both cases, however, writing is defined in terms of 
absence; the absence of passion and privacy. Unlike speech, writing is 
depersonalized, detached. What is an exclusion of private passion and of therefore 
partiality in contract doctrine signifies in the traditional hierarchy the suppression of 
that which is the immediate meaning - intention. With respect to the dichotomy 
between that which is and its representation, distance and evasion undergo a 
displacement not dissimilar. The notions which appear to make conceivable a 
distinction of the same and the similar, life and faith. reality and fiction, authenticity 
and inauthenticity, science and ideology, disclosure and concealment, choice and 
force, and so on, in the first place, tum out to be none other than the defining 
features of that which is the marginal term in each one of the binary oppositions-
the religious, the forceful, the simulated, the mimetic. 
Faith 
The dichotomy between the law and its readings, then, is to be defined as one 
primordially of mimesis, of habit, of faith. The faith metaphor has performed a key 
part in the present study. Both discourses on the basis of whose motifs and thematic 
unfoldings this study has sought an evaluation of some of the contemporary 
arguments posit faith as on order which transcends the attachments, the so-called 
realities, of a world fraternity, a life-form, a discernible (con) text, and signifies 
instead a fonnal mode, a way of being that resists, and contrasts with, what is 
classified as the natural, the pagan, the secular. Geny draws a radical distinction 
between the realistic an the faith-based attitudes, the latter being epitomized in the 
mechanistic jurisprudence of the exegetical school. l78 And Lyotard contrasts the 
heteronomous outlook of the pagans with the formalism of two basic approaches, 
the autonomous approach of the mainstream Western thinking, one based on a 
markedly fallacious notion of the subject, and the Judaic tradition, one which, while 
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repudiating the anthropologism of the mainstream Western thinking, at once tends 
to supplant the pagan narrative with that of faith and thereby banish that which is 
natural. I79 Lyotard's Judaism ('the Jewish pole') simply reproduces Nietzsche's 
Zarathustrianism, the symbolic starting point of the opposition between the natural 
and the formal. The critique of formalism Nietzsche more concretely pursues in the 
case of Christianity is mimicked in the present essay by writers amongst whom are, 
notably, Uewellyn and Goodrich. lSO One of the objectives of this thesis is to make 
sense of the interpretative controversy that surrounds the American Constitution. 
The title of a book by one of the key contributors to the debate, Levinson, is 
Constitutional Faith.ISI The pagan way appears to be invoked as a primordial 
condition of human existence and therefore ineluctable. The ineluctability of 
paganism, the natural, is at once ignored, however, as a radical dichotomy of the 
pagan and fonnalist attitudes is subsequently introduced. References, it has been 
argued, by a revealing variety of writers to (suppress) the divine have a symbolic 
significance: to exclude (or simply distinguish) the divine is to exclude the 
primordiality of positions of prejudice not only in reading the divine, but in reading 
generally. Catechismic reading, accordingly, is not a paradigm merely in reading 
the commandments of faith. But reading is in each case catechismic reading. It is by 
means of the inevitably prejudiced nature of reading that (a) the law. a concept that 
is in each case read - a concept of absence, as opposed to presence - has been 
reassessed in terms of its readings; the viewpoint, that is to say, from which the law 
is interpreted and evaluated has been taken form periphery to the centre, Of. to be 
more exact, a perpetually shifting concept of the centre and the periphery has been 
suggested; and (b) the individual evaluations and interpretations of the law have 
been defined as attached; while a specific reading is based on, and mirrors. a 
particular fraternity, a faith, a life-form. a diversity of readings on an issue are 
equally characterized by a fraternity which engulfs individual distinctions. That is to 
say. a displacement of the traditional hierarchy between the law and its readings 
does not necessarily amount to an effectively free-floating concept of the law. What 
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may be tenned a nihilistic concept of the law, therefore, has been refuted. Crucially, 
nihilism as a term of presence signifies the traditional approach as well as that of its 
critics, who have been traditionally labelled nihilistic. A concept of anything-goes 
in the absence of a formally circumscribed set of principles has equally underlay the 
mainstream mentality. Therefore. the thesis has sought to indicate not only the 
prirnordiality of the positions of prejudice in reading. whether the text of the law or 
its intention, whether the reality or the formal law. has been the rhetorical basis. but 
it has also attempted to point out the essentially transfigurational - absent, 
mimetic. discursive - character of the terms of each one of the thematic 
distinctions that have been central to the theory: the text and the extratext, intention 
and extension. the tame and the freakish, the real and the formal. In pointing out the 
essentially mimetic character of these binary oppositions, however, the thesis itself 
has presupposed a dichotomy of that which is and that which merely mimics it, the 
same and the similar. 
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1 JUDGEMENT, CRITERIA, JUSTICE 
1 J.-F. Lyotard andJ.-L. Thebaud, Just Gaming 76 (transt. W. Godzich, 1985). 
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that fidelity to immoral rules is a contradiction in terms. for in order to qualify 
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as law the rules have to bear a moral essence. It would certainly be interesting 
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Nazis were busy in Germany, to the state laws and the Supreme Court 
decisions on his side of Atlantic, which, presumably not less immorally, 
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interpretation of the positivist position in the debate, as a more liberating and 
morally justifiable one (in that, unlike the Fullerian position of natural law, 
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Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law,' 20 Valparaiso Law Review 1 (1985). 
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obedience, and ... however great the aura of majesty or authority which the 
official system may have, its demands must in the end be submitted to moral 
scrutiny.' But for a criticism of the positivist position morally understood, see 
P. Soper, 'Choosing A Legal Theory on Moral Grounds' Philosophy and Law 
31 (eds. J. Coleman and E.F. Paul, 1987). For a careful account of the case 
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Loewenstein, 'Reconstruction of the Administration of Justice in American 
Occupied Germany,' 61 Harvard Law Review 419, 432 (1948). Writing 
immediately after the War, he makes (perhaps not) surprising revelations on 
the inhuman, in both senses, technicalism of the German judge. Loewenstein 
states: The truly exasperating feature of the Nazi legal system lay in the fact 
that the most arbitrary and unjust of its acts were couched in the form of a 
statute, decree. or similar enactment, which, because of its fonnal character as 
a legal norm, was applied by the judge as 'law' regardless of its inherently 
arbitrary character. The German judge worships the written law and slavishly 
follows its letter. He is unaffected by intellectual doubts as to the intrinsic 
justice of the legal rule he has to apply, provided it is enacted by the authority 
of the state, and he does not question whether the authority is legitimate or 
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not' (id.). That which is immediately questionable in this account is not that 
the Nazis had thefull cooperation of the legal establishment, not even the state 
of the German legal thought at the time, but that the cooperation came 
naturally because those who then manned the courts happened to be holding 
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Radbruch's 1946 lecture 'Gesetzliches Unrecht und iibergesetzliches Recht,' 
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interview with him in 14 Diacritics 16 (1984). For an account of his work and 
ideas, see G. Bennington, Lyotard: Writing the Event (1988). 
lOin fact, a certain vision of moral apocalypse has always been part of the 
project of modern philosophy in the true Cartesian spirit from Kant down to 
John Rawls. The dilemma of that apocalypse, I mention in 1.3, note 4. 
1.1 Judgement, Authorship, Audience 
1 J.-F. Lyotard and J.-L. Thebaud. Just Gaming 9 (transl. W. Godzich, 1985). 
2 Id .• at 12. Postmodemity. the term which Lyotard favoured in his later studies 
and is widely known for, does not originally enter the discussion here. In a 
footnote. however. he divides the modernity side of the dichotomy further and 
distinguishes the postmodem from the modern as the situation in which there 
is absolutely 'no assigned addressee and no regulating ideal' while. for 
instance. the modernity of romanticism, has, as its addressee. 'the 'people,' an 
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idea whose referent oscillates between the romantics' Volk and the fin-de-
siec/e bourgeoisie.' He adds: 'Postmodern is not to be taken in a periodizing 
sense.' (id. at 16). See, for his later, and better known, formulation of it, J.-F. 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (transl. G. 
Bennington and B. Massumi, 1989) 
3 Just Gaming, supra note 1, at 15. 
4 Id. 
SId. at 9. 
6 Id. at 15. 
7 Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
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9 Id. at 15. 
10 See. Introduction. the text accompanying notes 6-15. 
11 J. Derrida. 'Signature Event Context' in his Limited Inc 1 (trans 1. S. Weber and 
J. Mehlman, 1990); cf. the present study, 2.2, the text accompanying notes 1-
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13 See, I. Kant, The Critique of Judgement 65 (trans!. J.C. Meredith, 1952). See 
also. the present study, 1.4. the text accompanying notes 14-20. 
14 
15 
'The essence of things is not changed by their external relations .. .' I. Kant, 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 439 (transl. L.W. Beck, 1959). 
Id. at 429. 
16 Just Gaming, supra note I, at 15. 
17 Id. at 17. 
18 Id. at 14. 
19 Aristotle, 'Nicomachean Ethics,' transl. W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson 2 
The Complete Works of Aristotle VI, 1140 a 24 - b 30 (ed. J. Barnes, 1984). 
20 Just Gaming, supra note I, at 26 (emphasis added). 
21 Plato, Republic IV, 433 (transl. A.D. Lindsay 1950); see, 1.4, the text 
accompanying note 30. 
22 Just Gaming, supra note I, at 26. 
23 Id. 
24 Aristotle, 'Rhetoric,' transl. W.R. Roberts, supra note 19, at 1,1364 b 11-16. 
25 (emphasis added). 
26 (emphasis added). 
27 M. Heidegger, Being and Time 98 (transl. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, 
1990). 
28 On theory and practice cf id. at 238. 
29 Id. at 237. 
30 Id. at 186. 
31 Id. at 157 and 237. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 159 and 96-98. 
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34 Id. at 186-187. Cj. 'Dasein is its disclosedness' (id. at 171. emphasis in 
original). 
35 Supra, note 24. 
36 Id. (emphasis added). 
37 J. Derrida, Writing and Difference 279-280 (transl. A. Bass, 1978); J. Derrida, 
Positions 7 (transl. A. Bass, 1987). 
38 Just Gaming, supra note I, at 26. 
39 Id. at 9. 
40 Id. 
41 1d. 
42 1d. at 26. 
43 Id. at 15. 
44 [d. at 26. 
45 Aristotle, 'Politics: The Politics of Aristotle, I, 1253 a (transl. E. Barker, 
1946). 
46 Just Gaming, supra, note I, at 29. 
47 Id. at 26. 
48 Id. at 15. 
49 Id. 
SOld. 
SlId. at 29 (emphasis added). 
52 Cf Dereida, 'Signature Event Context: supra, note 11, at 21: There is no 
concept that is metaphysical in itself. There is a labour - metaphysical or not 
- performed on conceptual systems.' 
53 Just Gaming, supra. note 1, at 43. 
1.2 Judgement and Blind Faith 
1 J.-F. Lyotard andJ.-L. Thebaud, Just Gaming 38 (transl. W. Godzich,1985). 
2 Id. at 31. 
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4 See, I. Kant, Foundations of the Melllphysics 0/ Morals 453 (trans I. L. W. 
Beck, 1959). 
5 See, the present study, 1.1, the text accompanying notes 38-51. 
6 Just Gaming, supra note 1, at 35. 
7 [d. at 32 (emphasis added). 
8 (emphasis added). 
9 [d. at 40. 
10 [d. at 43. 
11 Supra, note 7. 
12 Itt 
13 Just Gaming, supra, note 1, at 40. 
14 [d. at 65-6. 
15 [d. at 66 (emphasis added). 
16 Id. 
17 [d. 
18 [d. 
19 Cj Wittgenstein on certainty ('Doubt comes after belief'), L. Wittgenstein, On 
Certainty par. 160 and passim (eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. 
transl. D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, 1989). 
20 Just Gaming, supra, note 1. at 66 (emphasis added). 
21 Supra, note 15. 
22 Supra, note 20. 
23 Supra, note 18. 
24 'When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not 
somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally 
encapsulated. but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' 
alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already 
discovered.' M. Heidegger, Being and Time 89 (transl J. Macquarrie and E. 
Robinson. 1990). 
25 Just Gaming, supra note 1, at 66. 
26 Martin Buber, 'Upsetting the Bowl,' Tales o/the Hassidim: The Early Masters 
259 (transl. O. Marx, 1972). 
27 S. Fish. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of 
Theory in literary and Legal Studies 11 (1989). 
28 "The Bowl,' supra, note 26, at 259. 
29 Supra, note 15. 
30 Just Gaming, supra, note 1, at 66 (emphasis added). 
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31 See. the present study. 1.1. 
32 L. Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus par. 4.2 (transl. D.F. Pears 
and B.F. McGuinness. 1988). 
33 See. id .• par 6. 522. 
34 Just Gaming. supra. note 1. at 66 (emphasis added). 
35 For the sources. inspirations and philosophical programme of Logical 
Positivism from a s e m i ~ f f i c i a l l angle. see. J. Joergensen. The Development of 
Logical Empricism (1951); AJ. Ayer's lIlnguage. Truth and Logic (1936) is 
the celebrated. if naive and overenthusiastic. manifesto of the movement in the 
English speaking world; Ayers 'Introduction' to his edition of the classical 
logical positivist essays. Logical Positivism (1959). is his mature account of 
the movement; a concise record of the sources. development and fundamental 
ideas of the movement in the recent literature is to be found in O. Hantling. 
Logical Positivism (1981). For Wittgenstein's personal involvement with the 
group of philosophers behind Logical Positivism. see F. Waismann's notes. of 
the conversations by Wittgenstein in the years 1929-31. in his Wittgenstein 
and the Vienna Circle (ed. B. Mc Guinness. transl. J. Schulte & B. Mc 
Guinness. 1979). 
36 See. the text accompanying, supra. note 20. 
37 Just Gaming. supra. note 1. at 60. 
38 On Certainty. supra. note 19. par. 160 (emphasis in original). 
39 For a comparison. Nietzsche disagrees. a view hardly compatible with his 
general rhetoric of the ineluctability of experience on the basis of will to 
power. His Christianity seems to elude the primeval pagan condition the way 
Lyotard distinguishes Judaism from paganism. 'The affirmation of the natural. 
the sense of innocence in the natural. 'naturalness: is pagan. The denial of the 
natural. unnaturalness. is Christian.' F. Nietzsche. The Will to Power par. 147 
(transl. W. Kaufmann and RJ. Hollingdale. 1968). 
1.3 The Just, the Unjust, and the Ugly 
1 Cj. Arendt's consent. a notion that is the basis of representative government 
and yet that 'has lost. in the course of time. aU institutions that permitted the 
citizens' actual participation: H. Arendt. Crises of the Republic 89 (1972); and 
Habermas' bourgeois public realm ({jffentlichkeit) as the uninterrupted state of 
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transparency that serves as the frame of reference for political legitimacy 
within the meaning of liberal (as opposed to advanced> capitalism. J. 
Habermas. Legitimation Crisis 36-37 (transl. T. McCarthy, 1975). 
2 I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 453 (transl. L. W. Beck. 
1959); dicussed in the present study, 1.4, the text accompanying notes 7-12. 
3 What is it that makes one particular idea of justice better amongst others? In 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality (1988), Alasdair MacIntyre's answer to that 
question is that different rhetorics of justice are artefacts of different traditions 
of rational inquiry. The diversity of views follows from a diversity of 
rationalities, 'each with its own specific mode of rational justification.' The 
traditions of inquiry, as far as the European culture is concerned, MacIntyre 
exemplifies with the conceptions developed by such philosophers as Aristotle, 
Aquinas, and Hume. Behind each conception are demands, claims, and 
impositions of a particular culture and community. 'That Aristotle, Aquinas 
and Hume ... were historically situated in the way that they were ... is not then a 
merely accidental or peripheral fact about the philosophy of each' (Ui. at 389). 
But the forms of life which they had to be parts and participants of were truly 
constitutive of how they thought about justice. The reply, then, to the question 
'Whose justice? Which rationality?' is that one's choice will always depend on 
the particular connections of rationality in which one is situated and which one 
is. 'This is not the kind of answer,' he adds, 'which we have been educated to 
expect in philosophy, but that is because our education in and about 
philosophy has by and large presupposed what is in fact not true, that there are 
standards of rationality, adequate for the evaluation of rival answers to such 
questions, equally available, at least in principle, to all persons, whatever 
tradition they may happen to find themselves in and whether or not they 
inhabit any tradition' (Ui. at 393). 
4 J.-F. Lyotard andJ.-L. Thebaud,Just Gaming 66 (transl. W. Godzich, 1985). 
5 The Cartesian dichotomy sets out to eliminate the chaos of scepticism. The 
first thing which a radical separation of matter and thought establishes, 
however, is the essential privacy of mind, and hence a truly apocalyptic free 
play of 'other minds.' Which turns out to make Cartesianism a vindication of 
scepticism, rather than a repudiation of it. Cj. the present study, Introduction, 
the text accompanying notes 8-15. The Kantian dichotomy of the sensible and 
the intelligible gives rise to a very much similar dilemma; see, 1.4, the text 
accompanying notes 7-12. The most recent example of the pattern is found in 
John Rawls' influential work A Theory of Justice (1973). Rawls makes the 
basis of morality, in the footsteps of Kant, the individual capacity to make 
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choices. His principles of justice as fairness accompany his criticism of 
utilitarian tradition, a vein which, despite being customarily thought of as 
individualistic, 'does not take seriously the distinction between persons' (ill. at 
27). Indeed, Rawls' project owes much to the idea of persons as ends in 
themselves. Utilitarianism does make individuals sound as ends with emphasis 
on the equality and the well being of each of the members of society. In so 
doing, however, utilitarianism proceeds to treat them at once as 'means' in that 
individuals are made responsible for each other's welfare. 'In the design of the 
social system,' states Rawls in his criticism, 'we must treat persons solely as 
ends and not in any way as means' (ill. at 183). The full significance of his 
position is particularly in sight in the event fA the rights fA individuals being 
challenged by thoughts of the good of society as a whole. 'Impartiality,' 
according to Rawls, must not necessarily bring about 'impersonality' (it!. at 
190). And 'in a just society the basic liberties are taken for granted and the 
rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the 
calculus of social interest' (ill. at 28). Instead, Rawls seeks to achieve the 
desired impartiality by one of the two fundamental principles of his theory -
the difference principle. We do not need to get into the intricacies of that 
principle. In connection with it, however, a view by Rawls which does away 
with one of the 'pillars' of the liberal conceptions of justice, namely the notion 
of desert, has attracted interesting criticism. Accordingly, one of the things 
which gets in the way of impartiality is the totally arbitrary distribution of the 
assets, by birth, of individuals. 'The natural distribution' of personal accidents 
such as better fortune, gift, and social position, states Rawls, 'is neither just 
nor unjust; nor is it unjust that men are born into society at some particular 
position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that 
institutions deal with these facts' (ill. at 102, emphasis mine). These 
contingencies, therefore, Rawls suggests, must be so institutionally managed 
that the least well off can benefit the mere fact of the arbitrariness of these 
assets. 'In justice as fairness men agree to share one another's fate' (ill.). One 
of Rawls' critics, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), objects to 
that idea of 'sharing,' of 'having to share,' by simply bringing against him the 
very charges which according to Rawls utilitarianism is guilty of; namely (a) 
that he does not seem to take the separateness of persons seriously, and (b) 
that his quest for impartiality leads him, inadvertently, to impersonality (ill. at 
228). For Nozick, it does not make sense to regard natural assets of persons as 
'common property' to be managed institutionally and invoke, simultaneously, 
the idea that persons cannot be considered to be means to each other's well 
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being. Finally, for the conception of the person that emerges with the problem 
of natural assets, Nozick doubts that 'any coherent conception of a person 
remains' in the absence of the accidental traits from which Rawls strips off his 
individual - can 'the distinction between men and their talents, assets, 
abilities, and special traits' be so 'very hard' pressed? (id.) Where Nozick spots 
a fundamental inconsistency, however, is a curious sort of integrity. Rawls 
states that the principle of desert, which he rejects. 'would not be chosen in the 
original position' (A Theory of Justice, supra, at 310; for the 'original position,' 
see the present work, 1.4, note 37). Because it is a position which is absolutely 
independent of sensory ties it is only natural that it will eschew that which is 
arbitrary and accidental. How could one maintain a radical separation of 
persons and make it the very basis of one's theory if one were not, at once, to 
have a notion of the person free of contingencies? Persons are private, 
contingencies common. The privacy of persons, accordingly. should be 
uninfected by what is accidental and contingent about them. The paradox is 
that when one ceases to exist commonly, one will also cease to exist privately. 
What Nozick recognizes as an inconsistency. therefore, is more likely the 
mark of the very tradition in which Rawls' project is firmly situated. An 
insightful criticism of the Rawlsian notion of the person is to be found in MJ. 
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), where it is stated: 'To 
imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to 
conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly 
without character, without moral depth. For to have character is to know that I 
move in a history I neither summon nor command ... As a self-interpreting 
being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to distance myself 
from it, but the distance is always precarious and provisional, the point of 
reflection never finally secured outside the history itself (it!. at 179). But. see 
R. Dworkin, 'Liberal Community,' 77 California Law Review 479, 488 - 490 
(1989), where what the writer calls the 'communitarian' view of the personal 
identity formulated by Sandel comes under attack. And see, for a discussion of 
personal autonomy vis-a-vis the 'individualism' of contemporary moral 
theories with their fundamental emphasis upon the priority of personal rights. 
J. Raz. 'Right-Based Moralities,' 17Jeories of Rights 182 (ed. J. Waldron, 
1989). Raz maintains that right-based moralities are misled in that they, not 
accidentally, view collective goods as instrumental while at once invoking the 
intrinsic value and priority of personal autonomy. No personal autonomy, 
according to him, would plausibly come out of an instrumental view of that 
which is collective, simply because a person's right is another person's duty. In 
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order for a right (such as that of an homosexual man to be able to marry his 
partner) to be exercised, it will, in the first place, need, 'a society where such 
opportunities exist and make it possible for individuals to have autonomous 
life' (id. at 193). The intrinsic value of some of the collective goods, therefore, 
must be recognized in an account of legal morality. For a concise account of 
the theories of distributive justice, see Tom Campbell, Justice (1988); see also 
W. Sadurski, Giving Desert its Due (1985), and G. Sher,Desert (1987). 
6 Just Gaming, supra, note 4, at 66-7 (emphasis added). 
7 From the back cover of the book. In an interview, in 1984, Lyotard announced 
his second thoughts about the notion of language games as he came to find it 
anthropocentric. See G. Van Den Abeele's interview with him. 1. note 9. 
8 Just Gaming. supra, note 4. at 67. 
9 Id. (emphasis added). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. (emphasis added). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 70. 
14 Id at 67 (emphasis added). 
15 Id. 
16 Cf Rawls' difficulty, supra. note 5, in fonnulating a conception of persons as 
'ends' in contradistinction to the utilitarian idea of persons as 'means.' 
17 Just Gaming, supra, note 4. at 67. 
18 C. Dobson and R. Payne, The Te"orists 180 (1982). 
19 Just Gaming. supra, note 4. at 67 (emphasis added). 
20 Id. at 70. 
21 The Terrorists, supra note 18. at 181. 
22 Id. at 180. 
23 In fact. a conception of the moral as the unruly has been the supreme drive 
behind much legal philosophizing since Bentham. As he puts it, 'all is 
uncertainty, darkness. and confusion' where there are no rules 'expressed in 
words.' This, accordingly. is a state where 'there can scarcely be said to be 
right or wrong in any case.' J. Bentham. Of Laws in General 184 (ed. H.L.A. 
Hart. 1970). 
24 Just Gaming, supra, note 4, at 70. 
25 Id. at 35. 
26 Foundations. supra, note 2. at 447. 
27 See. the text accompanying, supra. note 18. 
28 Cf. L. Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations pars. 31 and 219 (transl. 
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G.E.M. Anscombe, 1988): 'When one shews someone the king in chess and 
says: This is the king', this does not tell him the use of this piece - unless he 
already knows the rules of the game up to this last point. .. 
'[The] explanation ... only tells him the use of the piece because, as we might 
say, the place for it was already prepared. Or even: we shall only say that it 
tells him the use, if the place is already prepared. And in this case it is so, not 
because the person to whom we give the explanation already knows rules, but 
because in another sense he is already master of a game' (emphasis added). 
"All the steps are really already taken' means: I no longer have any choice.' Cf 
M. Heidegger, Being and Time 41 (transl. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, 
1990): '[His] own past - and this always means the past of [his] 'generation' 
- is not something which follows along after [man], but something which 
already goes ahead of [him].' 
29 Consider, on the quest for absolute lines, boundaries, two recent conceptions: 
Dworkin's 'liberal conception of equality,' as a postulate of political morality 
and a possible ground, therefore, for rights, in R. Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously 272-78 (1978); and Ackerman's notion of 'Neutrality' as 'a place ... 
that can be reached by countless pathways of argument coming from very 
different directions,' in B.A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 12 
and passim (1980). 
30 Just Gaming, supra, note 4, at 68 (emphasis added). 
31 Being and Time, supra, note 28, at 215; M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference 
27 (transl. J. Stambaugh, 1969). 
32 'Categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearances, and 
therefore to nature, the sum of all appearances (natura materia liter spectata). 
(. .. ) For just as appearances do not exist in themselves but only relatively to 
the subject in which, so far as it has senses, they inhere, so the laws do not 
exist in the appearances but only relatively to this same being, so far as it has 
understanding. Things in themselves would necessarily, apart from any 
understanding tlwt k n o ~ ~ them, conform to laws of their own. But 
appearances are only representations of things which are unknown as regards 
what they may be in themselves.' I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason B 163 - 64 
(transl. N.K. Smith, 1968) (emphasis added). 
33 Being and Time, supra, note 28, at 215. 
34 'What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational'. Hegel's 'Preface' to his 
Philosophy o/Right 10 (transl. T.M. Knox, 1969) 
35 'What does the history of ideas prove if not that mental production changes 
concomitantly with material production?' K. Marx and F. Engels, The 
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Communist Manifesto 50 (transl. M. Lawrence. 1963). 
36 Thinking and being are thus certainly distinct. but at the same time they are in 
unity with each other.' K. Marx. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844 93 (transl. not cited. 1981) (emphasis in original). 
37 Aristotle. 'Rhetoric.' transl. W.R. Roberts 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle I. 
1364 b 11-16 (ed. J. Barnes. 1984) (emphasis added). Cf. 'The reasons why we 
call things true is the reason why they are true ... ' William James. Pragmatism: 
A New Name for Some Old Ways of ThinJdng 37 (1978). 
38 Cf. the present study. 1.2. the text accompanying notes 36-39. 
39 'Politics.' The Politics of Aristotle, 1.1253 a (transl. E. Barker. 1946). 
40 Being and Time. supra. note 28. at 67 (emphasis added). 
41 Aristotle. 'Nicomachean Ethics,' transl. W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson. 
supra. note 37. at V. 1134 a (emphasis added). 
42 Plato, The Republic IV, 433 (trans!. A.D. Lindsay. 1950). 
43 Being and Time, supra, note 28. at 67. 
44 Poli'tics, supra, note 39. at 1.1253 a (emphasis added). 
45 Id. 
46 Rhetoric. I. 1374 b. 
47 Ethics 1134 b - 1135 a; Rhetoric 1373 b. 
48 Poli'tics, 1253 a. 
49 See. Rhetoric, I, 1368 b. 
SOld. at, I, 1354 a-b; Ethics. V, 1134 a-b. 
51 See. for Aristotle employing 'persuasion... on opposite sides of a question,' 
2.3. the text accompanying notes 101-104. 
52 E. Barker. 'Introduction.' The Poli'tics of Aristotle XI. LXX (1946). 
53 Id. 
54 Ethics, V. 1135 a. 
55 Rhetoric, I. 1373 b. Cj. Blackstone on natural law as 'binding over all the 
globe in all countries. and at all times.' Sir William Blackstone. The 
Sovereignty of the Law: Selections from Blackstone's 'Commentaries on the 
lAws of England 29 (ed. G. Jones. 1973). 
56 Rhetoric, I. 1373 b. 
57 Id. at I. 1368 b. 
58 Id. 
59 Ethics, V. 1135 a. 
60 Id. at VIII. 1162 b. 
61 Id. at V, 1135 a. 
62 Id. (emphasis added). 
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63 'Appendix,' The Politics of Aristotle, supra, note 39, at 366. 
64 Cf. Kelsen's 'substantive (material) constitution,' as opposed to 'formal 
(procedural) constitution,' a sense of the constitution which represents the 
highest level in the hierarchical structure within a system. Validity, 
accordingly, is a matter regarding the constitution in its substantive sense. H. 
Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory [The First Edition of the 
'Pure Theory of Law,' 1934] 63-64 (transl. B.L. Paulson and S.L. Paulson, 
1992). 
65 Rhetoric, 1,1373 b (emphasis added). 
66 Philosophicallnvesh'gations, supra, note 28, par. 415. 
67 Id. note [to par. 142] at 56. 
68 Cf. id. at 226: 'What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say -
forms of life' (emphasis in original). 
69 In a short story, Woody Allen relates the exploits of the genius who 'invented' 
sandwich, amongst whose early, and failed, projects were that of 'a slice of 
bread, a slice of bread on top of that, and a slice of turkey on top of both,' that 
of 'two slices of turkey with a slice of bread in the middle,' that of 'three 
consecutive slices of ham stacked on one another,' and finally that of '[t]hree 
slices of bread on top of one another.' W. Allen, 'Yes, But Can the Steam 
Engine Do This?' in his Complete Prose 175, 179 (1992). 
70 Cj. 'It is true that beliefes and wishes have a transcendental basis in the sense 
that their foundation is arbitrary . You cannot help entertaining and feeling 
them, and there is an end of it. As an arbitrary fact people wish to live, and we 
say with various degrees of certainty that they can do so only on certain 
conditions. To do it they must eat and drink. That necessity is absolute.' O.W. 
Holmes, 'Natural Law' 32 Harvard lAw Review 40,41 (1918). 
71 Politics, I, 1252 a. 
72 Ethics, VIII; 1160 a. 
73 Politics, I, 1253 a. 
74 Cj. Heidegger's translation of the 'polis' in the first chorus in Sophocles' 
Antigone: '[T]he foundation and scene of man's being-there ... the polis. Polis 
is usually translated as city or city-state. This does not capture the full 
meaning. Polis means, rather, the place, the there, wherein and as which 
historical being-there is. The polis is the historical place, the there in which, 
out of which, andfor which history happens.' M. Heidegger, An Introduction 
to Metaphysics 152 (transl. R. Manheim, 1987). 
75 Politics, I, 1253 a. 
76 Being and Time, supra, note 28. at 164. 
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77 Id. at 165. 
78 See, the present study, Cone/usion, the text accompanying notes 63-68. 
79 See, Introduction, the text accompanying notes 6-15; 1.1, the text 
accompanying notes 10-11. 
80 Politics, I, 1253 a. 
81 Id. Cf. 'Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor 
Mind. If they were. they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as 
well as his Senses. and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in 
Society, not in Solitude.' T. Hobbes. Leviathan. Part I. ch. 13 [po 66] (1940). 
82 Politics. I, 1253 a. 
1.4 The Ordinary and the Extraordinary 
1 R. Descarates, 'Meditations on First Philosophy,' 2 The Philosophical Writings 
of Descartes 3, 16-23 (transl. J. Cottingham et. al., 1985). 
2 J.-F. Lyotard andJ.-L. Thebaud,Just Gaming 70 (transl. W. Godzich, 1985). 
3 See, 1.3. 
4 Just Gaming, supra, note 2, at 73. 
SId. 
6 Id. at 83. 
7 I. Kant, Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals 453 (transl. L. W. Beck, 1959) 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See, J. Derrida, Writing and Difference 279-280 (transl. A. Bass, 1978); J. 
11 
12 
Denida, Positions 7 (transl. A. Bass. 1987). 
Foundations, supra, note 7, at 454. 
Id at 447. 
13 Just Gaming, supra, note 2, at 74. 
14 J. Derrida, 'Parergon,' in his The Truth in Painting 15-147 (trans!. G. 
15 
16 
Bennington and I. McLeod, 1987). 
I. Kant, Critique of Judgement 65 (transl. J.e. Meredith, 1952). 
Id. at 68. 
17 Preceding Kant, the conception of a parergon seems to have lent a curious use 
to Bentham. See, J. Bentham, 'Preface' to his A Fragment on Government 93 
(ed. F.e. Montague, 1980). In this polemic against Blackstone's Commentaries 
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upon the Laws of England (of which premiere volume appeared in 1765, and 
the early edition of Bentham's polemic was published, anonymously, in 1776), 
he distinguishes between the work of what he calls the 'Expositor: who merely 
describes what the law is, and that of the 'Censor: who contemplates and 
makes suggestions as to what the law ought to be. 'The Expositor ... is always 
the citizen of this or that particular country: the Censor is, or ought to be the 
citizen of the world' (ill. at 99). To someone such as Blackstone ('the downfall 
of [Whose] work: Bentham thought, meant nothing less than 'the welfare of 
mankind' [id. at 94]), accordingly. the work of the 'Censor' was nothing but a 
parergon (id. at 99). One is very much tempted, however, in the anticipatory 
reference of Bentham's argument to the lonely sadness of one 'eleventh thesis' 
that once was and that invoked. along similar lines, 'change' as opposed to 
'interpretation' (see, K. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach' in K. Marx and F. Engels 
Selected Works. 30 [transl. not cited, 1970]), to bring up the question of 
parerga as fonnulated in and for his own project (of, perhaps. the delicate 
swing between the two notions of 'reformation,' as the ergon, yet somehow 
ultimately defined in terms of the parergon, of 'what-is-already-there' - of 
which Blackstone is the 'Expositor'). 
18 Truth in Painting, supra, note 14, at 45. 
19 [d. at 97-98. 
20 [d. at 81. 
21 Supra, note 2. 
22 See, for the politeia, 1.3, the text accompanying notes 60-62. 
23 Just Gaming, supra, note 2, at 74. 
24 [d. 
25 [d. 
26 See. 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. 
27 Supra. note 4. 
28 Just Gaming, supra, note 2, at 74. 
29 See,1. 
30 Plato, The Republic I, 338 (transl. A.D. Undsay. 1950). See, for a reading of 
the statement by Thrasymachus from a 'Wittgensteinean' point of view which 
wildly contrasts with the position I. likewise. hold to be Wittgensteinean, H.F. 
Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice 169-180 (1972). According to the author, 
Thrasymachus identifies an individual - accidental - pattern of the just with 
the word 'justice' the way the picture theory of the early Wittgenstein labels 
facts with propositions. Realist Felix Cohen makes the same choice as he finds 
in Socrates' definition of justice a functionalism congenial to the realist stance. 
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F.S. Cohen. The Legal Conscience: Selected Papers of Felix S. Cohen 55-56 
(ed. L.K. Cohen. 1970). Cf my discussion of Cohen's pictorialism. 2.4. the 
text accompanying notes 128-151. 
31 For an account of the Sophist morality in this respect. see G.B. Kerferd. The 
Sophistic Movementch. 12 (1981). 
32 Just Gaming, supra, note 2. at 76. 
33 J. Locke. An Essay Concerning HUlTUln Understanding. book IV. ch. XV. par. 
6 (ed. P.H. Nidditch. 1975) (emphasis in original). 
34 Just Gaming. supra. note 2. at 76. 
35 See,l.1. 
36 Just Gaming, supra, note 2. at 82. 
37 The pure transcendence Lyotard seeks to achieve through what he calls one's 
'capability to decide,' Rawls achieves by his 'veil of ignorance,' of the original 
position of his contractarian theory. See. J. Rawls. 'The Kantian Interpretation 
of Justice as Fairness.' A Theory of Justice 251-57 (1973). The Kantian 
dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy is wholly preserved in Rawls' theory. 
The original position, accordingly. is the position in which. by means of a veil 
of ignorance. man is assumed to be deprived of his phenomenal. 
heteronomous side. He therefore becomes a nournenal and autonomous being. 
The original position may be viewed. then. as a procedural interpretation of 
Kant's conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative' (id. at 256). 
38 Aristotle. 'Rhetoric,' transl. W.R. Roberts 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle 
II. 1402 a (ed. J. Barnes. 1984). 
39 Just Gaming. supra. note 2. at 78. 
40 
41 
Rhetoric. supra, note 38. at 11.1402 a. 
[d. 
42 See. 1.1. the text accompanying notes 18-26. 
43 Just Gaming. supra. note 2. at 78. The Kantian theory of justice along the 
specific lines Lyotard suggests is that of Rudolf Stammler. The Theory of 
Justice (transl. I. Husik. 1969). first published in 1902. Die Lehre von dem 
richtigen Rechte. Berlin. According to F r a n ~ i s s Geny. Stammler's work 
'merits a place beside the great works of Savigny. Ibering and Kohler.' F. 
Gooy, 'The Critical System Udealistic and Formal} of R. Stammler,' Appendix 
I to ill. 493, at 494. Stammler is sometimes recognized as the final word of an 
eventful period of German legal philosophy. in particular in his apparent 
reconciliation of positivism and the views of natural law. He separated law 
from morals. yet he at once attempted to formulate an idea of universal 
validity for legal rules. a notion crudely reflected in the misleading slogan 
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associated with the bulk of his work, 'natural law with variable content' (UI.). 
Lyotard's project of justice appears to be significantly marked by his Kantian 
conceptions of 'Idea' and of 'anticipation.' In an absurdly paradoxical way, 
contrary to its outmoded overtones at first, Stammler appears to be not only 
definitely less problematic but probably more profoundly 'non-transcendental,' 
if that can be said at all, whose work on justice, similarly, is based on the 
Kantian notions of 'Idea' and of 'critical reflection.' As he puts it, 'the idea of 
just law ... is found by critical reflection upon the possibility of a unitary 
comprehension of all empirical legal material' (id. at 211, cf. the Lyotardian 
conception of 'capability to decide' as 'anticipation,' or consideration, of 'all of 
society as a sensible nature, as an ensemble that already has its laws, its 
customs, and its regularities,' supra the text accompanying note 36). The 
model and principles of just law, Stammler finds in the concept, suggested by 
Kant. of the 'neighbour.' '[T]he celebrated fonnula of the Old Testament as 
well as that of the New has in view what in technical philosophical language is 
known as an idea ('Idee' = idea, ideal), i.e. a principle that serves as a criterion 
for the content of volition and its application in practice' (id. at 219, cf the 
Lyotardian 'willing' - '[t]here is a willing. What this will wants we do not 
know. We feel it in the form of an obligation, but this obligation is empty, in a 
way. So if it can be given a content in the specific occasion, this content can 
be only circumscribed by an Idea: supra the text accompanying note 2). 
Stammler adds: 'To realize completely the love of one's fellowman as oneself 
would presuppose a perfect rational being that was at the same time social 
without any limitation. But since in both respects the life of man is subject to 
limiting conditions, the command in question as an ideal ['Love thy 
neighbour .. .'] can only serve as a maxim, to the fulfilment of which every one 
must earnestly strive to approach; but to attain it absolutely is impossible if 
only because of the limitation of man's physical power. And secondly in 
carrying out our fundamental norm we must not fail to take account of the 
conditioning social bases upon which it must be realized' (id. at 220-21). 
Universal validity Stammler seeks to establish for law can easily be sneered at 
unless it is understood in the very terms of his formulation. 'Just law,' he 
notes, 'is positive law whose content has certain objective qualities. It applies 
to all law, past, present, future' (ill. at 19). Max Weber was among the first, as 
a champion of the then newly fashionable dichotomy of natural and human 
sciences, to criticize the conception of objectivity ascribed here to law, 
according to the said dichotomy only natural sciences being genuinely blessed 
by it. Weber's polemic is practically a hatchet job he does on Stammler's book 
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Wirtschajt und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung: Eine 
sozialphilosophische Untersuchung [The Historical Materialist Conception of 
Economy and Law: A Sociophilosophical Investigation] (2nd ed. 1906, 
Leipzig) where Stammler elaborates his project of a social science on the basis 
of a notion of 'social life. ' As he, in so doing, sidesteps the current problematic 
characterized by the dichotomy things-as-they-are-seen-culturally and things-
as-they-are, Weber's basic (and markedly Cartesian-Kantian) objection to his 
work is its conception of objectivity. It is Cartesian, because behind it is the 
privacy that is significantly alloted by Weber to that which is social. It is 
Kantian, because it takes for granted the above dichotomy that defines the 
current problematic, and finds in the Stammlerian objectivity a claim to the 
knowledge of what may loosely be called noumena (object-ivity). See, M. 
Weber, Cn'tique of Stammler (transl. G. Oakes, 1977). Stammler's response to 
him is to try and elucidate his notion of objectivity as a teleologic one in 
contradistinction to the objectivity of natural sciences. See, John C.H. Wu, 
'Stammler and His Critics,' Appendix II to Stammler, supra, 553, at 559-61. 
Only he hardly need have taken the trouble, if the then trendy, Diltheian 
movement of Geisteswissenschaft had not obscured, for Weber, the textual, 
outside, non-private, hence the 'objective,' quality of understanding 
(verstehen). Is not the shakiness it might suggest equally (in 'kind,' that is) 
prevalent in the objectivity of natural sciences? According to Stammler, just 
law 'denotes a critical treatment of a historically growing legal content, in so 
far as it classifies its content systematically as just or unjust' (id. at 19). What 
is fundamental about it is that 'we constantly make this division ... And 
therefore it must be possible to have a clear and adequate idea of what we are 
actually doing' when we make it (id. at 19-20, emphasis added). All positive 
law, accordingly, is an attempt to capture that which penneates that division 
(id. at 24). What Stammler has to say about the division between the positions 
of JX>sitive law and natural law, on the other hand, is hardly an affinnation of 
the classical views on the subject. 'The contents of JX>sitive and natural law do 
not come from two distinct spheres. The subject matter is the same for both, 
the conditions of their origin are the same, and both of them were born in one 
and the same world' (id. at 78). In both, he adds, '[t]he subject matter is gotten 
from historical experience and there is no material that is independent thereof 
(id. at 80, emphasis added). What naturally follows is that no universal 
validity can have claim for the content, 'there are no concrete legal rules 
whose content is absolutely valid: hence the tragic mistake of the natural law 
position (id. at 91). Can universal validity have claims for the 'method: then? 
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'We must admit that a systematic and universal vkw [as opposed to the 
'content'] of law may also undergo change and progress. And experience tells 
of many differences of opinion concerning the absolutely valid method of just 
legal content. Nevertheless the aim of the investigation is to find something 
absolute' (itt. at 92, emphasis added). 'Something absolute' Stammler comes up 
with in the end is the above mentioned categorical imperative, the 'Idea,' of the 
concept of 'neighbour' (cf. the Lyotardian conception of the pragmatics of 
obligation, 1.3, the text accompanying note 5). See for a lucid and critical 
account of Stammler's work, Morris Ginsberg, 'Stammler's Philosophy of Law' 
in Modem 1heories of Law 38 (ed. W.I. Jennings, 1933). 
44 Rhetoric, supra, note 38. at 11.1402 a (emphasis added). 
45 Id. at I, 1355 a. 
46 Id. at I. 1354 a. 
47 Id. at I, 1355 b. 
48 See, 2.3, the text accompanying notes 101-104. 
49 Rhetoric, supra, note 38, at I, 1355 a. 
50 Aristotle onphronesis, 1.1, the text accompanying note 24; and 1.3, the text 
accompanying note 36. 
51 Rhetoric, supra, note 38, at I, 1355 b (emphasis added). 
52 Id. at II, 1402 a. 
53 Id. at III, 1404 a (emphasis added). 
54 See, 1.3, the text accompanying note 36. 
55 See, J. Derrida, 'Signature Event Context' in his Limited Inc. 1 (transl. 
S.Weber and J. Mehlman, 1990). 
56 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with W o r ~ ~ 22 (eds. J.O. Urmson and M. 
Sbisi.1989). 
57 Id. (emphasis in original). 
58 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations par. 257 (transl. G.E.M. 
Anscombe, 1988). 
59 'Signature Event Context: supra, note 55. 
60 Rhetoric, supra, note 38, at III, 1404 a. 
61 Supra, note 55. 
62 Supra, note 53. 
63 See, for a discussion of the Aristotelian dichotomy, S. Fish, Doing What 
Comes Naturally: Change. Rhetoric. and the Practice of Theory in Literary 
and Legal Studies 475-479 (1989). 
64 T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). See. for Fish's 
discussion of Kuhn's project in the wider context of the rhetorical controversy, 
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Doing What Comes Naturally. supra. note 63. at 486-488. 
65 Cf. 'The use of impossible probabilities is preferable to that of unpersuasive 
possibilities.' Aristotle. 'Poetics,' Aristotle's Poetics. 1460 a (transl. L. Golden. 
1968). 
66 Rhetoric. supra, note 38. at n. 1402 a. 
67 Just Gaming. supra. note 2. at 79. 
68 Id. at 76. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at SO. 
71 Cf. Heidegger on anxiety as a possible vehicle of transition to the domain of 
authenticity. the present study. Conclusion. the text accompanying notes 64-
68. 
2 THE LAW AND ITS READINGS 
1 F. Gerty. Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law: 
Critical Essay [1899] par. 149 (transl. J. Mayda. 1963). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. par. 146. 
4 E. Lambert. 'Codified Law and Case-Law: Their Part in Shaping the Policies 
of Justice' [1903], The Science of Legal Method 251. 278 (transl. L.B. 
Register. 1969). 
5 H. Kantorowicz. 'Some Rationalism About Realism' 43 Yale Law Journal 
1240. 1241 (1934). 
6 Method. supra. note 1. par. 97. In the Second Edition (1919) of the Method. 
Gerty offers a panoramic account and criticism (see, pars. 205-222) of this 
German legal movement which has come to be known by such diverse titles as 
jreies Recht. jreie Rechtsfindung. the Free Search of the Rule. and jreie 
Rechtswissenscha/t. the Free Jurisprudence. 
7 H. Kantorowicz. 'Legal Science - The Summary of Its Methodology' 28 
Columbia Law Review 679 (1928). 
8 See. 2.4. the text accompanying notes 23-69. 
9 Method. supra. note 1. par. 98. 
10 Id. par. 57. 
11 See. 2.4 generally. 
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12 K. N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice 42 (1962) 
(the celebrated 1931 article 'Some Realism About Realism' [cl the title of 
Kantorowicz's article. supra. note 5]. with Jerome Frank as its co-author. 
reprinted id. pp. 42-76). 
13 See R. David. French Law: Its Structure, Sources and Methodology 83 (transl. 
M. Kindred. 1972); and H. P. de Vries. Civil lAw and the Anglo-American 
Lawyer 243-248 (1976). 
14 The title of Llewellyn's seminal book The Common Law Tradition: Deciding 
Appeals (1960) is a clear reference to the 'realist' (and not 'validist' [formal]: 
hence the civil law view cA 'short circuit') nature of decisional law based 
systems 'by definition.' 
15 See. 1.4. note 17. 
16 See. 1. note 3. 
17 See, 2.3, the text accompanying notes 105-119. 
18 H.L.A. Hart. The Concept of Law 124-125 (1988). 
19 R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 87 (1986). 
20 Cf Justice Sutherland dissenting in Home Bldg. & Loan ksn. v. Blaisdell. 
290 U.S. 398. 451 (1934): 'The provisions of the Federal Constitution. 
undoubtedly, are pliable in the sense that in appropriate cases they have the 
capacity of bringing within their group every new condition which falls within 
their meaning. But. their meaning is changeless; it is only their application 
which is extensible' (footnote omitted). 
21 See. 1.3, the text accompanying notes 31-36. 
22 See. id .• the text accompanying notes 49-53. 
23 J. Locke. Two Treatises of Government Second Treatise par. 124 (ed. P. 
Laslett. 1965). 
24 J.-J. Rousseau. 'The Social Contract' in his The Social Contract and 
Discourses Book 2. ch. 6 [Law] (transl. G.D.H. Cole. 1986). 
25 The Interpretation of Statutes par. 1. Law Com. No. 21. Scott. Law Com. 11 
(1969). 
26 See. for a classic essay exploring the three rules. J. Willis. 'Statute 
Interpretation in a Nutshell' 16 Canadian Bar Review 1 (1938). 
27 E. McWhinney. Supreme Courts and Judicial lAw Making: Constitutional 
Tribunals and Constitutional Review 94 (1986). 
28 S. Levinson. Constitutional Faith 21 (1988). See also on the same theme. T.C. 
Grey. 'The Constitution as Scripture' 37 Stanford Law Review 1 (1984); MJ. 
Perry. Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay 142-144 (1988); and 
S.D. Smith. 'Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation' 79 Virginia Law Review 
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583 (1993). 
29 One such project is that of the Comparative Statutory Interpretation Group 
part of whose work is to be found in D.N. MacConnick and R.S. Summers 
(eels), Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (1991). Another project 
seeking to establish a uniform discourse is that of 'constitutional modalities' by 
P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991). As distinct from the former, 
Bobbitt emphasizes that his 'modalities' in the verification of interpretative 
propositions operate on an 'incommensurate' (as opposed to logical-analytical) 
basis. 
30 Supra. note 1. 
31 See. for an account of Geny's work generally and in its links to the legal 
thought prevalent at the time, J. Mayda, Franfois Geny and Modern 
Jurisprudence ch. 1 (1978); and T J. O'Toole, 'Jurisprudence of F r a n ~ i s s
Geny' 3 Villanova lAw Review 455 (1958). For the Anglo-American influence 
of Geny's work, see A. Kocourek, 'Libre Recherche in America' in Recueil 
d'etudes sur les sources du droit en l'honneur de Franfois Geny Vol. 2 at 459 
(ed. E. Lambert, 1935); J.G. Rogers, 'A Scientific Approach to Free Judicial 
Decision'ill. at 552; and B.A. Wortley. ' F r a n ~ o i s s Geny' in Modern Theories 0/ 
Law 139 (ed. W.I. Jennings. 1933). 
2.1 The Text and Its Edges 
1 R. Saleilles. 'Preface' [1899] to F. Geny, Method of Interpretation and Sources 
of Private Positive Law: Critical Essay [1899] LXXVII (trans I. J. Mayda, 
1963). 
2 Id. at LXXVII - LXXX. 
3 Id. at LXXXV - LXXXVI. 
4 See, for the problem of the correct rendering of the phrase into English. J. 
Mayda. 'Geny's Methode After 60 Years: A Critical Introduction' to the 
Method. supra. note 1. at V, XI - XII. 
5 Method, supra, note 1, par. 35. 
6 Id. (footnotes omitted). In a footnote added to the Second Edition, id. 23 a, 
Geny draws attention to his slightly revised position regarding the absolute 
supremacy of the written law and refers to his later work Science et technique 
en droit prive positi/ 4 Volumes (1914-1924). 
7 Method, supra, note 1, par. 35. 
8 Id. par. 36. 
9 Id. par 57. 
10 Id. fn. 135. 
n Id. par. 146. 
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12 P. Brest, 'The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding' 60 Boston 
University Law Review 204 (1980). 
13 J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 1 (1980). 
14 Brest divides originalism into its moderate and extreme fonns. A further 
division of the latter is, in tum, introduced: strict textualism and strict 
intentionalism. See, 'The Misconceived Quest: supra, note 12, at 204. See, for 
a succinct statement of the concepts of the text in the interpretative 
controversy, namely the text (a) as a structure referring to the world logically 
or pictorially, (b) as a historical discourse, a model, an object of comparison, 
and finally (c) as a self-referential unit, G.L. Bruns, 'Law and Language: A 
Hermeneutics of the Legal Text' in Legal Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and 
Practice 23 (ed. G. Leyh, 1992). 
15 J. Bentham, O/Laws in General 162 -163 (ed. H.L.A. Hart,1970). 
16 Id. at 163. 
17 Id. at 239 - 241. 
18 Method, supra, note I, par. 33. 
19 C. Fried, 'Sonnet LXV and the 'Black Ink' of the Framers' Intention' in 
Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 45 (eds. S. Levinson 
and S. Mailloux, 1988). 
20 Id. 
21 An epistemological indeterminacy is invoked by some of the writers in the 
critical legal studies movement. Indeed, it is this very movement that is 
targeted by Fried rather than the traditional extratextualist positions. See, for 
critical legal studies, Conclusion, note 79. His point is equally relevant to the 
traditional extratextualist views. however. for abandoning reading on a textual 
basis without at once giving up the principle of the rule of law can be said to 
suggest problematic consequences for the extratextualist rhetoric. 
22 E. Meese III, 'Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society 
Lawyers Division' in Interpreting Law, supra, note 19, at 25,29. 
23 Democracy and Distrust, supra, note 13, at 1. 
24 See, id. ch. 4. 
25 The Misconceived Quest: supra, note 12, at 224-226. 
26 T.C. Grey, 'Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?' 27 Stanford Law Review 
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703,7070974-1975). 
27 MJ. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay 133 (1988). 
28 W J. Brennan, Jr., 'The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification' in Interpreting Law, supra, note 19, at 13, 18. Cf Sandalowon 
constitutional reading 'not as exegesis, but as a process by which each 
generation gives fonnal expression to values it holds fundamental in the 
operations of government: T. Sandalow. 'Constitutional Interpretation' 79 
Michigan Law Review 1033.1068 (1981). 
29 'Contemporary Ratification,' supra. note 28. at 18 (emphasis added). 
30 Morality, Politics, and Law. supra. note 2:7. at 133. 
31 [d. (emphasis added). 
32 See. The Misconceived Quest: supra. note 12, at 224; MJ. Perry, The 
Constitution. the Courts, and Human Rights 92 (1982); D. Lyons, 
'Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning' in Philosophy and Law 
75.89-90 (eds. J. Coleman and E.F. Paul, 1987). 
33 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See. the text accompanying infra, notes 98-109. 
34 But see, for a study that questions the historical Marbury as 'an all-
encompassing symbol of the modern doctrine of judicial review,' R.L. Clinton, 
Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review 190 (1989). According to Clinton, 
the case was an 'essentially obscure case. whose holdings were very narrow' 
(id.). 
35 347 U.S. 483 (954). 
36 A.M. Bickel, 'The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,' 
appendix to his Politics and the Warren Court 211,256 (1965). 
37 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
38 The decision of Brown found the holding 'separate but equal,' of Plessy, non-
applicable only 'in the field of public education.' Supra, note 35, at 495. 
39 H. Wechsler, 'Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law' 73 Harvard 
Law Review 1 (1959). 
40 'Address,' supra, note 22. at 30. 
41 R. Berger. Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 412 (1977). 
42 R. Berger. 'Lawyering vs. Philosophizing: Facts or Fancies' 9 University of 
Dayton Law Review 171 (1984). 
43 R.H. Bork. The Tempting of America 76 (1990). 
44 Id. at 76-77. 
45 Morality, Politics, and Law, supra, note 27, at 279-280, n.7. 
46 Democracy and Distrust, supra, note 13, at 221, n. 4 (the square-bracketed 
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term is 'interpretivism' in Ely's original, cf. the text accompanying, supra, 
notes 12-14). 
47 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 29-31. 
48 Cf. Lyotard on the loss of origins in modernity, 1.2, the text accompanying 
note 9. 
49 Cf. Derrida on framing; 1.4, the text accompanying notes 14-20. 
50 See, the text accompanying, supra, note 19. 
51 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 37-44. 
52 'Address,' supra, note 22, at 31. 
53 F. Douglass, 'The Constitution and Slavery' [1849] in The Life and Writings of 
Frederick Dougltlss Vol. I, at 361, 362 (ed. P.S. Foner, 1950). 
54 See, the text accompanying, supra, note 10. 
55 'Constitution and Slavery,' supra, note 53, at 362. 
56 W. Goodell, 'Views of American Constitutional Law in Its Bearing Upon 
American Slavery' [1844] in The Influence of the Slave Power with other Anti-
Slavery Pamphlets 155 (1970). 
57 Id. 
58 See,1.2. 
59 Method, supra, note I, par. 57. n. 135. 
60 Id. par. 57. 
61 See,2.2. 
62 See, 2, note 28. 
63 See the text accompanying, supra, note 3. 
64 CJ. Antieau, Constitutional Construction 51-52 (1982). 
65 [1976] 1 All ER 353, 360. I have been referred to the present and following 
cases by Antieau, supra, note 64, at 51-52. 
66 Lord Diplock in Hinds v The Queen, supra, note 65, at 360. 
67 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
68 For a comparison with their constitutional counterparts. for the three basic sets 
of arguments in statutory interpretation, see, (1) textualism, F.H. Easterbrook, 
'Statutes' Domains' 50 University of Chicago Law Review 533 (1983); (2) 
intentionalism, E.M. Maltz, 'Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: 
The case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach' 63 Tulane Law Review 1 
(1988), and R.A. Posner, 'Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in 
the Courtroom' 50 University of Chicago Law Review 800 (1983); (3) 
transformative (ex tunc) extratextualism (the 'present-minded' reading), T.A. 
Aleinikoff 'Updating Statutory Interpretation' 87 Michigan Law Review 20 
(1988). And see, for the 'dynamic statutory interpretation' of Eskridge which 
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aims at a hermeneutic understanding of the reading process, as well as 
transcending the sterility of what he calls the 'foundationalism' of the three 
basic sets of arguments. W.N. Eskridge, Jr., 'Politics Without Romance: 
Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation' 74 Virginia 
Law Review 275 (1988); W.N. Eskridge, Jr.. 'Gadamer / Statutory 
Interpretation' 90 Columbia Law Review 609 (1990); W.N. Eskridge, Jr. and 
P.P. Frickey, 'Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning' 42 Stanford Law 
Review 321 (1990). 
69 '[God] hath made us able ministers of the new testament; not of the letter, but 
of the spirit: for the letter killeth. but the spirit giveth life.' 2 Cor. Ill, 6 (The 
King James Version). 
70 R. David, French Law: Its Structure, Sources, and Methodology 159 (transl. 
M. Kindred. 1972). In a paradigmatic decision of the Turkish Court of 
Cassation, one to 'unify prior judicial holdings' (the unifying decisions have 
the effect of laws), the following dictum is expressed: 'The spirit of the law is 
to control its letter' (9.3.1955 E. 22/ K.2). In another unifying decision the 
Court cites it as 'one of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence and legal 
practice today' that 'in order to avoid contradicting the purpose of the law. 
rules are to be construed not solely by their letter but on the bases of both their 
letter and spirit' (4.2.1959 E.14 / K.6). Meaning is to be sought. accordingly, 
in the triangle of the letter. the purpose, and the spirit: 'the first principle is to 
determine the meaning by the plain words of the statute ... if the meaning thus 
ascertained appears to contradict its purpose. then ... the spirit of the statute is 
to dictate the decision' (27.3.1957 E.l / K.3). 
71 French Law. supra note 70, at 157. 
72 See, supra, note 33. 
73 T.C. Grey. 'The Constitution as Scripture' 37 Stanford Law Review I, 14 
(1984). 
74 Id. 
75 [1850] 20 LJ. C.P. 33. 
76 Id. at 35. See also Lord Bramwell's words reiterating Abley in Hill v East and 
West India Dock Co. [1884] 9 AC 448, at 465; and those of Lord Esher in the 
same vein in R. v The Judge 0/ the City 0/ London Court [1892] 1 QB 273 
(C.A.) at 290. 
77 Casso crim. 8.3.1930; cited in R. David and H.P. de Vries, The French Legal 
System: An Introduction to Civil Law Systems 88 (1958); and A. West et al., 
The French Legal System: An Introduction 52-53 (1992). 
78 [1919] 3 WLR 1025; cited in R. Cross. Statutory Interpretation 67 (008. J. 
Bell and G. Engle, 1987). 
79 [1868] 4 QB 147. 
80 [1964] 2 QB 7, [1964] 1 AIl ER 628. 
81 Interpretation, supra, note 78, at 67. 
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82 1... Wittgenstein, Zettel par. 405 (eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, 
transl. G.E.M. Anscombe, 1988). 
83 1... Wittgenstein, On Certainty par. 467 (eds. E.G. M. Anscombe and G.H. von 
Wright transl. D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, 1989). 
84 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations par. 454 (transl. G.E.M. 
Anscombe, 1988); see also ill. par. 86 (emphasis in original). 
85 M. Heidegger, Being and Time 108-109 (transl. J. Macquarrie and E. 
Robinson, 1990). 
86 Id. at 110. 
87 Philosophicollnvestigations, supra, note 84, par. 454. 
88 L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books 36 (1989). 
89 Cf. Derrida's reading of the Aristotelian dichotomy (in the Topics, I, 5, 102 a) 
of the essence of a thing as opposed to its properties, that which is literal 
being based on the former. The metaphorical, on the other hand, is a mere 
play of the properties, 'without directly, fully, and properly stating [the] 
essence itself, without bringing to light the truth of the thing itself.' J. Derrida, 
Margins a/Philosophy 249 (transl. A. Bass, 1986). 
90 Philosophical Investigations, supra, note 84, par. 454 (emphasis in original). 
Cj. Blue and Brown Booles, supra, note 88, at 28; 'a word hasn't got a meaning 
given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a 
kind of scientific investigation what the word really means. A word has the 
meaning someone has given to it' Cf. Being and Time, supra, note 85, at 193: 
'Meaning is an existentiale [a 'humanishness'] of Dasein, not a property 
attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them ... ' 
91 Id at 114-122. 
92 Philosophical Investigation, supra, note 84, par. 38. 
93 See, Being and Time, supra, note 85, at 112. Cj. Philosophical Investigations, 
supra, note 84, par. 129. 
94 See, supra, note 69. 
95 Cj. E.A. Driedger, 'Statutes: The Mischievous Literal Golden Rule,' 59 
Canadian Bar Review 780 (1981), where a binary opposition of literal and 
secondary meaning is insightfully challenged; the author notes that 'the 
secondary meaning is the literal meaning in the context in which the words are 
used,' and that 'there is no such thing as a literal meaning as distinguished 
from some other meaning' (itt. at 780). 
96 See, supra, note 78. 
97 Being and Time, supra, note 85, at 122. 
98 See, supra, note 33. 
99 See, supra, notes 73-74. 
100 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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101 Id. at 414. Cf J. Leubsdorf, 'Deconstructing the Constitution' 40 Stanford Law 
Review 181, 182: 'TIle Constitution's avoidance of figures of speech is itself a 
figure insinuating simplicity and honesty, like the plain dress of a Quaker.' 
102 Marbury, supra, note 33, at 175-176: 'TIle powers of the legislature are 
defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, 
the Constitution is written.' 
103 'Interpretare means 'to be mutually indebted'; pret: from popular Latin 
praestus, from the classical adverb praesto, meaning 'close at hand,' 'nearby'; 
praesto esse: 'to be present, attend'; praestare: 'to furnish, to present .. .' J. 
Kristeva, 'Psychoanalysis and the Polis' 9 Critical Inquiry 77, 80 (trans). M. 
Waller, 1982). Cf interpretation as 'presencing,' the present study, Conclusion, 
generally. 
104 B. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 60 (1924); quoted in K. Llewellyn, The 
Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 25 (1960). 
105 Method, supra, note 1, par. 99 (footnote omitted). 
106 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). Levinson points out the difference of rhetoric 
between the opinion of the present decision and that of the following. I have 
been referred to the cases by his discussion. See, S. Levinson, Constitutional 
Faith 66-67 (1988). 
107 The legal, in the present case, is represented by the domestic laws of Spanish 
and Portuguese slave-owners. [d. 
108 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
109 The statute at issue is also found to overrun the contract clause of the 
Constitution. Id. 
110 See, supra, note 35. 
111 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 32-36. 
112 See, supra, notes 37-39 and 41-42. 
113 See, supra notes 40 and 43-44. 
114 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 29-31 and 45-57. 
115 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
116 [d. at 499. 
117 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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118 The decision of Plessy v Ferguson is justified by a segregationist reading of 
the equal protection clause; see. supra. note 37. 
119 Supra. note 115. at 500. 
120 C.L. Black. Jr .• 'The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions' 69 Yale Law 
Journal421 (1960). 
121 See. for Llewellyn's 'Grand Style.' 2.4, the text accompanying notes 36-83. 
122 See. Muir v Louisville Park Theatrical Association 347 U.S. 971 (1954), 
desegregating the use of sports and leisure facilities; Mayor and City Council 
of Baltimore City v Dawson 350 U.S. 8n (1955), desegregating the use of 
public beaches and bathhouses; Gayle v Browder 352 U.S. 903 (1956). 
desegregating in public transportation. The decision of Gayle is usually 
considered to have officially buried that of Plessy (see. supra. note 118) even 
though this particular decision is not accompanied by an opinion and only 
affinns the lower court opinion in its reading of Brown as relevant also to 
public transportation. 
123 Supra. note 35. at 495. 
124 Bourne v Norwich Crematorium Ltd [1967] 1 AIl ER 576. 
125 See. supra. note 37. 
126 Supra. note 37. 
127 Method, supra. note I, 'Notice for the Second [1919] Edition,' at XCI. 
128 Id. par. 146. 
129 See, 1.4, the text accompanying notes 14-20. 
130 See. J. Derrida. OjGrammatology. Part 2. ch. 2 (transl. G.C. Spivak. 1976). 
131 Id. at 157. 
132 Id. 
133 See, the classic article, W.K. Wimsatt and M. Beardsley, 'The Intentional 
Fallacy' 54 Sewanee Review 468 (1946). Intentionalism returns with a 
vengeance in the much discussed essays by Knapp and Michaels. S. Knapp 
and W.B. Michaels. 'Against Theory' 8 Critical Inquiry 723 (1982); 'A Reply 
to Our Critics' 9 Critical Inquiry 790 (1983); 'A Reply to Richard Rorty: What 
is Pragmatism?' 11 Critical Inquiry 466 (1985); 'Against Theory 2: 
Henneneutics and Deconstruction' 14 Critical Inquiry 49 (1987); 'Intention, 
Identity, and the Constitution: A Response to David Hoy' in Legal 
Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and Practice 187 (ed. G. Leyh. 1992). See, 
for a succinct statement of the new-intentionalist ideas regarding the issues 
surrounding the interpretative controversy in law, W.B. Michaels, 'Response 
to Perry and Simon' 58 Southern California Law Review 673 (1985). 
134 A theory of reading based on a notion of the text-itself is to be found in B.S. 
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Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory (1987), where the grammar disclosed is 
stated to be 'itself part of the message of the text; it does not represent any 
mechanism, separate from that of narrative grammar, by which the text itself 
is produced' (ld. at 299). In his more recent work, however, the author is 
anxious to counter the claims of the textual positivistic overtones of his 
reading. The text, he defends his position, is not the onlY semiotic object. On 
the contrary, 'any semiotic account of law at all... must necessarily include all 
types of semiotic objects which carry legal signification.' B.S. Jackson, Law, 
Fact and Narrative Coherence 177-179, 178 (1989). What makes his work 
susceptible to a positivistic vein, of course, is hardly the fact that he chooses to 
work on texts. But it is his view of the text as a closed. self-bordered. self-
referential unit. See, for a critique of Semiotics and Legal Theory for its 
formalistic sterility and scientific and objectivist pretensions, P. Goodrich, 
'Simulation and the Semiotics of Law' 2 Textual Practice 180 (1988). 
135 W.B. Michaels, 'Against Formalism: The Autonomous Text in Legal and 
Literary Interpretation' 1 Poetics Today 23 (1979). The following by Frye is a 
good formulation of the New Criticist objectives of scientific maturity: 'If 
criticism exists, it must be an examination of literature in terms of a 
conceptual framework derivable from an inductive survey of the literary field.' 
N. Frye, Anatomy of Criticism 7 (1957). 
136 'Against Formalism,' supra, note 135, at 25. 
137 Frigaliment Importing Co. v B.N.S. International Sales Corp. 190 F. Supp. 
116 [S.D.N.Y. 1960], ill. at 25-26. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 27. 
140 S. Fish, Doing What Comes NaturallY: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of 
Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 506-507 (1989). In a later essay Fish 
points out the 'formalism' the parol evidence rule effectively achieves, albeit 
one suppressed and underrated in the traditional formulations and aspirations 
of formalism. The rule does constrain, accordingly, by demanding in the first 
place a high degree of persuasive capability from the ('extrinsic') evidence 
brought to the court's attention with respect to the specific contract. The 
second 'formal' function of the rule shows itself as the rule in turn becomes a 
weighty supporter and protector of the evidence once it is admitted. S. Fish, 
The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence' in The Fate of Law 159, sec. 1 
(eds. A. Sarat and T.R. Kearns, 1991). 
141 Id. at 507. Fish's reading of Hart's The Concept of Law is ill. ch. 21. 
142 ld. at 503. See, H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law ch. 2 (1988). See, for an 
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essay radically questioning the general Hartian approach to the Austinean 
morality, R.N. Moles, Definition and Rule in Legal Theory: A Reassessment of 
H.LA Hart and the Positivist Tradition (1987). 
143 Doing What Comes Naturally, supra, note 140 at 507. 
144 See, Concept of Law, supra, note 142, at 89-96. 
145 Doing What Comes Naturally, supra, note 140, at 509. 
146 Id. at 301. 
147 'Preface,' supra, note 1, at LXXXVI; See also the text accompanying, supra, 
notes 1-4. 
148 Cj. J. Derrlda, Limited Inc 21 (transl. S. Weber and J. Mehlman, 1990): 
'Writing is read; it is not the site, 'in the last instance,' of a hermeneutic 
deciphering, the decoding of a meaning or truth .. .' 
149 Ehrlich. whose work is often associated with that of Geny, also points out in 
his comment on Saleilles' dichotomy of the text and its beyond that the 
dichotomy cannot really be maintained and that both positions necessarily go 
beyond the text. The sole difference between the two positions, accordingly, 
'lies rather in the manner of doing so.' E. Ehrlich. 'Judicial Freedom of 
Decision: Its Principles a n ~ ~ Objects' [1903] in The Science of Legal Method 
47, 73 (transl. E. Bruncken, 1969) (emphasis added). To have meant by 
'manner' the differences of rhetoric between the two positions would have 
made all the difference. That Ehrlich means by it distinct methodologies, and 
that free decision-making he advocates is simply a supplement (notice below 
his also) to the formal core of the law, however, places his initial judgement 
not too far away from Saleilles' formalism. 'For the technical method [i.e., the 
mechanistic jurisprudence] requires that its work of art be achieved only by 
means of certain devices of legal thinking from which no variation must be 
permitted; while free decision [Freie Rechtsfindung] counts also upon the 
element of creative thought by great individual minds' (id., emphasis in 
original). 
150 See. the text accompanying. supra, notes 140-146. 
151 C. Dalton, 'An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine,' in 
Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 285 (eds. S. Levinson 
and S. Mailloux, 1988). 
152 Id. at 309. 
153 Id. at 293. 
154 [d. at 291. Cj. Derrida on 'indeterminacy,' the present study, Conclusion, note 
26. 
155 [d. 
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156 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 84-93. 
157 See, 'Contract Doctrine,' supra, note lSI, at 290-291,317-318. 
158 See, 1.2, the text accompanying notes 30-37; and, 1.3, the text accompanying 
note 29. 
159 See, supra, note 135. 
2.2 Intention and Extension 
1 J. Derrida, Writing and Difference 2:19 (transl. A. Bass, 1978) (emphasis in 
original); see also J. Derrida, Positions 7 (transl. A. Bass, 1987). 
2 J. Derrida, OfGrammatology 166 (transl. G.C. Spivak, 1976). 
3 See, 2.1, the text accompanying notes 90-96. 
4 Grammatology, supra, note 2, at 281. 
5 Cf Lyotard, authorship, and substitution, 1.1, the text accompanying notes 1-
16. 
6 'The system of 'bearing (understanding)-oneself-speak' [s'entendre parler].' 
Grammatology, supra, note 2. at 7-8. Cf L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations par. 363 (transl. G.E.M. Anscombe, 1988): 'I should like to say: 
you regard it much too much as a matter of course that one can tell anything to 
anyone. That is to say: we are so much accustomed to communication through 
language, in conversation. that it looks to us as if the whole point of 
communication lay in this: someone else grasps the sense of my words - ... 
' ... (It is as if one said: 'The clock tells us the time .. .')' 
7 See, for the derived quality of immediacy, itt. at 157; for the notions of 
'rupture' and 'iterability,' refer to J. Derrida, 'Signature Event Context' in his 
Limited Inc 1 (transl. S. Weber and J. Mehlman, 1990). '[liter ... probably 
comes from itara, other in Sanskrit, and everything that follows can be read as 
the working out of the logic that ties repetition to alterity' (M. at 7). Cf 
Heidegger on das Man, the present study, 1-3, the text accompanying note 73. 
8 See, for Derrida's clarification of the point over which there has been some 
confusion. especially Positions, supra, note I, at 13. 
9 Grammatology, supra. note 2, at 159. 
10 Cf 2.1. the text accompanying notes 87-89. 
11 J. Derrida. 'Plato's Pharmacy' in his Dissemination 61 (transl. B. Johnson, 
1981). 
12 The dichotomy to which Hobbes objects is that of government by laws and 
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government by men. 'that in a weI ordered Common-wealth. not Men should 
govern. but the Laws.' T. Hobbes. Leviathan Part IV. ch. 46 (1940). Cf '[W]e 
do not allow a miln to rule. but law. because a man behaves ... in his own 
interests and becomes a tyrant.' Aristotle. 'Nicomachean Ethics.' transl. W.O. 
Ross. revised by J.O. Urmson. in The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. 2. at 
V. 1134 a-b (ed. J. Barnes. 1984). 
13 See. Aristotle. 'Rhetoric.' transl. W.R. Roberts. ibid at I. 1354 a-b. 
14 See. E. Barker. 'Introduction' to his The Politics of Aristotle xi. lxx (1946); 
and the present study. 1.3. the text accompanying note 53. 
15 Ethics. supra. note 12. at V. 1137 b. 
16 See. 2.1. the text accompanying notes 140-146. 
17 That of Hobbes. more precisely. is a dissolution of the opposition rather than 
siding simply with government by men as distinct from government by laws. 
See. supra. note 12. 
18 Cf Wittgenstein's reference to the 'soul.' the present work. 2.1. the text 
accompanying note 90. 
19 F. Geny. Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law: 
Critical Essay [1899] par. 97 (transl. J. Mayda. 1963). 
20 Id. par. 98 (footnote omitted). 
21 C. Fried. 'Sonnet LXV and the 'Black Ink' of the Framers' Intention' in 
Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 45 (eds. S. Levinson 
and S. Mailloux. 1988). 
22 E.M. Maltz. 'Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a 
Modified Intentionalist Approach' 63 Tulane Law Review 1 (1988). 
23 S.E. Thome. 'Introduction' to T. Egerton. A Discourse upon the Exposicion & 
Understandinge of Statutes 59 (ed. S.E. Thome, 1942). 
24 Id. (footnote omitted). 
25 Id. at 62. 
26 U. Eco. 'After Secret Knowledge' [based on his 1990 Tanner lectures at 
Cambridge] TLS 666 (June 22-28.1990). 
27 Id. Eco rather flatters himself over the part his own work he thinks must have 
played in the present plague of overinterpretation. See. for his 1962 work 
which. more accurately. stands somewhere in between the American New 
Criticist and the Continental Structuralist concepts of reading. U. Eco. The 
Open Work (transl. A. Cancogni. 1989). He explains that 'my readers mainly 
focused on the 'open' side of the whole business.' while in truth the 'work' was 
equally stressed. 'Secret Knowledge,' supra, note 26, at 666. 
28 Id. at 678. 
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29 Id. at 666. 
30 See. 2.1. particularly the text accompanying notes 45-57. 
31 Philosophical Investigations. supra. note 6. par. 454 (emphasis in original); 
see. the present study. 2.1, the text accompanying note 90. 
32 Supra. note 20. 
33 L Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books 5 (1989). 
34 'Secret Knowledge,' supra, note 26, at 666. 
35 See, 1.2. the text accompanying notes 1-14. 
36 See, 1,4, the text accompanying notes 38-71. 
37 Rhetoric supra, note 13. at n. 1402 a; see. 1.4. the text accompanying note 52. 
38 Lord Lorebum in Vickers, Sons and Maxim lid. "Evans [1910] AC 444, 445 
(emphasis in original). Cf Lord Diplock's statement of the rule in Hadmor 
Productions Ltd v Hamilton. [1983] 1 AC 191,232. 
39 [1584] 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b. 
40 [1844] 11 Cl. & Fin. 85. 143. 
41 But see, Lord Reid's rationalization in Beswick v Beswick, [1968] AC 58. 74. 
of the inadmissibility of parliamentary debates for the 'practical reasons' of 
time. expense. and poor access especially to older material. 
42 [1897] AC 22. 38. 
43 Supra. note 40, at 143. 
44 [1975] 1 All ER 810. 
45 It must be noted. however, that citing Hansard by the counsel in court without 
prior permission of the relevant House of the Parliament was forbidden by a 
parliamentary rule of privilege until 1980. a state of affairs which did not 
exactly encourage courts extensively to refer to the proceedings. See. W. 
Twining and D. Miers. How to Do Things with Rules 370-371 (1991). 
46 As well known. the use of preparatory material has not been a great issue of 
controversy in the French legal rhetoric, even though recourse to it has 
sometimes been criticized in France too for the perplexing nature of 
parliamentary debates and for the exegetical and therefore unnecessarily 
restraining character of the enterprise. Its extensive use by French courts 
would seem to overlap with the special brand of the concept of separation of 
powers that marks the French rhetoric, and where, consequently, 
parliamentary references bear significant political weight. See, for the French 
uses of the travaux preparatoires, M. Troper. et al. 'Statutory Interpretation in 
France' in Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study 171, 185-186 (eds. D.N. 
MacConnick and RS. Summers, 1991); A. West et aL. The French Legal 
System: An Introduction 53 (1992); R David. French Law: Its Structure. 
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Sources, and Methodology 160 (transl. M. Kindred, 1972); and Sir W. Dale 
(ed), British and French Statutory Drafting: The Proceedings of the Franco-
British Conference of 7 and 8 April 1986 (1986). In the United States, the use 
of legislative history in constitutional or statutory interpretation has not been a 
problem of the scale that it has been in England despite the common origins of 
the respective legal domains. In constitutional interpretation the Supreme 
Court has been engaged in elaborate surveys of the genealogy of the 
Constitution especially in its controversial decisions such as those of Brown v 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). Of the use of parliamentary evidence in statutory interpretation, the 
Court declares, in its opinion of United States v American Trucking 
Association, 310 U.S. 534,544 (1940), that 'there can certainly be no 'rule of 
law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may be on superficial 
investigation.' The interpretation of the Turkish Civil Code makes a distinct 
case in that, as its main body has been adopted from the Civil Code of 
Switzerland, of 1907, it enables liberal uses of both the preparatory works of 
the original code and the Parliamentary evidence in the making of the Turkish 
version of that code, especially where it clearly departs from the solution of 
the former. See, M.K. Oguzman, Medeni Hulcuk Dersleri: Giris, Kaynaklar, 
Temel Kavramlar [Course in Private Positive Law: Introduction, Sources, 
Fundamental Notions] 45-46 (1971). 
47 Sturges v Crowningshield 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122,202 (1819). 
48 Dartmouth College v Woodward 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,644 (1819). 
49 Method, supra, note 19, par. 97. 
50 See, id. par. 98; see also the present study, 2.1, the text accompanying notes 
15-18. 
51 See, 1.4, the text accompanying notes 53-59. 
52 See, 'Signature Event Context,' supra, note 7; see also the text accompanying, 
supra, notes 1-9. 
53 See, Philosophical Investigations , supra, note 31, par. 243 et seq. 
54 Id. par. 293. 
55 Id. par. 271. 
56 See, J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 22 (eds. J.O. Urrnson and M. 
Sbisa, 1989). Derrida's reading of Austin is countered in J.R. Searle, 
'Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida' 1 Glyph 198 (1977). 
Derrida's long response fonns one of the most accessible accounts of his entire 
project, Limited Inc, supra, note 7. A succinct statement of the positions in the 
first two essays in the debate is to be found in F.B. Farrell, 'Iterability and 
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Meaning: The Searle-Derrida Debate' 19 Metaphilosophy 53 (1988). See. for 
two significant commentaries on the debate. B. Johnson. 'Mallarme and 
Austin' in her The Critical Difference: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Reading 52 (1980); and S. Fish. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, 
Rheton'c, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies ch. 2 
(1989). 
57 See. 1.4. the text accompanying notes 53-60. 
58 Rhetoric. supra. note 13. at m. 1404 a. 
59 [d. 
60 Supra. note 38. at 201. 
61 [d. 
62 [1993] 1 All ER 42. The text in question is the Section 63 (2) of the Finance 
Act 1976. Lord Mackay dissents on the ground of the increasing cost of 
litigation. a state of affairs he thinks a relaxing of the exclusionary rule would 
immediately result in. id. at 46-49. 
63 See also the earlier decision of Pickstone v Freemans pic [1988] 2 All ER 803. 
807 and 814, where parliamentary references by Lords Keith and Templeman 
receive general consent. 
64 Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pepper, supra. note 62. at 64. 
65 March 26. 1981; cited by Lord Denning in Hadmor. supra, note 38. at 201. 
66 V. Sacks. 'Towards Discovering Parliamentary Intent,' Statute Law Review 
143 (1982). 
67 [d. at 157. 
68 [d. 
69 [d. at 158. 
70 [d. (emphasis added) (the footnote that follows refers to Lord Denning's 
reading in Hadmor case. supra. note 60). 
71 Supra. note 64. 
72 Justice Frankfurter. 'Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes' 2 The 
Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 213.234 (1947); 
cited in F.A.R. Bennion. Bennion on Statute Law 111 (1990). 
73 See. 2.1. the text accompanying notes 56-57. 
74 C.E. 17.2.1950 [Dame Lamotte]. cited in 'Statutory Interpretation in France: 
supra note 46, at 181-182. C! C. Dadomo and S. Farran. The French Legal 
System 213 (1993). 
75 [d. 
76 See. 2.1. the text accompanying notes 75-84. 
77 See. supra. note 40. 
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78 See, for the uses of the notion in the French rhetoric of statutory reading, 
'Statutory Interpretation in France,' supra, note 46, at 179-180. 
79 See, for a discussion of the distinction. G.C. MacCallum. Jr .• 'Legislative 
Intent' in Essays in Legal Philosophy 237.264 (ed. R.S. Summers, 1970). 
80 French Law, supra, note 46, at 156. 
81 ld. 
82 Quoted in 'Statutory Interpretation in France.' supra, note 46. at 180. 
83 [1857] 6 HL Cas 61. 
84 See, the text accompanying. supra, note 20. 
85 Supra. note 83, at 106. 
86 [1877] 2 AC 743. 763. 
87 See, supra, note 47. 
88 ld. at 202-3. 
89 Leviathan, supra. note 12, at Part II, ch. 26. 
90 ld. [po 149] (emphasis added). 
91 Id. (emphasis added). 
92 ld. Cf the Aristotelian notion of equity in determining the intention of the 
legislator. 'Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature, to 
think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about 
what he said than about what he meant .. .' Rhetoric, supra, note 13, at I, 1374 
b. 
93 Leviathan, supra, note 12, at Part II, ch. 26 [po 149]. 
94 Aristotle, 'Politics' in The Politics of Aristotle I, 1253 a (transl. E. Barker, 
1946); see, for a discussion of it, the present study, 1.3, the text accompanying 
notes 74-79. 
95 Supra. note 83. at 106. 
96 See, the text accompanying, supra. notes 30-34. 
97 J.M. Landis. 'A Note on Statutory Interpretation.' 43 Harvard Law Review 
886,888-890 (1930). 
98 H.P. Monaghan, 'Our Perfect Constitution' 56 New York University Law 
Review 353. 377 (1981); R.H. Bork, The Tempting of America 162-165 
(1990). 
99 'Perfect Constitution.' supra, note 98 at 377. 
100 Id. 
101 Tempting, supra. note 98 at 164. 
102 Hirsch introduces his notion of 'valid' interpretation on the basis of authorial 
will as a criterion to enable judgement between the competing senses 
attributed to the text. Its impetus is the otherwise engulfing chaos in the event 
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of signification, a free-for-all to be remedied by valid interpretation. Ironically 
enough, the fiercely opposing camp of New Criticism (see, 2.1, notes 133-
135) is motivated by the very same anxiety to acquire scientific reliability and 
order in its refusal of claims to intentional validity. In fact, Hirsch only 
chooses the term validation, and not 'verification,' a word strongly associated 
earlier this century with scientific rigour, because of the attenuated quality 
(through the Continental-hermeneutic connections of his work) of validity he 
suggests in comparison with the more exacting validity of natural sciences. 
See, E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (1967) (see, for the choice for 
validity as opposed to verifiability, id. at 171). In his later work Hirsch offers 
a revised definition of meaning where it is no longer associated exclusively 
with the authorial will. 'The enlarged definition now comprises constructions 
where authorial will is partly or totally disregarded.' E.D. Hirsch, Jr., The 
Aims of Interpretation 80 (1978). That which is immediately mystifying, 
naturally, is how one is possibly to rationalize partial or total exclusion of 
authorial will where it is available. 
103 See, for a use of the Hirschean ideas of authorial will and validity to prevent 
law from being an 'arbitrary' enterprise where it 'would be whatever a judge 
takes it to mean at any time,' S.C.R. McIntosh, 'Legal Hermeneutics: A 
Philosophical Critique' 35 Oklahoma Law Review I, 36 (1982). 
104 See, 'Legislative Intent,' supra, note 79, at 242-245. 
105 Id. at 242. The state of common awareness that defines the entire process is 
emphasized by Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Ealing London Borough Council v 
Race Relations Board [1972] AC 342, 360 (emphasis added): 'It is the duty of 
a court so to interpret an Act of Parliament as to give effect to its intention. 
The court sometimes asks itself what the draftsman must have intended ... 
[T]he draftsman knows what is the intention of the legislative initiator ... [H]e 
knows what canons of construction the court will apply; and he will express 
himself in such a way as accordingly to give effect to the legislative intention.' 
106 'Statutory Interpretation,' supra, note 97, at 888. 
107 'Legislative Intent,' supra, note 79, at 242. 
108 Tempting. supra. note 98. at 162-165. 
109 M. Radin, 'Statutory Interpretation' 43 Harvard Law Review 863 (1930). 
110 Id. at 867. 
111 Id. at 870. 
112 Id. 
113 J. Willis, 'Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell' 16 Canadian Bar Review I, 3 
(1938). 
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114 D. Payne, 'The Intention of the Legislature in the Interpretation of Statutes' 9 
Cu"ent Legal Problems 96, 97-98 (1956). Cf. '[T]he general proposition that 
it is the duty of the court to find out the intention of Parliament - and not 
only of Parliament but of Ministers also - cannot be supported.' Lord 
Simonds in Magor and St. Me/lons R.D. C v Newport Corporation [1952] AC 
189, 191. 
115 Cf. 'Of course we use a fiction if we speak of the legislature as if it were a 
being 0/ one mind. But so durable a fiction endures because it has a use 
validated by experience.' J.W. Hurst, Detl/ing with Statutes 33 (1982) 
(emphasis added). 
116 See, 2.1, the text accompanying note 36. 
117 J.P. Frank and R.F. Munro, The Original Understanding of 'Equal Protection 
of the Laws" 50 Columbia Law Review 131, 133 (1950). 
118 Id. 
119 WJ. Brennan, Jr., 'The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification' in Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 13, 15 
(eds. S. Levinson and S. Mailloux, 1988). Cj. 'To attempt to treat the 
Constitution as one would a text by a single author is to commit the single-
author faUacy.' T. Ball, 'Constitutional Interpretation and Conceptual Change' 
in Legal Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and Practice 129, 138 (ed. G. Leyh, 
1992). 
120 See, 2.4, the text accompanying notes 130 et seq. 
121 See, 1.2, note 35, and the accompanying text. 
122 M. Heidegger, Being and Time 89 (transl. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, 
1990). 
123 S. Levinson and S. Maillaux, Interpreting Law, supra, note 115, at 37. 
124 Sir T. Egerton, A Discourse upon the Exposicion & Understandinge of 
Statutes [1557-1567] 151 (ed. S.E. Thorne, 1942) (emphasis added, editors 
footnote omitted). 
125 'Parliamentary Intent,' supra, note 66, at 149-150. 
126 See, for the intentionality of ambiguity by the French legislator, 'Statutory 
Interpretation in France,' supra, note 46, at 174. 
127 In the Swiss-Turkish civil law system, for instance, silence intended by the 
legislator indicates no lacunae in the law. Deliberate omission means simply a 
refusal of involvement on the part of the legislator. If silence is not intended, 
on the other hand, it is a duty of the judge either to use discretion (the gap is 
intra legem) or himself make the law (the gap is praeter legem). See, A. 
Egger, l s v i ~ r e e Medeni Kanunu Serhi [Commentary upon the Swiss Civil 
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Ccxle] Vol. 1. at 65 (transl. V. ~ e r n i s . . 1947); and A. Ataay. Medeni Hukukun 
Genel Teorisi [The General Theory of Private Positive Law] 233-235 (I 980). 
According to the Swiss Federal High Court (Bundesgeriehl). silence is 
intentional when it is in the face of the evident fact that the legislator was in a 
position at the time of the legislation to have been aware of the specific 
problem and had the means to regulate it (BGE 76 n 62 [1950]. BGE 82 II 
224 [1957]. BGE 87 n 355 [1962]; cited ibid at 233. 237). There have been 
issues. however. over the intentionality of which the Swiss Court and the 
Turkish Court of Cassation have had to part company. One specific issue 
which has ended up ascnDing a split mind. as it were. to the legislator is the 
disputed intentionality of the Code's silence on the paternal grandmother's 
position regarding the legal recognition of the child born out of marriage. 
while the Ccxle does entitle the grandfather the right to pursue the matter (The 
Turkish Civil Code. Art. 291). The Swiss Court finds no compelling reason to 
construe the legislator'S silence unintentional. The grandmother is refused the 
entitlement in the intended silence (BGE 54 II 4-12 [1918]; cited ibid. at 234-
235). The Turkish Court. on the other hand. interprets the silence 
unintentional in one of its decisions-to-unify-prior-court-holdings. decisions 
which have the binding force equal to that of laws, and, declaring a gap in the 
law. instructs the judge to fill it accordingly (Yargitay If. Bir. Kar. 18 11 1959 
E. 12/ K. 29; cited ibid. at 235). 
128 Being and Time, supra, note 118, at 89. 
129 Id. at 90 (emphasis added). 
130 Supra. note 113. 
131 C. McGinn. Wittgenstein on Meaning viii (1989) (emphasis added). 
132 Cj. S. Fish. 'Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law' in Legal Hermeneutics. 
supra, note 119, at 297, 300: 'The thesis that interpretation always and 
necessarily involves the specification of intention [ej. Doing What Comes 
Naturally, supra, note 56, at 295: 'There is only one way to read or interpret, 
and that is the way of intention.'] does not grant priority and authority to the 
author. who is in no more a privileged relation to his own intentions than is 
anyone else. Each of us has had the experience of walking from a conversation 
and asking himself or herself. with respect to something just said. 'Now what 
did I mean by that?' The question is shorthand for 'With what kind of motives 
and in the context of what hopes, fears. anxieties, and desires did those words 
issue?" 
133 Philosophical Investigations, supra, note 6, par. 342. 
134 [1990] 2 All ER 170 (Divisional Court). 
135 The Adoption Act of 1976 (Section 51). 
136 R v Registrar, supra, note 134, at 171-172. 
137 Lord Watkins' words, id. at 175 (emphasis added). 
138 Supra, note 124. 
139 Supra, note 109. 
140 See, 2, the text accompanying notes 6-10 
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141 Method, supra, note 19, pars. 97-98; see, the present study, the text 
accompanying, supra, notes 19-20. 
142 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 106-110. 
143 Blue and Brown, supra, note 33, at 5; see, the text accompanying, supra. notes 
31-33. 
144 J. Kohler, 'Judicial Interpretation of Enacted Law' in The Science of Legal 
Method 187, 188 (transl. E. Bruncken, 1969). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 195. 
147 Id. at 189. 
148 [d. (footnote omitted). 
149 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 120-122. 
150 Philosophical Investigations, supra, note 6, pars. 65 and 67. 
151 Supra, note 124. 
152 Cf. 'And in the same way we also use the word 'to read' for a family of cases. 
And in different circumstances we apply different criteria for a person's 
reading.' Philosophical Investigations, supra, note 6, par. 164. 
153 J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law Vol. 1, 
at 455 (ed. R. Campbell, 1879) (emphasis added). 
154 H. Kantorowicz, The Definition of lAw 44 (ed. A.H. Campbell, 1958). 
155 Id. at 44-45 (emphasis added). 
156 [d. at 49. 
157 Id. (emphasis added). 
2.3 The Tame and the Freakish 
1 See, 1, notes 3-4 and the accompanying text. 
2 See. 1, generally; and in particular, 1.4, the text accompanying notes 28-34. 
3 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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4 W. Rehnquist, 'The Notion of a Uving Constitution' 54 Texas Law Review 
693,700-702 (1976); R. H. Boric, The Tempting of America 28-34 (1990). 
5 Id. at 28. 
6 198 U.S. 4S (1905). 
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
8 Tempting, supra, note 4, at 32. See also, Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion 
in Roe, supra, note 7, at 174. 
9 Lochner, supra, note 6, at 57. 
10 Supra, note 7, at 158 (footnote omitted). 
11 Supra, note 3, at 403 - 405. 
12 See, 2.1, the text accompanying notes 53-55. 
13 But see, for the inaccuracy of Taney's account of the established rights which 
in some instances gave a black man superior status over a married white 
woman, D.E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its SignifICance in 
American Law and Politics 349 (1978). 
14 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, for a discussion of this case, the present study, 2.1, 
the text accompanying notes 35-44 and 110-126. 
15 Tempting, supra, note 4, at 76-77. 
16 Id. at 34. 
17 See, S.H. Asch, The Supreme Court and its Great Justices 75 (1972). 
18 163 U.S. 537,552-562 (1896). 
19 See, for a formulation of judicial self-restraint in the review of legislative acts 
to help to keep the powers separate, the concurring opinion by Justice 
Brandeis in Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority 297 U.S. 288, 346-348 
(1936). 
20 The 'interpretative statutes' in the French system aim to help to retain the 
separation of powers thereby risked. To make a point about the current 
practice by means of legislative acts is possible, naturally, in all representative 
systems. The French uses of interpretative laws, however, seem to serve in 
practice to make retrospective points which are not possible through ordinary 
laws. See, M. Troper et al., 'Statutory Interpretation in France' in Interpreting 
Statutes: A Comparative Study 171, 211 (eds. D.N. MacCormick and R.S. 
Summers, 1991). Similarly, the 1924 Turkish Constitution provided for 
interpretative statutes. The Constitution of 1961, however, abandoned the 
system, for what significantly characterized its regime was an anxiety over the 
powers of the parliamentary majority whose abuses of its privileges were 
thought to have brought about the closure of the previous era, and to 
overcome which the solution of the French Fourth Republic was adopted. The 
1982 Constitution has continued the 1961 system in this respect. 
21 Supra. note 6, at 59. 
22 Tempting. supra, note 4. at 49. 
23 Id. 
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24 J. Thayer. The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law' 7 Harvard Law Review 129 (1893). 
25 See. L. Hand. The Bill of Rights (1958) generally. 
26 H. Wechsler. 'Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law' 73 Harvard 
lAw Review 1 (1959). 
Z7 A.M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics 18 (1962). See, for a recent work exploring the theme in a similar 
mood. R.A. Burt. The Constitution in Conflict (1992). 
28 J.H. Ely. Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review ch. 4 (1980). 
29 See. on politics and the Warren Court, A. Cox. The Warren Court: 
Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform (1968); L.B. Bozell. The 
Warren Revolution (1969); A.M. Bickel. Politics and the Warren Court 
(1965) (the latter covering the period after 1962). 
30 W J. Brennan. Jr .• The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification' in Interpreting lAw and Li'terature: A Hermeneutic Reader 13. 16 
(ed8. S. Levinson and S. Mailloux, 1988). 
31 Id. 
32 P. Bobbitt. Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982). 
33 See. for a criticism of Peny'8 work in terms of its 'anti-democratic 
implications,' D.AJ. Richards, 'The Aims of Constitutional Theory' 8 
University of Dayton Law Review 723 (1983), and M. W. McConnel. 'The Role 
of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law' 98 Yale 
lAw Joumal 1501 (1989). 
34 MJ. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (1982). 
35 MJ. Perry. Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay 134 (1988) 
(emphasis in original). 
36 Cf. the 'ultra-textualism' which some of the extratextualist concerns really 
amount to. the present study. 2.1, the text accompanying notes 18,53. 
37 Morality, Politics, and Law. supra, note 35. at 134. 
38 P. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding' 60 Boston 
University Law Review 204. 225 (1980). 
39 Id. 
40 See, for a typical instance, Perry's dichotomy of the extraconstitutional and the 
contraconstitutional, the text accompanying. supra, note 34. 
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41 Cf, '[Original choice] is a choice no less political than any other; it expresses 
antipathy to claims of the minority to rights against the majority.' 'Constitution 
of the United States,' supra. note 30. at 16. 
42 Tempting. supra. note 4. at 176-177. 
43 Supra. note 38. 
44 See. the text accompanying. supra. notes 21-23. 
45 See. 2.1. 
46 See. 2.3. 
47 M. Cappelletti. The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (1989). 
48 'Preface.' id. 
49 Id. at xvii-xviii. See also. for accountability through judicial sensitivity to 
popular needs and desires. ill. at 45. 
50 In addition to the countermajoritarian difficulty. judicial creativity is deemed 
to differ from legislative acts in its 'inherent limits.' The major drawbacks 
from which it suffers are its inaccessibility for ordinary people. its 
unpredictability. and finally the lack of sufficient sources and equipment on 
the part of the court (id. at 35-40). The uncertainty the realists reach via rule 
scepticism. Cappelletti assumes for the same reason he finds judge-made law 
relatively inaccessible. He traces the law to statutes and law reports. And the 
uncertainty of decisional law is defined by the oddly understood notion of the 
Rule of Law which requires that people first read statute books and find out 
where they stand before they go ahead and do anything. That reading the law. 
reading not only by the 'ordinary citizens' (id. at 35) but also by the judge. in a 
mediation where ordinary and extraordinary are transfigurational. is a 
performance carried out. not in order to find out where people stand. but in 
terms of where people stand. I discuss regarding the realist concept of 
unpredictability. 2.4. 
51 Judicial Process. supra. note 47. at xvi-xvii. 
52 The Decree of December 22. 1789; cited in H.P. de Vries. Civil Law and the 
Anglo-American Lawyer 91 (1976). 
53 The Law of August 16-24. 1790. art. 13; cited in Judicial Process, supra. note 
47. at 195; see also. R. David. French Law: Its Structure. Sources, and 
Methodology 23-24 (transl. M. Kindred. 1972); C. Dadomo and S. Farran. The 
French Legal System 46-47 (1993); and A. West et aL, The French Legal 
System: An Introduction 23-24 (1992). The decret of 16 Fructidor An Ill. 
1795, repeats the provision of the art. 13: 'Courts are constantly forbidden 
from subjecting administrative acts, whatever their nature, to judicial review.' 
Cited in Dadomo and Farran. supra, at 47. Cf. the ConseiJ constitutionnel 
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decision of January 23, 1987 [Competition Law] on the separation, id. at 48-
49; and J. Bell, French Constitutional Law 194 (1992). 
54 The Law of August 16-24, 1790, art. 10; cited in Judicial Process, supra, note 
47, at 194; see also 'Statutory Interpretation in France: supra, note 20, at 203. 
55 Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws Book XI, ch. VI (transl. T. Nugent, 
ed. and revised by J.V. Prichard, 1914). 
56 Title VIII, the arts. 64-66. 
57 See, for a review of the French droit administratif as a whole different 
interpretation of the principle of the separation of powers from that of the 
Anglo-American tradition, B. Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the 
Common-Law World (1954). And see briefly, on the dual character of the 
French court system, Dadomo and Farran, supra, note 53, at 47-48; and A. 
West et al., supra, note 53, at 80-86. 
58 The Constitution, art. 61. But, see, French Constitutional Law, supra, note 53. 
at 55: The Conseil constitutionnel is a court in all but name, though its 
procedure for reviewing legislation lacks significant attributes of a judicial 
process, even when compared just to ordinary French Courts.' Bell charts in 
this excellent study the development of the Conseil constitutionnel, gradually, 
since at least 1971, when in its decision Liberte d'Association the Conseil 
found a bill restricting the freedom of association - what the Conseil 
considered to be a general principle of law - unconstitutional, into a virtual 
court. See also his account of the growth of the idea of constitutional review 
in France, id. at 20-29. 
59 See, for the judicial organization of the ancien regime, J. Brissaud, A History 
of French Public Law ch. 12 (transl. J.W. Gamer, 1915). A vivid account of 
the workings of the pre-Revolutionary courts is to be found in J.P. Dawson, 
The Oracles of the Law 350-371 (1968). 
60 Id; see also 'Statutory Interpretation in France: supra. note 20, at 203. 
61 See, E. Lambert, 'Codified Law and Case-Law; Their Part in Shaping the 
Policies of Justice' [1903] in The Science of Legal Method 251 (transl. L.B. 
Register, 1969). See, fa a recent account, R. David, English Law and French 
Law (1980). 
62 In the Swiss-Turkish private postitive law system. the judge takes the place of 
the legislature when a rule to cover the particular case cannot be drawn from 
either the statute or the custom, the two formal sources of the law (The Swiss 
Civil Code, art. 1). See. for a discussion of the Swiss-Turkish regime. 
regarding Geny's conception of it and its consequences. 2.4, the text 
accompanying notes 103-118. A clash with the principle of the separation of 
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powers is thought not to be the case, however, because what the judge does is 
to perform a duty, to start with. Secondly, the duty is executed within the 
general framework of the prevailing law. S. Edis, Medeni Hukuka Oiris ve 
Baslangic Hiildimleri [An Introduction to the Civil Law and Commentary 
upon the Preliminary Provisions of its Code] 137 (1979). The Turkish 
Constitution concedes in a strained language a possible clash of the personal 
convictions of the judge and the regime drawn by the law: 'Judges shall be 
independent in the discharge of their duties; they shall give judgement in 
accordance with the Constitution, law. and their personal con viction 
conjinning with the law' (art. 138 [1]) (emphasis added). 
63 See. for a contrasting picture of courts in England and Germany. H.B. 
Gerland, 'The Operation of the Judicial Function in English Law' in The 
Science of Legal Method 229 (transl. E. Bruncken. 1969). 
64 See, Sir W. Dale (ed), British and French Statutory Drafting: The 
Proceedings of the Franco-British Conference of 7 and 8 April 1986 (1986); 
see, esp. the contributions by the editor. See also, infra. 
65 Sir W. Dale, Legislative Drafting: A New Approach 332 (1977). 
66 '[T]he intention of the authors of the Civil Code was to prevent the so-called 
'arrets de reglement' of the old monarchy. According to the principle of the 
separation of powers proclaimed by the French Revolution, a judge cannot act 
as a law-maker. Filling the gaps would be on this account a legislative 
function.' 'Statutory Interpretation in France,' supra, note 20, at 176. But see 
Portalis. in the Discours prelim ina ire to the Code, noting the insufficiency of 
the written law, excerpt provided in A. West et al. J supra, note 53, at 39-42. 
67 The subject of gaps points in the direction of yet another significant 
divergence between different systems of civil law. In the Swiss-Turkish 
system. acknowledgement of lacunae in the law takes place in the very 
opening articles of the Civil Code. The articles 1 and 4 regulate the praeter 
legem and intra legem gaps which relate to judicial law-making and judicial 
discretion, respectively. A fascinating literature is devoted to the classification 
of lacunae in the law. M.K. Oguzman, Medeni HuM Dersleri: Girls, 
Kaynaklar, Temel Kavramlar [Course in Civil Law: Introduction, Sources, 
Fundamental Notions] 58-61 (1971); Medeni Hulcuka Oiris. supra, note 62. at 
107-109 and 116-119. According to a decision by the Swiss Federal High 
Court, '[a] gap in the law is to be acknowledged not only when there is 
absolute textual silence on a specific matter, but also when the legislative 
purpose is contradicted in the application of the text to the specific case' (BGE 
[Bundesgericht] 60 II 185 [1934]); cited in A. Ataay. Medeni Hukukun Genel 
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Teorisi [The General Theory of Civil Law] 239 (1980). See, for an 
acknowledgement of, or controversy over, the gaps in the text of the United 
States Constitution, the Supreme Court cases: Balcer v Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
242 (1962); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525. 535 (1949); 
and Prudential Ins. Co. v Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408.413 (1946). 
68 'Ask a French Lawyer any question, no matter how novel, and you can rest 
assured that he will tlDd, in the arsenal of legislative texts at his disposal or by 
an appeal to the spirit of these texts, a rationale which will permit him to 
answer it. ( ... ) 
'( ... ) Psychologically, without any question, the French judge always does 
apply a statute. Even in those cases where he most clearly rewrites the statute, 
he sees himself applying and interpreting it. He does not think he is making 
law and would be surprised to have his actions thus characterized.' French 
Law, supra, note 53, at 167. 
69 Art. 4. The Turkish law, on the other hand, makes it a duty of the judge to 
decide the case in his jurisdiction even if he has to improvise the law. 'No 
court shall refuse to hear a case within its jurisdiction' (the Constitution, art. 
36 [2]). In addition, the Criminal Code regulates the criminal responsibility of 
the judge in avoiding the delivery of a legal entitlement (art. 231), and the 
Civil Code of Procedure provides for compensation of the damages in the case 
of delay or non-delivery of the judgement (art. 573 [b6]). 
70 See, 2.4, the text accompanying notes 36-41 and 74-83. 
71 See, for the 'collegiality and anonymity in court practice' in the civil law 
systems generally, E. McWhinney, Supreme Courts and Judicial Law Making: 
Constitutional Tribunals and Constitutional Review 98 (1986); and see, for the 
French practice, A. West et aL, supra, note 53, at 60; 'Statutory Interpretation 
in France: supra, note 20, at 172, 197, 199-200; and French Law, supra, note 
53. at 45. 
72 Judicial Process, supra. note 47. at 31 (emphasis in original). 
73 Supra. note 55. 
74 F. Geoy. Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law: 
Critical Essay [1899] par. 32 (trans 1. J. Mayda, 1963). 
75 M. V. Tushnet. 'Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism 
and Neutral Principles' in Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic 
Reader 193 (eds. S. Levinson and S. Mailloux. 1988). 
76 'Neutral Principles: supra, note 26. 
77 M.S. Moore. 'The Interpretive Tum in Modem Theory: A Tum for the 
Worse?'41 Stanford Law Review 871,882 (1989). 
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78 W.O. Weyrauch, 'Law as Mask - Legal Ritual and Relevance' 66 California 
Law Review 699 (1978). 
79 Id. 
80 J .L. Harrison and A.R. Mashburn, 'Jean-Luc Godard and Critical Legal 
Studies (Because We Need the Eggs)' 87 Michigan Law Review 1924, 1943 
(1989). 
81 Method, supra, note 74, par. 32. 
82 Id. 
83 F.S. Cohen, The Legal Conscience: Selected Papers of Felix S. Cohen 37 (ed. 
L.K. Cohen. 1970). 
84 Id. 
85 Method, supra, note 74, par. 32. 
86 Id. par. 26. 
87 In the Turkish doctrine of civil law the criticisms by Geny of mechanistic 
jurisprudence are part of the canon via Geny's links with the Swiss-Turkish 
Civil Code (see, 2.4, the text accompanying notes 103-118). The Geruan 
argument that the written law is essentially insufficient in view of changing 
circumstances and evolving concepts (see, 2.1, the text accompanying notes 5-
9) is thoroughly incorporated in the rhetoric. One direct result is the 
acknowledgement of lacunae in the law. That,in turn, invites discretionary and 
even law-making involvements on the part of the judge. That what Geny 
argues for in the Method is taken for granted in the doctrine, however, seems 
to have little effect to reverse the lasting appeal of the rhetoric against which 
Geny advances his ideas in the first place. An image of the legal reasoning 
about the same league as Liard's concept of mechanistic adjudication phrased 
in 1894 (see, the text accompanying, supra, note 86) is displayed in a recent 
text-book discussion of the subject by a Turkish jurist: 'In a sense, 
adjudication is a process of matching the particular and concrete event with 
the general and abstract rule of the law. By its mechanism, this matching of 
the concrete event with the legal rule resembles syllogism in logic insofar as 
the legal rule corresponds to the 'general proposition' in logic and the legal 
event to the 'particular proposition.' And the conclusion that follows from the 
encounter of the legal event and the legal rule is equivalent of 'inference.' 
'Take the Article 8 of the Civil Code as an example. Accordingly, 
"Everyone [every person] is entitled to the civil rights' (= the general 
proposition) 
'A is a person' (= the particular proposition) 
'Then A is entitled to the civil rights (= the inference).' Medeni Hukulal 
Giris, supra, note 62, at 57-58. 
88 Method, supra, note 74, par. 33. 
89 See, the text accompanying, supra, note 55. 
90 Spirit of Laws, supra, note 55, at Book XI, ch. VI. 
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91 See, R. Dworkin, 'Law as Interpretation' 60 Texas Law Review 527 (1982), 
reprinted in R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle ch. 6 (1985); S. Fish, 'Working 
on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature' 60 Texas Law 
Review 551 (1982), reprinted in S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: 
Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies, 
ch. 4 (1989); W.B. Michaels, 'Is There a Politics of Interpretation?' 9 Critical 
Inquiry 248 (1982); R. Dworkin. 'My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn 
Michaels): Please Don't Talk About Objectivity Any More' in The Politics of 
Interpretation 287 (ed. WJ. Mitchell, 1983), reprinted (altered and 
abbreviated) in A Matter of Principle, supra, ch.7; S. Fish, 'Wrong Again' 62 
Texas Law Review 299 (1983), reprinted in Doing What Comes Naturally, 
supra, ch. 5; S. Fish, 'Still Wrong After All These Years' 6 Law and 
Philosophy 401 (1987) (reviewing Law's Empire), reprinted in Doing What 
Comes Naturally, supra, ch. 16. 
92 Supra, note 86. 
93 See, Aristotle, 'Rhetoric,' transl. W.R. Roberts, in The Complete Works of 
Aristotle Vol. 2, at III, 1404 a (ed. J. Barnes, 1984); and my discussion, 1.4, 
the text accompanying notes 53-64, and 2.2, the text accompanying notes 57-
59. 
94 See, R. Descartes, 'Rules for the Direction of the Mind' in The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes Vol. I, at 9, 12 (transl. J. Cottingham et al, 1984); R. 
Descartes, 'Meditations on F'U'St Philosophy' ibid Vol. 2, at 3, 14 (1985). 
95 Doing What Comes Naturally, supra, note 91, at 14. 
96 Id. at 95. 
97 Id. at 100. 
98 Id. at 112 (footnote omitted). 
99 Id. at 113. 
100 See, 1.4. the text accompanying note 48. 
101 Rhetoric. supra, note 93. at I. 1355 a. 
102 Id. at I, 1375 a-b. 
103 Id. at I, 1376 b. 
104 Id. at I, 1377 b. 
105 Supra. note 88. 
106 See, R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously cbs. 2-4 (1978). 
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107 The 'strong' discretion implicitly rationalized in the Hartian positivism, 
Dworkin explains, 'means reaching beyond the law for some other sort of 
standard to guide [the judge] in manufacturing a fresh legal rule or 
supplementing an old one' (id. at 17). The 'weak' kind of discretion, on the 
other hand, is indispensable for creative interpretation. For the sake of 
simplicity I concur with Dworkin to consider Hart's to be a 'strong' discretion 
and therefore drop the former's distinction altogether. See, infra, note 109. 
108 See, id. ch. 4. 
109 'Here at the margin of rules and in the fields left open by the theory of 
precedents,' writes Hart, 'the courts perform a rule-producing function ... ' 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 132 (1988). 
110 The part of the law that complements and supplements the rules comprises 
principles and policies which Dworkin sometimes calls 'standards,' Taking 
Rights, supra, note 106, at 22. What differs principles from policies is that 
principles are to do with rights, as opposed to the economic, social, or 
political goals described in the policies (id. at 90). In my discussion the 
supplement to the rules is designated as principles, rather than standards, 
because, first. a transcendental quality that defines principles puts them in a 
customary opposition with the positive law and therefore contributes to 
simplicity. and secondly. Dworkin himself often uses standards and principles 
interchangeably as the interpretative controversy tends to centre around 
'rights.' 
111 R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 7 (1986). 
112 Supra, note 88. 
113 115 N.Y. 506.22 N.E. 188 (1889). Palmer was denied the inheritance left to 
him by the will of his grandfather who had been contemplating altering his 
will and who. possibly for that reason, had been murdered by Palmer. The 
New York Court justified its decision: 'No one shall be permitted to profit by 
his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity or to acquire 
property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy. have 
their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, and 
have nowhere been superseded by statutes' (id.). See, for Dworkin's discussion 
of the case to exemplify principled decision-making as opposed to discretion, 
Taking Rights. supra, note 106. at 23; and Law's Empire, supra, note Ill, at 
15-20. See also, for an insightful reading of the case to throw light on the 
common attachments behind divergent positions in the interpretative 
controversy. K.S. Abraham, 'Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: 
Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair' in Interpreting Law and 
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Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 115 (eds. S. Levinson and S. Mailloux, 
1988). 
114 R. Pound, whose work is sometimes thought to be a precursor to that of 
Dworkin, found the decision in Riggs v Palmer 'legislative' as opposed to 
judicial. R. Pound, 'Spurious Interpretation' 7 Colombia Law Review 381 
(1907), cited ill. at 119. 
115 As a matter of fact, it is a notion of the right 'right principle,' for principles are 
so recognized through 'a sense of appropriateness' in the first place. Its sense is 
'developed in the profession and the public over time.' And principles last as 
long as they are appropriate. In other words. there is hardly any chance of the 
'wrong.' inappropriate principle to crop up, to start with. See, Taking Rights, 
supra, note 106. at 40. Cf the present work. 2.1, the text accompanying notes 
29-31. 
116 See, H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 63-64 (1983). 
Although a rule 'bas ... its area of open texture where [the interpreter] has to 
exercise a choice, [it also] ... has a core of settled meaning. It is this which [the 
interpreter] is not free to depart from, and which. so far as it goes, constitutes 
the standard of correct and incorrect [interpretation] .. .' Concept of Law, supra, 
note 109, at 140. 
117 Hart places his notion of 'open texture' in opposition to the notion of the text 
that defines mechanistic jurisprudence (id. at 124-125). 'The open texture of 
law means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct where much must be left to 
be developed by courts or officials striking a balance, in the ligth of 
circumstances, between competing interests which vary in weight from case to 
case. None the less. the life of law consists to a very large extent in the 
guidance both of officials and private individuals by detenninate rules which, 
unlike the applications of variable standards. do not require from them a fresh 
judgement from case to case' (ill. at 132). 
118 Law's Empire, supra, note 111, at 87. 
119 'Law as Interpretation,' supra, note 91. at 529. 
120 See, for his notion of 'consistency with the past,' Law's Empire, supra, note 
111, at 130-135 andpassim. 
121 See, id. at 359 et seq. 
122 '[I]t aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show the 
best route to a better future, keeping the right faith with the past' (id. at 413). 
123 See, itt. ch. 7. 
124 'Law as Interpretation,' supra. note 91. at 538. 
125 [d. at 547. 
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126 See, 2.2. 
127 Supra, note 88. 
128 See, for the argument of the appellee in Roe v Wade, supra, note 7, at 156-
157. Curiously enough, the pro-choice majority opinion of the Court dismisses 
the argument of the appellee on an onginalist basis. See, the text 
accompanying, supra, note 10. 
129 R. Dworkin, 'The Great Abortion Case,' The New York Review 49, 50 (.June 
29,1989). 
130 Id. 
131 Cf, Boric on the decision of Dred Scott, the text accompanying, supra, notes l-
IS. 
132 'Abortion Case,' supra, note 129, at 50. 
133 R. Dworkin, 'No Right Answer?' in Law, Morality, and Science 58, 76 (eds. 
P.M.S. HackerandJ. Raz,1979). 
134 Id. at 82. 
135 Id. at 84. 
136 Cf, Finnis on the want of sense in the right answer thesis, J. Finnis, 'On 
Reason and Authority in Law's Empire' 6 Law and Philosophy 357, 372 
(1987). 
137 See, H.L.A. Hart, 'Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence' [1953] in Essays, 
supra, note 116, at 21. 
138 Cf, Dworkin on pragmatism and legal rights, Law's Empire, supra, note 111, 
ch.5. 
139 See, 1.4, the text accompanying notes 31-33. And see, for a difference-
affirming concept of rights, Conclusion, note 37. A weighing up of the 
rationalistic -totalistic- and localistic moralities (the latter, the author calls 
'the Wittgensteinean challenge') is pursued in J. Lear, 'Moral Objectivity' in 
Objectivity and Cultural Divergence 135 (ed. S.C. Brown, 1984). 
140 Law's Empire, supra, note 111, at 225. 
141 Id. at 73. 
142 Id. at 424-425. 
143 See, D.O. Brink, 'Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review' 17 
Philosophy and Public Affairs lOS, 113-120 (1988). 
144 'Reply to Fish,' supra, note 91, at 297. 
145 Id. at 298. 
146 Cf, 1.4, the text accompanying notes 28-30. 
147 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 72-74. 
148 See, 2.1, the text accompanying notes 140-146. 
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149 The words of the opinion in Cargill Commission Co. v Swartwood, 198 N.W. 
536, 538 (1924), cited in Doing What Comes Naturally, supra, note 91, at 
507. 
150 Law's Empire, supra, note Ill, at 413. 
151 R. Dworkin, 'The Center Holds!' The New York Review 29, 32 (Aug. 13, 
1992). 
152 Id. 
153 Supra, note 88. 
154 'Center Holds,' supra, note lSI, at 32. 
155 'Law as Interpretation,' supra. note 91, at 531. 
156 Cf. Dworkin's elucidation of 'making the best' of that which is read, Law's 
Empire, supra, note 111. at 421. n.12. 
157 'Law as Interpretation,' supra, note 91, at 534. 
158 Supra, note 155 (emphasis added). 
159 'Law as Interpretation,' supra, note 91, at 535. 
160 Cf Kuhn on the problems of theory choice in science, T.S. Kuhn, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). 
161 'Law as Interpretation,' supra, note 91, at 542. 
162 Id. at 541, n.6. 
163 Id. 
164 See, for a disappointed review by the disciples, of Dworkin's A Matter of 
Principle which reprints the 'Law as Interpretation' article, K. Kress and S. W. 
Anderson, 'Dworkin in Transition' 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 
337 (1989), where it is stated: 'If Dworkin wishes to hold the Right Answer 
Thesis, then the analogy to the judge as an author in a chain novel seems 
problematic. Imagine presenting David Marnet, Berthold Brecht. and Sam 
Shepard with the first act of Death of a Salesman. No doubt the three would 
write three very different plays ... Fortunately for Dworkin's theory, the 
analogy to literature can be excised, leaving the legal theory to stand on its 
own' (id. at 349-350). 
165 'Law as Interpretation,' supra, note 91, at 543. 
166 See, the text accompanying, supra, note 126. 
167 See, S. FISh, Is There a Text in This Class: The Authority of Interpretive 
Communities (1980); S. Fish, 'Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision' 60 Texas 
Law Review 495 (1982); S. Fish, 'Fear of Fish: A Reply to Walter Davis' 10 
Critical IfUJuiry 695 (1984); Doing What Comes Naturally, supra, note 91; S. 
Fish, 'Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence' 57 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1447 (1990); S. Fish. 'The Law Wishes to Have a 
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Formal Existence' in The Fate of Law 159 (eds. A. Sarat and T.R. Keams, 
1991). An excellent, clear and incisive, statement of Fish's ideas on intention, 
text, history, politics, theory, criticism, change, and so on, is to be found in his 
comment, 'Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law,' on the essays that make G. 
Leyh (ed), Legal Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and Practice (1992). 
168 'Law as Interpretation,' supra, note 91. at 544 (emphasis added). 
169 Id. 
170 See. the text accompanying. supra. note 111. 
171 'Law as Interpretation.' supra. note 91, at 543. 
172 See. the text accompanying. supra. note 42-
173 Bork's reference is to R. Dworkin. 'The Forum of Principle: 56 New York 
University Law Review 469 (1981); Tempting. supra. note 4, at 176-177. 
174 Id. at 177 (emphasis added). 
175 Cf Rawls' concept of person, 1.3. note 5. 
176 Doing What Comes Naturally, supra. note 91. at 92-93 (emphasis in original). 
177 [d. at 95. 
178 'Reply to Fish: supra, note 91. at 289. 
179 [d. at 290. 
180 [d. at 310. 
181 See, the text accompanying, supra. note 157. 
182 'Reply to Fish,' supra. note 91, at 291. 
183 W.B. Michaels is the co-addressee of Dworkin's response. See, his comment 
on the latter's essay. 'Politics of Interpretation,' supra. note 91. 
184 See, Doing What Comes Naturally. supra. note 91. at 119. 
185 Supra. note 178. 
186 See, for iterability. J. Derrida, 'Signature Event Context' in his Limited Inc 1 
(trans. S. Weber and J. Mehlman. 1990); c! the present study, 2.2, the text 
accompanying notes 1-10. 
187 Doing What Comes Naturally, supra, note 91, at 107. 
188 See. the text accompanying, supra. notes 140-143. 
189 'Reply to Fish.' supra. note 91, at 297. 
190 See. 'Politics of Interpretation,' supra. note 91. 
191 [d. at 253. 
192 [d. at 254. 
193 [d. at 249 (emphasis added). 
194 M. Heidegger, Being and Time 194 (transl. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. 
1990). 
195 [d. at 195. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 See, 2.2. 
199 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 121-126. 
200 Doing What Comes Naturally, supra, note 91, at 98. 
201 Id. at 99-100. 
202 Id. at 100 (emphasis in original). 
203 See especially Is There a Text, supra, note 167, Introduction and Part 2. 
204 See, the text accompanying. supra. notes 161-165. 
205 See. Doing What Comes Naturally. supra. note 91, at 90-91. 
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206 Id. at 513 (emphasis in original). See. for a fine discussion. and repudiation, of 
the radical, non-interpretative. distinction in contemporary theory between 
hard and easy cases, K.S. Abraham, 'Three Fallacies of Interpretation: A 
Comment on Precedent and Judicial Decision' 23 Arizona Law Review 771 
(1981). 
207 'Law as Interpretation,' supra, note 91, at 542. 
208 Id. at 543. 
209 Doing What Comes Naturally, supra. note 91. at 370 (emphasis added). 
210 See, the text accompanying, supra. notes 136-139. 
211 O.W. Holmes, 'Natural Law' 32 Harvard Law Review 40, 41 (1918). 
Commenting on Rorty's pragmatism, Fish expresses dissent that a 
heterogenous sort of awareness would have as its consequence a degree of 
tolerance: the notion of a practical effect of what is a theoretical position is at 
once an affirmation of the traditional -epistemological- dichotomy between 
theory and practice. 'Almost Pragmatism,' supra, note 167. at 1466-1468. My 
frequent emphasis on heterogenous awareness, on the other hand, is a 
suggestion, as I make it clear, merely for rhetorical ploy for a position that is 
already - and primordially - acquired, namely that of the advocacy of civil 
rights. 
212 F. Geny, Science et technique en droit prive positij. 4 Vols. (Paris: Tenin, 
1914-1924). 
213 Method, supra, note 74. par. 33. See, the text accompanying. supra, note 88. 
316 
2.4 The Real and the Formal 
1 K.N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 422, n. 46 
(1960). See, for Holmes on Geny, the present study, 2.3, the text 
accompanying notes 211-213. 
2 See,2.3. 
3 See, for the major works of American realism, K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble 
Bush: On Our Law and Its Study (1960); K.N. Llewellyn. Jurisprudence: 
Realism in Theory and Practice (1962); Common law, supra, note 1; J.N. 
Frank, Law and the Modem Mind (1963); J.N. Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth 
and Reality in American Justice (1949); F. Rodell, Woe Unto You, Lawyers! 
(1957); and F.S. Cohen, The Legal Conscience: Selected Papers of Felix S. 
Cohen (ed. L.K. Cohen. 1970). A comprehensive, and affectionate, account of 
Llewellyn's life and work is to be found in W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and 
the Realist Movement (1973). The book also includes an account of the facts 
in the making of American realism, between 1870 and 1931, and two chapters 
(11 and 12) on Llewellyn's contribution to the Uniform Commercial Code. An 
analysis of the legal philosophy of Frank is pursued in J. Paul. The Legal 
Realism of Jerome N. Frank: A Study of Fact-Skepticism and the Judicilll 
Process (1959). A general account of American realism and its precursors 
with a concise description of its major themes is to be found in W.E. Rumble, 
American Legal Realism (1968). 
4 198 U.S. 45.76 (1905). 
5 D. Howe (ed). Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice 
Holmes and Harold J. Laski Vol. I, at 243; cited in Legal Realism, supra, 
note 3. at 39-40. See, for a recent theory of rules that centres around the theme 
of law's generality, F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical 
Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991). The 
language in which rules are fonnulated, according to the author. is essentially 
'open-textured,' a term he borrows from F. Waismann (id. at 35-36). It 
signifies 'the possibility that even the least vague, the most precise, term will 
tum out to be vague as a consequence of our imperfect knowledge of the 
world and our limited ability to foresee the future' (id. at 36, emphasis in 
original). (Cf. Geny on the essential 'incompleteness' of that which is written, 
present work, 2.1, the text accompanying notes 7-11. See also Hart's notion of 
'open texture: borrowed from the same source, 2.3, the text accompanying 
notes, 116-117). Because rules have to be general, in tum, they have to be 
'under-' and/or 'over-inclusive' regarding their reference (id. at 31-34). Hence 
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the 'presumptive positivistic' view of rules the author gathers from the 
performances of rules - the constraints rules exert on those who engage in 
decision-making are merely presumptive. as opposed to absolute in the 
traditional sense (iii. at 196-206). See also. for a view that holds the generality 
of the constitutional text responsible for most of the controversy that 
surrounds its readings. J. Leubsdorf. 'Deconstructing the Constitution' 40 
Stanford Law Review 181 (1987). 
6 See. P. de Man. Allegories of Reading 246-'m (1979). 
7 JJ. Rousseau. The Social Contract [and Discourses] Book 2, ch. 6 (transl. 
G.D.H. Cole, and revised by J.H. Brumfitt andJ.C. Hall, 1986). 
8 Allegories. supra, note 6, at 267. 
9 Id. at 266. 
10 See, iii. at 267-269. 
11 Id. at 268. 
12 See, 1.3, the text accompanying notes 34-36. 
13 See, for a collection of writings composed between 1916 and 1939 by the 
prolific Swedish philosopher who has been the inspiration behind the 
Scandinavian legal realism, A. HagerstrOm, Inquiries Into the Nature of Law 
and Morals (ed. K. Olivecrona, trans!. C.D. Broad, 1953). A hyperbolic 
statement of the Hagerstromian concept on the metaphysical foundations of 
legal terminology is to be found in A. V. Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised 
(1956). A milder approach on the issue is adopted in K. Olivecrona, Law as 
Fact (1971), where the designation 'Scandinavian Realism' is explained as 
follows: 'The term 'Scandinavian Realism' applies to a group of authors who 
have all been strongly influenced by Axel HagerstrOm. In many ways their 
views are divergent; but for all of them Higerstr6m's critical examination of 
legal concepts has been of decisive importance' (iii. at 174). Although likewise 
indebted to Hiigerstr6m's work, I aim to show later in the text the somewhat 
distinct stance of the critical enterprise by A. Ross, Towards a Realistic 
Jurisprudence: A Criticism of the Dualism in Law (trans!. A.I. Fausboll, 
1946); A. Ross, 'T1i-T1i' 70 Harvard Law Review 812 (1957); A. Ross, On 
Law and Justice (trans!. M. Dutton, 1958); A. Ross. Reviewing 'The Concept 
of Law' by Hart, 71 Yale Law Journal 1185 (1962); and A. Ross, Directives 
and Norms (1968). 
14 See, Allegories, supra, note 6, at 266. 
15 Id. at 270. 
16 See, for a typical expression of the concept of discrepancy. the essay 
Uewellyn and Frank wrote together. 'Some Realism About Realism' [1931] in 
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Jurisprudence, supra, note 3, at 42-76, where 'recognition of change in 
society' is listed on the top of the elements that form a 'common core' for 
otherwise diverse views of realism. The change in society, accordingly, 'may 
call for change in law' (id. at 68). 
17 The realist foundation is succinctly expressed in Taylor's statement, 'No actual 
meaning can be given to the idea of an illegal judicial decision.' R. Taylor, 
'Law and Morality' 43 New York University Law Review 611, 627 (1968) 
(emphasis in original). 'It is merely empty words,' Ross points out the realist 
rationale, 'if legal writers insist on upholding a rule as 'valid law,' admitting 
that practice 'wrongly' follows a different rule. t A dichotomy of validity and 
practice is a contradiction in terms. On Law, supra, note 13, at 50 (footnote 
omitted). Cf. the concept of silly judgement, the freakish, discussed in, the 
present study, 2.3. 
18 R. Saleilles, 'Preface' [1899] to F. Geny, Method ojlnterpretation and Sources 
of Private Positive Law: Critical Essay [1899] LXXVII (transl. J. Mayda, 
1963); see, for the previous reference, 2.1, the text accompanying notes 1-3. 
19 'Preface,' supra, note 18, at LXXVII. 
20 Id at LXXVII - LXXX. 
21 Id. at LXXVIII. 
22 ld. at LXXVII (emphasis added). 
23 Method [the Second Edition, 1919], supra, note 18, par. 202 (footnote 
omitted). 
24 ld. par. 33. See, for a recent equation of formalism and subjectivism, F J. 
Mootz, III, 'The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model 
of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur' 68 Boston 
University Law Review 523 (1988). Mootz objects to Fish for minimizing the 
extent of possible subjectivism in decision-making and suggests a frankness of 
rhetoric regarding the actual process as the only true deterrent against judicial 
partisanships. 'To ensure that judges are constrained by the text's meaning.' he 
writes, 'the legal system should require judges to justify their decisions 
explicitly with reference to their actual hermeneutical activity rather than 
masking the reality of their decision with an abstract formalism' (id. at 554). 
See, FISh on judicial bias, 2.3, the text accompanying note 176. 
25 Method, supra, note 18, par. 33. 
26 ld. 
27 ld. (emphasis in original). 
28 ld. 
29 Id. 
30 See, 2.2, the text accompanying notes 19-20,49-50, and 136-138. 
31 See, Method, supra, note 18, par. 97. 
32 Id. par. 33. 
33 See, J. Mayda, Franfois Geny and Modern Jurisprudence 31 (1978). 
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34 Cited in E. Ehrlich, 'Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects' 
in The Science of Legal Method 47,68 (transl. E. Bruncken, 1969). 
35 Id. 
36 Bramble Bush, supra, note 3, at 159 (emphasis in original). 
37 See, 2.2, note 12 and the accompanying text. 
38 T. Hobbes, Leviathan Part IV, ch. 46 (1940). 
39 Common Law, supra, note I, at 37-38 (emphasis in origina}). But see. the 
early Uewellyn on the dichotomy between government by laws and 
government by men, Jurisprudence, supra, note 3, at 62: 'All that has become 
clear is that our government is not a government of laws. but one of law 
through men.' 
40 See, 2.1, the text accompanying note 75 et seq. 
41 Jurisprudence, supra. note 3, at 70 (emphasis in origina!). 
42 Supra. note 39. 
43 Method, supra, note 18, par. 156. 
44 See, for the Savignean notion of Volksgeist as the sole basis, or, as he puts it, 
the 'seat,' of law; in other words, law as a concept in history, in 
contradistinction to its formalistic considerations, F.C. von Savigny, Of the 
Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence (transl. A. Hayward, 
1975) (the 'seat of law' at 28). See, for a brief. but authoritative account of 
Savigny's work, times, and achievements, H. Kantorowicz, 'Savigny and the 
Historical School' 53 Law QuarterlY Review 326 (1937). See also, M. 
Franklin, 'Legal Method in the Philosophies of Hegel and Savigny' 44 Tulane 
Law Review 766 (1970). 
45 Method. supra, note 18, par. 97. '[I]t is obvious that all this [suggested by the 
Free Law writers],' remarks a Jena professor in weighing the ideas to import 
the common law concept of judge to supplement the German civil law system, 
'is but the preaching of a new law of nature which, like the old one, has no 
ultimate foundation but subjective whim.' H.B. GerJand, The Operation of 
Judicial Function in English Law' in The Science of Legal Method 229, 232 
(transl. E. Bruncken. 1969). The idea that the Free Law school suggests a 
'subjective' notion of law, thus jeopardizing legal continuity and confidence, is 
part of the canon of the Turkish jurists. M.K. Oguzman, Medeni Hukuk 
Dersleri: Giris. Kaynaklar. Temer Kavramlar [Course in Private Positive Law: 
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Introduction, Sources, Fundamental Notions] 42 (1971); S.S. Tekinay, Medeni 
Hukuka Girt's Dersleri [Introductory Course in Private Positive Law] 54 
(1978); and S. Edis, Medeni Hukuka Girt's ve Bas/angif Hiildimleri [An 
Introduction to Private Positive Law and Commentary upon the Preliminary 
Provisions of the Civil Code] 100 (1979). 
46 Supra, note 39. 
47 Ehrlich answers the question how justice is to be administered in the absence 
of formal guidelines without at once dispensing with a notion of certainty by 
arguing that practice has rules of its own. '[I]n every period of time,' he writes, 
'there has existed a justice not hedged about by code sections. Such justice, 
however, is by no means arbitrary.' Judicial Freedom, supra, note 34, at 71. 
The 'judicial tradition,' he points out, provides practice with principles whose 
observance by the judge is not a matter of choice (id.). 'Free decision [Freie 
Rechtsfindung],' therefore, he adds, 'is conservative, as every kind of freedom 
is .. .' (itt. at 72). 'In reality life creates primarily its own rules,' he elucidates the 
idea of a non-formal notion of law. 'How small is the influence of the law of 
family, as formulated in rules, on the actual conduct of family life; how 
different the interpretation and execution of contracts in actual business from 
the interpretation by the courts in the few cases in which a decision passes 
upon them!' (id. at 80). 
48 Method, supra, note 18, par. 97. In the Second Edition (1919) of the Method, 
Geny chronicles in detail the rise and the fall of what he relates as a historical 
school inspired 'tendency' in the First Edition, namely the Gennan-Austrian 
movement of Free Law lfreies Recht, freie Rechtsfindung, or freie 
Rechtswissenschaft), pars. 205-222. 'All the manifold effort of the German 
Scholars,' Geny ends his account of the already stagnant movement, 'has not 
even equalled the so simple and yet complete formula of Art. 1 of the Swiss 
Civil Code' (id. par. 222). 
49 [d. par. 156 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original). 
50 [d. par. 168 (footnote omitted). 
51 [d. 
52 [d. par. 162. 
53 [d. 
54 [d. par. 161. 
55 Cited id., n. 297. 
56 [d. par. 161 (footnotes omitted). 
57 [d. par. 162 (emphasis in original). 
58 [d. par 161 (footnote omitted. emphasis in original). 
59 See,1. 
60 See, 1.4, the text accompanying notes 43 and 67. 
61 See, 1.4, the text accompanying note 36. 
62 See, 1.1, the text accompanying notes 49-51. 
63 Lochner, supra, note 4, at 76. 
64 Method, supra, note 18, par. 163. 
65 Id. 
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66 See, for instance, F r a n ~ o i s s Geny, supra, note 33. at 17. Mayda regards Geny's 
attitude regarding the concept of hunch as 'uncommitted and aloof' in the 
Second Edition (1919). The author provides a short, but useful, account of the 
concept in the early realist thinking (ill. at 143-145). See. for two early. classic 
essays in the Anglo-American environment. T. Schroeder. 'The Psychologic 
Study of Judicial Opinions' 6 California Law Review 89 (1918) ('the written 
opinion is little more than a special plea made in defense of impulses which 
are largely unconscious,' at 95); and J.C. Hutcheson. 'The Judgement Intuitive: 
The Function of 'Hunch' in Judicial Process' 14 Cornell Law Quarterly 274 
(1929) (by a federal district judge, 'hunching.' as opposed to 'judging,' as the 
true mechanism behind the decision). Frank considers the judge's hunch to be 
'the key to the judicial process.' Modem Mind, supra. note 3. at 112. 'Judicial 
judgements, like other judgements, doubtless, in most cases, are worked out 
backward from conclusions tentatively formulated' Ud. at 109). See. for 
Llewellyn's anecdote of the 'trifling,' the 'silly.' and the 'unworthy' in decision-
making, Common Law. supra, note 1 at 264-265. Cohen, on the other hand. 
dismisses the concept of hunch for 'magnifying the personal' and obscuring the 
'social determinants' behind the decision. Legal Conscience. supra, note 3, at 
70. 
67 See, 1.4, the text accompanying notes 7-9. 
68 See, Method, supra, note 18. par. 219. 
69 Common Law, supra. note 1. at 60-61 (emphasis in original). 
70 Courts on Trial, supra. note 3. at 2. 
71 '(T]heory has no consequences.' S. Fish. Doing What Comes Naturally: 
Change. Rhetoric, and the Practice o/Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 14 
(1989). See. for Fish's work. 2.3. 
72 F. Geay. Science et technique en droit prive positif Vol. 1. at 14 f. (1914 -
1924); cited i n F r a n ~ o i s s Geny. supra. note 33. at 124. 
73 See, the text accompanying. supra. note 41. 
74 See. Common Law, supra, note I, at 41. 
75 Id at 186 (emphasis in original). 
76 [d. at 374. 
77 [d. at 373. 
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78 I[O]ne of the more obvious and obstinate facts about human beings,' writes 
Uewellyn, lis that they operate in and respond to traditions, and especially to 
such traditions as are offered to them by the crafts they follow. Tradition grips 
them, shapes them, limits them, guides them .... (id. at 53). He contrasts the 
craft of an institution with its formal rules. and notes that Ithe rules not only 
fail to tell the full tale. taken literally they tell much of it wrong,l while the 
craft moulds the attitudes and appeals to the feelings that handle the rules in 
the first place. 'Now appellate judging is a distinct and (along with 
spokesmanship) a central aaft of the law side d the great-institution of Law-
Government. Every aspect of the work and of the man at work is informed 
and infiltrated by the craftl (id. at 214). Uewellyn equates steady outcomes in 
appellate cases with 'depersonized' judges (id. at 51). The steadying factors he 
lists ensure the precedence of the craft over the man and thus secure continuity 
(ill. at 16-49). 
79 [d. at 41. 
80 Id. at 132. 
81 Id. at 189. 
82 [d. at 129. 
83 Bramble Bush, supra, note 3, at 157. 
84 Jurisprudence, supra, note 3, at 56 (emphasis in original). 
85 The closest Llewellyn comes to address the realist predicament in its rule-
formalism is an apology, not for the formalism on the realist part, nor for the 
fact that realism leaves unaccounted for a minimal rule-formalism its rhetoric 
consistently retains, but. on the contrary, for the fact that the formalism 
invoked by the theory, namely law as a system of rules, is not realizedjullY 
and in each instance. See, Common Law, supra, note I, at 191. Is it not 
demeaning for the institution that its practice should not always overlap with 
its theory? IThis is a problem,' justifies Uewellyn. 'faced by every institution, 
not merely nor in any special manner by the appellate courts or by Law-
Government at large. It is a problem to which there is no easy answer' (id. at 
192). 
86 Jurisprudence, supra, note 3, at 70 (footnote omitted). 
87 In formulating the difficulty, in common law systems, of locating the rule, Iwe 
cannot interpret,' notes Schauer, 'what we cannot find: Playing by the Rules. 
supra, note 5, at 209. The idea that (a) the rule, (b) the interpreter, and (c) 
interpretation are distinct elements constitutive of what we know as the 
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interpretation of the law typifies the realist affinnation of the mechanistic 
concept of rule-reading. See, for Schauer's reproduction of the realist 
argument on the generality of rules, supra. note 5. 
88 Cf. 2.3, the text accompanying notes 189-193. 
89 See, 1.2, the text accompanying notes 18-19. 
90 Common Law, supra, note 1. at 529. 
91 Rodell claims the poverty of rules not only for appellate cases, but generally. 
See, Woe Unto You, supra. note 3. ch. 7. '[S]ince no two cases ever fall 
'naturally' into the same category so that they can be automatically subjected 
to the same rules eX Law, the notion that twenty or thirty or a hundred cases 
can gather themselves. unshaved. under the wing of one 'controlling' principle 
is nothing short of absurd' (id. at 119). Cj. '[T]he law in any particular case is 
not the written enactment, in case such exists, and not the common law. and 
certainly not some unwritten natural law, but precisely the judicial decision 
itself: 'Law and Morality: supra, note 17, at 627. 
92 See, supra, note 78. 
93 ld. 
94 Common Law, supra, note I, at 217. 
95 K.N. Llewellyn and E.A. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law 
in Primitive Jurisprudence [1941] (1967). 
96 ld. at 334. 
97 See, 1.2. Cj. Nietzsche on the pagan as the natural, and the 'Christian' evasion, 
M., note 39. 
98 Cheyenne Way, supra, note 95, at 311. 
99 ld. at 311-312. 
100 ld. at 312. 
101 See. 2.2, the text accompanying notes 8-18. 
102 Section 1-102 (2) of the 1952 text; the other two purposes (paragraphs a and b 
in the same section) are designated as ensuring flexibility and uniformity of 
practice; cited in Karl Llewellyn, supra, note 3, at 303. The author notes that 
the words I quote above in the text are Llewellyn's (the official text of 1962 
varies) (id. at 464, n.2). 
103 Method [the Second Edition. 1919]. supra note 18. par. 204. See, on the 
subject of the exchange of ideas between Geny and the principal architect of 
the Swiss Code E. Huber even though the former is not thought to have had a 
direct influence on the Code. Franfois Geny, supra, note 33. at 31. 
104 See, the text accompanying. supra. note 90. 
105 Cited in Karl Llewellyn. supra. note 3. at 322. 
106 Cited in Franfois Geny, supra, note 33, at 162. 
107 See, itt. at 31-64. 
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108 Uewellyn and Frank list in 'Some Realism About Realism' [1931] 'interest in 
what happens; interest in effects' as constitutive of the 'common core' of 
diverse positions of realism. Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 68. 
109 BGE [Bundesgerichtl 74 II 109 [1948], cited in Franfois Geny, supra, note 
33, at 47. 
110 Id. 
111 Id.at51. 
112 Id. at 52. 
113 Id. at 53 (footnote omitted). 
114 O.A. Gennann, Probleme und Methoden der Rechtsfindung 396 (1965); cited 
in Franfois Geny, supra, note 33, at 55. 
115 In chronicling the introduction, at the turn of the century, of realist 
methodology into the readings of the French law, David cites Ballot-Beaupre, 
the first president of the Court of Cassation, speaking at the centenary 
celebration of the Civil Code in 1904, who gave his blessing to the newly 
flourishing realist ideas but who at once 'reassured the traditionalists that 
nothing would be changed thereby. The Court of Cassation. he was bold 
enough to say, had always taken account of considerations of public welfare 
and justice in interpreting French legislation.' R. David, French Law: Its 
Structure, Sources, and Methodology 163-164 (transl. M. Kindred, 1972). Cj. 
Ballot-Beaupre on the legislative will, the present study, 2.2. the text 
accompanying note 82. 
116 See. on the Turkish naturalization of the Swiss Civil Code, HV. 
Velidedeoglu, 'The Reception of the Swiss Civil Code in Turkey' 9 
International Social Science Bulletin: The Reception of Foreign Law in 
Turkey 60 (1957); Ebulula [Mardin] and A. 8amin, 'Le passage des anciennes 
sources aux nouvelles sources en droit prive turc' in Recueil d'etudes sur les 
sources du droit en l'honneurde Franfois Geny Vol. 1 at 126 (ed. E. Lambert, 
1935). The transformation of the Turkish system ('one of the moo 
considerable events that has happened in the history of the East since fourteen 
centuries') is chronicled by a former judicial adviser to the Ottoman 
Government in Count L. Ostrorog, The Angora Reform: Three Lectures 
Delivered at the Centenary Celebrations of University College on June 27, 28, 
and 29, 1927 (1927) (the quotation in brackets at 14). An account of the 
Turkish code law in the second half of the nineteenth century is provided in 
the essays by two eminent Turkish jurists, Ebulula Mardin and 8.8. Onar, in 
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M. Khadduri and HJ. Liebesny (eds). Law in the Middle East Vol. 1 (Origin 
and Development of Islamic Law) at 279 and 292 (1955). See. for a vivid 
picture of the court room practices of first instance judges in Turkey with a 
brief account of discretionary and interpretative techniques. especially within 
the meaning of the Art. 1 of the Civil Code. J. Starr. Law as Metaphor: From 
Islamic CoUTts to the Palace of Justice ch.7 (1992). 
117 IjtihAd, namely the individual opinion of the jurist. follows the two formal 
sources of the law. the text (Qur'an) and the tradition ($unnah) (cj. the Swiss 
Civil Code Article 1. the text accompanying. supra. note 106). See. for the 
celebrated dialogue on individual opinion as the third source of the law 
between the Prophet of Islam and Mu'Adh b. Jabal whom he sends to Yemen 
to deliver justice. AbU Diwud. Sunan Vol. 3. at 109 [hadith no. 1038] (transl. 
A. Hasan. 1984). Cf. Umar. the second caliph. in a letter to AbU M11sa al-
Ash'ari at the appointment of the latter as a judge in Klifah: 'Use your own 
individual judgement about matters that perplex and about which neither an 
answer is found in the Qur'in and the Sunnah.' Cited in A.R.I. Doi, Shan"ah: 
The Islamic Law 14 (1984). Not to hold back from exercising individual 
opinion for fear of getting it 'wrong,' jurists receive the ultimate assurance 
from the Prophet. 'When a judge gives a decision having tried his best to 
decide correctly and is right [the term in the original is ijtihdd; thus, not 
literally translated: 'when a judge exercises ijtiluid and is right ... ']. there are 
two rewards for him; and if he gave a judgement after having tried his best but 
erred, there is one reward for him.' Imam Muslim. Sahih Muslim Vol. 3. at 
930 [hadith no. 4261] (transl. A.H. Siddiqi. 1982). Difference of opinion 
(ikhlildj) between jurists is considered in the tradition of the Prophet not to be 
a deficiency on the part of the system but a blessing (rahmah). Ijtihdd may 
mean in certain contexts mere interpretation on a strictly formal (textual) basis 
(when. notably. jurists disagree on the meaning of the particular textual or 
textual-traditional evidence); the standard Islamic terms for interpretation in 
the European sense, however, are tafsir (reading that emphasizes literal-
genealogical aspects) and ta 'wil (emphasizes purposive-contemporary 
aspects).ljtihAd as formulated in the Mu'idh b. Jabal hadith seems more to be 
an informal source of the law in a sense that is perhaps closer to the concept of 
libre recherche within the meaning of European jurisprudence (the 'absolute 
justice' that is the 'direction' of the search in Gooy's formulation - for it is not 
a free-floating search -. in that case. corresponds to the Islamic rationality 
which guides the jurist in his ijtiluld,' cf. the text accompanying. supra. notes 
52-58). An inspired study of the usul al-fUJh in English is M.H. Kama1i. 
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Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (1991), of which chapters 3 and 4 provide 
an authoritative analysis of the concept of interpretation, chapter 8 is on 
analogical deduction (qiYc:is), and chapter 19 on ijtihdd. A concise work on the 
developoment of Islamic law is NJ. Coulson, A History o/Islamic Law 
(1991). See also, on ijtihdd, B. Weiss, 'Interpretation in Islamic Law: The 
Theory of IjtihM' 26 American Journal of Comparative Law Review 199 
(1978). 
118 That the institution of ijtihdd backs the image of the judge the Civil Code 
presents, however, does not mean that the Turkish rhetoric is keen to dispense 
with the ease of approach a liberal interpretation of the law, technically called 
an objective-contemporary method, as opposed to an intentiona1ist method 
along the Genian lines, seems to bring about. According to the majority 
opinion, once made, laws must be considered to have a life independently of 
their genealogy. Interpretation, therefore. should be pursued on the basis of 
the contemporary circumstances. The dynamism thereby ensured, by that 
account, is indispensable for the soundness and the good life of the law. A.B. 
Schwarz, Medeni Hukuka Giris [An Introduction to Private Positive Law] 41 
(transl. H.V. [Velidedeoglu], 1942); A. Ataay, Medeni Hukukun Genel Teorisi 
[The General Theory of Private Positive Law] 166 (1980); E. {)zsunay, 
Medeni Hukuka Giris [An Introduction to Private Positive Law] 202-204 
(1970); Medeni Hukuka Giris [Tekinay] supra, note 45, at 54; and Medeni 
Hukuka Giris ve Baslangif [Edis], supra, note 45, at 124-125. Oguzman, a 
prominent jurist, however, like Geny, finds the liberal approach demeaning 
especially when it is tantamount to the evasion of the law in the fashion of the 
Free Law authors. A total disregard of the genealogy of the statue, according 
to him, is incompatible with the very notion of a statute. Instead of the contra 
legem approach that seems to be at work in some cases when the objective-
contemporary method is employed, Oguzman suggests that the interpreter 
avoid the rule at issue altogether on the grounds that its application in the 
specific case runs counter to the 'good faith' provision of the Code (Art. 2). In 
this respect Oguzman's thinking seems akin to that of Geoy, even though no 
practical difference is suggested between the objective-contemporary and the 
historical (Genian) methods of reading in the particular case. Medeni HubUc 
Dersleri [Oguzman] , supra, note 45, at 46. 
119 Jurisprudence, supra, note 3, at 42. 
120 See, the text accompanying, supra, note 39. 
121 Jurisprudence, supra, note 3, at 62. 
122 See, for an evaluation of Frank's work. The Legal Realism of Jerome N. 
Frank, supra, note 3. 
123 Modem Mind, supra, note 3, at xiv. 
124 Courts on Tria, supra, note 3, at 15-16. 
125 Modem Mind, supra, note 3, at xiv. 
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126 Courts on Tria' supra, note 3, at 50. Cf. Uewellyn's concept of certainty in 
Common Law, supra, note I, ensured by dynamics, moving in step with 
human need yet along and out of the lines laid out by history of the law and of 
the culture' (ill. at 186). The certainty thus attained, he elucidates, is 'not of 
logical conclusion from a static universal. but of that reasonable regularity 
which is laws proper interplay with life' (itt. emphasis in original). Cf. the 
text accompanying. supra. note 39. 
127 J.N. Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death': A Study of Moral Responsibility in 
Legal Criticism' 26 New Yolt University Law Review 545, 582 (1951). Cf 
'[T]here is little reason to fear that a judge, relying on his own deliberate 
reflections and the call of his own conscience, will apply erratic, capricious, or 
idiosyncratic moral standards. Our judges are products of our SOCiety, and ... 
they will generally think along with the beliefs of some substantial segment of 
the citizenry. A man who uses a moral standard that no one shares in a 
population of 150 million probably does not belong at large, much less on the 
bench.' E.N. Cahn, 'Authority and Responsibility' 51 Columbia Law Review 
838, 850 (1951). Cf Aristotle on those free of the association of the po/is, the 
present study, 1.3, the text accompanying notes 67-69. Cf also, on the matter 
of the artist as a judge, 2.3, the text accompanying notes 165-167. 
128 Legal Conscience, supra, note 3. at 70. Cf 'Short of Sickness,' supra, note 
127, at 582: 'Here [see, the text accompanying, supra. note 127]. is a kind of 
rampant subjectivity ignored by legal thinkers (like Cohen) who minimize the 
difficulties of legal criticism and of prediction of decisions. These thinkers 
overlook the distinction between (1) the more or less 'objective' (uniform) 
character of the norms embodied in the legal rules (whether 'paper' or 'real' 
rules) and, (2) the 'subjective' character of the trial judges' or juries' responses 
to conflicting oral testimony. Why? Because those thinkers are thinking of 
cases in upper courts where the 'facts' are ordinarily those 'found' by the trial 
courts.' 
129 Legal Conscience. supra. note 3, at 70. 
130 [d. at 48. 
131 Jurisprudence, supra, note 3, at 73. 
132 [d. at 55-56 (emphasis in original). 
133 [d. at 68-69. 
134 Legal Conscience, supra, note 3, at 45. 
135 Id. at 46 (emphasis in original). 
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136 Tauza v Susque}umna Coal Company, 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917); 
Legal Conscience, supra, note 3, at 34. 
137 Bank of America v Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); 
Legal Conscience, supra, note 3, at 36. 
138 Id. at 35. 
139 See, 2.3, the text accompanying notes 128-132. 
140 See, for the scientific reality as exemplary. rather than pictorial. reality. T.S. 
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). Kuhn's view of science 
is akin to the view of mathematics advocated by both Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein. 'Modem physics is called mathematical,' notes Heidegger in a 
lecture delivered in the thirties, 'because it distinctively applies a very definite 
mathematics. But it can proceed mathematically in this way only because it is 
in a deeper sense already mathematical. Ta mathemata means for the Greeks 
that which man knows prior to his observation of the existent and his 
acquaintance with things ... If we find three apples on the table, we recognize 
that there are three of them. But the number three, threeness. we know 
already.' M. Heidegger, 'The Age of the World View' in Martin Heidegger 
and the Question of Literature: Toward a Postmodern Literary Hermeneutics 
1 (ed. W.V. Spanos. transl. M. Grene, 1979). Wittgenstein has basically the 
same paradigmatic, or forestructured, quality in mind when he, at about the 
same time (1939). opposes mathematical invention to mathematical discovery. 
'I shall try again and again.' he sets the aim for his lectures on mathematics, 'to 
show that what is called a mathematical discovery had much better be called a 
mathematical invention.' L. Wittgenstein, Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics 22 (ed. C. Diamond. 1976). (Cf. language-games as 'objects of 
comparison,' L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations pars. 130 and 131 
[transl. G.E.M. Anscombe. 1988].) One single paragraph in the seminal 
lecture by Heidegger, in fact, encapsulates the entire message of Kuhn's much 
discussed project for a paradigmatic view of science: 'When we use the word 
science today. it means something which differs essentially from the doctrina 
and scientia of the Middle Ages. but also from the Greek episteme. Greek 
science was never exact - precisely for the reason that it could not by its 
nature be exact and did not need to be exact. There is therefore no sense 
whatever in supposing that modern science is more exact than that of 
antiquity. Nor can we say that Galileo's doctrine of freely falling bodies is 
true, and that Aristotle. who teaches that light bodies strive upward. is wrong; 
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for the Greek conception of the nature of body and place and their relation to 
one another rests on a different explanation of the existent, and therefore 
requires a correspondingly different kind of viewing and questioning of 
natural processes. No one would think of maintaining that Shakespeare's 
poetry is more advanced that that of Aeschylus. But it is even more impossible 
to say that the modern apprehension of the existent is more correct than the 
Greek. Thus if we want to understand the essence of modern science, we just 
first of all free ourselves of the habit of contrasting the newer science with the 
older simply by applying the standard of gradual progress.' 'The Age of the 
World View,' supra, at 2-3. Cf. Popper on tbeory-choice in science; 'scientific 
revolutions are rational in the sense that, in pinciple, it is rationally decidable 
whether or not a new theory is better than its predecessor,' K. Popper, 'The 
Rationality of Scientific Revolutions' in Scientific Revolutions 80, 95 (ed. I. 
Hacking, 1987). 
141 Legal Conscience, supra, note 3, at 52. 
142. [d. at 48. 
143 See, for the realist debts to the pragmatism of James and Dewey, American 
Legal Realism, supra, note 3, at 4-8. An assessment of the influence of 
Peirce's pragmatism on realism is to be found in R. Kevelson, The Law as a 
System of Signs esp. ch. 17 (1988). 
144 Legal Conscience, supra, note 3, at 52. 
145 See, L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus pars. 6.13, 6.421, 6.432, 
and 6.522 (transl. D.F. Pears and B. McGuinness, 1988). 
146 From a letter by Wittgenstein to L. von Ficker: The book's point is an ethical 
one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact 
there now but which I will write our for you here, because it will perhaps be a 
key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work 
consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. 
And it is precisely this second part that is the important one.' Quoted in P. 
Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a Memoir 143-144 
(1967). 
147 Legal Conscience, supra, note 3, at 46. 
148 [d. at 68. 
149 See, the text accompanying, supra, note 135. 
150 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 131-133. Cf Taylor on the realistic 
distinction of law and morality. 'Laws ... are one thing, morals another, and 
nothing but confusion results from mixing the two.' 'Law and Morality,' supra, 
note 17, at 611. 
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151 Legal Conscience, supra, note 3, at 68. Cj. '[The appellate judge] is a human 
being, and ... a lawyer. He [nevertheless] shows one sharp difference from the 
lawyer in practice. The practising lawyer's drive is to find and take a side, and 
at once, to see for, to see with, to see from. This drive the appellate judge 
must resist, and he does.' Uewellyn, Common Law, supra, note 1, at 118-119. 
Cj. Fish on the concept of side-taking by the judge. the present study. 2.3. the 
text accompanying note 176. 
152 See. supra, note 13. 
153 Inquiries, supra. note 13. at 48. 
154 A. HigerstrOm. Der romische Obligationsbegriff 1m Lichte der allgemeinen 
romischen Rechtsanschauung. Vol. 1. ch. 1 (1927); printed in English 
translation in Inquiries, supra. note 13, ch.1. 
155 See, 2.2, the text accompanying notes 148-151. 
156 Inquiries, supra, note 13, at 3-8. 
157 Id. at 4. 
158 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Cf. "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into 
words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.' Tractatus, 
supra, note 145, par. 6.522 (emphasis in original). See, supra, notes 145 and 
146. 
159 Inquiries, supra, note 13, at 16. 
160 Id. 
161 Legal Thinking, supra, note 13, at 16. 
162 Id. at 16-17. 
163 Id. at 17. 
164 Id. at 44-47. 
165 Id. at 45 (emphasis in original). 
166 Id. at 49-53. 
167 Id. at 46-47. 
168 Id. at 49-53. 
169 Id. at 49. 
170 See, Law as Fact, supra, note 13. ch. 8. 
171 See. the text accompanying. supra. notes 141-146. 
172 See, for a succinct statement of the Austenean duality. J .L. Austin. 
'Performative-Constative'in The Philosophy 0/ Language 13 (ed. J.R. Searle, 
transl. GJ. Warnock [from a paper written by Austin in French], 1979). '[Ilt 
seems to me,' states Austin, indicating the need for contextual support not only 
on the side of performatives but also on the side of constatives. 'that the 
constative utterance is every bit as liable to unhappiness as the perfonnative 
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utterances, and indeed to pretty much the same unhappiness' (id. at 19) -
'there is no purely verbal criterion by which to distinguish the perfonnative 
from the constative utterance' (id. at 20). He concludes: 'What we need, 
perhaps, is a more general theory of these speech-acts, and in this theory our 
Constative-Penonnative antithesis will scarcely survive' (fd.). The 
transfigurative tension between the terms of the duality penneates his entire 
venture, in the lecture notes, to establish and test possible criteria for a 
distinction between the two, J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with WoriU 55 et 
seq. (eds. J.O. Urmson and M. Sbisi. 1989). Cf. Derrida on the Austenean 
intentionalism, the present study, 1.4, the text accompanying notes 41-44; and 
2.2, the text accompanying notes 51-SS. 
173 Law as Fact, supra, note 13, at 252. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 253. 
176 How to Do with W o r ~ , , supra, note 172, at 85. 
177 Cf Wittgenstein on training as prerequisite of sign-reading, the text 
accompanying. infra. notes 221-224. 
178 Cf Philosophical Investigations, supra, note 140. par. 257. 'a great deal of 
stage-setting in the language is presupposed [even for] the mere act of 
naming ... to make sense.' 
179 See, on logical positivism, 1.2, note 35. 
180 Law as Fact, supra, note 13, at 184. 
181 See, Philosophicallnvest;gations, supra, note 140, par. 38. 
182 Law as Fact. supra. note 13, at 76. 
183 Id. at 180. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 181. 
186 Id. at 181-182. 
187 See. the text accompanying. supra. note 175. 
188 Law as Fact, supra. note 13, at 193. 
189 I see no reason to linger upon many points of problem with Olivecrona's 
stance. He reasons at one point, for instance, that the word 'right' may refer to 
'relationships' after all, even though not to determinate entities; then he adds. 
'this will be a relationship of a suprasensible kind,' as opposed to an 'actual 
relationship' (id. at 183). 
190 Id. at 215. 
191 See, the text accompanying. supra. note 182. 
192 Law as Fact. supra. note 13. at 215. 
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193 See, for Ross' writings in English, supra, note 13. 
194 An ambiguity regarding Ross' own work in this respect ought to be noted. In 
Law and Justice, supra, note 13, he makes verifiability a condition of validity 
for propositions both on and of law. Verifiability is introduced as 'a principle 
of modem empirical science that a proposition about reality (in contrast to an 
analytical, logical-mathematical proposition) must imply that by following a 
certain mode of procedure, under certain conditions certain direct experiences 
will result' (id. at 39). Accordingly, a proposition that lacks 'real content.' or 
'verifiable implications.' will be deemed to be devoid of 'logical meaning' (id. 
at 40). He states: "The interpretation of the doctrinal study of law presented in 
this book rests upon the postulate that the pinciple of verification must apply 
also to this field of cognition - that the doctrinal study of law must be 
recognized as an empirical social science' (id.). Propositions on law, he points 
out, have as their references 'the actions of the courts under certain conditions' 
(id). The verifiability of rules, on the other hand, signifies the predictable 
validity of the particular rule under certain conditions in future (Ui. at 42). The 
predictability required, Ross elucidates. is merely 'a greater or lesser degree of 
probability depending on the strength of the points on which the calculations 
about the future rest' (id at 45). In Directives and Norms, supra, note 13, 
special care is taken to refer to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle 
(see, for the project of the Vienna Circle, the present study, 1.2, note 35). 
Even though dissent is expressed regarding the Circle's declaration of 
sentences without empirical content meaningless, 'since sentences of this kind 
do undoubtedly have a role in communication,' its basic contention, namely 
the invalidity of metaphysical propositions in the sphere of science, is 
concurred with. 'It remains an open question whether such [metaphysical] 
utterances, despite their fundamental untestability may possess not only 
emotive but also descriptive meaning. I shall not discuss this problem' (id. at 
15). Although his verificationism is obviously at odds with that of logical 
positivism which he invokes, detectable particularly (a) in its mystifying 
'contrast' to 'analytical, logical-mathematical' verifiability, and (b) in its 
reservations about a non-grammatical dichotomy of the emotive and the 
descriptive, it is not mere accident that Ross too. like Cohen. HiigerstrOm. and 
Olivecrona above in the text, should eventually profess some sort of 
verificationism. The difference between the two positions Ross therefore 
alternates is roughly that of the early work by Wittgenstein to his later work. 
The frame of reference which the traditional dichotomy between positivism 
and anti positivism provides is hardly more than sterile. A 'subtle kind of 
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positivism' that is attributable to Wittgenstein's later work, as opposed to the 
crude positivism of the Tractatus, however, holds the key to the problem of 
the loose frontier between the two positions (the expression in inverted 
commas is Pears' in D. Pears, Ludwig Wiltgenstein 184 [1970]). The 
difference between the two projects, in this respect, is truly paradoxical, for, 
though a wild one as many would agree, it could not at once be subtler. 
Slipping from one position into the other, and then perhaps back, is therefore 
not only possible, but happens very often. In his very later work Wittgenstein 
himself, in my opinion, does that not infrequently. On many occasions as he 
tends to reject the 'abuses' d grammar, what he in fact does is simply to 
disregard another layer 0/ grammar the particular statement hinges on. He 
often issues rejections of linguistic uses almost with the assumption of a 
transcendental category where all those refuse uses may be deposited - a 
presupposition his work otherwise repudiates. As I have already hinted at it 
above in the text (see. 2.1, my comment on the text accompanying note 83), 
that may be said to be the case almost in each instance he denies philosophy 
its own game with language, thus to be understood in its own right - hence 
the whimsical exclusion of philosophical uses from the ordinary concept of 
language. In this respect, what is termed verificationism in Ross may even be 
comparable to Wittgenstein's idea of grammatical continuity in the 
performances of language. I discuss above in the text Ross' objections to the 
verificationism advocated by writers such as Duguit, Lundstedt, and 
Olivecrona. In another context Ross describes the Sophistic emphasis on 
common sense ('the agreement between the perceptions of persons of sound 
mind,' cf the concept of phronesis, the present study, 1.1, the text 
accompanying notes 18-26) as 'the germ of a theory of verification.' Law and 
Justice, supra, note 13, at 234. That Ross stands uncomfortably with the brand 
of verificationism advocated by the writers I discuss in the present study is 
attested also by his stance on a variety of issues. Characteristically, amongst 
the binary oppositions he dismantles but which are indispensable for a 
verificationist position are is and ought (A Realistic Jurisprudence, supra, note 
13, at 113 and 120; cf Uewellyn and Frank on the distinction between is and 
ought, the present study, the text accompanying, supra, notes 131-133); right 
and might (Law and Justice, supra, note 13, at 56-58 and 69; cf Hart on the 
dichotomy between law's authority and the authority of a gunman, the present 
study, 2.1, the text accompanying notes 140-143); theory and practice (Law 
and Justice, at 49-50; cf. Geny on the enlightened and benighted instances of 
practice, the present study, the text accompanying, supra, notes 71-73); 
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reading and passionate reading (A Realistic Jurisprudence, at 149-150; Law 
and Justice, at 118; cJ. Cohen and Llewellyn on the dispensability of passion, 
the present study, supra, note 151 and the accompanying text); and finally 
persuasion and truth (Law and Justice, at 326; cf. Dworkin on the distinction 
between the persuasive and the right, the present study, 2.3, the text 
accompanying notes 188-197). 
195 Law and Justice, supra, note 13, at 113, n.2. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 114. 
198 Id. (the footnote omitted refers to the note accompanying, supra, note 195). 
199 Ross refers to L. Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel Vol. 1 (1927). 
200 Law and Justice, supra, note 13, at 187. 
201 See, L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books 36 (1989). 
202 Law and Justice, supra, note 13, at 186. See, for a demonstration how 'the tU-
tU pronouncements have semantic reference although the word is 
meaningless,' 'Tu-Tu,' supra, note 13. 
203 Law and Justice, supra, note 13, at 187. 
204 A Realistic Jurisprudence, supra, note 13, at 73. 
205 Id. 
206 See, the text accompanying, supra, notes 84-85 and 91. Cf Llewellyn on rule-
formalism, supra, note 85. Cf, A Realistic Jurisprudence, supra, note 13. at 
68-71. Duncan Kennedy states. in the face of the claims. by some of the 
critical legal studies writers. of general indeterminacy in rule-following (a 
view based supposedly on the formulations by Wittgenstein and Derrida, a 
misconception Kennedy himself shares): 'My experience with legal argument 
doesn't allow me to meet your jurisprudential position on its own ground.' The 
rule which Kennedy tests the indeterminacy thesis against and which 
eventually fails the thesis is one that pronounces: 'the workers can't interfere 
with the owner's use of the means of production during a strike.' D. Kennedy. 
'Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging' in The Rule of Law: Ideal or 
Ideology 141. 164 (eds. A.C. Hutchinson and P. Monahan, 1987). 
207 Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
208 Law and Justice, supra, note 13, at 73. 
209 Id. at 74. 
210 See, for a much discussed reading of the notion of rule-following as 
paradoxical only within the meaning of a picture theory of truth, but not on 
the basis of an attached, 'communitarian,' view of the process, S.A. Kripke, 
Wiltgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1989). In repudiating an 
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interpretation of the notion as an intrinsic correspondence between the rule 
and that which complies with it, and therefore detached, Kripke is joined by 
N. Malcolm, 'Wittgenstein on Language and Rules' 64 Philosophy 5 (1989); 
R. Fogelin, Wittgenstein ch.12 (1976); C. Peacocke. 'Rule-Following: The 
Nature of Wittgenstein's Arguments' in Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule 72 
(eds. S.H. Holtzman and C.M. Leich, 1976); and C. Wright. 'Rule-Following. 
Objectivity. and the Theory of Meaning' id. at 99. The counterpole is 
succinctly expressed in G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker. Wittgenstein: Rules, 
Grammar and Necessity Vol. 2 of An Analytical Commentary on the 
Philosophical Investigations (1988), where the rule is stated to be 'internally 
related to acts which accord with it' (at 171-172, emphasis in original). A 
polemic by the same authors in refuting the view that rule-following requires 
fraternal attachments in order to make sense, is to be found in G.P. Baker and 
P.M.S. Hacker, Scepticism, Rules and Language (1984). Another refutation is 
presented in C. McGinn, Wiltgenstein on Meaning (1989). The legal 
implications of the debate are insightfully pointed out in a review of Kripke's 
book by C.M. Yablon. 'Law and Metaphysics' 96 Yale Law Journal 613 
(1987). A combination of the communitarian and the correspondence views on 
the subject is pursued in D.M. Patterson. 'Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice 
and Narrative' 76 Virginia Law Review 937 (1990). The 'point' of the rule, 
according to Patterson, is what dictates the response in following it. The point 
is determined in an attached manner. yet it at once forms an internal. 
detached. connection between the rule and the right response. And in a 
communitarian reading of the Wittgensteinean concept of rule-following, MJ. 
Radin. 'Reconsidering the Rule of Law' 69 Boston University Law Review 781 
(1989). the author ventures to test the vigour of the traditional dichotomy 
between the Rule of Law and the rule of men. Not entirely consistently. 
however, she at once retains the traditional distinction of theory and practice, 
one which is at least minimally intrinsic rather than purely mimetic or 
communitarian. 
211 Philosophicallnvestigations, supra, note 140. par. 20l. 
212 Law as Fact, supra. note 13, at 181. 
213 Blue and Brown, supra. note 201. at 13 (emphasis in original). 
214 ld. 
215 ld. 
216 Cf. 'It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which 
someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one 
occasion on which a report was made. an order given or understood: and 
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on. - To obey a rule. to make a report. to give an order. to playa game of 
chess. are customs (uses. institutions).' Philosophical Investigations, supra. 
note 140. par. 199. 
217 See. the text accompanying. supra. notes 3-15. 
218 Allegories. supra. note 6. at 268. 
219 Philosophical Investigations, supra, note 140, par. 201. 
220 Id. (emphasis added). 
221 Id. par. 198. Cf. Olivecrona on legal reading as sign-post reading. the present 
study. the text accompanying. supra, notes 175-177. 
222 Philosophical Investigations. supra, note 140, par. 198. 
223 Id. 
224 See. supra. note 216. 
225 Philosophicallnvesti'gations. supra. note 140. 
226 A characteristic expression of the traditional opposition between that which is 
right by law and that which is right by the interpreter is in Lord Scannan's 
words in Duport Steels Ltd. v Sirs, [1980] 1 All ER 529, at 551; if the judge 
were to apply his own 'sense of what is right.' accordingly ' ... confidence in the 
judicial system [would] be replaced by fear of it becoming uncertain and 
arbitrary in its application.' 
Conclusion: The Same and The Similar 
1 See, 2.4, the text accompanying notes 221-226. 
2 'If there is no god. then I am a god.' 
'I could never understand that particular point of yours: why are you a god?' 
'If there is a God. then it is always His will. and I can do nothing against His 
will. If there isn't. then it is my will. and I am bound to express my self-will.' 
'Self-will? And why are you bound?' 
'Because all will has become mine. Is there no man on this planet who, 
having fInished with god and believing in his own will. will have enough 
courage to express his self-will in its most important point? ... 
'I'm bound to shoot myself. because the most important point of my self-will 
is to kill myself.' F. Dostoyevsky, The Devils 612 (transl. D. Magarshack, 
1971). 
3 S. Levinson, 'Law as Literature' 60 Texas Law Review 373 (1982). 'It is 
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tempting to paraphrase Dostoyevski by saying that if there is no science, there 
is no truth, and if there is no truth, then anything is pennitted' (fd. at 388). Cf. 
supra, note 2. 
4 'While most CLS [Critical Legal Studies] writers have undoubtedly 
emphasized the inherent ambiguity of language Oust as realists did]... the 
more coherent CLS position has moved away from the tendency of certain 
Legal Realists to focus on the limitlessness of interpretations of each verbal 
command.' M. Kelman. A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 45 (1987) (emphasis 
in original). See. for realism. the present study, 2.4; and for aitical legal 
studies. infra. note 79. 
5 In his comment on Levinson's essay Graff. a literary aitic. indicates that 
'Levinson actually makes the same mistake committed by those whom he is 
attacking.' G. Graff, "Keep off the Grass,' 'Drop Dead,' and Other 
Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson' 60 Texas Law Review 405, 
406 (1982). His rejection of the authority of reading as pursued by individual 
jurists is to do with his expectations for reading to 'have the unchallenged 
autlwrity of divine commandments' in the first place (fd. at 410, emphasis 
added). Some of the views Levinson invokes in his essay, particularly those of 
'his mentors, Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish,' according to Graff, are also 
responsible for the confusion on the part of the essay (id. at 413, footnote 
omitted). 'He supposes either that interpretations have the unchallenged 
authority of divine commandments. or else that they have no autlwrity 
whatsoever except the coercive authority of institutional force' (fd. at 410. 
emphasis added). The institutional presumably signifies part of the confusion 
Levinson owes to Fish. It is dubious, however, that the latter, who quickly 
disowns Levinson's conclusions in his comment (see, S. Fish, 'Interpretation 
and the Pluralist Vision' 60 Texas Law Review 495 [1982]) would readily go 
along with an opposition of the divine and the institutional. The idea of the 
'unchallenged authority of divine commandments,' namely that the divine is 
read in ways radically different from the legal (or the literary), curiously. is 
Graffs. I repeatedly point out in the present study the symbolic significance of 
references by a variety of writers to (suppress) the divine: to exclude (or 
distinguish) the divine is to exclude the primordiality of positions of prejudice 
not only in reading the divine but in reading generally. Graffs notion of the 
divine seems to reiterate the pattern: catechismic reading is a paradigm merely 
in reading the commandments of faith. Conversely, assuming Graff were right 
and law, by its nature. were devoid of a catechismic structure. if reading on 
the basis of an 'unchallenged authority' is a possibility at all (which it is. 
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according to Graff), why should Levinson not seek or expect a similar 
authority for the reading of law? Graff in fact appeals to a Kirilov-like 
reasoning exactly the way Levinson, 'whom he is attacking,' does. He not only 
entertains the dichotomy of the divine and the institutional, which he reads in 
Levinson's essay and which makes possible in the first place a Kirilov-like 
shift, but he also clearly seeks and expects an authority for the reading of the 
law just as Levinson, as he equates with a semantic apocalypse the state of 
reading where 'no authority [other than] the coercive authority of institutional 
force' exists. 
Commenting on Levinson and Fish, O.E. White identifies the crucial 
question as that of whether cr not objectivity is possible. It is possible, 
according to him; yet it does not necessarily contradict a Kuhnian sort of 
relativism. The view he opposes and which 'leads very rapidly to nihilism' is 
that 'no answers that do not flow from one's prejudices are ever possible.' O.E. 
White, The Text, Interpretation, and Critical Standards' 60 Texas Law Review 
569, 579 (1982). Fiss also appeals to a notion of Objectivity and at once a 
Kuhnian emphasis on the exemplary, rather than absolute, character of 
practice. He charges with nihilism, in tum, writers who pursue 'a romance 
with politics' (his footnote refers to Brest and Levinson) and from whose 
viewpoint '(i]! is impossible to speak of law with the objectivity required by 
the idea of justice.' O.M. Fiss, 'Objectivity and Interpretation' 34 Stanford Law 
Review 739, 740, 742 (1982). Brest indicates in a rejoinder that an awareness 
of the political dimension does not necessarily signify nihilism; 'the line 
separating law from politics is not all that distinct... its very location is a 
question of politics,' as indeed the 'interpretive community' Fiss himself 
invokes for the objectivity of adjudication (see, the text accompanying, infra, 
notes 26-39) will always be a political community in terms of the distinctive 
backgrounds and experiences of its members. P. Brest, 'Interpretation and 
Interest' 34 Stanford Law Review 765, 771-773 (1982). The charge of 
nihilism,' writes an author, who argues with extensive references to Rorty's 
analysis of traditional philosophy for a concept of adjudication without the 
traditional notions of determinacy, objectivity, neutrality and certainty, 'is the 
most superficially plausible - and therefore the most rhetorically powerful -
complaint against those of us who maintain that law is a kind of politics.' J.W. 
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory' 94 Yale Law 
Journal I, 6 (1984). His combination of an epistemological nihilism with the 
Rortian pragmatism is found. problematic in J. Stick, 'Can Nihilism Be 
Pragmatic?' 100 Harvard Law Review 332 (1986). See, for an essay on legal 
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indetenninacy ('Indeterminacy matters because legitimacy matters'). K. Kress. 
'Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy' in Legal Hermeneutics: History, 
Theory, and Practice 200. 203 (ed. G. Leyh. 1992). The author distinguishes 
between 'moderate' and 'radical' statements of indetenninacy; while moderate 
indeterminacy can be maintained. its consequences for legitimacy are 
negligible. The lack of faith in law and its institutions is argued to be a good 
reason to consider disassociating from its academic teaching in P. Carrington, 
'Of Law and the River' 34 Journal of Legal Education 222 (1984). Responses 
to this essay are to be found in "Of Law and the River,' and of Nihilism and 
Academic Freedom' 35 Journal of Legal Education 1 (1985). The two 
significant offshoots of hermeneutic theory. according to Hoy, a philosopher, 
are Habennas' 'transcendental hermeneutics' and Derrida's deconstruction. The 
former supplements the traditional theory with a somewhat autonomous. 
progressive concept of reason which, unlike the circularity of the Gadamerian 
theory, makes radical change conceivable. What it also does is to provide a 
basis for genuine disagreement - a measure for meaning. Derrida. on the 
other hand. 'exaggerates' the elementary hermeneutic insights to come up with 
a notion of 'undecidability' whose legal use may well mean nihilism. D.C. 
Hoy, 'Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives' 
in Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 319 (eds. S. 
Levinson and S. Mailloux, 1988). 
In a study centred around the 'antinomy' that characterizes law, the 
contradiction between the private and the public. choice and force. theory and 
practice. one dissolved by Kant on a moral and yet ultimately problematic 
basis and pointed out by both Hegel and Marx as 'the paradox of civil society,' 
the author contrasts the 'nihilism' of philosophers such as Nietzsche. 
Heidegger. Derrida. and Foucault, writers who implicitly promise to solve the 
antinomy or at least surpass the metaphysics that defines the traditional 
solutions to it. with what is termed 'the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic.' G. 
Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law (1987). Rose aims to 
demonstrate (a) that the nihilist approaches to the antinomy hardly form an 
entirely original concept (in the detective-work part of her essay Rose 
establishes that the dissolution of the antinomy by neo-Kantian legal 
philosophers Stammler. Cohen and Lask on the basis of a concept of 'time' or 
'power,' a category inspired by the Critique of Pure Reason, is reproduced by 
philosophers such as Weber. Lukacs, and Heidegger in the respective concepts 
of 'rationality.' 'mode of production,' and 'Being and time,' a solution 
redeveloped in turn by Foucault, Deleuze. Derrida, and others). (b) that. just 
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as the liberal lawyers failed to dissolve the antinomy in the face of the critical 
expositions of it by the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic, the post-structuralist 
nihilism which misunderstands the nature of the dichotomy and thus ends up 
rejecting (legal) knowledge altogether is no match for the dialectic: the post-
structuralist nihilism fails to achieve its aim of surpassing metaphysics (Rose 
describes the post-structuralist discourse in terms of a dichotomy of 
metaphysics and science) and, more important still, lacks the consistency and 
rigour that defines the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic. Rose's essay is such an 
assemblage of consistent mis(s)readings of some of the texts it seeks to 
counter, it almost becomes ethicallY questionable. She attributes to Derrida, 
for instance, a series of binary oppositions which even a casual browsing of 
the latter's work might resist: deconstruction and reconstruction, opening and 
closing ('Derrida reconstructs while claiming he is deconstructing and closes 
questions while claiming he is opening them,' id. at 131); speech and writing, 
history and misology, hierarchy and misarchism ('By focusing on the contrary 
logoslgraplws Derrida reconstructs the 'history' of the metaphor of writing to 
produce a tale of misology and misarchisrn,' id. at 135); literal and 
metaphorical - the wild surmise that deconstruction does not simply redefine 
the literal in terms of a greater category of the metaphorical, but it bans the 
word altogether - ('Derrida makes a grave mistake when he says 'Hegel's 
formula must be taken literally ... ' For a thinker who denies that meaning is 
literal this exception is particularly interesting,' id. at 147); the moral and the 
non-moral ('Derrida's move beyond good and evil. .. ' ill. at 149); metaphysics 
and science ('[C]laims ... that metaphysics has been surpassed have turned out 
to be rhetorical... Metaphysics... has not been overturned by its 
transmogrification into positive science,' id. at 208), and so on. What stands 
out in Rose's 'reading' of Derrida as particularly bizarre is her notion that 
'Derrida turns law and knowledge into writing' (id. at 171) - writing in its 
'literal meaning' (ill. at 169). According to Rose, by 'writing' Derrida has in 
mind none other than its literal meaning. 'Writing cannot be picked out as 
definitive of metaphor by stipulating that it is to be understood as 'what gives 
rise to an inscription in general', since this is its literal meaning' (id.). Hence: 
'Derrida replaces the old imperialism of the Logos, the old law table, by the 
imperialism of the grapheme, as a new law table ... ' (id. at 170). In fact, where 
Rose refers in Derrida for the definition of writing and yet for some reason 
fails to quote in full, Derrida's meaning is anything but ambigious. 'Now we 
tend to say 'writing ' ... ' notes Derrida, 'to designate not only physical gestures 
of literal pictographic or ideographic inscriptions. but also the totality of what 
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makes it possible; and... thus we say 'writing' for all that gives rise to an 
inscription in general .. .' J. Derrida, Of Grammatology 9 (transl. G.C. Spivak, 
1976). (Cj. Derrida on writing. the present study. 2.2. the text accompanying 
notes 1-10.) A fine critique of the nihilistic trend in legal theory as based on a 
confusion between anti-foundationalism and meaninglessness. a confusion 
wrongly attributed to Derrida's work. is to be found in D. Cornell. 'From the 
Lighthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal 
Interpretation' in Legal Hermeneutics. supra. at 147. See also. for a criticism 
of Fish's work for overemphasizing politics and for the lack of concern 
displayed in his anti-foundationalism 'to provide a role for justice,' P. Bobbitt. 
Constitutionallnterpretalion 41-42 (1991). And see. for the 'crisis' of liberal 
jurisprudence under the 'deconstructionist' criticisms of its traditional notions, 
and the need to take stock. C.A.D. Husson. 'Expanding the Legal Vocabulary: 
The Challenge Posed by the Deconstruction and Defense of Law' 95 Yale Law 
Journal 969 (1986). 
6 'Objectivity,' supra, note 5. at 763. 
7 'Of Law and the River,' supra, note 5. 
8 'Law as Literature,' supra, note 3. at 385. 
9 Id. at 386 (emphasis added). 
10 Id. at 373. 'Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has 
imported into them: the finding is called science. the importing - art, 
religion. love. pride.' F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power par. 606 (transl. W. 
Kaufmann and RJ. Hollingdale, 1968). 
11 F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 70 (transl. RJ. Hollingdale, 1988). 
12 F. Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil par. 192 (transl. RJ. Hollingdale. 1990). 
13 Cf. M. Heidegger, Being and Time 207-208 (trans 1. J. Macquarrie and E. 
Robinson, 1990): 'What we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, 
but the creaking waggon. the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march. 
the north wind, the woodpecker tapping. the fire crackling. 
'It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to 'hear' a 'pure 
noise'. The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is 
the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dssein [There-being. man]. as 
Being-in-the-world. already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-
the-world ... Dasein, as essentially understanding. is proximally alongside what 
is understood. 
' ... OnIy he who already understands can listen.' 
14 Beyond, supra, note 12, par. 192. 
15 Cf. Derrida on J.L. Austin. 1.4. the text accompanying notes 55-61; and 2.2. 
342 
the text accompanying notes 51-58. And cf realism and stage-setting, 2.4, the 
text accompanying notes 177-207. 
16 Beyond. supra. note 12, par. 192. 
17 Cf the Kantian transcendence,lA, the text accompanying notes 7-10. 
18 But see, for what might mildly be termed an "northodox reading of 
Nietzsche's work, R.H. Weisberg, 'On the Use and Abuse of Nietzsche for 
Modem Constitutional Theory' in Interpreting Law and Literature, supra, note 
5, at 181. 'There is nothing less radical today than the position that textual 
meanings are indeterminate,' the author reproaches Levinson. 'As a 
Nietzschean, I say this not only because indeterminacy has become so 
popular; rather, I contend that the position itself is fundamentally 
conservative, if not reactionary' (ill. at 181). A grasp of Nietzsche's true stance 
on interpretation, accordingly, depends on three assumptions that are never 
questioned in his actual work; first, 'the independent existence of [the text] 
outside the reader' (id. at 182), a notion which signifies a clear break with the 
work of such 'ultramodernists' as Derrida and Rorty (id. at 188); secondly, a 
disinterested. non-passionate. approach on the part of the reader, a 
Nietzschean vein well reflected in the hermeneutic work by Heidegger and 
Gadamer (ill. at 185-186); and finally, the crucial concepts of truth. 
'antecedent to all reflection and combination' (itt. at 191, the actual words are 
Hamilton's. who, according to Weisberg, 'anticipated' Nietzsche in The 
Federalist), justice ('Nietzsche suggests that a sound idea of justice does 
indeed exist: id. at 183), and origin ('only the ressentiment-imbued nineteenth 
century has perverted [the idea of justice] so as to forget completely its origin,' 
id. ). The interwoven character of all three assumptions is expressed in the 
earlier work by Weisberg, The Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as 
Lawyer in Modem Fiction (1984), as follows: 'Nietzsche on justice is 
Nietzsche at his least 'modem' and most Judea-classical. In this marvelous 
aphorism [2nd essay, par. 11 in Genealogy: 'only after a corpus of laws has 
been established can there be any talk of 'right' and 'wrong"]. he reminds us 
that justice does exist. It exists because an objective notion of textuality also 
exists. Indeed, justice derives from an unchanging, impersonal text rather than 
from a private and idiosyncratic urge for revenge' (at 18, in the endnote 
omitted here Weisberg stresses the significance. in Nietzschean terms. of a 
self -conscious and disinterested attitude on the part of the reader with 
references, again. to Heidegger and Gadamer). The section to which Weisberg 
refers in Gadamers Truth and Method (1988) in support of the concept of 
disinterested reading is uncannily entitled 'The Hermeneutic Circle and the 
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Problem of Prejudices' (id. at 235). What Gadamer in fact investigates under 
that title is the Heidggerian notion of the circularity of understanding as a 
primordial condition, an idea which I have already discussed in the present 
work (see, 2.3. the text accompanying notes 188-197; cf. its formulation by 
Nietzsche, the text accompanying, supra, notes 10-17) and which postulates 
prejudiced reading as the only conceivable way of reading rather than suggest 
a way out of it. Interpretation. accordingly. is a project not possible without a 
forestructure which prejudices. and only prejudices. provide. To be sure. 
Heidegger does imply a binary opposition of 'understanding' (which is based, 
phenomenologically put, on 'things themselves') and 'fancies' (Being and 
Time, supra, note 13, at 195) - a dichotomy that is more famously 
reproduced between the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity in Being 
and Time (namely that some possibilities of Dasein are simply more equal 
than others). even though the work as a whole clearly precludes the concept of 
a transcendental criterion to distinguish the marks of understanding from 
fancies - other than, that is, the criteria of simply more fancies. Gadamer, in 
tum, refers to 'arbitrary fancies' that may spoil the hermeneutic process if the 
reader is not constantly alert and self-conscious (Truth and Method, at 236). 
(Of the aporia Gadamer faithfully reiterates, Heidegger himself is in fact only 
too well aware; every time he invokes the dichotomy he goes to great lengths 
to justify the immediately striking contradiction: 'Authentic Being-one's Self 
does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has 
been detached from the 'they [das Man]', it is rather an existentiell 
modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as an essential ex is ten t i a Ie,' 
Being and Time, supra, note 13, at 168, emphasis in original.) Nevertheless, 
just as the circularity brought about by the primordiality of the learned, 
staged, quality of experience, namely the part played by prejudices, is 
absolutely central to Heidegger's work as a whole, so is it to Gadamer's. As he 
famously puts it in the very section to which Weisberg refers, 'the 
fundamental prejudice of enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice 
itself (Truth and Method. at 239-240). The Enlightenment, indeed, is what 
seems far more accurately to define the frame of reference on whose basis 
Weisberg conducts his reading; a feature which betrays itself at the very outset 
as he produces an opposition of the progressive and the reactionary. Cf. 
Nietzsche on 'progress' ("Mankind' does not advance, it does not even exist'), 
Will to Power, supra, note 10, par. 90; on the concept of 'origin' ("Essence,' 
the 'essential nature,' is something perspective and already presupposes a 
multiplicity') and persuasion as the sole criterion ('the essence of a thing is 
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only an opinion about the 'thing.' Or rather: 'it is considered' is the real 'it is,' 
the sole 'this is"), ilL par. 556 (emphasis in original) (cf. the Aristotelian 
phronesis, the present study. 1.3. the text accompanying note 37, and W. 
James on 'truth,' itt. note 37); on unmediated perception ('Something 
unconditioned cannot be known; otherwise it would not be unconditioned'), 
Will to Power, supra. note 10. par. 555; on disinterested attitude 
("contemplation without interest' ... a nonsensical absurdity'). F. Nietzsche. On 
the Genealogy of Morals 3rd essay. par. 12 (transl. W. Kaufmann and RJ. 
Hollingdale. 1969): '[L]et us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual 
fiction that posited a 'pure. will-less. painless. timeless knOwing subject' ... 
There is onlY a perspective seeing. onlY a perspective 'knowing'... [T]o 
eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every effect, supposing we 
were capable of this - what would that mean but to castrate the intellect? -' 
(emphasis in original). 
19 See, Will to Power, supra. note 10, Book One passim. 
20 Id. par. 12 (emphasis in original). 
21 As well-known, in Theaetetus Plato cites from Protagoras that 'man is the 
measure of all things: of those which are. that they are. and of those which are 
not, that they are not.' Plato. Theaetetus 1521 (transl. J. McDowell, 1987). The 
'fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their 
rise,' declares Heidegger at the very outset of the ontological inquiry of Being 
and Time, 'must be sought in the existential analYtic of Dasein.' Being and 
Time, supra, note 13, at 34 (emphasis in original). Again, the view of 
language held by the later Wittgenstein as a tool-box, rather than a logically 
analyzeable picture of the world, and the very emphasis on the performance of 
the player in language-games have suggested to many a form of 
anthropologism. Finally. the Derridean notion of reading has often been 
thought to imply, notoriously. that the reader is the 'measure of all things' -
hence the notion of a free play associated with his work. Nothing. of course. 
could be more deceptive. Heidegger does not even name man in Being and 
Time; man is merely a There-being (Dasein). humbly a part and artefact of 
that without which she. as homo. is unthinkeable - the world. the humus. 
With Wittgenstein. again. forms of life are constitutive of man's being; 
training, as opposed to a free-floating privacy, is the distinctive mark of man. 
And for Derrida, what a dissolution of the dichotomy between the text and 
history ('there is no outside-text [il ny a pas de hors-texte],' J. Derrida, Of 
Grammatology 158 [transl. G.C. Spivak, 1976]) signifies first and foremost is 
the vanishing of the reader as one who dictates and oversees borderlines, the 
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subiectum. Nietzsche himself, in fact, as I quote him in, supra, note 18, 
invokes opinion as the sole possible criterion of truth, even though he at once 
states it to be 'the hyperbolic naivete of man: positing himself as the meaning 
and measure of the value of things' C$upra, note 20). The naivete to which he 
refers, therefore, is hardly to do with the meaning of Protagoras' statement. 
Protagoras merely expresses what Nietzsche himself points out in appealing to 
opinion; man as narrator, as opposed to the autonomous subject of traditional 
metaphysics. See, for a typically Heideggerian analysis of the contrast 
between the Cartesian subjectivism and the apparent 'subjectivism' of 
Protagoras' statement, M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume IV: Nihilism 91-95, 
119-122 (ed. D.F. Krell, transl. F.A. Capuzzi, 1982). 
22 'A nihilist is a man who judges of the world as it is that it oUght not to be, and 
of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist. According to this view, our 
existence (action, suffering, willing feeling) has no meaning .. .' Will to Power, 
supra, note 10, par. 585 (emphasis in original). 
23 See, supra, note 2. 
24 Will to Power, supra, note 10, par. 590: 'Our values are interpreted into things. 
'Is there then any meaning in the in-itself?! 
'Is meaning not necessarily relative meaning and perspective? 
'All meaning is will to power (all relative meaning resolves itself into it' 
(emphasis in original). 
25 'Law and Literature,' supra, note 3, at 373. 
26 'Objectivity: supra, note 5, at 740-741. Cj. J. Derrida, Limited Inc 148 (transl. 
S. Weber and J. Mehlman, 1990): 'I do not believe I have ever spoken of 
'indeterminacy: whether in regard to 'meaning' or anything else. 
Undecidability is something else... I want to recall that undecidability is 
always a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example, of 
meaning. but also of acts). These possibilities are themselves highly 
determined in strictly defined situations (for example, discursive - syntactical 
or rhetorical - but also political, ethical, etc.). They are pragmatically 
determined' (emphasis in original, endnote omitted). Cj. Kelman on meaning, 
supra, note 4. 
27 F. Geny, Method o/Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law: 
Critical Essay par. 97. Cf. the present study, 2.4, the text accompanying notes 
44-48. And see, for the 'hazards' of a formal concept of law. id., the text 
accompanying notes 24-35. 
28 'Objectivity,' supra. note 5, at 739. 
29 [d. 
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30 See. 2.4 the text accompanying note 105. 
31 See. for objectivity as the basis of free search. Method. supra. note 27. par. 
156; the present study. 2.4. the text accompanying note 49. 
32 'Objectivity,' supra, note 5, at 745. 
33 ld. at 746. 'H we consider law as literature,' writes Levinson in the essay Fiss 
attacks. 'then we might better understand the malaise that afflicts all 
contemporary legal analysis, nowhere more severely than in constitutional 
theory.' 'Law as Literature,' supra, note 3, at 377. The essay comes at a 
symposium on law and literature. Jurists seem to have always been conscious 
of a particular kinship between legal and literary rhetorics. The latest affinity 
with literature, however, has provoked uneasy responses - hardly surprising, 
given the mixed responses the latest trends in literary criticism have received 
in the literary community itself. A fine example of the classical vein in 
exploring the literature in law, the legal stylistics, is N. Cardozo. 'Law and 
Literature' in Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 339 (ed. M.E. 
Hall, 1947). J.B. White's work on legal rhetoric has been an attempt to 
continue the tradition with an added flavour that blends, if not altogether 
happily, a textual positivism that perceives language as self-referential with a 
hermeneutic commitment to the forestructuring quality of culture. For him, 
law can best be understood as a 'language,' a notion that embraces all that can 
be put under the rubric of culture (J.B. White. The Legallmagination xii-xiii 
[abridged ed., 1985]). Law as language is how law was understood in classical 
times; refusing, in turn, a sharp demarcation line between law and literature 
(J.B. White, When W o r ~ ~ Lose Their Meaning xii [1984]). The ancient 
concept linked 'the fields of law and literature and perhaps classics and 
anthropology as well' (ilL at xiii). Meaning, within that concept. is an artefact 
of the creative relationship the reader establishes with the text (ilL at 17). It is 
not, therefore, an uncovering of the authorial intention as sometimes falsely 
assumed (J.B. White. 'Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature' 
60 Texas Law Review 415, 440 [1982]). That, however. does not make the 
reader the source of meaning. Rather. meaning 'resides in the life of reading 
itself, to which both text and [the] reader contribute' (When WOTW-, supra, at 
19). In Heracles' Bow (1985) White refers to a 'condition of radical 
uncertainty' which defines the process of signification (at 40). Neither the 
creative part played by the reader nor a hermeneutic uncertainty, however, is 
to be confused with a view of reading that recognizes no constraints in 
achieving meaning. Such view, he warns, would be 'to propose the destruction 
of an existing community, established by our laws and constitution, extending 
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from 'we' who are alive to those who have given us the materials of our 
cultural world, and to substitute for it another, the identity of which is most 
uncertain indeed' ('Law as Language,' supra, at 442). New Criticism seems to 
form the literary horizons of White's vision, and his hermeneutics goes only as 
far as the turn-of-the-century ideas of Geisteswissenschaften go (odd couple 
those two, you may think; unprecedented it is not: consider Weber's project, or 
if he can somehow find his way out, T. Parsons'). 
The new trends in literary theory and hermeneutics are sketched for the 
benefit of American jurists in D.HJ. Hermann, 'Phenomenology, 
Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary 
Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena' 36 University of Mimni Law 
Review 379 (1982) - impressive title. The essay is particularly interesting for 
reflecting the amazing gluttony that almost characterized 1980s in American 
legal scholarship for magic, all-at-the-touch-of-a-button, ideas. They are all 
bite-size, yet overwhelming in sheer number, and typically piled up in a 
mystery order, to defy any system of digestion. Not surprisingly, only few of 
the ideas get represented with some accuracy. Consider the following. 'Jacques 
Derrida, best known for his work on the critical activity of deconstruction, 
focuses on the activities of speaking and reading' (ill. at 401, n. 124). 'Michel 
Foucault is now associated with the view that there are important social and 
political dimensions implicit in the form of discourse' (itt., n. 125). 'Louis 
Althusser is perhaps best known for his development of an interpretive 
approach to the work of Karl Marx. He denied the alleged radical break in 
Marx's early and later theoretical writings' (id., n. 126). The idea of a legal 
hermeneutics that inspires not 'arbitrariness' but validity, a notion the author is 
unable to collect in the mainstream hermeneutics (along the Gadamerian lines, 
accordingly, '[t]he law would be whatever a judge takes it to mean at any 
time'), is to be found in S.C.R. McIntosh, 'Legal Hermeneutics: A 
Philosophical Critique' 35 Oklahoma Law Review 1 (1982) (the Gadamerian 
view of reading as 'solipsistic' at 36). A rough guide to mainstream 
hermeneutics with a view to acquire tips for the Anglo-American interpretive 
controversy, which, unlike McIntosh, does not infer an ensuing 'anarchy' 
('Phenomenological hermeneutics explains a changing Constitution without 
surrendering to the notion of judicial anarchy'), is pursued in T.G. Phelps and 
J.A. Pitts, 'Questioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological 
Hermeneutics for Legal Interpretation' 29 Saint Louis University Law Journal 
353 (1985) (the 'anarchy' remark at 382). See, for a view of hermeneutics to 
ensure a principled practice as opposed to the 'cynical' and 'political' elements 
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nurtured by an abstract fonnalism - a dangerous state, according to the 
author, equally risked by non-formalist views such as those of Fish which find 
superfluous the idea of providing practice with principles, F J. Mootz, III, 'The 
Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry 
Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur' 68 Boston University 
Law Review 523 (1988). See, for a fine essay that repudiates the alleged 
contradiction between hermeneutics and commitment to a concept of the rule 
of law (for hermeneutics, notably that of Gadamer. 'insist[s] on the cultivation 
of shared meanings and a shared public space as a premise of interpretive 
praxis'). F. Dallrnayr. 'Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law' in Legal 
Hermeneutics. supra, note 5. at 3. 18. 1be classic work in English on legal 
hermeneutics is F. Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics [1839] (1963). A 
brief account of the method. object. and principal works of juristic 
phenomenology is to be found in D. Schiff. 'Phenomenology and 
Jurisprudence' 4 Liverpool Law Review 5 (1982). See, for three authoritative 
essays on the subject. M. Natanson (ed), Phenomenology and the Social 
Sciences Vol. 2 (1973) (W. Friedmann. 'Phenomenology and Legal Science,' 
at 343; P. Amselek, 'The Phenomenological Description of Law,' at 367; and 
M. Franklin, The Mandarinism of Phenomenological Philosophy of Law,' at 
451). 
Another major attraction in the interpretive controversy has been philosophy 
of language. The part it ought to playas umpire is emphasized in F. Schauer, 
'An Essay on Constitutional Language' 29 Ucla Law Review 797 (1982). 
'Philosophers commonly argue.' the author notes. 'that if a speaker says p. and 
p logically entails q, then the speaker is committed to q even if he had never 
thought of q and never would have intended to say q' (id. at 825, footnote 
omitted). So that's what philosophy of language teaches. The involvement 
between the two put as logical. it is mystifying that the author should 
contemplate anyone objecting to it in the first place. or that anyone's intention 
when uttering a statement should be in such contradiction with what is a 
logical involvement on the part of the statement after all - where would that 
person have to be from. out of space? Nevertheless, the significance of context 
for the performances of language happily to function is in turn indicated. 
Accompanying it are two fundamental oppositions. One is between the 
parasitic instances of language (when the language has a technical sense in law 
yet primarily belongs to ordinary language. as in 'real property' and 
'wrongful') and instances where the language is fully autonomous (as in 
'habeas corpus') (id. at 804) - it is revealing that the author should 
349 
intrinsically connect two different uses of the term 'real property,' one legal 
the other non-legal, and as such it should differ from 'habeas corpus,' a term 
whose ordinary meaning either resides abroad or is dead (i.e.,you do not have 
to mouth its sound pattern lor a non-legal sign) and which, therefore, is purely 
legal: what the frame of reference on whose basis the distinction is drawn 
precludes first and foremost is a notion of the primordiality of context; a 
vacuum-like environment, rather than a regulating and dictating context, is 
what ethereally surrounds the intrinsically linked (again: only because you 
employ the 'same' pattern of sounds when uttering them, or the 'same' graphic 
signs when writing), yet alie1lllled, uses of the term 'real property,' hence the 
notion of a problematic instance in performances of language. The second 
opposition which accompanies the author's idea of context is between the law 
and its specific applications (it/. at 806), a dichotomy, again, aborting the idea 
of the primordiality of context: a thing is more than its applications. See. for a 
Wittgenstein-inspired view of legal language as a form of life to be 
understood in its own right, and the meaning of a word as hinged on its 
'movements,' C.D. Stone, 'From a Language Perspective' 90 Yale Law Journal 
1149 (1981). And see, for a criticism of this essay for its 'reactionary retreat' 
into 'law as an independent, closed conceptual system,' M. Shapiro, 'On the 
Regrettable Decline of Law French: Or Shapiro Jettet Le Brickbat' 90 Yale 
Law Journal 1198 (1981). 'Law as language is aimed principally at reasserting 
the autonomy of law - at returning law to lawyers by claiming that law is a 
specialized language that only lawyers can speak' (it/. at 1200). (Cf. Gellner on 
philosophy of language, notably that of Wittgenstein, as an ultimately 
'reactionary' enterprise for creating autonomous research units [forms of life, 
language-games] within the meaning of which all possible criticisms of the 
practice are effectively pre-empted, E. Gellner, W o r ~ ~ and Things: An 
Examination ot and an Attack on, Linguistic Philosophy esp. chs. 8 and 9 
[1979].) On the history of English language as a medium of law, with remarks 
on its current use, see, D. Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (1963). And 
see, for a well arranged, useful collection of extracts from key texts on a range 
of subjects in philosophy, including meaning, language, and the language of 
law, with elucidatory notes and questions, W.R. Bishin and C.R. Stone, Law, 
Language, and Ethics: An Introduction to Law and Legal Method (1972). 
The idea of a syntax, a grammar, for a particular system of signs, on whose 
basis to disclose the constituent units at work within the system and uncover 
the underlying texture, the generative logic. the deep structure, permeated the 
bulk of the studies of literary criticism and cultural analysis in the late '60s and 
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'70s. Semiotics, the so-called science of signs (the rhetoric of that which 
cannot be seen in the graphic sign but which can be heard, to contra-phrase 
Derrida on dijJerance, namely the repression of the graphic dichotomy 
between science and signs - the archi-science) sought in its mainstream in 
literature to establish the notion of a pre-destined, yet self-referential, text, as 
opposed to a semantic invasion of it from outside. A dichotomy of inside and 
outside the text, and an ensuing concept of meltl-language, allowing the oltic 
a detached position where the text has definite, circumscribeable borders, are 
consequently the obvious assumptions of the project of mainstream semiotics. 
One representative of mainstream semiotics in legal studies is B.S. Jackson. 
See, for his study for a syntax of the Anglo-American legal rhetoric, based on 
the work of AJ. Greimas and E. Landowski for a grammaire juridiiJue, B.S. 
Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory (1987). The grammar, accordingly, 'is 
itself part of the message of the text; it does not represent any mechanism 
separate from that of narrative grammar, by which the text itself is produced' 
(id. at 299). See, for an excellent critique of this book for 'den[ying] the 
relevance of genealogy, tradition, and discourse, [and] disawow[ing] the 
hermeneutic and rhetorical characteristics of its own text, in favour of a 
transcendent or self-evident reason,' P. Goodrich, 'Simulation and the 
Semiotics of Law' 2 Textual Practice 180, 187 (1988). Cf. B.S. Jackson, Law, 
Fact and Narrative Coherence 180 (1989): 'If one were to construct a set of 
'families' of legal theory, Semiotics, Deconstruction and Critical Legal 
Studies, would, in my view, form a single family group. The metaphor is not 
entirely arbitrary. Family quarrels are known for their intensity, and it often 
appears that more effort is expended, within this group, on internal family 
quarrelS than on opposition to the opposed family group, represented by 
positivism and natural law in their various guises' (footnote omitted). See, for 
an exposition of the influence of Peirce's notion of inquiry on the studies of 
law, notably realism (alongside the American and Scandinavian versions of 
realism, the author detects direct influence in Holmes, who had the good 
fortune to be a fellow club member but who probably would have been 
slightly surprised to hear the nucleus of his ideas, which is so very general, 
being as new as Peirce, and in Gooy's Method, who, on the other hand, quite 
possibly did not even speak English at the time of the composition of the 
Method, a work, incidentally, Peirce could hardly inspire if he at once inspired 
Holmes), with an unhelpful attitude of repeatedly mentioning the particular 
Peircean influences as opposed to showing them, R. Kevelson, The Law as a 
System of Signs (1988). A brief. yet informative. introduction to legal 
351 
semiotics, is R. Carrion-Wam's 'Semiotica Juridica' in D. Carzo and B.S. 
Jackson (eds), Semiotics, Law and Social Science 11 (1985), a collection of 
essays on the subject. See also R. Kevelson (ed) lAw and Semiotics 3 Vols. 
(1987-1989). The classic essay on law as a system of signs is F.E. Oppenheim, 
'Outline of a Logical Analysis of Law' 11 Philosophy of Science 142 (1944). 
A fine example, on the other hand, of the narrowing of the margin in recent 
theory between (a) a semantics based on a closed notion of the text and (b) a 
post-semiotic dissolution of the distinction between the text and its outside, 
precluding thereby the concept of a meta-discourse, is to be found in C. 
Douzinas and R. Warrington, with S. McVeigh, Postmodern Jurisprudence: 
The Law o/Text in the Texts of Law (1990), an eruicbingly venturesome work 
and a brilliant introduction to the studies of law and literature. See also, for 
the perverse dialectic of a semiotic textualism and a post-semiotic seeing 
through of the text in Goodrich's work, the text accompanying, infra, notes 
72-177. 
The literary trend in legal criticism is discussed in various essays in 'A 
Symposium on Law and Literature' 60 Texas Law Review 373 (1982). A 
collection of essays to reflect the diversity of views in contributions to the 
literary controversy is presented in Interpreting Law and Literature, supra, 
note 5. The essays by J.A. Smith and A. Axelrod in 'Law and Literature: A 
Symposium' 26 Rutgers Law Review 223 (1976) deliberate on the subject of 
law and humanities, notably literature. In 'Symposium: Law and Literature' 32 
Rutgers Law Review 603 (1979), H. Suretsky provides a useful, annotated 
bibliography of writings on the subject of law and literature. In these two 
special issues of Rutgers Law Review Dante, Balzac, Dickens, Dostoyevski, 
and Joyce are the literary figures discussed from a 'legal' perspective. See, for 
an analysis of the legal in the literary, B. Thomas, Cross-examinations 0/ Law 
and Literature: Cooper, Hawthorne, Stowe, and Melville (1987). A reading of 
some of the works by Dostoyevski, Flaubert. Melville, and Camus on the basis 
of a concept of ressentiment, a borrowing from Nietzsche (whose notion of 
Christianity as the 'denial of natural,' as ressentiment, is supplanted by 
legalistic 'wordiness'), is pursued in The Faiwre of the Word, supra, note 18. 
The author expresses his views on law and literature as an interdisciplinary 
enterprise in R. Weisberg, Poethics and Other Strategies 0/ Law and 
Literature (1992). Wallace Stevens is the literary personality who provides 
inspiration for a fonn of legal pragmatism in T.C. Grey, The Wallace Stevens 
Case: Law and the Practice 0/ Poetry (1991). In R.A. Posner, Law and 
Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (1988), 'the first to attempt a general 
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survey and evaluation of the field of law and literature,' the Judge Posner 
inquires what all the fuss is about. Literature, he finds out, has little to offer to 
the lawyer in his profession, notably in interpreting the law; but it can help for 
an improved understanding of judicial opinions and a better quality of the 
language thereof. Posner's work is criticized for its 'scientific' discourse, as 
opposed to a henneneutic, or humanistic, one, in J.B. White, 'What can a 
Lawyer Learn from Literature?' 102 Harvard Law Review 2014 (1989). 
Fish teases Posner's opposition of law and literature in S. Fish, 'Don't Know 
Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature' 97 Yale Law 
Jou11lll1777 (1988), reprinted in his Doing What Comes Naturally: Change. 
Rhetoric. and the Practice of 17Ieory in Literary and Legal Studies ch. 13 
(1989). (His review of Posner's The Problems of Jurisprudence [1990] is in S. 
Fish, 'Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence' 57 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1447 [1990].) See also his (and indeed Dworkin's) 
essays in the Dworkin-Fish exchange, discussed in the present study, 2.3, the 
text accompanying notes 91 et seq.; and, again, Fish's and W.B. Michaels' 
examination of formalism in literature and law with particular emphasis on 
parol evidence rule, discussed, once more, in the present study, 2.1, the text 
accompanying notes 134-149. In an insightful critique of the textualist and the 
extratextualist arguments in Riggs v Palmer, 115 NY 506,22 NE 188 (1889), 
Abraham finds both approaches essentially belief-governed, discipline-guided, 
and the 'facts' of the case interpretive in a way which resists a radical 
opposition of objectivity and subjectivity; the constitutive part of the 
community in the interpretive act emphasized, '[t]he differences between 
statutory and literary interpretation, then,' he notes, 'are differences in 
communities of interpretation.' K.S. Abraham, 'Statutory Interpretation and 
Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair' in Interpreting 
Law and Literature, supra, note 5, at 115, 126 (emphasis added). Finally, see, 
for a view of legal language as persuasion, Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice 
and the Problem of Argument (transl. J. Petrie, 1963). 
34 'Objectivity,' supra, note 5, at 34. 
35 In response to Fiss Levinson reminds him of Fiss' simultaneous criticisms of 
the Rehnquist Court for 'fall[ing] radically short of the ideals of the profession' 
(0. Fiss and C. Krauthammer, 'The Rehnquist Court,' New Republic, Mar. 10, 
1982; cited in 'Law as Literature,' supra, note 3, at 396-402). And he asks, 
referring to Fiss' comparison of the judge's authority within the meaning of the 
notion of an interpretive community with the authority of the Pope, 'will 
Professor Fiss argue that the interpretive community has been taken over by a 
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false pope. a usurper. against whom the truly faithful must rally?' (id. at 399). 
He concludes: The united interpretive community that is necessary to Fiss' 
own argument simply does not exist' (id. at 401. footnote omitted). 
36 'Objectivity: supra. note 5. at 751. 
37 Will to Power. supra. note 10, par. 481: 'Against positivism, which halts at 
phenomena - There are only facts' - I would say: No, facts is precisely 
what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact 'in itself: 
perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing. 
'Everything is subjective,' you say; but even this is interpretation. The 
'subject' is not something given, it is something added and invented and 
projected behind what there is. - Finally, is it necessary to posit an 
interpreter behind the interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis. 
'In so far as the word 'knowledge' has any meaning, the world is knowable; 
but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless 
meanings. - 'Perspectivism.' 
'It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and 
Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that 
it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm' (the 'facts' and 
the 'interpretable' emphasized in original). 
See, for a life and difference affirming concept of constitutional law, RM. 
Cover. 'Foreword: Nomos and Narrative' 97 Harvard Law Review 4 (1983). 
'No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists,' writes Cover, 'apart from 
the narratives that locate it and give it meaning' (id. footnote omitted). The 
primordially attached quality of experience, the 'normative world' as he terms 
it, is constitutive of the workings of the law, the nomos. In a revealing contrast 
to formulations of rights with a distinctively homogenous character, such as 
that of Dworkin, Cover lays emphasis on individual life-forms, on diversity 
and difference, which ultimately makes a far more convincing rhetoric for 
minority rights than the former's. (Cf. Dworkin on rights, present study, 2.3, 
the text accompanying notes 136-146; and Holmes [reading Geny] on the 
rhetoric of homogeneity, id., the text accompanying notes 210-213.) The 
multiplicity of narratives within one legal domain, rather than one grand 
narrative, signifies the mechanism behind what Cover calls the 1urisgenerative 
principle' in reading the law - the 'legal DNA' ('Foreword,' supra, Part 2). It 
accounts for the diversity of interpretations in reading one and the same text. 
'All Americans share a national text in the first or thirteenth or fourteenth 
amendment, but we do not share an authoritative narrative regarding its 
significance' (id. at 17, footnote omitted). It is, however, neither possible nor 
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desirable to dispense with it: getting rid of the principle is getting rid of 
meaning altogether. The difficulty for the Court, of course, is often to have to 
choose between different and conflicting narratives. Nevertheless 'whichever 
story the Court chooses, alternative stories [will] still provide normative bases 
for the growth of distinct constitutional worlds' Ud. at 19). An affirmation of 
distinct 'constitutional worlds,' distinct life-forms, the life-energy, lies at the 
heart of Cover's view of the Constitution (his essay is centred around Bob 
Jones University v United States, 461 U.S. 574 [1982], whose opinion denies 
the fundamentalist Christian educational institution tax-exempt status for its 
overtly racist policies - the dramatic victimization of one life-form by 
another that is itself often in the periphery and victimized). He concludes, 
'[w]e ought to stop circumscribing the nomos; we ought to invite new worlds' 
(id. at 68). 
38 Doing What Comes Naturally, supra, note 33, at 141-142: The notion of 
'interpretive communities' was originally introduced as an answer to a 
question that had long seemed crucial to literary studies. What is the source of 
interpretive authority: the text or the reader? Those who answered 'the text' 
were embarrassed by the fact of disagreement ... Those who answered 'the 
reader' were embarrassed by the fact of agreement ... What was required was 
an explanation that could account for both agreement and disagreement, and 
that explanation was found in the idea of an interpretive community, not so 
much a group of individuals who shared a point of view, but a point of view 
or way of organizing experience that shared individuals in the sense that its 
assumed distinctions, categories of understanding, and stipulations of 
relevance and irrelevance were the content of the consciousness of community 
members who were therefore no longer individuals, but, insofar as they were 
embedded in the community's enterprise, community property ... In this new 
vision both texts and readers lose the independence that would be necessary 
for either of them to claim the honour of being the source of interpretive 
authority; both are absorbed by the interpretive community which, because it 
is responsible for all acts interpreters can possibly perform, is finally 
responsible for the texts those performances bring into the world.' The concept 
is originally formulated in S. Fish. Is There a Text in This Class: The 
Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980). Fish reads Fiss' essay in S. 
Fish, 'Fish v. Fiss' 36 Stanford Law Review 1325 (1984), reprinted in Doing 
What Comes Naturally, supra, note 33, ch. 6. Cf, Fish on Dworkin, the present 
study, 2.3, the text accompanying notes 91 et seq. 
39 Just as one is reminded of Kuhn's concept of scientific community, as well as 
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Fish's interpretive communities. at the mere sound of the notion Fiss invokes 
for legal interpretation; with his disciplining rules (see, supra note 34) Kuhn's 
'disciplinary matrix' springs to mind. Ironically. however, Kuhn elucidates that 
he was led to the idea of a disciplinary matrix in the first place precisely 
because he had been unable to find rules. written or unwritten. to account for 
the specific choices and performances of scientific community. See. T.S. 
Kuhn. The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in SCientific Tradition and 
Chlmge 298-319 (1977). See also his 'Postscript' in the second edition of The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). An attempt to do with legal 
meaning and scholarship what Kuhn does in Scientific Revolutions with 
history of science and scientific knowledge is pursued in W.E. Nelson, 
'Standards of Criticism' 60 Texas Law Review 447 (1982). where. concluding, 
the author suggests, in a manner that is not strictly Kuhnian, to distinguish 
critical standards shared by the community of scholars 'from their own 
aesthetic and ideological values' (id. at 491). According to the author. some 
such consensus with recognizeable standards existed until 1950s in American 
legal scholarship. Presently, however, '[t]he old consensus has broken down 
and a new one has failed to emerge' (id. at 470). Not unlike Fiss, the standards 
he is after seem to be standards to discipline a free-wheeling legal scholarship, 
rather than standards, in the Kuhnian fashion. olthe prevailing discipline. 
40 Nietzsche: Nihilism, supra, note 21. 
41 [d. at 59. 
42 Will to Power, supra, note 10, par. 2 (emphasis added). 
43 [d. par. 111. 
44 [d. par. 112 (emphasis in original). 
45 Nietzsche: Nihilism, supra, note 21, at 28. 
46 [d. at 136. 
47 See, the text accompanying, supra. note 11. 
48 Ecce Homo, supra, note 11. at 70. 
49 Cf audience and authorship, the present study, 1.1, the text accompanying 
notes 1-16. 
50 See. 1.2, note 39. 
51 See. id., the text accompanying notes 7-13; and 2.4, the text accompanying 
notes 95-100. 
52 Cf Llewellyn. Geny, Lyotard on 'conscious seeking,' id., the text 
accompanying notes 41-69. 
53 See, 1.4, the text accompanying notes 2-28. 
54 See, 2.4, the text accompanying notes 58-69. 
356 
55 Nietzsche: Nihilism, supra, note 21, at 147 (the whole sentence emphasized in 
original). 
56 [d. at 28. 
57 [d. 
58 [d. (emphasis in original). 
59 See, for Heidegger's statement of the characteristics of modern metaphysics, 
M. Heidegger, 'The Age of the World View,' transl. M. Grene. in Martin 
Heidegger and the Question of Literature: Toward a Postmodern Literary 
Hermeneutics 1 (ed. W.V. Spanos. 1979). 
60 Nietzsche: Nihilism, supra, note 21, at 138. 
61 Id. at 204. 
62 Supra, note 44. 
63 Id. 
64 Being and Time, supra, note 13, at 233. 
65 Id. 
66 Cf the present study, 1.3. the text accompanying notes 76-77. 
67 Being and Time, supra, note 13, at 235. 
68 Cf the Heideggerian dichotomy between 'understanding' and 'fancies' in 
reading, supra, note 18. Cf. Heidegger's simultaneous negation of the concept 
of metalanguage; whether interpretation is pursued by attending to the manner 
in which an entity reveals itself ('phenomenology') or a specific interpretation 
is forced upon the entity (such as in Cartesianism), '[iln either case, the 
interpretation has already decided for a defined way of conceiving it... it is 
grounded ... in a!ore-conception,' Being and Time, supra, note 13, at 191; 'the 
manner in which it, Being, gives itself. is itself determined by the way in 
which it clears itself,' M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference 67 (transl. J. 
Stambaugh, 1969). 
69 'Age of the World View,' supra, note 59. 
70 'Poetry,' according to Heidegger, who seems to understand by it all that is 
mimetic fLanguage itself is poetry in the essential sense'), 'is the saying of the 
unconcealedness of what is.' M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought 74 
(transl. A. Hofstadter, 1975). 
71 See, the text accompanying, supra. notes 15-16. 
72 P. Goodrich, Reading the Law: A Critical Introduction to Legal Method and 
Techniques 213-214 (1986). 
73 Id. at 214. 
74 Id. at 217-218. 
75 P. Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks 
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282 and id. n.3 (1990). 
76 C. Norris, 'Law, Deconstruction, and the Resistance to Theory' 15 Journal of 
Law and Society 166, 185 (1988). 
77 [d. at 184. 
78 [d. (emphasis added). 
79 'Here's one account of the technique that we in Critical Legal Studies often use 
in analyzing legal texts: writes Kelman, 'a technique I call 'Trashing': Take 
specific arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are 
actually foolish ([tragi]-comic); and then look for some (external observers) 
order (not the germ of truth) in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos 
we've exposed' M. Kelman, 'Trashing' 36 Stanford Law Review 293 (1984) 
(emphases, square brackets in original). In his essay, Norris refers to a 
'vulgarised account of deconstruction put about by those who wish to 
represent it as a species of feckless intellectual nihilism.' 'Law, 
Deconstruction,' supra, note 76. at 169. He has in mind literary critics with an 
opinion of deconstruction as a blank cheque for free play. Yet deconstruction 
can hardly be said to have found better employment in the hands of lawyers. 
Although Kelman makes no specific mention of it in the above essay, 
'deconstruction' has been the banner of the group of writers of whom he 
speaks 'we,' Goodrich expresses the deconstructionist adventure of the critical 
legal studies writers as follows: '[T]he various forms and expressions of 
modernism have been misunderstood by (critical) legal studies and misapplied 
to the analysis of law... [M]etaphors, images and fashionable expressions of 
mood and lifestyle have been uncritically transposed on to legal studies and 
used as therapeutic consolation for a somewhat neurotic dissatisfaction with 
the state of the legal discipline. The catchphrases of a superficial eclecticism 
can all too easily stand in the place of historical consciousness and political 
argumentation.' Reading the Law. supra. note 72. at 212. See. for an official 
account of critical legal studies, M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 
(1987). The strategy and principal themes are explored in R.M. Unger. 'The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement' 96 Harvard Law Review 561 (1983); and D. 
Kairys (ed). The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (1982). See, for 
further references, the aitical legal studies special issue, 36 Stanford Law 
Review 1 (1984); D. Kennedy and K. Klare. 'A Bibliography of Critical Legal 
Studies' 94 Yale Law Journal 461 (1984). 
80 See, S. Fish. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the 
Practice of Theory in LiJerary and Legal Studies ch. 15 (1989). Ct A. Hunt, 
'The Critique of Law' 14 Journal 0/ Law and Society 5, 18 (1987), on critical 
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legal studies and 'the challenge of elaborating a distinctive theory of law.' A 
response to Fish on the charges of theory is to be found in MJ. Perry, 'Why 
Constitutional Theory Matters to Constitutional Practice' in Legal 
Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and Practice 241 (ed. G. Leyh, 1992). 
81 'Law, Deconstruction,' supra, note 76, at 184. 
82 C! Culler on metalanguage as simply 'more language' ('a theory of repression 
involves repression'), J. Culler, Framing the Sign: Cn"ticism and its 
Institutions 139-140 (1988). Cf. Derrida, Limited Inc. supra, note 26, at 60, 
152, 150 (emphasis in original): 'Context is always, and always has been, at 
work within the place, and not only around it.' '[T]he limit of the frame or the 
border of the context always entails a clause d nonclosure.' '1be repression at 
the origin of meaning is an irreducible violence. 
83 'Law, Deconstruction,' supra, note 76. at 184. 
84 C. Norris. Paul de Man: Deconstruction and the CritilJue of Aesthetic 
Ideology (1988); C. Norris, Derrida (1987). 
85 P. de Man, Allegories of Reading 131 (1979) (the 'text' emphasized in 
originaO. 
86 'Law, Deconstruction,' supra, note 76. at 184. 
87 Id. 
88 See, 2.4, the text accompanying notes 170-177. 
89 P. de Man, 'The Resistance to Theory' 63 Yale French Studies 3 (1983). 
90 P. Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies In Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal 
Analysis 206 (1987). 
91 'Law, Deconstruction,' supra, note 76, at 177. 
92 'Resistance,' supra, note 89, at 5. 
93 'I reserve that word for an abstract or algorithmic formulation that guides or 
governs practice from a position outside any particular conception of practice. 
A theory, in short, is something a practitioner consults when he wishes to 
perform correctly, with the term 'correctly' here understood as meaning 
independently of his preconceptions, biases. or personal preferences ... When I 
assert the lack of a relationship between theory and practice I refer to the kind 
of relationship (of precedence and priority) implied by the strongest notion of 
theory; the relationships that do exist between theory and practice (and there 
are many) are no different from the relationships between any form of talk and 
the practice of which it is a component.' Doing What Comes Naturally, supra, 
note 80, at 378. 
94 Cf, 'Resistance,' supra, note 89, at 11: 'Those who reproach literary theory for 
being oblivious to social and historical (that is to say ideological) reality are 
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merely stating their fear at having their own ideological mystifications 
exposed by the tool they are trying to discredit. They are, in short, very poor 
readers of Marx's German Ideology.' 
95 Id. at 19. 
96 Id. (emphasis in original). 
97 See, 2.2, the text accompanying note 37. 
98 'Law, Deconstruction,' supra, note 76, at 183. 
99 J. Habermas, 'Modernity - An Incomplete Project' [1980] in Postmodern 
Culture 14 (ed. H. Foster, transl. S. Ben-Habib, 1989). See, for an assessment 
of Derrida's work, J. Habennas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
lee. 7 (transl. F. Lawrence, 1990). In an endnote to a letter to G. Graff, 
Derrida cites Habermas' evaluation as an instance of the obvious lack of the 
'ethics of discussion,' - a 'nonreading.' In an entire chapter (one of the two) 
devoted to his ideas texts by Derrida are not once consulted (Habermas uses 
second-hand accounts by J. Culler and others). J. Derrida, Limited Inc. 156-
157 (1990). See, for Fish on Habermas, 'a thinker whose widespread influence 
is testimony to the durability of the tradition that began (at least) with Plato,' 
Doing What Comes Naturally, supra. note 80, at 450-457,498-499. 
100 Derrida. supra. note 84, at 169. 
101 Id. (emphasis in original). 
102 See, Framing the Sign, supra, note 82, at 185-200. 
103 See, supra, note 99. 
104 Framing the Sign, supra, note 82, at 190 (footnote omitted). 
105 'Modernity - An Incomplete Project,' supra, note 99. 
106 See, for two distinct approaches to the Marxist concept of ideology, one as 
false consciousness, a notion which makes the very rhetoric of Marxism 
ultimately self-repudiating, M. Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology 
(1977); and one, from a more orthodox perspective, as a concept with two 
coherent, mutually complementary aspects, as false representation, 
rationalization, and at once as a device that is capable of genuine criticism, J. 
Larrain, Marxism and Ideology (1984). A concise account of the 
contemporary theories of ideology, Marxist and otherwise, is to be found in H. 
Williams, Concepts of Ideology (1988). 
107 V. Kerruish, Jurisprudence as Ideology 22 (1991). Cf. Kerruish on 'rights 
fetishism,' infra, note 113. 
108 Legal Discourse, supra. note 90, at 208. Cf. D.M. Trubek, 'Where the Action 
Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism' 36 Stanford Law Review 575, 597 
(1984): '[C]ritical studies research seeks to discover the false but legitimating 
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world views hidden in complex bodies of rules and doctrines and in legal 
consciousness in general.' 
109 Legal Discourse. supra. note 90. at 208. 
110 G. Lukacs. History and Class Consciousness 50 (transl. R. Livingstone. 1971); 
see. for the text. infra. note 112. Engels' letter (to Mehring) goes. 'ideology is 
a process which is indeed accomplished consciously by the so-called thinker. 
but it is the wrong kind of consciousness.' Cited in Marxism and Ideology, 
supra, note 106. at 103. 
111 K. Marx and F. Engels. Selected Works 181 (1970). Cf, K. Marx and F. 
EIlgels. TM German Ideology 42 (eel. S. Ryazanskaya. transl. W. Lough. 
1965): 'Consciousness is. therefore. from the very beginning a social product, 
and remains so as long as men exist at all.' 
112 'It is true that the conscious reflexes of the different stages of economic 
growth remain historical facts of great importance; it is true that while 
dialectical materialism is itself the product of this process, it does not deny 
that men perfonn their historical deeds themselves and they do so consciously. 
But as Engels emphasizes in a letter to Mehring. this consciousness is false. 
However. the dialectical method does not permit us simply to proclaim the 
'falseness' of this consciousness and to persist in an inflexible confrontation of 
true and false. On the contrary. it requires us to investigate this 'false 
consciousness' concretely as an aspect of the historical totality and as a stage 
in the historical process.' History and Class, supra. note 110. at 49-50 
(footnote omitted). CJ on the problematic exemption, by dialectical 
materialism. of itself from the consequences of its own relativist rhetoric. K. 
Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia 66 (1972). 
113 See. for the hegemonic consciousness as a second theoretical consciousness. 
A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks 333 (ed. and transl. Q. 
Hoare and G.N. Smith. 1971). See also on the function of intellectuals, id. at 5 
et seq. And see. for an account of law as constitutive consciousness. and the 
'relative autonomy' of legal system. Guide to Critical Studies, supra. note 79. 
at 243-263. See also. R. Gordon. 'Critical Legal Histories' 36 Stanford lAw 
Review 57 (1984); and D. Kennedy. The Role of Law in Economic Thought: 
Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities' 34 American University lAw Review 
939 (1985). Kennedy makes the sociologism of Marx's concept of commodity 
fetishism a notion that is specifically capitalist and therefore irrelevant to 
fonnations within the meaning of pre-capitalist or advanced-capitalist 
societies. Hirst, on the other hand, who regards the concept as paradigmatic of 
Marx's thought as a whole contrasts it with the Althusserean epistemology 
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(see. for the Althusserean epistemology, the text accompanying, infra, notes 
114 et seq.) Through a dichotomy of science and ideology, accordingly, 
A1thusser seeks to transcend the mimetic ineluctability invoked in the concept 
of commodity fetishism. P. Hirst, On Law and Ideology 10 (1979). The idea 
of critical autonomy, explains Hirst, invites whole-sale approaches, as 
opposed to a heterogenous notion of social relations. And there lies the 
fundamental weakness of contemporary Marxist theory. It becomes 
incompetent to grasp new fonnations within society and fails to address 
pressing political problems. Hirst designates Marxism as a 'means of 
calculation,' rather' than an epistemological device that somehow survives the 
relativism it preaches. Marxism as a means of calculation at a specific instance 
is 'conditioned and limited by [that which it] construct[s] in calculation' (id. at 
3). This. however. Hirst points out, by no means amounts to a nihilistic 
sterility. 'Nietzsche long ago showed that the effect of the decomposition of 
absolutes (or rather the fictional substitutes for them, for such there cannot be) 
is not nihilism. The recognition that everything is permissible was for him the 
foundation of a new sort of morality' (id. at 11-12). (Cf nihilism as de-
presencing and re-presencing. the text accompanying. supra. notes 42 et seq.) 
And finally. an interesting solution is introduced in Kerruish's concept of 
'rights fetishism.' Jurisprudence as Ideology. supra, note 107. Rights 
fetishism. a concept inspired by Marx's commodity fetishism. according to 
Kerruish. is law's defining characteristic. Just as commodity is thought 
independently of the relations in which it really acquires its significance in 
industrial society. rights in jurisprudence assume a false autonomy once the 
dynamics through which they become possible are ignored. Rights fetishism 
opposes the individual (the private) to the society (the public), and posits law 
as a system of norms to reconcile the two. It is formed, writes Kerruish, 'by 
legal practices ... But jurisprudence justifies legal practices in terms of values 
constructed by legal practices' (id. at 6). (Cj. Kerruish on the 'neutral' and 
'negative' senses of ideology. the text accompanying, supra. note 107.) In the 
term 'legal practices' she accommodates two distinct positions without 
committing herself to either; it signifies neither Kennedy's relatively 
autonomous law nor Hirst's ineluctable, dictating practice. 'Legal practices' is 
a concept that tells more about the deadlock that is the contemporary Marxist 
theory than about jurisprudence. 
114 '[E]very state is ethical,' writes Gramsci, 'in as much as one of its most 
important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular 
cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs 
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the productive forces for development. and hence to the interests of the ruling 
classes. The school as a positive educative function. and the courts as a 
repressive and negative educative function. are the most important State 
activities in this sense: but. in reality. a multitude of other so-called private 
initiatives and activities tend to the same end - initiatives and activities 
which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling 
classes.' Prison Notebooks. supra. note 113. at 258. An elaboration of the 
Gramscian concept of ideology as reproduction is pursued by Althusser in his 
'ideological State apparatuses: the conceptual means responsible for 'the 
repoductiOll of the conditions of poduction.. L. Althusser. Essays on 
Ideology 1 et seiJ. (1984). 'Who bas rmJIy attempted to follow up the 
explorations of Marx and Engels?' asks Althusser in For Marx 114 (B. 
Brewster. 1969). 'I can only think of Gramsci.' Lukacs. Althusser points out in 
a footnote. is to be omitted on account of 'a guilty Hegelianism' which 
contaminates his attempts (itt). An articulate theory of the State along the 
Gramscian-Althusserean lines is to be found in N. Poulantzas, Political Power 
and Social Classes (1973) Cideology has the precise function of hiding the 
real contradictions and of reconstituting on an imaginary level a relatively 
coherent discourse which serves as the horizon of agents' experience,' at 207). 
And see, for a fine study of Althusser's work, S.B. Smith. Reading Althusser: 
An Essay on Structural Marxism (1984). 
115 The idea of the inevitability of the so-called bias stands uncomfortably with 
the idea of falsehood. Cj. '[L]anguage. typically. is immersed in the ongoing 
life of a society. as the practical consciousness of that society. This 
consciousness is inevitably a partial and false consciousness. We can call it 
ideology. defining 'ideology as a systematic body of ideas. organized from a 
particular point of view. Ideology is thus a subsuming category which 
includes sciences and metaphysics. as well as political ideologies of various 
kinds, without implying anything about their status and reliability as guides to 
reality.' G. Kress and R. Hodge, Language as Ideology 6 (1981). 
116 Essays on Ideology. supra. note 114. at 9. 
117 Id at 39. 
118 Id. at 33-34. 
119 Althusser calls the vulgar version of positivism simply the 'positivist 
conception' of history, a history without ideology or philosophy ('the end of 
all philosophy'). And the latter he terms the 'individualist-humanist conception 
(the subjects of history are 'real, concrete man').' For Marx, supra, note 114, at 
36-37. And see, on humanism as 'the philosophical (theoretical) myth of man,' 
id. at 229. 
120 Essays on Ideology, supra. note 114, at 35. 
121 Id. at 33. 
122 Id. at 32. 
123 Id. at 35 
124 Id. at 45. 
125 Id. at 35 (emphasis in original). 
126 For Marx, supra, note 114. at 34-36. 
127 Id. at 34. 
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128 Id. at 167-168. The difference from the standard Marxean concept of critical 
reflection is dramatic. In The German Ideology, supra. note 111. at 50. 'not 
criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of 
philosophy and all other types of theory.' Marx contrasts one's attachments 
with the notion of one's 'self-consciousness.' According to him, 'the real 
intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real 
connections' (id. at 49). In this respect Marx is closer to Fish than Althusser. 
See. for a fine study which explores Marx's work from this particular point of 
view, D. Rubinstein, Marx and Wittgenstein: Social Praxis and Social 
Explanation (1981). 
129 Cf For Marx, supra, note 114, at 63, 127. 
130 See, particularly. P. Goodrich, 'Simulation and the Semiotics of Law' 2 
Textual Practice 180, 183 (1988). 
131 See, the text accompanying, supra, note 78. 
132 M. P&heux, Language, Semantics and Ideology: Stating the Obvious (transl. 
H. Nagpal, 1982). 
133 Languages of Law, supra, note 75, at 153 (emphasis in original); see, for the 
'contract,' the text accompanying, infra, notes 163-167. 
134 Cf the text accompanying, supra, note 105. Cf also Lyotard on the dichotomy 
between classicism and modernity, 1.1. 
135 Languages of Law, supra, note 75, at 296 (emphasis added, footnote -
referring to Nietzsche - omitted). 
136 Id. at 210. 
137 Id. at 16, 70. 
138 M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences xi 
(1989). 
139 S. Freud, The Unconscious' [1915] in his Collected Papers Vol. 4, at 98, 101 
(transl. J. Riviere et al., 1956). Cf Wittgenstein's reservations of the Freudean 
project for the dichotomy Freud consistently assumes between discovering and 
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inventing ('he cheats the patient') in L. Wittgenstein, Lectures and 
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief 24, 27-29, 42-
48, 52 (ed. C. Barrett, 1987). Fish reads psychoanalysis in this vein in Doing 
What Comes Naturally, supra, note 80, ch. 22. 
140 [d. at 104. Cf J. Kristeva, 'Psychoanalysis and the Polis,' transl. M. Waller, 9 
Critical Inquiry 77, 80 (1982): 'Two great intellectual ventures of our time, 
those of Marx and Freud, have broken through the hermeneutic tautology to 
make of it a revolution in one instance and, in the other, a cure. We must 
recognize that all contemporary political thought which does not deal with 
technocratic administration - although technocratic purity is perhaps only a 
dream - uses interpretation in Marx's and Freud's sense: as transformation 
and as cure' (emphasis in original). 
141 Supra, note 124. 
142 Languages of Law, supra, note 75, at 50-52. Cj. Uewellyn on the dichotomy 
between the common law and the German juristic traditions, 2.4, the text 
accompanying note 98. 
143 [d. at 51. 
144 Cf 1.2; 2.1, the text accompanying notes 54-63; 2.4, the text accompanying 
note 147; the text accompanying, supra, notes 50-51; and, supra, note 5. 
145 Languages of Law, supra, note 75, at 50. 
146 [d. at 52. 
147 A. Hamilton in J. Madison et al., The Federalist Papers No. I, at 88 (ed. I. 
Kramnick, 1987). Cf. Feyerabend on science 'run by slaves, slaves of 
institutions,' as opposed to science 'run by free agents,' P. Feyerabend, 'How to 
Defend Society Against Science' in Scientific Revolutions 156, 165 (ed. I. 
Hacking, 1987). See also by Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an 
Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (1975), and Science in a Free Society 
(1978). (Cf Kuhn on choice in science, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, supra, note 39; see also, the present study, 2.4, note 140.) 
Institutionalism in education and medicine is condemned in the essays by I. 
Illich, Deschooling Society (1971), and Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation 
of Health (1975). An archetypal attack on institutionalism in humanities is 
E.W. Said, 'Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies and Community' in 
Postmodern Culture 135 (ed. H. Foster, 1989). Cj. Fish on the anti-
institutionalist - anti-professionalist - discourse, Doing What· Comes 
Naturally, supra, note 33, esp. cbs. 8,10 and 11. 
148 Legal Discourse, supra, note 90. at 51. Cf supra notes 94 and 128. 
149 Supra, note 98. 
150 Supra, note 99. 
151 Legal Discourse, supra, note 90, at 52, 78. 
152 Id. at 78. 
153 Id. 
154 Supra, note 78. 
155 Legal Discourse, supra, note 90. at 78. 
156 See. supra. note 21. 
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157 M. Heidegger. Identity and Difference, supra. note 68. at 36. Cf. Derrida. 
Limited Inc, supra. note 26. at 102: 'Iterability is precisely that which - once 
its consequences have been unfolded - can no longer be dominated by the 
opposition nature/convention. It dislocates. subverts. and constantly displaces 
the dividing-line between the two terms.' 
158 See, 2.4, the text accompanying notes 210 et seq. 
159 Legal Discourse. supra. note 90. at 79. 
160 Languages of Law. supra. note 75. at 3. 
161 In a response to Goodrich's criticism of his work for being textualist (see. 2.1. 
note 134; and supra, note 33), Jackson correctly observes: 'It is Goodrich's 
own approach - which privileges the discovery of rhetorical tropes within 
legal texts, and pays only lip-service to the need to study the social conditions 
of the production of these texts (other than through a quasi-traditional 
histOriography) - which comes closer to privileging the text.' B.S. Jackson, 
Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence 178 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
162 Legal Discourse, supra, note 90, at 206. Cf J. Derrida. 0fGrammatology 158 
(trans 1. G.C. Spivak, 1976). 
163 Languages of Law, supra, note 75, at 149-150. 
164 Id. at 149. 
165 See, for Lacan's reading of E.A. Poe's short story 'The Purloined Letter' as a 
metaphor for psychoanalytic disclosure. J. Lacan. 'Seminar on 'The Purloined 
Letter," transl. J. Mehlman, 48 Yale French Studies 38 (1972). Derrida's 
reading of Lacan which deconstructs the presumed dichotomy of disclosure 
and concealment, of discovering and inventing ('Psychoanalysis. supposedly. 
is found'), is in J. Derrida. 'Le facteur de la verite' in his The Postcard: From 
Socrates to Freud and Beyond 413 (transl. A. Bass. 1987). The Derridean 
mode of disclosure (which emerges in the dissolution of the distinction 
between disclosure and concealment> is in tum questioned in B. Johnson, 'The 
Frame of Reference: Poe. Lacan. Derrida' in Psychoanalysis and the Question 
of the Text 149 (ed. G. Hartman. 1978). 
166 Languages of Law, supra. note 75. at 149-150. 
167 See, 2.4, the text accompanying notes 6-16 and 217. 
168 See, 2.4, note 194. 
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169 Cf, C. Butler, Interpretation, Deconstruction, and Ideology 47 (1984): '[The] 
hostility to the mimetic function of literature as traditionally conceived, sterns 
largely from the Derridan redevelopment of Saussure - the conception of the 
text as a 'play' amongst 'differences' within language, rather than as reflecting 
reality.' 
170 See, the text accompanying, supra, note 69. 
171 J. Derrida. 'Sending: On Representation.' transl. P. Caws and M.A. Caws. 49 
Social Resetuch 294. 304 (1982). 
172 Id. at 311. Cf, J. Denida. Speech and PIrenome1ul 45 (transl. D.B. Allison. 
1989): ' .. .perception does not exist or... what is called perception is not 
primordial... somehow everything 'begins' by 're-presentation' (a proposition 
which can only be maintained by the elimination of these last two concepts: it 
means that there is no 'beginning' and that the 're-presentation' we were talking 
about is not the modification of a 're-' that has befallen a primordial 
presentation)' (emphasis in original). 
173 See, 2.2, the text accompanying notes 1-10. 
174 Languages of Law, supra, note 75, at 284. 
175 Grammatology, supra. note 162. at 159. 
176 Cf, Heidegger on the Pannenidean 'sameness' of being and seeing, 1.3, the text 
accompanying notes 31-33. 
177 See, 2.2, the text accompanying notes 11-18. 
178 Method. supra, note 27. par. 57. n. 135; cf. the present study, 2.1, the text 
accompanying note 59. 
179 J.F. Lyotard and J.L Thebaud, Just Gaming 31-40 (1985); cf. the present 
study, 1.2. 
180 See, K.N. Uewellyn and E.A. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case 
Law in Primitive Jurisprudence 311-312 (1967); cf. the present study, 2.4, the 
text accompanying notes 95-100; and see, for Goodrich, the text 
accompanying, supra, notes 133 and 143. 
181 S. Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988). 
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